Historical Transformations

The Anthropology of Global Systems

KAJSA EKHOLM FRIEDMAN AND JONATHAN FRIEDMAN

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Introduction

The chapters in this volume represent the work of two decades of research into questions of the global. In a previous publication (Friedman 1994:1) the trials and tribulations of the establishment of a global systemic anthropology are detailed. They are the outcome of an engagement that has permeated our lives, one in which anthropology is not so much a career as a calling. This is partly the result of living in an era in which intellectuals thought that they could get by, one in which demands on standards of living were at a minimum since life was relatively easy. Such *is* life at the end of empire, for the middle classes, at least. Our own orientations in the world were very much developed in a matrix in which we believed that the structures of social life could be altered in their very foundations. And such beliefs must be understood in a global view, one characterized by the cultural lag of declining empires, when mobility is high, consumption is accelerating, and the future is just around the bend. Today, when, for many, catastrophe is just around the bend, a clearer historical perspective becomes evident. However one may be engaged in changing the world, it is now obvious that the world is both Kafkaesque and obstinately self-directed. Not only is it not easily susceptible to revolution, but revolution has itself been part of the fantasy, the virtual reality, of systemic continuity.

The project of a global anthropology had its beginnings in the 1970s. It began as a confrontation in the field between the assumed nature of society as a closed entity that can be studied and understood in its own right and a global reality that simply falsified that assumption. While the assumption of social closure was taken for granted in anthropology and reinforced very much by the fieldwork tradition itself, the stringent definitions of structuralist Marxism made it easier to see exactly what was wrong. This is because of the concept of social reproduction that serves as the framework of analysis, rather than institutional arrangements or cultural meanings. The former insists on understanding social form as constituted by socially organized processes of production, distribution, and consumption, the basic framework by which a population reproduces itself over time. Social reproduction is a process of constitution and reconstitution of social form over time, and in the particular approach that we advocated at that time, the more static aspects of "Structural Marxism"[1] and more orthodox materialist models were eliminated. The only acceptable account of the existence of a particular social form was to be found in the way it came into being historically. The concept of reproduction, thus, implies both systematicity and historical transformation. There was no interest in reducing social form and cultural structures to material conditions, whether they are organizations of production, technologies, ecological adaptations, or levels of population density. The positive, intentional organization of social reproduction was conceived as a social and, by implication, cultural phenomenon. The so-called material determinants of the reproductive process ? were interpreted as constraints on and potential contradictions to the dominant strategies of social life rather than positive determinants in the sense of having any causal/organizational effect. On the contrary, many of the constraints at any historical moment were conceived largely as the product of the historical operation of the social system itself.

The assumption, however incorrect it may appear today, was that a circumscribed population could be treated as a self-reproducing whole. The inheritance of the concept of society in Marxist anthropology was due, as indicated here and in Friedman (1976) to the general assumptions of social science at the time. Kajsa Ekholm Friedman discovered this flaw in the midst of fieldwork in Madagascar in 1973. The societies that she had chosen to study could not be understood as historically self-reproducing entities. They could be understood only in terms of the long-term historical articulation of the local social world with the larger Indian Ocean economy and with the politics of the French, British, and Arabs in the Indian Ocean arena. On returning home she wrote several articles, one of which was finally published in a gratuitously doctored version by Stanley Diamond in *Dialectical Anthropology* (Ekholm 1980), seven years after it was first submitted for publication in *Current Anthropology*. This article discusses the geographical discontinuity of evolutionary trajectories in terms of processes of expansion and contraction in global systems. We have saved the reviews of the submitted article as relics. They are quite revealing of the reigning assumptions of the decade. From positions as varied as standard structural functionalism and neo-evolutionism to Maoism, the criticism was identical in one respect. The idea that something larger than society might account in any way for the constitution of that society was simply absurd.

The idea that sociocultural evolution could be accounted for by anything other than local technological or demographic factors was simply dismissed. And the Maoists, faithful to a certain evolutionary and materialist orthodoxy, called it all a case of "circulationism"—the demented idea that external exchange might have something to do with social dynamics and transformation. This was a term aimed at famous renegades such as A. G. Frank and, later, at I. Wallerstein by the more orthodox Marxists.

In these difficult times, we made excellent contact with some ancient historians and archaeologists with whom we worked together for a number of years. And something global was clearly in the air, since Wallerstein published the first volume of *The Modern World System* in 1974, and in New York a kind of world-system-oriented anthropology grew up around Eric Wolf, referred to as the political economy approach. It should also be noted that this was occurring during the decline of Marxism in Europe and that the global approach contributed significantly to the internal criticism which led to a dispersal of structural Marxists into the renaissance of culturalism, symbolic analysis, postmodernism, and the like.

The early years of cooperation led to a number of publications which lay outside the mainstream of anthropology and were discussed more among archaeologists, historians and ancient historians, and eventually even some sociologists and political scientists associated with the newly established world system approach (Ekholm and Friedman 1979). By the mid-1980s we were doing other things, including long-term fieldwork in Africa and Oceania, and lost track of world systemic archaeology, which was developing rapidly on both sides of the Atlantic. The global systemic framework remained central, however, to our work in this period insofar as it informed our ethnographic strategies. The study of the relation between cultural identity and global process led to extensive research on the rise of the "fourth world"[2] and more specifically to the study of the emergence of the Hawaiian cultural movement from the 1970s until today. This further developed into a number of studies of ethnification in Europe and Africa and has today led to our recent work on immigration and the transformation of the nation-state in the context of larger global processes.

GLOBALIZATION

Since the mid-1980s a different kind of approach has emerged in anthropology and some related disciplines. It is part of the development of cultural studies and especially of postcolonial studies. The two are, of course, related and have emerged more as tendencies in other disciplines than as disciplines in themselves. The names of Robertson (1992), Appadurai (1996), and Hannerz (1996) are associated with this approach, although there are significant differences among the latter two. For these particular researchers, although to a lesser degree for Robertson, the field of globalization is a cultural field. It is generally assumed that globalization is a new phenomenon in history, and it is usually seen in evolutionary terms. Much of the approach is part of a larger focus of interest in fields from economics and geography to literature. From "global reach" to the "global village" (the return of), it has often been stated that we are entering a new world. The latter is one place, there is a world culture, and people, information, money, and technology all flow around the world in a rather chaotic set of disjunctive circuits that somehow bring us all together. There are several essential differences between the globalization and the global systemic approach. First, in the global systems approach, the global refers to the total social arena within which social life is reproduced, and the global systemic refers to the properties of the complex cycles of global social reproduction, the way in which they constitute local institutional forms, identities, and economic and political cycles of expansion and contraction. The local is always part of the global in this framework, but this does not mean that the local is produced by the global. On the contrary, the global is not something *other* than the local, i.e., *on a higher plane.* The global is the properties of the systemic processes that connect the world's localities, and this includes their formation as more or less bounded places. There is no global space floating above the local. The global is in empirical terms the arena of interaction among localities. The global systemic refers to the logic or logics of such interactions, that is, the processes that emerge from such interactions. Globalization is a phenomenon that occurs *within* already existent global systems (Friedman 1994), and it may even, in the right conditions, give rise to a consciousness of the global that did not exist previously. In this approach the global is not new, nor is globalization. The global is at least as old as commercial civilizations, and in more general structural terms, it is as old as human social organization. We try to demonstrate that the isolated "tribes" of anthropological mythology are not leftovers from the Paleolithic, but historical outcomes of larger articulations. This argument (Ekholm and Friedman 1980) has been increasingly vindicated by both historical anthropological and archaeological studies (Wilmsen 1989; Gordon 1992; Kristiansen and Rowlands 1988; Spriggs 1986, 1995, 1996). This is not the same kind of argument as that of the globalization approach. The latter is, in our terms, empiricist and behavioral. It is about contact, movement of people, and things that remain in awareness, about diaspora formation, about global Internet communication and CNN. It is about things that are strikingly apparent, not about the underlying structures that make them apparent. There is a vast difference in such terms between the work of Saskia

Sassen or David Harvey and the work of the globalization school. Sassen suggests a model of global transformation in which the globalization of capital plays a central role. Harvey provides a model of the globalization of capital that includes as instrumental the technological increases in speed that lead to "time-space" compression. These are not about the emergence of the global but about its transformation.

Even in terms of migration and global consciousness we are not necessarily in a brave new world. Migration in percentage terms was equal or greater at the turn of the twentieth century, and global and multicultural consciousness has periodically become a central issue in the West, not least in the period of mass immigration to the United States, when concepts of cultural pluralism and transnationalism were employed in debates (Kallen and Chapman 1956; Bourne 1916). But if we look more closely at history, we find similar forms of consciousness in the Hellenistic world and Rome, when cosmopolitanism and localism were also common and where problems of immigration and multiethnicity were significant issues.

It was a pleasant surprise for us to find, some years ago, that a group of illustrious researchers in political science, economics, sociology, and history had joined in the development of a science of world historical systems. This group, the world historical systems group of the International Studies Association, has published a number of volumes and has made a concerted effort to establish cooperation among several disciplines (Frank and Gills 1993; Denemark et al. 2000).

Global systemic anthropology is about the history of the human species, the forms of its social life and culture, understood in terms of the structures of social reproduction that have guided its trajectories. This framework encompasses the study of cultural forms, of symbolic structures of ritual practices of everyday strategies of life. It does not aim to replace them, but to contextualize them. It is this that allows a transdisciplinarity that reaches out to all subjects that deal with one or another aspect of the human condition.

ETHNOGRAPHY AND THE GLOBAL SYSTEM

The array of approaches to the global life of the species includes both the analysis of political economic structures and processes and the phenomenology of everyday life. It is in its foundation existential but understands that the conditions of human life are bound up with processes that are profoundly nonhuman and even inhuman. The concept of culture in this endeavor lies somewhere in between. It lies in the specificities of human existence, in the different products that are generated by different lives. But it is nowhere the central problem for an anthropology that never heeded the powerful critique proffered by Radin against the false abstractions that became the common fare of much of ethnography (Radin 1987). The cultural anthropology that takes rituals as texts, that focuses on cultural products rather than lived existences, is a field that has lost contact with human existence. It becomes a collector's science—texts, objects, commodities, symbols, meanings that take on a "superorganic" existence, a reified reality that has become the tangible object of much anthropology. Much of the cultural globalization discourse is based on such assumptions, which lead to a truly impoverished understanding of human life. Culture flows, mixes, hybridizes, and does things that it didn't do when it was more bounded in an imaginary past, when the cultural mosaic still existed, when culture was in its proper places. That all of these concepts are related to the way people in the relations of power in their social lives bind, unbind, fix, disintegrate, and move meanings is eliminated and replaced by a magical quality of culture as a dynamic substance in its own right, culture as subject. This is no mere error in anthropological thinking. It is a pervasive reality of anthropological practice, of a world of assumptions concerning the nature of the social world itself. The culture concept as a set of discrete and relative texts is central to the entire construction of the discipline. Radin's critique is not only a timely corrective. It is an expression of that which was marginalized in the very foundation of the subject, the notion that anthropology was about lived existence rather than its more tangible products. All those aspects of life that have been reduced to culture harbor the risk of taking the life out of anthropology. It is, of course, true that cultural things are much easier to study than life itself, the life within which such *cultural things* take on existential meaning, but this challenge remains central to any self-respecting anthropology.

This is not, of course, meant as a characterization of all of anthropology. On the contrary, there have always been examples of attempts and even systematic programs that have focused on the concrete forms of social existence. These are characteristic of all the more phenomenologically oriented approaches in the field as well as those that have delved into the nature of sociality. They range from recent developments in cognitive anthropology (Strauss and Quinn et al. 1997), to the work of anthropologists such as Kapferer (1999), Csordas (1994), and many others. Even Geertz (1973) sometimes grappled with such problems in discussing the varying nature of personhood, but he most often fell back on the textual models that turned his insights into cultural objects. In the work of Lévi-Strauss, usually relegated to the worst kind of objectivism and anti-humanism, there is an important paradox that leads in quite another direction. The latter was, of course, perfectly conversant with the problem of the relation between the lived and the structural, which he understood as different aspects of a single reality. The most interesting example of this kind of analysis can be found, strangely enough, in that most maligned and celebrated *La Pensée Sauvage*, and specifically in his discussion of the "totemic operator," the combinatorial structure that he used to analyze the relation between the concrete categories of the social cosmology and the identification of the person. The model is one that begins with a series of totemic species and then breaks them into subgroups followed by a further breakdown into body parts. As one descends from the cosmic species toward the individual, the different parts and subgroups are recombined to finally coalesce in the formation of an individual identity. This is a logic that can account for the specific individuality of the person as well as the fact that he or she is entirely a manifestation of the larger group. The characteristics of the individual's life, his personality, his exploits, his physical appearance, can be rendered meaningful with respect to the more encompassing categories of the group. While this is certainly not a phenomenological analysis, it is an attempt to gain purchase on a structure that organizes the specificity of a concrete social existence. For Lévi-Strauss, structure is never to be understood as an abstract reality but as the organization of the properties of concrete lived reality, which is always the fundamental object of understanding:

> Si nous affirmons que le schème conceptuel commande et définit les pratiques, c'est que celles-ci, objet d'étude de l'ethnologue sous forme de réalités discrètes, localisées dans le temps et dans l'espace et distinctives de genres de vie et de formes de civilisations ne se confendent pas avec la *praxis* qui—sur ce point au moins nous sommes d'accord avec Sartre—constitue pour les sciences de l'homme la totalité fondamentale. (Lévi-Strauss 1962:173)

Ethnography in the global context is not simply a question of expanding the horizons of the anthropological gaze. It requires, from our point of view, a reorientation that in itself has nothing to do with the global but with the general perspective of field research. This is particularly important because there is a tendency that we noted for globalizing anthropology to distance itself increasingly from the question of social existence and to transform the field into a collector's art—local, global, and hybrid objects, defined and interpreted entirely by the observer. In one sense, then, ethnography of the global need not imply increasing complexity of perspective. If the global is not a place but merely a set of properties that inform the local, then nothing in the fieldwork situation need change other than the perspective on what we are looking at and the need to understand that world processes work through a number of places simultaneously. But this has always been the case insofar as social life has always been globally enmeshed. Multi-sited ethnography should have always been part of ethnography because the world has always been organized in global/local articulations. The current infatuation with going beyond borders and with assuming that today's world challenges such borders because everyone is on the move is a middle-class mirage, an interesting object of analysis in its own right. If only 1.7 percent of the population of the world is on the move (internationally) today, then we have reason to suspect that the globalizing visions are based exclusively on the experiences of the academics and other movers who so identify. This does not mean as it might for globalizers that the large majority of the world is not part of a larger systemic reality. On the contrary, we have insisted on the way the local has always been produced in ~~local-~~regional-global articulations.

The challenge for the kind of global systemic anthropology that we have struggled to develop is precisely in the combination of the analysis of the structural properties of the global and the local, all of which are embedded in a deeper understanding of people's lives, of their conflicts, their joys, and their pains. The cultural in this approach can be understood to either include *both* the existential *and* the objectified products of life processes insofar as specific properties of life forms, or to limit the use of the cultural to the objectified as opposed to the lived-experiential. The understanding of witchcraft in the Congo, as personal disintegration and the loss of control over the components of the self, is comprehensible only in terms of the specificity of Congolese constitutions of personal experience. A fuller understanding of this experience requires that we look at the way it became what it was or is as well as the conditions, local, regional, and global, that orchestrate its appearance. The formation of Hawaiian endosociality (backs to the world and facing inward) can be understood in historical transformational terms, but it is still a form of sociality whose ramifications cannot be represented as a set of rules, principles, or other forms of objectified culture. It is a way of being in the world that conditions the generation of local cultural products and objectifications.

This collection explores the development of a global systemic anthropology. It begins with the emergence of the idea itself, how it arose and the way it developed. It explores the way in which it evolved in cooperation with historical disciplines, the way it found its way into the interpretation of cultural practices, practices of representation and discursive forms. In the companion volume, *Modernities, Class, and the Contradictions of Globalization*, but also in part here, we argue for the relevance of the approach in understanding the contemporary world, its identity politics and articulations between local and global processes, and relations between historical continuities and discontinuities, understood in ethnographic terms. It is even, we suggest, relevant to an understanding of the current flurry of globalization discourses.

GLOBAL SYSTEM VERSUS GLOBALIZATION

The global systemic is not a theoretical concept as such, but a perspective or framework of understanding that has always been potentially available in the civilization that we inhabit. It does not always appear obvious, however, as the early reception of this research demonstrates. The notion that society was not an adequate unit of analysis because it was reproduced within a larger regional system was met with more than mere skepticism. On the left it was seen as a renegade attempt to deny the importance of class struggle. For liberal social scientists it was a jolt to a comfortable position that had been taken for granted. In both cases, the systemic nature of the argument was seen as dangerous. Society was the unit of analysis; it was a unit under control, easy to insert into, and reinforced by the fieldwork paradigm. In the early years of the 1970s we made two kinds of arguments in favor of the global. The first was that local social forms were constituted in larger historical-geographical processes. The second was that such forms were only reproduced within such larger processes. This was not an argument that there was a global sphere above the local, but that the relations between localities were systemic and that they were also constitutive of particular local forms. This is a structuralist argument. In elementary kinship terms it states that a local lineage structure is constituted by a larger framework of movement and identification of people, that is, that a patriline is a product of an alliance structure in which women are transferred out of their own groups to produce members of another group in a long-term process that produces lines of men and children using imported women (Dumont 1966). The global is always about interlocal relations, not about a supralocal organism. The latter is an abstraction, the structural properties of such relations. Any global approach that assumes that the global is an empirical field in its own right is a victim of misplaced concreteness. And yet this is precisely the nature of much of the globalization literature. The notion that the global is somehow postnational or transnational is precisely this kind of error. It is one harboring its own evolutionary bias; *once we were local but now we are global. We have gone beyond all that now*. In a global systemic approach, on the contrary, the global is not an empirical unit or space, but a set of properties of the reproduction of any locality, not just now, but always. There is an interesting parallel here with the structural functionalist versus the structuralist position. For the former, the local is primary, the descent group or even the on-the-ground resident group. Relations are then established with other such groups in a process that builds new levels of sociocultural integration (Steward 1955). There is an interesting link between structural functionalism and evolutionism here, one that in structural terms moves from simple to complex, from primary units to relations between such units, to relations between relations, and so on, until we get to the global. The common property of these understandings is that relations are links between already constituted entities, that is, entities that by definition exist previous to the larger relations. This conflates complexity with scale as if it were a mere effect of addition. The structuralist approach, on the other hand, is that larger structures always constitute smaller ones, that alliance structures generate the specific form of descent groups, or at least that descent groups are constitutive elements of larger alliance structures. This is not to say that descent can be deduced from alliance, but that alliance and descent form a single reproductive process in which the exchange relation is dominant. This is the argument at the core of Lévi-Strauss's atom of kinship. His argument against the nuclearity of Radcliffe-Brown's nuclear family was based on his argument that the group, as an exogamous unit, could reproduce itself only via a social relation to another group, thus the necessity of including the wife-giver (or husband-giver) in the elementary structure. Descent becomes salient only where exogamy is random: not repetitive, nor structured in any other way. In more general terms structuralism postulates that the relation constitutes its units which are, thus, inseparable from the relation. Rather than seeing relations as an addition of something in between units, it seeks to understand the unit as an aspect of the larger relation. Another way of understanding this is in terms of the logic of wholes and parts, expressed in Hegel, Marx, Lévi-Strauss, and Dumont. It states that the world never begins with parts that somehow come together into larger wholes. Rather the wholes, or structures, are already immanent in their parts, and the parts can have no autonomous existence. A lineage is a mere aspect of a larger structure of kinship-organized reproduction. A factory is a localization of larger processes of capital investment, labor recruitment, and the formation of a production process that can exist only because the products themselves can be realized on the market and thus converted back into the production process itself.

Just as an alliance structure does not create a new social place, global relations do not create a global place separate from lineage space, not unless a higher function is associated with such an encompassing unity, as in the formation of a chiefdom or state. The self-defined citizen of the world belongs to the world, not to an in-between place, but to the world as a whole, that is, as a single place. All notions of globalization are dependent on prior notions of bounded political units that can be transcended. The global systemic perspective is based on the hypothesis that the bounded entities are themselves generated within the larger global space within which they exist and reproduce themselves. This is *not* to say that nations and other political units are products of global subdivision, since the globe as such is not a system. Rather, political units are constituted in larger relations within the global, and the global is that structured field rather than an entity in its own right. This is the basic principle of structuralist analysis. The global does not generate the local. It is rather the field whose processes are necessary and sufficient for understanding the formation of the local. And the local is not a common global product, spread by diffusion or generated from above, as in Robertson and Appadurai. Localization may be a global process, but the local is always an articulation between a specific historical and cultural and localized set of practices and its larger field of forces and conditions of reproduction. Papua New Guinea may well be a nation-state defined in terms of globalized political institutional power that shapes conditions of naming and formalizing institutions, but PNG is organized by specific, that is, cultural structures of political practice that are very unlike those found in Western European nation-states. To call them hybrid is to misconstrue and even mystify the real relations of articulation involved. In other words, it is not a question of mixture and formation of a new product but of a field of tensions and contradictions, a combination of opposing forces rather than a cultural pea soup.

The properties or logics of global processes are what we have called global systems. They are not visible, behavioral relations but the properties of such visible forms and relations. These properties are explored in terms of notions such as expansion and contraction, the formation and demise of center periphery relations, the cyclical and dialectical relations between cultural identity and global hegemony. These systemic properties are hypotheses, theoretical models of the dynamics of global systems. They are no more visible in immediate terms than the properties of business cycles. Only their effects are visible. This ought not to appear strange or even especially sophisticated. It is the basis of any scientific approach in which the behavioral or the directly observable is what is to be explained and has no explanatory value in itself. Thus, a particular imperial organization is not a global system but the product of such a system in a particular historical situation. Its specific or cultural properties cannot be accounted for in global systemic terms, but its more general properties are deducible from those of the system (Friedman 1994).

There is indeed an apparent paradox in discussions of global versus local. An attempt to solve this problem by using words such as *glocal* is a symptom of this paradox which is an outcome of misplaced concreteness and its institutionalization in globalizing identities. The paradox exists because of the fact that at any one particular time there are peoples organized into political structures and separated by boundaries that are penetrated by transborder organizations and processes. At any one point in time the question of local versus global is a question of that which is internal as opposed to that which is external or in between. But from the global systemic point of view, both "within" and "without" are products of the bounding process itself, which is a global phenomenon, not in the sense of a process that lies outside of the local, but in the sense of a process that articulates the inside and the outside, an articulation that constitutes the inside and outside as well. The notion of glocalization (Robertson 1992:177–78), which comes from Japanese marketing discourse, concerns the globalization of the local, that is, the making of home abroad (for the Westerner) in international hotels, but is applied to phenomena such as fundamentalism that seem to have become global forms, in the same way as indigenous movements, nationalisms, and perhaps democracy. These are forms that have diffused and have become, by abstraction, globalized institutions. But aside from planned glocalization, it would pay to look more closely at the conditions under which phenomena such as fundamentalisms emerge. Christian fundamentalism, Islamic communalism, and religious revival may indeed be related within the global system as identity movements, but to account for them in terms of the globalization of a single form of activity is superficial, completely ignoring the specificities of the processes involved. Christian fundamentalism, we would argue, is structured differently and arises in different circumstances than do the new Islamic movements. If there are similarities, they are at the very general level of the emergence of identity politics and not a question of diffusion of a phenomenon that arose in one part of the world (Robertson 1992:178). The particular forms of identity politics in the world are the outcome of articulations between local lives and global processes within which those lives are lived. They are practices that develop in larger arenas of interaction and not simply packages of ideas that circulate around the world.

Because the global is embedded in real lives, although its properties may not necessarily be experienced directly in those lives, it is not another place or level of reality, but an *aspect* of social reality, and thus ethnographically accessible. There can be no ethnography of the global as such because there is no such place, because the global only exists in its local effects. The fact that ethnographic understanding of a phenomenon may require multi-sited fieldwork does not subtract from this understanding. If the global is not a new place, it is certainly a perspective on social reality. If it is not something that has suddenly occurred, it is an insight into the organization of the world. There are certainly ethnographic and institutional realities that are global, from transnational corporations and international institutions to ethnic diasporas. These are not new phenomena in world history, however, and their historical vicissitudes are central to any global systemic analysis.

One of the most salient aspects of what is often called globalization is, in fact, the intensification of localization that results from time-space compression.

The world is localized to living rooms, to television sets, to computer screens. Access to the world has not globalized anything other than access itself. And this implies the converse, that is, that globalization is really a form of radical localization. People, some people, can stay home and access all points of the globe without moving. And the movement of some people in the world has led to local concentrations of migrants from distant origins. The implosion of the urban has led to the extension of its sources beyond those regions that were common in the past. This is the basis of so-called global consciousness, not movement as such, but an informational and, even more important, awareness implosion. When one tries to assess the global a number of phenomena immediately come to mind:

- The access to the wider world that results from the development of the media
- The movement of things and people around the world at a greater velocity than ever before and at cheaper rates
- The standardization of global places under the aegis of global capital or even local adaptations to the global
- The formation of global institutions and organizations

These phenomena, which are the framework for most of the discussions of globalization, are not the result of research into this area. They are common fare because they are present in the everyday lives of those who are continuously bombarded with media images of these phenomena. One can, that is, know all this without going anywhere. And for those who circulate only among global nodes, the same images are available everywhere, and no new information need intrude on the weary global traveler unless he or she ventures further into the hinterlands of local social relations. It is here that even the state apparatus appears as something other than a glocalization, since presidents may also be vampires and bureaucracies may be clan hierarchies. National and regional identities may prove to be very different from what one would expect if they were merely glocal. The terms *creolized* or *hybridized* may spring to mind as well, but such terms obfuscate the details which are often quite structured rather than merely mixed or co-present. The offices of government may have formal Western names, but what goes on in and between the offices may be of an entirely different character than the ideal type would have us expect. This is not a mere question of "quasi-states" or corruption (Jackson 1990; Bayart 1989), but of an assimilation of the global to local strategies. It is this articulation that must be understood here. After the analysis we might want to call it syncretism, creole, hybrid, or whatever, but these terms do not say anything about the realities in question, except perhaps for us, observing and objectifying at a distance. Potlatching with sewing machines does not turn the latter into objects that are half Western and half Kwakiutl. Something else entirely is going on here, an appropriation of the foreign within a local form of sociality.

And then, finally, one must ask, whose globalization is it—globalization for whom? And whose hybridity? Can one be a cultural hybrid without knowing it? We would argue that hybridity is meaningful only as an identity term. And it is meaningful socially only if it has a social effect. If anthropologists and others, in a newfound diffusionist discourse, itself a product of the turn to roots in the global system, busy themselves with discovering where things come from and showing how they get all mixed up in particular urban places, this need not have anything to do with real social lives other than their own. If such is the case, then we are dealing instead with the identity of the collectors themselves, and here we are in a situation in which a "we" identifies "the other," a strikingly hierarchical way of going about describing the world, not unlike the colonial intellectuals who in the past also were concerned with identifying hybrids and creoles in their empires. Terms such as *hybridity* and *creolization* are products of the global gaze; they are part of the world of the observer, in the sense of the experienced world. They are ways of identifying the experience of multiplicity at a distance.

Globalization, as we stated above, is one process within global systems and depends on the prior existence of such systems. The absence of this understanding among proponents of cultural globalization is, in our approach, a fatal error that results in the array of problems that we have detailed here: the assumption of evolution from local to global, the renaissance of diffusionism, and the focus on strange combinations that become a new kind of exoticism, hybrid cultures of Coca-Cola, Dallas, and "traditional" rituals. This new self-identified diffusionism has a clear ideological component, cosmopolitanism. "Diffusionism, whatever its defects and in whatever guise, has at least the virtue of allowing everyone the possibility of exposure to a world larger than their current locale" (Appadurai 1988:39).

Diffusion, no matter what its virtues, is not so much a theory as a preoccupation with the geneaology of objects rather than their integration into the social context in which they are *located*. Even the archaeologist Gordon Childe, writing decades ago, understood that diffusion was embedded in larger systems of exchange. And American cultural anthropology has always been concerned to stress that culture is not about the origins of cultural elements but of their structuration into larger schemes of life. It is significant that it is precisely this tendency to practice coherence and structuration of local life that is questioned by these new diffusionists (Hannerz 1992:218).

PREDICAMENTS OF GLOBALIZATION: THE NOT-SO-HIDDEN AGENDA

We have indicated the importance of understanding in global systemic terms, the emergence of discourses of globalization. We suggested that such discourses were socially positioned and could be understood as a particular experience-based perspective of new global elites. This is expressed in the growing interest, often normatively expressed, in the transnational.

The concern, which has fast become something of a cult, with the translocal expressed as transnational, border-crossing, postnational is more indicative of the immediate orientation of the authors of such terms than of their referents in the real world. It has virtually nothing to say about the way in which borders and boundaries are constituted (see, e.g., Sahlins 1999). After all, one cannot cross boundaries unless they already exist. Transnational communities can abide only in the presence of national entities. This is trivial but equally easily forgotten or ignored by those who have invoked the prophecy of a new postnational world.

There is an evolutionary assumption which seems to function as the doxa for much of this discourse, a doxa that we have criticized in the last chapters of this volume for several reasons. This is the notion that we move from the local to the global as if to a higher stage of world history. As with the older notion of colonial civilization, those who belong to the global are truly évolué.[3] They have left the "rednecked" masses behind and have entered the new world of the cosmopolitan, a world, not a position, in which all the values of humanism, democracy and human rights, cultural pluralism and hybridity, catchwords of global organizations from CNN to UNESCO, have been adopted by what we would characterize as a new *inorganic*[4] intellectual class, often associated with what I have referred to as left-center "third way" or the *Neue Mitte* as it is called in Germany, for whom the most serious problems in the world are in their own downwardly mobile national populations who are becoming so terribly local, and even xenophobic, the new notion of *classes dangereuses*. There are indeed other voices here who have tried to promote a more grassroots transnationalism, one that is critical to the received culturalist and elitist version, one that in fact harks back to the internationalism of the left earlier in this century. Such visions may prove important in the near future, but they are not for the time being a real alternative, and they do not speak to the overwhelming majority of the world's population that is not on the move. And yet they are as much a part of the global system as the self-congratulating globalizing elites who would gaze upon their insignificant lives from above. The discourse of cultural globalization has a strong ideological component, what we have referred to elsewhere as a global vulgate (Friedman 2002).

It resides in an assault on the family of terms that convey closure, boundedness, essence—all expressions of the same basic problem related to the assumed Western nature of such categories. The root metaphor is the category of the nation-state itself. The latter is represented as a closed unit, whose population is homogeneous and whose mode of functioning is dominated by boundedness itself, by territoriality, and thus by exclusion. The notions of national purity, ethnic absolutism, and all forms of essentialism are deducible from the root metaphor. But for this metaphor to work, the nation-state has first to be reduced to a cultural totality. Now Gellner's notion of the homogeneity of the nation-state was not about cloning, but about the formation of shared values and orientations, primarily related to the public sphere. When this notion is culturalized it suddenly implies total cultural homogenization, that is, the formation of identical subjects. It is via the essentialization as well as individualization of the culture concept that the latter is transformed into a substance that is borne or at least possessed by people . . . the subject is, in this sense, filled with culture. And this substance can either be pure or mixed, monocultural or multicultural. Multiculture here is a mixture of substances within the same human receptacle that fuse into a single creole or hybrid substance. The reduction of culture to substance is curiously like earlier metaphors of race defined as kinds of blood, and the solution to purity is simply mixture. This is not a critique of essentialism but an extreme form of the latter. And as in a certain biological individualism, culture is shared to the degree that individuals are filled with the same or different cultural substance, that is, the collective is a product of the similarity of its individuals. This is clearly a replication of nineteenth-century racialism (Young 1995); and it accounts for why biracial and mixed-race movements in the West, which are clearly based on racialist categories, have been understood as progressive by constructivist postcolonial intellectuals.

The new critique, which seeks to unbind the old categories, consists largely of inserting the prefix *trans-* into all such formerly closed terms. Thus translocal, transcultural, and transnational all stress the focus on that which is beyond borders, all borders. The core of all this vocabulary may well be located a certain identity crisis among a specific group of intellectuals, as it is expressed in its purest form in the work of Judith Butler (1993) and her discourse of postgender. This hyperconstructivist discourse is premised on the notion that the only personal reality is acts, such as sexual acts, and that gender categories are externally imposed political categories. It is power that creates gender identity, and our politics must therefore be directed against this power so that we may be truly liberated. As a mode of orientation this position expresses a desire to transgress the boundaries of embodied identity, which is conceived as a political imposition. If the gendered body is so victimized, then what of all other identities?

The trans-X discourse consists largely of deconstructing supposedly pure or homogeneous categories in order to reveal their constructed nature. In this practice there is a logical relation between the trans and the hybrid or even the creole. The latter terms are used to describe social realities that are culturally mixed or plural, a plurality that results from the movement of culture throughout the world. The misrepresentation of the nation-state as a homogeneous entity thus hides its true heterogeneity. There are two models of this "true situation." One, which is partially suggested by Homi Bhabha, is that hybridity was the condition of the world before the Western colonial imposition of principles of national uniformity. The period of modernity, also the era of colonialism, was an era of homogeneity imposed from above.[5] With the decline of colonialism, the true hybridity of the world is again appearing in the postcolonial era. The other model most prominent in anthropology is that the world was indeed once a mosaic of separate cultural units, but that with globalization these units have been opened up and culture is today flowing all around the world, creating a process of mixture referred to as hybridity or creolity, what has been referred to as a "leaky mosaic" (Friedman 1994). In this latter approach, the terms *trans-X* + *hybridity* + *globalization* form a conceptual totality.

There is a certain convergence in this conceptual clustering of postcolonial and globalization discourses in anthropology. It is said that globalization has changed the world profoundly. It has destroyed our old categories of place, locality, culture, and even society. The contemporary world is one of hybridity, translocality, movement, and rhizomes. Is this an intellectual development or realization that the world has really changed, that is, before we were local but now we are global, or is it an expression of the experience of those who themselves move from conference to conference at increasing velocities and are otherwise totally taken with the facility of Internet communication across the world to their colleagues? We have argued that this latter situation may be the true explanation of this new development, the experience of academic elites, traveling intellectuals, an experience that is presaged by the representations of CNN and other internationalized media as well as in the spontaneous representations of international networks of media managers, politicians, diplomats, and "high-end" nongovernmental organizations. This discourse is, then, positioned. It is the discourse of global elites whose relation to the earth is one of consumerist distance and objectification. It is a bird's-eye view of the world that looks down upon the multi-ethnic bazaar or ethnic neighborhoods and marvels at the fabulous jumble of cultural differences present in that space. Hybridity is thus the sensual, primarily visual, appropriation of a space of cultural difference. It is the space below that thus becomes hybridized, even if, for the people who occupy that space, reality is quite different. And it is the space for the observer, or rather for the consumer/appropriator of that space. This is the perspective that generates the identification of a New Guinea war shield painted with a beer ad as a hybrid object (Clifford

1997:147–87). It may be hybrid for us, but in the street or the village, things are very different.

To ascertain that there is a clear political or ideological content to this discourse we have only to look at some of the texts produced by people so identifying. First there is the apocryphal statement by Appadurai, "We need to think ourselves beyond the nation," (1993: 411) which is elaborated upon in the context of an article in *Public Culture* in which both native Fijians and Hawaiians are taken to task by the anthropologist John Kelly:

> Across the globe a romance is building for the defense of indigenes, first peoples, natives trammeled by civilization, producing a sentimental politics as closely mixed with motifs of nature and ecology as with historical narratives. . . . In Hawaii, the high water mark of this romance is a new indigenous nationalist movement, still mainly sound and fury, but gaining momentum in the 1990s. . . . This essay is not about these kinds of blood politics. My primary focus here is not the sentimental island breezes of a Pacific romance, however much or little they shake up the local politics of blood, also crucial to rights for diaspora people, and to conditions of political possibility for global transnationalism. (Kelly 1995)

More recently he has gone somewhat further in the affirmation of transnationalism. Citing an Indian-Fijian member of parliament as saying, "Pioneering has always been a major element in the development of resources for the good of mankind" (Kelly 1999:250), the latter chimes in with, "People who move inherit the earth. All they have to do is keep up the good work, 'in search for better opportunity"' (Kelly 1999:250).

Lisa Malkki, another adherent of this ideology, has gone to some lengths in her monograph on Burundian refugees (Malkki 1995) in Tanzania to argue for a dichotomy between those who stay in the camp and cultivate their Hutu nationalism and others who make it to town (for what reason, we might ask) and identify out of the group.

> In contrast (to the nationalists in the camps), the town refugees had not constructed such a categorically distinct, collective identity. Rather than defining themselves collectively as "the Hutu refugees," they tended to seek ways of assimilating and of manipulating multiple identities—identities derived or "borrowed" from the social context of the township. The town refugees were not *essentially* "Hutu" or "refugees" or "Tanzanians" or "Burundians" but rather just "broad persons" (Hebdige 1987:159). Theirs were creolized, rhizomatic identities—changing and situational rather than essential and moral (Hannerz 1987; Deleuze and Guattari 1987:6, 21). In the process of managing these "rootless" identities in township life, they were creating not a heroized national identity but a lively cosmopolitanism. (Malkki 1992:26)

Despite the fact that she cites no ethnographic evidence for her dichotomi tion, the thrust of the article is clear. Camp refugees are dangerous nationali since this rooted identity can only lead to violence, while those who h adapted and given up that identity to become “broad people” point the w for the rest of us, toward a cosmopolitan hybridity. This is an extraordin piece of doctored ethnography made to fit a simple ideological scheme; go guys versus bad guys, essentialist, nationalist refugees longing for their ima ined homeland versus hybrid cosmopolitans adeptly adapting to their curr circumstances. Her message to the refugee camps is to forget their iden ties and get on with the process of adapting to the current situation. Deleu and Guattari are borrowed here to argue that arboreal metaphors, typica Western, have caused only suffering. It is time to switch to rhizomes. In t metaphoric space the evil is easy to spot. If national identity is dangero indigeneity is positively poisonous. Malkki, more cautious than Kelly, do not venture a critique of indigenous politics but instead displaces her critic to Western supporters of such movements who would wed them to green p itics. “That people would gather in a small town in North America to hol vigil by candlelight for other people known only by the name of ‘Indigeno suggests that being indigenous, native autochthonous, or otherwise rooted place is, indeed, powerfully heroized” (Malkki 1992:59). “Are people ‘roote in their native soil somehow more natural, their rights somehow more sacr than those of other exploited and oppressed people? And, one wonders, if ‘Indigenous Person’ wanted to move away to a city, would her or his cand be extinguished?” (Malkki 1992:59)

This distinction is explicitly designed to criticize the ideological associati between ecology and native peoples as romantic and basically reactionary, becomes clear in her own celebration of cosmopolitanism. It is part of the er of conflating “culture and people,” “nation and nature” (Malkki 1992). “N tives are thought to be ideally adapted to their environments” (Malkki 199 These are understandings that entail that natives “are somehow *incarcerat* or confined, in those places” (Appadurai 1988:37). But is this really the cas Who has argued for such a model of reality? Is it perhaps that people *do* ada to their environments and develop social and cultural worlds around speci places that is the problem? When indigenous peoples “romanticize” their ter tories, is this not because they maintain some practical and spiritual relation them? Does this contradict the equally obvious fact that people also move, th the history of global systems has been one of massive displacement as well the emergence of dominant global elites? We fail to see the problem. But the is, clearly, a real conflict for these new globalizers. If as argued by Gord (1992), Wilmsen (1989), and others, the Bushmen of the Kalahari have a lo history of integration and marginalization within the Western world syste does this eliminate their identification with their territories? Even more striking in Malkki's version is its reduction of the entire issue to one of individual preferences. What if some individuals move to town, she asks, as if this were relevant to the situation of indigenously identified populations. Perhaps, as she seems to imply, they should all move to town and rid themselves of their reactionary rootedness. One senses a rather childish disenchantment with what was perhaps an assumed anthropological authenticity, just as among many inventionists who in their disappointment have taken to criticizing "natives" for having invented unauthentic traditions for political reasons.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL VERSIONS OF JIHAD AND MCWORLD

The most recent publications in this vein have extended the metaphor to one of global flows versus local identity. Flows of culture are the normal current state of affairs in a globalized world, people, things, culture, and money. This is difficult to accept for anthropologists with their model of bounded units, and so they may tend to deny the truth. Meyer and Geschiere in their edited volume (1999) argue that closure is a reaction to flows, to the experienced, if not real, loss of control over conditions of existence. This is not a new idea, of course. It is clearly stated as the Jihad versus McWorld thesis. The difference between this more recent approach and some of the earlier writings is that there is less optimism about the new globalized world. On the other hand, it is accepted as a fact of nature. The Comaroffs (1999) suggest that South Africa today has developed a modern or postcolonial "occult economy" in which magic and witchcraft accusations are rampantly intertwined with real violence, all a result of the integration of the area into the new globalized economy where there is so much to buy and so little income with which to buy it. This is not the first time that such an argument has been suggested. It is arguably a translation of the structural functionalist explanations of Marwick and others into the new postcolonial discourse. The earlier situation was one in which colonial markets offered opportunities for accumulation that contradicted the control exercised by elders over the distribution of wealth. The recent situation, which is several decades old, is one in which wealth accumulation is increasingly impossible in relation to demand/desire for consumption, in which the market is flooded with goods which are inaccessible to most people. But that this should generate witchcraft accusation can never be explained by the circumstances alone. These authors understand globalization as a thing in itself, an evolutionary reality composed of intensifying flows. A global systemic perspective would allow for such flows as well, but would see them as generated by specific conditions of capital accumulation, as articulations between local conditions and global relations of which globalization is only one. Thus while disaster and social disintegration characterize much of Africa (and this is not the first time), East Asia has become increasingly integrated in conditions of rapid growth.

It is, paradoxically, the limited character of the transnational approach, its obsession with the closure of the local, that leads its practitioners to criticize those who talk of bounding and territorialization since such terms are thought to be old fashioned, even reactionary. Unfortunately, *social reality seems to be mistaken as well*! "[A]nthropologists' obsession with boundedness is paralleled by the ways in which the people they study try to deal with seemingly open-ended global flows" (Meyer and Geschiere 1999:3).

But if people studied by anthropologists are doing this thing called bounding and closure and essentialism, should this not be recognized as a real social phenomenon rather than shunned as a terrible mistake? Everything from the Nationalist Right to African witchcraft must now be accounted for in terms of the production of locality, an apparent reaction to globalization itself. And, of course, it must be asked, who is it that produces locality? Are there any agents, any subjects in this process of conversion of flow into place? Could it be that people have been local all the time and did not simply land from the global jet stream to construct locality? Could it be that the local is indeed a structure of the global, but not by way of the application of an idea diffused around the globe? Could it be that the local is a relation of interlocality, thus not a cultural representation but a social and cultural practice within a larger arena?

It appears to us that the transnationalist trend or perhaps *urge* in anthropology and neighboring disciplines is more than simply intellectually flawed. It is an agenda that seeks to morally reform the discipline. It is difficult to understand why the obsessive attack is only on boundedness. It is true that there have been tendencies to treat societies as closed units, especially in the heyday of structural functionalism. In fact, the very starting point of our own global systemic anthropology, as we have indicated, was a critique of the tendency to treat societies as isolates. But this was not an issue of culture. Nor was it argued that this was the case because societies were now *finally* joined together in a single globalized world. On the contrary, we argued that regional systems were as old as humanity and that, if there were cases of more or less isolated societies, they most often were societies that became isolated in the global historical process. Similarly, this approach entails that the production of culture is interwoven with such systems of relations, but not necessarily as a product of the circulation of ideas or cultural elements. The fact that people occupying a particular place and living and constructing a particular world are in their entirety integrated into a larger system of relationships does not contradict the fact that they make their world where they are and with the people that are part of their local lives. But not so for transnational/globalization approaches to the subject. For the latter globalization is behavioral, as structure was for Radcliffe-Brown. It is about people, things, and ideas in transit, as if such movement implied something systemic in itself. For the globalizers, the introduction of new objects into former strategies implies total rupture, as we said of potlatching with sewing machines, that if witchcraft representations include whites that come from faraway places, if underage children are now targeted instead of maternal uncles, then we are in a new ball game called "modernity." If this is the argument, then Latour's suggestion that "We have never been modern" (Latour 1993) makes all the more sense.

Marshall Sahlins has made some important arguments about this so-called afterology (Brightman 1995). Where, he asks, are the classical anthropologists that maintained a view of culture as bounded and homogeneous, as essentialized? Sahlins argues to the contrary. "They could even speak of 'the fallacy of separation': the mistaken idea that because cultures are distinctive they are closed" (Sahlins 1999:404).

He describes at several points how the cultural relativists stressed that cultures were constantly undergoing change, and he cites Herskovits himself on the issue of homogeneity. "To think in terms of a single pattern for a single culture is to distort reality . . . for no culture is (so) simple (as not) to have various patterns" (Sahlins 1999:405).

Of course there are deeper overarching configurations that anthropologists attempt to discover, but this is not a question of homogeneity; it is a question of coherence, which is not the same thing.

PLAN OF THE BOOK

The following chapters are divided into three themes that reflect the basic arguments and research that we have attempted to develop in the area of global systemic anthropology concentrating here on long-term historical process. Another volume, *Modernities, Class, and the Contradictions of the Global System*, deals with the anthropology of the contemporary global system and its more recent historical trajectories.

Part I: Social Reproduction, Social Transformation, and Global Process

This introductory part deals with the conceptual arguments that historically formed the basis for the development of global systemic anthropology. It approaches the issues from the point of views of a critique of Marxist theory and of the crisis in the 1970s that this entailed for the notions of development and the world economy. Here we limit ourselves to the political economic aspects of an argument that then extends into issues of social and cultural relations.

Part II: Global Process and Long-Term Change

This part of the book deals with world historical models, that is, the global anthropology of ancient and prehistoric social systems. The arguments concern processes of social transformation in a long-term historical framework. This does not imply a gradualist or evolutionist approach. On the contrary, the arguments concerning historical transformation often suggest that change occurs rapidly and even suddenly. The idea of catastrophic models (in the formal sense of abrupt change as threshold phenomena) has been one of our principal interests over the past decades. If it is possible to speak here of state formation in general terms, it can also be suggested that the latter does not arise as the result of thousands of years of piecemeal change. It occurs as a relatively rapid transformation of structures of power, even if the content of the latter may well be the *longue durée* basis of transformation. Thus the theocratic forms of early states are based on a series of structural invariants present in non-state societies out of which states emerged. But the actual emergence of such power structures can often be understood as political acts, as revolutionary projects, even if the latter are not necessarily intentional with respect to their specific outcomes. That is, the consolidation of power occurs in a world already structured in sociocultural terms, so that the resultant forms of power are part of the unconscious logic within which power is achieved. A transformational approach assumes that historical change is not a mere question of random events, but that there are potent logics involved. It implies that history has a Kafkaesque quality in which social agents may be free in a certain sense, yet locked into situational fields that are strongly determined. The existence of free will does not, of course, imply that the will is free, that is, that subjects are the authors of the content of their desires and intentionalities. This may be at odds with much current postmodern understanding, but the object of these chapters is to make a case for precisely this kind of argument. It is true that there are issues of complexity in the formal sense and of indeterminacy that need to be tackled here, but we argue that such indeterminacy occurs within a more encompassing determinist frame of reference. Chapter 3 takes up the overriding incompatibility between short-term local or even imperial strategies and the long-term processes inherent in global systems, an incompatibility that generates the riskiness of such systems, where local discontinuity is the rule, and which makes "social evolution" into a process of rising and falling hegemony in which new centers are always located in new areas of the larger arena. In chapter 4 the dynamics of kinship-based systems are examined as part of the emergence of states, but the issue of kinship and power is explored more in detail in Part III. Chapters 5 and 6 explore the nature of economic accumulation, political strategy, and structural integration in Bronze Age civilizations. Chapter 7 relates phenomena related to the contemporary world, transnationalization, political disorder, and ethnicization, to more general systemic processes that can be found in the ancient world.

A principal issue discussed in these chapters is the nature of commercial civilizations and their invariant features. We have argued for quite some time that a great number of phenomena that have been assumed to be historically specific to European modernity are in fact of a more structural nature. Forms of labor, of accumulation, but also of representation and of politics have, with significant variation, appeared and disappeared since the emergence of Old World commercial civilizations, an argument against evolutionary thinking. That is, while, there are indeed macro-historical changes that might be said to occur in linear sequences, there are also long periods, following the emergence of ancient world systems, of cyclical variation within a set of similar structures. We argue, for example, that the emergence of global systems, differentiated into commercial centers and peripheries, occurred in the Middle East near the end of the fourth millennium, that such systems contain many of the properties of succeeding systems, and that their dynamics reveal interesting transhistorical similarities. Processes of transformation involve epigenetic-evolutionary, cyclical, and devolutionary change, which implies that there may be cumulative tendencies in certain world historical processes (primarily technological and demographic), but there is no general evolution of world society. This is important to note for postcolonialists who, in spite of their generally anti-evolutionary position, unwittingly assume that globalization is the next stage of history.

The issue of interpretation of ancient historical and archaeological material is, of course, a major problem for any social scientific approach. We have tried to work with models of social relations and processes in such a way that archaeological data is used as a source of data and a field of falsification. This implies that social models are constructed in such a way that their implications for archaeological data are worked out by confronting expected results with actual data. If social processes are structured in a particular way, it should, for example, imply a particular distribution of artifactual remains. In this way we hope to be able to constantly reformulate our hypotheses and not conflate interpretation and material reality. This, of course, is a general problem, and we make no claims to originality here. The issue of interpreting historically produced texts is in some ways a similar problem.

At several points, but especially in chapter 8 (in part III), it is argued on the basis of textual evidence that classical Athenian society developed a kind of capitalist organization and that this can account for a number of features of that social world in a better way than the established approaches inspired by Polanyi, Finley, and others. The argument for capitalist accumulation in classical Athens is a real bone of contention as witnessed by some of the debate, but as we argue several times, much of the taken for granted opposition between the ancient economies and modern Western capitalism is based on extraordinarily simple assumptions concerning the pure market nature of the latter.

Part III: Structure and History: Transformational Models

This section introduces the issues of local-global articulation. Chapters 8 and 9 deal with the transformational logics of history in the Congo region. The first analyzes the role of the control of external exchange in the formation and maintenance of kingship and on the implications that this has for the structuring of social and symbolic relations. It argues as well that any understanding of the subsequent social and political structures of the area can be understood only in terms of the articulation of the introduction of the slave trade into this local arena and the specific way in which the world system articulate with this part of the world. Chapter 9 deals with a later period in the history of the same region and shows how the emergence of the kind of sacred kingship, so important for the work of Frazer but also of the more recent anthropology of Africa, overlooks that this form of kingship, in which the king is something of an anti-chief, made to live in the forest, denied power, and often sacrificed to create an ancestor, is part of the crisis of the late nineteenth century and not the embryo of an evolutionary trajectory leading to stronger forms of centralized power. Chapter 10 argues that the once assumed evolutionary relation leading from egalitarian to bigmen, chiefs, and states in the Pacific might better be understood in very different and partially reversed terms based on a regional system approach in which an original prestige good-based system that was more or less maintained in Western Polynesia, parts of Micronesia, and Southern Melanesia, developed into a locally stratified but regionally less integrated theocratic feudal organization in Eastern Polynesia and devolved, politically, into an intensely exchange-based but small-scale organization in Northern Melanesia, where it led to what became known as a "big-man" type of society. Chapter 11 compares the logic of power in western and eastern parts of Polynesia in an attempt to elaborate the structural transformations that link the two, comparing the relation between these logics and the structures of mythical representation that they generate.

NOTES

1. Structural Marxism is the reformulation of Marxism that developed in the work of Louis Althusser and his colleagues and successors and which had considerable influence on French social anthropology in the 1970s as well as British and American social anthropology in the following years.

2. *Fourth world* refers to the category of indigenous peoples, institutionalized by United Nations and other related discourses.

3. The term *évolué* was used in French colonies to refer to those *indigenes* or natives who were socially mobile within colonial society, usually within the locally imposed regime itself.

4. By *inorganic* we refer here to intellectuals who are engaged in the elaboration of dominant ideologies as opposed to Gramsci's organic intellectuals.

5. The notion of a pre-colonial hybridity appears in works as diverse as Bhabha (1994), Mamdani (1996), and even Amselle (1999), who uses the term *Logiques métisses* to refer to the openess and flexibility of pre-colonial sociopolitical categories rather than what is usually understood as hybridity. In his new introduction to *Logiques Métisses* he is quite critical of these new intellectual tendencies which reinforce the kind of racial boundaries that they may have hoped to surpass, at least in theory (Amselle 1999: i–xiii).

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Part I

SOCIAL REPRODUCTION, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, AND GLOBAL PROCESS

The first two chapters in this book are historical products of an intellectual transition on our part from single-society-based understanding that was common to most of anthropology, from structural functionalism to Marxism, to a global systemic framework. As we state in the introduction, the impetus to this shift in perspective was induced by direct confrontation with ethnographic reality in which a particular village society in Madagascar could not be understood without placing it in a global historical framework within which it was constituted and reproduced (Ekholm 1976, 1980). Here the insight based on the falsification of our own previous framework is brought to bear on a reconsideration of the common assumptions of Marxist analysis.

These chapters are important here insofar as they situate the problem in theoretical-historical terms. The first chapter argues that the very logic of a certain kind of Marxist analysis, one that reduces social reproduction to production, entails an impossibility of grasping the importance not only of global relations, but also of the way in which societies are constituted in larger fields. The argument is structuralist in inspiration as well as global, and in two important respects. First, as suggested in the introduction, it might be argued that structuralism is itself a kind of elementary global approach to social organization. The critical concept of the "atom of kinship" was about the socially reproductive insufficiency of the nuclear family. Previous to the publication in 1949 of Lévi-Strauss's work on kinship (1969 [1949]) the basic unit of kinship-based societies was assumed to be the nuclear family and, by extension, the descent group. The issue of marriage alliance was considered secondary and related in a simple way to the accepted fact of the incest tabu that entailed a necessity of taking marriage partners from outside one's own group. Lévi-Strauss reversed this understanding by making alliance immediately constitutive of group structure. And his argument, if not explicit, is one based on the premise of social reproduction. In the same sense societies are constituted within larger relations of reproduction and cannot be understood as totalities in themselves. Reproduction must in this approach remain primary.

The second chapter extends this argument to a critique of closed models in economic reasoning, arguing that phenomena from the Industrial Revolution to the then-current global crisis of economic hegemony and the decentralization of accumulation (the early 1970s) can be grasped only in larger reproductive terms. These are arguments that originated with Kajsa Ekholm Friedman but which were shared by both of us and are detailed in several publications that were either ignored or vehemently attacked (e.g., Ekholm 1976, 1980). Global systemic anthropology was the product of a confrontation, a breakdown as Agar would have described it in his excellent primer on ethnographic method (Agar 1986), in which our theoretical baggage was falsified by ethnographic reality and more generally by a set of new experiences of the world. The same experiences might also have induced the approach referred to as globalization, but in the 1970s when this occurred we were still very much part of a tradition of strict theoretical work, and it soon became apparent that the historical parallels, both ancient and modern, had more to offer than a mere reflection upon our experience of movement in the world.

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1

Marxist Theory and Systems of Total Reproduction

Jonathan Friedman

The argument developed here represents one of the main avenues along which we were moved from the analysis of societies as totalities, as systems, as the seat of adequate self-explanation to a global systemic framework. We have discussed the ethnographic question at length in other contexts (Ekholm and Friedman 1980), arguing for the inadequacy of the local ethnographic field as the empirical basis for its own comprehension. This is not an argument against long-term intensive fieldwork as some have now begun to suggest, but for its extension to wider fields adequate to the investigation of processes which constitute social realities. This implies in the most trivial way a multi-sited approach, not as an adaptation to a new globalized world, but as a necessity that is always present in historical global systems. The ethnographic argument, thus, requires a theoretical argument that was provided in this early article, reproduced in part below.

In the following we argue against the restriction of theory, in the form of Marxist theory, to the society as totality. We argue also that this reductionism is the result of the political and ideological vectors in the constitution of historical materialism, vectors that were equally as evident in the constitution of functionalism, structural functionalism, and neo-evolutionism. As Marxism claims to be a dynamic model it is the best case of our argument for the global systemic approach, and it is for this reason that it makes sense to return to an argument that we made in the 1970s, which was at the time largely rejected. This is also a way of distinguishing our approach from the current approach to globalization. The latter is strongly evolutionary and sees the global as the continuation of the local or even its replacement. The global systemic perspective is based on a structural argument, in which the local is and has been reproductively dependent on larger global processes, not something which happened yesterday but which characterizes much of world history (Ekholm 1975, 1976, 1981). We do not, of course, deny that there are and have been locally reproducing populations organized into single polities, but we emphasize that the way their organization is constituted is a product of interrelations of a systematic or structural nature even where these are on a relatively small scale. Global systemic refers to two distinct aspects of the local-global nexus. First it argues that local social organization is historically constituted within larger social fields. These fields may imply social isolation and political autonomy, but they are relational all the same. The populations encountered by anthropologists and represented as leftovers from the Stone Age, or isolated communities, are on closer examination the products of regional or global historical processes. Self-reproducing subsistence economies are not a stage or a fixed type, but a historical variable practice, a suggestion that is increasingly borne out by archaeological research. Second, the stronger sense of global systemic refers to ongoing processes that link the reproduction of local organization to larger reproductive processes so that the reproduction of the local is directly dependent upon the larger process. This is no way implies that the actor is eliminated, nor his or her cultural specificity. It merely signals, as an empirical question, the degree to which both intentionality and cultural specificity, from forms of sociality to political strategies, are constituted within and dependent upon larger structural contexts. The most concise expression of this free will/determinism relation is that "Men have free will, but the will is not free." For if the will were free, there would be nothing for which to account.

THE REDUCTION OF REPRODUCTION TO PRODUCTION

There have been many Marxisms during the past century, and there is no point in recounting the complex history of these divergent conflictual strands. There is one particular and popular form that Marxism took quite early which is referred to as historical materialism. The latter also took on numerous expressions, but the way it influenced anthropology is primarily in that form that emerged in the Second International. Historical materialism consists of a hypothesis of the primacy of material conditions in the generation of social life. The latter can be reduced to the immediate process of labor, that is, the technological organization of production, which has led to what has been called mechanical materialism. Marx, however, stressed that it was the social form of the appropriation of nature that was the key to understanding and that technology in itself was a false abstraction. In his major works, such as *Capital*, the *Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie*, and even his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, the theoretical object is always the social system of reproduction and the way its particular structure distributes both power and wealth in society. There is some crucial ambivalence in his work. He claims on the one hand that consumption is not generally an immediate effect of production but that distribution acts as an intervening structure in determining the way in which wealth is allocated and is not a mere derivative of production (Marx 1971a:199). But when he analyzes the forms of capitalist reproduction, the argument seems more determinist. There is, of course, a reason for this. In the capitalist form, the social categories of production are also categories of the distribution of wealth. Here Marx distinguishes between two notions of distribution, one superficial, the actual distribution of the social product, and the other fundamental, "the distribution of the members of the society among the various types of production (the subsuming of individuals under definite relations of production)" (Marx 1971a:201).

The argument here is that the determination of relations of circulation and consumption by relations of production is dependent on the specific social form of capitalist reproduction. The categories of capital and labor and the various forms of surplus value (interest, profit, etc.) are both social forms of control over the production process and forms of income. A wage as a cost of production and a form of income provides the framework in which costs of production are metamorphosed into a portion of the value of the total product. The same logic applies to industrial and financial capitalists and landlords.[1] In other "modes of production" the relations of distribution do not logically follow from the direct production process, so any deterministic claims would have to be based on extralogical criteria. Furthermore, the determination of distribution by production that is specific to capitalism is not the determination of social form by production. On the contrary, it is only *within* the social form of capitalist reproduction that distribution follows from production, and this is only because the two moments of the larger process are structured by the same social categories.

This kind of determination has little to do with the popular forms of historical materialism. The latter nonlogical notion of determination is based on the generalization of what was discussed as a logical form in capitalism to an absurd notion that forms of distribution are determined by forms of production in all societies. The specificity of capitalism, the penetration of capitalist relations into the production process, became an ideological model for all societies. And for this to work, the entire notion of logical determination had to be replaced by either functionalism or causality. The point is as fundamental as the confusion is simple. The logical notion of determination is not an explanatory concept. It is not a question of accounting for the existence of a given social form but simply of delineating the determinate relations in an already-given structure.

There is no question that Marx often confused the two notions of determination, but the dominance of the latter notion, mechanical determination, is primarily developed in the work of Engels and in the successors of the Second International. The notion of technological determinism or of determinism in general by the structure of production is the principal form of reductionism that has become predominant in Marxist theory.

THE POLITICAL FORMATION OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM: THE "SOCIETY" AS UNIT OF ANALYSIS

The second aspect of historical materialism, one that characterizes much of nineteenth-century economic thinking as well, is the choice of the state and by abstraction the society as the unit of analysis. As the emergent political space of the West was a field of competing nation-states, in which the primary unit of identification and socialization became the state itself, it is not unreasonable that it became the locus of thinking about the social and even the cultural. It dominated economic thinking from Ricardo on, and in the Second International it gave rise to notions of autonomous national development and even of alternative culturally based roads to socialism. In spite of the existence of a world order, the latter was filtered through the identity structures of the state. Both evolutionary and culturalist thought were products of this political organization of social space. Anthropology was very much a product of this period of development in which the society at most became the ultimate unit of analysis for structural functionalists, functionalists, evolutionists, and ecologists, in which larger systems were usually reduced to external factors since the society or polity contained within it the totality of the conditions necessary for its understanding.

Marx was himself very much influenced by this process of conceptual localization, what can be called the nationalization of social reproduction. Following classical economists such as Ricardo, he tended to see capitalist reproduction as a national cycle however contradictory, in a way that presaged the work of Keynes. And while Marx was himself quite ambiguous about this, as historical materialism became wedded to one state, the Soviet Union, it became a powerful ideology. "Marx showed in Volume II that capitalist production can easily be conceived without external markets, with growing accumulation of wealth" (Lenin).

Of course there were other interpretations. Luxemburg, far superior as a theorist to Lenin, argued that Marx's schemes of reproduction were logically impossible to maintain without a larger economic field of markets and resources (continuous "primitive" accumulation). This implied for her the logical necessity of an international political economy that Lenin opposed vehemently. This accounts as well for the latter's understanding of imperialism as the highest and latest stage of capitalism rather than one of its fundamental properties.

The results of the reductionism in Marxist thinking are the single society as the unit of analysis within which everything relevant occurs and within which social structure and representations are determined by one or another model based on the immediate production process. This amounts to the reification of society as a natural scientific object and the reduction of reproduction to production.

BACK TO REPRODUCTION

The notion of mode of production became very popular in France in the 1960s and was taken up by anthropology in France and then in many other countries in the following decades. While there are various approaches to this concept, the great majority tends to conflate technological processes with social processes, reducing the latter to the former by way of a vague notion of causality. Among the spectacular attempts to systematize the concept of mode of production is the extensive work of Althusser, Balibar, and others. They were quite aware of the logical issues involved in Marx's analysis, and in order to maintain the model of determination they simply divided the explanatory mechanism into a formal versus a real relation of appropriation. In capitalism the two coincide so that the economy could be said to be truly dominant, organizing directly the process of exploitation. In precapitalism the two do not coincide, and here enters the notorious notion of *determination in the last instance*. Since in the feudal mode of production the actual organization of production is such that the immediate producers control their own means of production, another mechanism is required to exploit them, a political structure. But this structure is said to be determined in the last instance by the economic structure, that is, by the very nonseparation of the producers from their means of production. The political structure here substitutes for the direct economic exploitation that is by definition possible in capitalism. The argument is a kind of tautology since economic dominance is maintained by extension or by displacement onto the "political instance." This rather far-fetched attempt to maintain the notion of determination is intellectually interesting if somewhat absurd. The more usual model, much less intellectually challenging, is simply that a given technological level or organization determines a specific form of society. This is the model commonly found in various forms of anthropological materialisms. At its most sophisticated, as in Steward's work on band society and in some of

Meillassoux's attempts to deduce structures of power from technological forms of production, it is still flawed by reductionist arguments. That a given techno-ecology, for example, determines that populations must be small and mobile and maintain networks of relations of access to resources in a wider region, is not sufficient to generate a social organization of bands. In its most vulgar form it reverts to a simpler functionalism, that irrigation works require centralized states, that ecosystem stability requires ritual feasting, all arguments that have the form that if *X* does *Y* in population *Z* and the latter survives, then *X* is a necessary mechanism of survival. This is the link between historical materialism and cultural materialism.

Forces of production is another term disfigured by the reduction of capitalist logic to a universalist model. Such forces become neutral and autonomous elements, the combination of means of production, raw materials, and a specific organization of labor, without social properties but instead generative of the latter. The so-called correspondence of relations of production to forces of production is easily translated into a relation of causality or functional necessity. From a reproductive perspective, forces of production are always dependent functions, permeated by social choices and structured relations within which they take form. And then there is also the important fact that these "forces" are very often not simply there, not simply local, but the product of larger regional cycles of reproduction. While local conditions of production do indeed provide constraints, they do no more than this. The material properties of technological and ecological processes are effective only within the larger social processes in which they are organized. Mesopotamia, famous for its hydraulic theories of state formation, could only construct irrigation systems with clay tools and raise sheep for wool in the nearby highlands. But the signs of its greatness are associated with a trade dependent technological base, tin, copper, gold, wood, obsidian, stone, and slaves. The latter can *only* be included in the *material base* of Mesopotamia as a global systemic phenomenon. In a more general sense the accumulation of "civilization" can be understood only as a larger scale systemic phenomenon connecting a great many areas in a single reproductive totality within which the circulation of objects and people plays a critical role.

Reproduction is a concept proper to the level of the forces of production. If the latter cannot be defined without specifying its conditions of continued existence, a local production process cannot be a base unless it is truly self-reproductive. In this light, forces of production cannot realistically be equated with immediate processes of production. The latter are embedded within larger social structures of reproduction; structures that not only organize the larger flow of necessary elements in production but also subsume the latter within culturally specific projects. This is of course true even where production is truly localized.

Relations of production have in much Marxist literature been reduced to those relations directly involved in the immediate production process itself. In the case of capitalism this may have seemed straightforward since there was the wage relation itself, a relation between capital and labor in which the categories of production are directly expressive of capitalist exploitation, the wage defined as a necessary cost of production for a capitalist enterprise just as are costs of raw materials, costs of maintenance, of machinery, and so on. This cost is, of course, a cost of reproduction, that is, of the maintenance in the long run of the productive apparatus and of labor itself. And this cost, from the capitalist point of view, can be subtracted from the total revenue resulting from the sale of commodities, leaving profit, interest, and rent. The latter are included in surplus value for Marx, those *social* costs related to the use of capital and profit itself, that is, for the reproduction of the capitalist and the accumulation of capital in the form of new investment or expanded reproduction. As indicated earlier, it is the very fact that the immediate production process is subsumed within capitalist categories that enables one to equate relations of production with direct exploitation of labor. But the determination of the level and even the forms of exploitation cannot be separated from the larger process of capitalist reproduction. The realization of production on the market is, of course, the absolutely necessary goal of production, and this in its turn is merely a subset of a higher goal, the accumulation of capital in general, which includes all the methods by which money can be turned into more money and which includes financial accumulation and even speculation as its driving forces. These latter forms cannot be deduced from the social relations in immediate production but are its prerequisite and in historical terms its origins. It is capitalist accumulation that penetrates and reorganizes production, and it is the integration of the latter within larger cycles of capitalist accumulation that becomes the major contradiction of industrial capitalism, the contradiction between fictitious capital accumulation and real production, the subject of the third volume of *Capital* and much of the *Theories of Surplus Value*, books that are mostly forgotten today, but also rarely used systematically by Marxists who were themselves victims of a materialist determinism of a certain theory of value (Ricardian in origin) that would deduce the value of capital from the immediate process of production, that is, "real" costs. It is interesting that it is precisely in volume III of *Capital* that the issue of reproduction becomes absolutely crucial for understanding the illusive issue of the "falling rate of profit." The Ricardian and Keynsian reformulations of this problem in Marxist economics eventually led to the abandonment of the concept that makes no sense without the notion of fictitious capital, capital that simply grows by itself without reference to the productive process. The materialist reduction of relations of production to immediate production divides the space of analysis into forces + relations of production on the one hand and circulation and almost everything else on the other. The distortion is all the clearer when the concept is applied outside of capitalism, that is, where production exploitation and circulation are organized by different logics. In both Marxist and other economic historical discussion, feudalism is usually defined in terms of a basic feudal rent and a division between a class of landlords organized into a hierarchy of partial rights over a class of serfs. The relations of production are defined as a form of direct appropriation of agricultural surplus. But this appropriation indicates nothing about the realization of this surplus, although it is sometimes implied that the feudal demesne is a total economy. In fact, the latter situation occurs only in marginal areas and in periods of economic depression or "dark ages." The more usual situation is one in which the estates are linked to larger regional markets, which are in their turn linked to dominant mercantile economic centers in the Middle East to which they supplied raw materials, slaves, and certain rare goods. The aristocracy in return got luxury goods from the larger system. The lack of logic linking these different spheres suggests that the relations of exploitation were no more than that and that they had no internal dynamic of accumulation. The fact that in relation to the commercial towns feudal lords applied the same relation, that is, feudal rent, indicates that the exploitation relation is not one that can be in any way deduced from production itself. The historical variation between the different kinds of rent also indicates the lack of material determination in the feudal world. Rent in kind, money, or labor service varied according to the variation in peasant autonomy and the strength of market demand. This implies that any understanding of the feudal economy must be sought in the larger dynamic of a global system, one in which Europe was largely peripheralized as a raw material and slave producer in a larger Middle Eastern–dominated commercial system. It is for this reason that the famous transition from feudalism to capitalism is such a misnomer. The latter did not grow out of the former. Rather its forms, already present in the larger system, became gradually dominant in the form of a shift of power from a declining Middle East to the particular points in the Mediterranean and Flanders. And this shift of power was very much related to the decentralization of capital accumulation in the Middle East, a decentralization toward Europe which simultaneously weakened the former while strengthening the latter (Abu-Lughod 1989). The attempt to argue a genetic relation between feudalism and capitalism is simply illogical and dependent on a reductionism that flies in the face of the facts of history (Anderson 1974:150).[2] It also creates a false notion of dynamics as if forms of exploitation were accumulative in themselves, something that in logical terms is true only for capitalist exploitation.

The notion of mode of production is an inadequate framework for explanation. Social reproductive totalities are the necessary starting point for an adequate analysis even of those phenomena classified as modes of production. It is in the social processes of reproduction that we can locate the fundamental strategies that organize lower-order processes. It is here that we can grasp that which drives a system and where we can discover whether there is such a system. Social reproduction refers to the sum of processes that organize and move populations through historical time, that link individual and social actors in larger chains of activities that maintain and transform their conditions of existence. And while Marx, as we noted above, was partially trapped in the national reductionism of his day, he is also splendidly clear about the larger systemic connections that are the basis of historical transformation.

> Direct slavery is just as much a pivot of bourgeois industry as machinery, credits etc. Without slavery you have no cotton: without cotton you have no modern industry. It is slavery that gave the colonies their value; it is the colonies that created world trade, and it is world trade that is the precondition of large scale industry. (Marx 1963:111)

The conversion of money capital into slave labor does not negate the capitalist mode of production. On the contrary, it demonstrates that the properties of capitalist reproduction are not simply expressions of a particular set of relations of exploitation. This is true even of capitalist reality, in which there exists a logic linking production and reproduction. To simplify things one can simply note that a capitalist would be out of his mind if he did not see the advantage of making his money grow in multiple says. Wage labor is, in an important sense, a great burden on capital, and ultimately this is true of all labor and all costs of production. The true spirit of capital is, in this logic, the conversion of money into more money, the goose that lays golden eggs.

A mode of production as relations of exploitation-appropriation + forces of production can never be a system. It has no temporal properties and has therefore no explanatory value. It is entirely static and merely descriptive. The combination forces of production + relations of exploitation-appropriation + relations of realization do form a system, but one whose *social* properties determine the system's nature and one which might include any number of forms of exploitation and forces of production. We have argued that the concept of mode of production is itself the product of a severe reductionism within historical materialism, one that consists in a generalization of capitalist logic to a kind of universalist causality that transforms that logical relation itself into a mechanical determinism, one that is further transfigured by the identity space of the nation-state into a local determinism in which the single society is the ultimate field of explanation.

It is interesting that while Marx did recognize the importance of the larger processes of social reproduction, he did not make it the focus of his analysis. This, we argue, is partly the product of the strongly localizing identity space within which he worked, but it is also because the larger world had not yet emerged clearly as a conscious, practical political issue. Larger systems have become a theoretical issue today because they have intruded upon our conscious everyday existences. This is very much the result of the geographical shift of accumulation, the breakdown of former colonial and postcolonial hierarchical orders and the partial construction of new hierarchies, and it may account for an earlier bout of global thinking that occurred at the end of the past century and that found its way into Marxism as well.

The concept of reproduction opens the door to two crucial areas of rethinking. First, the hypothesis that social reproductive processes are at the core of any adequate account of the social world implies that socially specific, that is, culturally specific, properties or structures of such processes must become the centerpiece of our attempts to understand the world. It is here that we discover the intentionality of systemic processes, the unity in the diverse social projects that pervade any social world. But it is also here that we discover the materiality of the social and of the contradictory nature of social reproduction, by discovering the fundamental structural incompatibilities in such processes. The concept of reproduction also implies the necessity of considering processes that encompass particular social worlds and link them to one another in ways that generate new forms and dissolve others (Friedman 1976, 1979). These processes are emphatically not to be understood as independent of the social worlds that they encompass. On the contrary, the reproductive process is constituted by the articulation of these worlds. This is a structural argument for a global systemic anthropology. The reasoned rejection of the notion of mode of production and all its components leads to the critical necessity of considering the social and therefore cultural nature of reproductive process as well as the necessity of considering the larger processes within which the social, including its boundedness, is constituted.

NOTES

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1. This is not a logic that determines the actual quantitative relations of distribution, but it does determine their limits of variation and as such implies the potential contradictions that arise within the dynamics of expansion and contraction. Marx's most important and ignored work concerns precisely the fictitious component in the accumulation process and its determinant effects on capitalist dynamics.

2. Anderson is concerned with the role of commerce in the dissolution of the feudal mode of production, but the question is misconstrued. To say that it is the peculiarity of feudalism that it permitted the emergence of autonomous mercantile enterprise is to confuse possibility with explanation. Feudal relations emerged within an already existing mercantile economic world and are not its cause.

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2

Crises in Theory and Transformations of the World Economy

Jonathan Friedman

This chapter is reproduced with minor changes from a 1978 article that appeared in *Review.* It is reproduced here to provide a historical background to the emergence of a global historical anthropology. It focuses on economic relations that are not the usual subject matter of anthropology but which, as we have argued, are necessary for the development of a truly global framework of understanding in the social sciences. The article places itself on the turf of the then-current debates in political economy regarding issues of development and underdevelopment, and it consists of a critique of the national economic assumptions that were dominant among Marxist and non-Marxist macroeconomists alike. The article outlines a global alternative based on the notion of reproduction, referred to in the previous chapter, in which global systems are understood as historical systems of shifting accumulation and empire formation. The article was an important expression of our progress toward a global systemic anthropology. Among other things it went so far as to predict a crisis of accumulation in the West as the expression of declining economic hegemony. This was largely borne out in the rise of the East and Southeast Asian economies in the 1980s and 1990s as major global competitors. Kajsa Ekholm Friedman had already produced a longer work (Ekholm 1977) on risk generation in which such declines and shifting hegemonies were analyzed in both historical and contemporary situations and where many of the social and cultural conflicts that have become prevalent today were understood as expressions of these larger processes.

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The following brief remarks are meant as a basis for discussion only. They relate to a problem that has become increasingly obvious to a number of researchers—that our theoretical models have tended not to keep up with reality.[1] This is always the case in a crisis where many theories compete to no avail on a political rather than a theoretical basis. It has been a commonplace in the social sciences. The present crisis in imperialism theory is no exception—nor is it unusual, though perhaps tragic, that it occurs as a response to a profound structural crisis in the world economy.

ECONOMIC THEORY AS EMPIRICAL ABSTRACTION

Economic theory has consistently been a faithful reflection of the concrete situation in which it has been formulated. The eighteenth century was the crucial period of expansion for the industrial development of England as the world's central power. It was based almost entirely on the accelerated growth of the export sector and a relative stagnation of production for internal consumption. Not surprisingly, Adam Smith was its chief theoretician, propounding a theory that production is the basis of all wealth, and especially that production for export and international trade was the necessary condition for economic development.

The nineteenth century was a period in which England gradually developed a more complete "self-centered" economic structure, including an expanding internal market. The theoreticians of this period denied the importance of foreign trade for the expanded reproduction of capital, stressing instead the problem of costs, and especially, for the Ricardians, labor costs. With the emergence of internal reproductive cycles, the major issues are related to questions of equilibrium between sectors, the pricing of output, and the rate of profit. For Ricardo, foreign trade was important only because of imports that might cheapen the cost of labor. Even Marx, who was fully aware of the world economy's importance in the formation of national capitals, provided no model for it. He usually envisaged trade as a supplementary mechanism that could raise the rate of internal accumulation without being a necessary component of that accumulation. While it might, of course, be argued that the reproduction schemes are not national in character, this was never said to be a feature of the model.

From 1870, and probably somewhat earlier, England exported an unprecedented amount of capital, mostly in the form of loans and portfolio investments while the national economy stagnated. England became the world's banker after having been the world's workshop. Imperialism theory was born. It took two forms, reflecting two aspects of the phenomenon. Rosa Luxemburg, working out of an elaborate theory of the contradictions of capital accumulation, analyzed the violent and nonviolent forms of capital expansion into its noncapitalist environment in terms of a model of primitive accumulation. Thus, for example, the export of loan capital might solve the incompatibilities of the reproduction cycle while maintaining or raising the rate of accumulation in the center through a net inflow of capital that offset the falling rate of profit. This process could continue only so long as the world was not entirely subsumed by capitalist production. The theories of Hobson and Hilferding, synthesized by Lenin, interpreted the outflow of capital as a response to the formation of financial monopoly structures through increasing concentration and a resultant constant overproduction of capital that needs an outlet for investment outside the declining-profit center. The export of capital was discussed as an expression of a particular stage of capitalist development. Exported capital itself gains a clear advantage in the form of higher profits, superprofits that can be used to bribe the working class at home by raising its standard of living. But there was no assumption that the export of capital implies the underdevelopment of the periphery. On the contrary, the initial cheapness of labor is due to the scarcity of capital, and the inflow of capital should lead to the capitalist development of the area in question.

Early imperialism theory was clearly a response to and a reflection upon the actual movement of capital out of industrial centers and the return movement of profit, interest, and dividends. While Luxemburg conceived the export of capital as a strong form of exploitation of noncapitalist sectors for the continued reproduction of the central capital, she saw this as a self-destructive process leading to the capitalization of the whole world and the end of external primitive accumulation. For Lenin there was no clear necessary relation between the export of capital and the growth of the central capital, but there was again the prediction that the whole world would be industrialized by capital. Only Bukharin came close to a view later expressed by dependency theorists—seeing capitalism as a single world economy characterized by an unequal division of labor, a raw material-producing periphery, and an industrial center.

After World War II, it became increasingly clear that the world was not becoming more industrialized by capital. On the contrary, the periphery seemed to be declining at an accelerated rate relative to the center. This resulted in the replacement of the "civilizing mission" theory by dependency underdevelopment theory. In that theory, the central power, in this case the United States, appeared as an octopus whose long capitalist tentacles sucked out the wealth of the entire globe in order to feed its own growth. The massive export of U.S. capital to Europe, where it ate up a considerable portion of the industrial economy, and to the Third World, where it took over the major portion of raw material production and reduced large areas to a state of indebtedness and poverty, was characteristic of this period.

From the 1950s to the late 1960s dependency theory flourished, beginning with Baran (1957), carried on and developed by Frank (1967), Amin (1970), Palloix (1971), and Emmanuel (1969)—a model of hierarchical asymmetrical center/periphery relations where the hierarchy itself was considered to be the very definition of world capitalism, that is, with no capacity for change within the capitalist system itself. Then, finally, in the late 1960s, it became apparent that something might be wrong with the hierarchy model. Not all capital movements created underdevelopment in the receiver nations. Imported U.S. capital was found to be largely responsible for the rapid industrial growth of Europe and its increasing competitiveness on the world market. The massive expansion of multinational capital from the center to the periphery created conditions for rapid industrialization in some areas. In fact, exported capital appeared to grow more rapidly than national capital in the case of the United States, and multinational expansion was accompanied by national stagnation.

In reaction to the seeming weakening of the strict national hierarchy structure, there came a wave of research on multinational corporations (MNCs), the declining power of the nation-state, and the flows of direct investment and their effect on local development and industrialization. The fixed and necessary character of center/periphery relations was criticized, and the contradiction between multinational capital and national entities became a focus of analysis. The German school, especially Busch (1974) and Neusüss (1972), have attempted to account for the internationalization of capital by using a model linking differences in productivities (unequal technological development) to export advantages on the world market (increasing positive trade balances) that cause the upward valuation of the national currency, resulting in a need to export capital in order to remain competitive in the world market, where labor time is unequally valued.

The model was similar in effects, if not in causes, to Vernon's (1966) product-cycle model. The only national advantages occur in a specific phase of the cycle where the overvaluation of a national currency permits "unequal exchange" with nations having devalued currencies. To preserve such international exploitation, external political means are required (e.g., the franc zone, Bretton Woods arrangement), and these must necessarily be strained to the limit if international balance of payments shift significantly. The model in itself cannot generate a center periphery structure, but rather seems to imply an oscillation of capital movements, one that has, in effect, been applied only to center nations. The center/periphery relation could be discussed only in terms external to the model of capital reproduction—that is, a specific imperial or colonial structure leading to a specialization in raw material production in a period when industrial accumulation was located in the metropoles only, an absence of capital accumulation, local markets, and a constant "overproduction" of raw materials at low prices linked to a politically fixed undervaluation of local currency. These, however, were all conditions and not part of the necessary structure of capitalism. This fact was implied by Warren, who attempted to show that industrial development was, in fact, beginning in the periphery.

All the above models seem to be descriptively adequate to the periods when they were conceived. But they are clearly of limited application—limited to their immediate historical situation. There is something seriously wrong here. Can it be that Marxists, who have always attacked empiricism, have nonetheless created no more than so many empirical abstractions in lieu of genuine theoretical models? At the moment we find ourselves in the midst of yet another crisis in imperialism theory—between those who hold fast to the hierarchical center periphery model and those who insist that there is a new and increasing capitalist development in the Third World.

The problem, it seems, has very much been that Marxists, just as non-Marxists, have attempted to relate their empirical situation directly to a fixed set of categories instead of attempting to revise the categories themselves, to discover theoretical schemes that might generate their appearance and disappearance as well as other realities past and future. The German school must be credited with at least having attempted to discover the implications of the Marxist model of capital accumulation for the larger world market, but they have found that very little indeed can be deduced about global processes of reproduction from the capitalist model itself. Insofar as they have had that model as a starting point to be elaborated upon instead of the world economy as such, they have been largely unable to address such crucial problems as longer-term flows of capital, hegemonic declines, and changing center/periphery relations.

Every change in the real situation tends to come as a surprise unless we are theoretically prepared for it. Such situations where theory and reality contradict each other ought to lead to the reconstitution of theory. Instead, they have most often led to a hardening of positions—usually reified by differing political standpoints. This in itself may help to distort attempts at explanation in such a way that we are sure to limit the relevance of our theories to particular historical situations that have become eternalized as the evolutionary definition of the "highest stage" of capitalism or even of just plain capitalism in general. Every change in the world economic system has been reflected in a change in dominant theoretical model. And every change in model has implied a change in spokespersons. The old model cannot be given up, and its defense is usually a matter of politics. "Truth" and the "correct line" march hand in hand against the revisionists, right and left deviations, Trotskyists, and bourgeois academics.

Two Case Studies

An excellent example of the political distortion of a theoretical crisis is the response by McMichael, Petras, and Rhodes (1974) to Warren's 1973 article

"Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialisation." Their argument is irrelevant to Warren's principal point. While he essentially tries to document what appears to be a rapid increase in industrial growth in the Third World—though, *of course,* not everywhere, as his critics vehemently exclaim—the latter stress the high rate of exploitation, the enormous debt, the low standard of living, the enclave nature of the economy, and so on. All this is not necessarily in contradiction to Warren's main point, which is simply that there is a tendency for the spread of capital accumulation. Starvation, miserable standards of living, an almost exclusively export-oriented economy, and high rates of exploitation were characteristic of England's early industrialization as well as that of Japan. High consumption per capita is not a measure of capitalist development as such. It is, further, the case that MNCs have played the central role in Third World industrialization, and not local capital, which has been largely blocked by its peripheral world position. There is also an extraordinarily high level of debt and debt-service payments that are a continual source of primitive accumulation. But this does not imply that capitalist industrialization is not occurring—only that it must take a specific form in the periphery. If, after all, the conditions of accumulation today are such that capital flows to the Third World precisely because of the appalling economic and political conditions there, we should have all the more reason to try to understand the specificity of this new tendency in the accumulation process as well as its limits.

It is, of course, evident that Warren presents no comprehensive model of the form of this capitalist development in relation to the previously more hierarchical structure—nor does he have any such overt pretensions. A more serious critique might have attempted to take up the question of total wealth flows, distinguishing between the movement of capital and tendencies for its accumulation and the return flow of profits, and debt service in order to assess the longer-term effects of this process.

The clearest example, it seems to me, of the way in which models can be maintained in the face of a contradictory reality is Poulantzas's 1974 article on the "Internationalisation of Capitalist Relations and the Nation State."

The author seems to make two major assumptions. First, capital is by definition national so that its internationalization is equivalent to the expansion of the nation itself. Second, the principal form of imperialist dominance is the export of capital irrespective, apparently, of where it is accumulated. The fact that U.S. foreign investment has increased from 35 percent to 60 percent of the world total from 1935 to 1960 indicates the absolutely increasing dominance of the United States as the center of the world economy. Furthermore, the fact that this is mostly direct investment, 75 percent today as opposed to 10 percent or less before 1914, when most investment was portfolio, somehow implies that U.S. penetration is that much more complete. Investment in manufacturing increased from 24 percent in 1950 to 40 percent in 1966 as a percentage of total U.S. investment in Europe. Eighty-five percent of that 40 percent has been in the most advanced-technology, high-growth industries that have on the average expanded twice as fast as the average growth rate in Europe. We might even add to Poulantzas's picture Dunning's statistics indicating that between 1957 and 1966, U.S. multinational investment in Europe rose 800 percent while European investment rose only 250 percent and that during roughly the same period, U.S. multinational sales of manufactures rose four times more than European sales. Poulantzas goes on to say that the marked European increase in world export production can similarly be accounted for by U.S. firms in Europe, thus undermining the argument that Europe has become a rival of the United States on the world market.

What is the net effect of all this capital export? For Poulantzas, it means that the United States is taking over Europe. It is, however, a fact that most of Europe has gone through a period of rapid capitalist industrialization, even if it is U.S. capital that accounts for a major portion of it. If multinational capital accumulates within the borders of the receiver nation, it does not necessarily mean that the nation is being sucked dry of wealth to the benefit of the donor nation. It is clearly insufficient to look at the flow of invested capital without taking account of the total reproduction cycle. U.S. export of capital has obviously not led to the increasing accumulation of wealth within its own borders at the expense of receiver nations. In effect, U.S. internal production has stagnated relatively while exported capital has grown rapidly. Multinational assets have grown twice as fast as domestic assets. In 1965, 25 percent of U.S. imports were the products of its own exported capital. It is this global redistribution of manufacturing capital that is the core of the negative balance of payments that appeared at the start of the 1970s and that led in turn to a monetary crisis that has not yet ended.

No one is suggesting that capital has not accumulated at an increasing rate through multinational expansion or any other form of export. But there is clearly a difference between the accumulation of exported capital and the accumulation of capital in the exporting nation. Capital that arrives in a nation employs the labor of that nation and, if successful, accumulates in that nation via reinvestment. Direct investment implies a local expansion of capital. The expansion of capital need not coincide with the growth of any particular gross national product (GNP). This is clearly the case with U.S. expansion in Europe. The latter represented, from the beginning, an area where higher returns on investment could be achieved. The continued accumulation of foreign capital in a target area is not necessarily a mark of increasing dominance of the exporting country or center. It might be a sign of weakness. It certainly implies an increase in competition, growing unemployment in the center, a decline in the center's rate of capital formation—represented in the United States in 1976 as an acute shortage of capital.

"What Happens to Capitalism If We Run Out of Capital?"

If the export of capital means simply the dominance of one nation over another, in imperialist fashion, then Europe would appear to be a very strange sort of periphery. But Poulantzas claims something of that order; that the imperialist chain is being extended to make the United States a superimperialist and Europe a subcenter or periphery. In such a model, Australia might appear near the bottom of the imperialist chain since it is almost entirely dominated by multinational capital. Nevertheless, it is a powerful national economy, a growing industrial producer with a high level of internal consumption and a major exporter of manufactures in Asia. Perhaps Poulantzas would have us say that Australian, or for that matter French, exports are really U.S. (for Australia includes British) exports. The problem is that they are not—first, because they reproduce a multinational capital and not its mother country, and second, because they reproduce a production apparatus in the country from which the goods are exported and not in the country that originally exported the capital.

Poulantzas offers an extreme example of an attempt to reaffirm the octopus model of imperialism precisely at a time when the tentacles are being severed. But it is not necessary to go to the other extreme and to see the whole thing in terms of the rivalry of national capitals. Poulantzas is, in fact, just as "nationalistic" as those he attacks. It is equally as serious an error to reduce international capital to its place of origin as to assume that all capital belongs to the place where it is employed.

WEALTH FLOWS AND CAPITAL REPRODUCTION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY

What is needed if we are to avoid becoming the victims of our own empirical abstractions is a more consistent theoretical model of the functioning of the world economy that takes account of the different kinds of flows and their relation to the distribution of points of capital accumulation over time. Some of the elements that might need to be elaborated in a more complete model are given below.

1. Capital is money that is converted into more money, ultimately by exploiting labor and means of production in order to realize a profit on the

market. Capital can also be accumulated by speculation, unproductive employment, and various other forms of fictitious accumulation, but it is ultimately limited by the rate of real accumulation of productive wealth. It is not itself "national."

2. Any movement of capital from nation A to nation B is a movement of potential power of exploitation and accumulation. Whether or not such accumulation occurs and to what degree depends on conditions of growth of that capital and not the capital itself. Here, all the problems of capital's relation to local reproductive structures are crucially relevant.
3. Very generally, the kinds of reciprocal flows generated by the export of capital are as follows:



Figure 2.1. Center-periphery capital flows

A first issue here is the comparative rates of these flows and the mechanisms that determine how they change over time. The second issue is how these flows are related to accumulation in both A and B.

4. The proportions of the different kinds of capital outflow have changed considerably over time. Earlier, portfolio investment and international loans were crucial, making up 90 percent of the total before 1913, but there has been a constant shift toward direct investment, 25 percent in the 1920s and 75 percent by the 1970s. Portfolio investment resulted in the rapid productive expansion of the nations to which it was exported. England financed the growth of U.S. industry in the late nineteenth century, just as the United States developed European industry after World War II. In both cases this process was accompanied by declining capital formation at home, but then again, by 1840 the cost of building a railway in England was five times higher than in the United States.

Portfolio investment brings back dividends while financing production in the receiver country. In the short run, it means a return flow of monetary wealth, but in the long run, it leads to competition with new and more advanced industrial capital.

Loan capital does not necessarily lead to investment, certainly not at a rate at which loans need to be repaid. English loans to Egypt in the nineteenth century led to the destruction and subordination of that economy. The debt service implied by massive loans can greatly outweigh the local accumulation of capital. This is especially true where a previous deindustrialization has occurred (that is, as the result of previous English expansion on the world market) so that local economic growth depends upon the import of industrial capital, which is minute relative to the loans. In such a case, the nation becomes victim to the classical extraction of wealth described as primitive accumulation by Luxemburg (1968). Such a process occurred in England's relation to the colonial periphery in the nineteenth century and in the U.S. relation to the postcolonial periphery after World War II. Where loan capital arrives to prop up the incorporated colonial elite of a region or to maintain levels of elite consumption in areas of severe decline (Turkey, Egypt, South America, etc.), it may even stimulate the domestic production of the dominant nation.

Loan capital has been a powerful underdeveloper in the past. Its effects again depend upon the conditions in which it functions, that is, its articulation in the reproductive structure of the receiver nation.

5. Direct investment, as in portfolio investment, results in an accumulation of capital. But it implies a form of multinational control and the direct control of production by the managers of the exported capital. In the reverse direction there is a flow of repatriated profit. If the direct investment is to be maintained, however, a share of the profit must be kept in the receiver country. The rate of reproduction of the capital depends on conditions of accumulation in the receiver country relative to the return on capital that might be obtained by redeployment elsewhere.
6. The question of national accumulation depends on the rate at which flows from the larger network are directed toward a particular geographical investment area. Thus, it is clear that the United States and Great Britain, the largest capital exporters of the postwar period, are among the lowest with regard to national accumulation. There seems to be a clearly inverse correlation between the rate of export of capital and the rate of domestic capital formation.
7. The conditions of national accumulation seem to evolve in a rather regular way in the larger system. The two greatest accumulators since the Industrial Revolution have been the United Kingdom and the United States. Internal accumulation in the United Kingdom was initially based on an enclave economy in which export of manufactures accelerated in the eighteenth century and part of the nineteenth while production for internal consumption was stagnant.

Table 2.1. Increase in Production (percentage)

	1700–1750	*1750–1780*
Production for internal consumption	7%	42%
Production for export	76%	209%

Source: W. A. Cole & P. Deane, *British Economic Growth* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 72.

This was followed by internal structural differentiation and the emergence of a large and growing internal market so that export production fell relatively. Enormous capital accumulations were absorbed in nonproductive as well as productive activities. Final consumption increased—from housing, public building, and roads to domestic consumption (at a later date). The net effect was that the cost of production increased (in capitalist terms) relative to other areas of the globe. High levels of consumption—so-called development—is a major cause of the outflow of capital in this system. UK capital flowed out to the rest of the world, especially to the United States. Internal capital formation declined, and there was a capital shortage with respect to productive investment. The costs of new technology could not be met (although invented in England), and it was exported along with capital so that the competitive position of the UK declined and it became less developed. Instead, the import of manufactures increased and the increasing domestic consumption was financed, for a time, by the dividends, the interest on exported capital, and the profit related to the still-dominant merchant navy.

The United States took on the UK's role as the world's workshop and ran through an apparently similar cycle leading from high internal accumulation and export of manufactures to declining growth and the export of capital.

8. This cycle was one that ran from high national accumulation and a high proportion of world production and export of manufactures associated with relatively limited internal consumption (relative to other areas of high production) to a low rate of accumulation and a high rate of export of capital. It was in the latter phase that internal consumption was highest, but it was followed by a weakening national economy, a decline in real wealth, and a shift in the center of accumulation. This process characterized the developments of Britain and the United States. As the level of capital accumulation has increased generally throughout the center of Europe, the United States, and Japan, the degree of competition, internal high consumption, fictitious accumulation, and multinationalization

that normally characterized the single nation now seems applicable to the center as a whole (for example, Japan, with a previously low ratio of development of multinationalization to commodity export, seems now to be reversing that trend). Much of the present structural crisis in the world economy is clearly related to this development—that is, the tendency, small but growing, for the center as a whole to become a consumer of the products of its own exported capital, while producing less itself, leading to a chronic negative balance of payments. If the model outlined above is applicable to the center as a whole, that is, a number of competing nation-states, it would seem to imply the long-term decline of the West and Japan and a shift of accumulation to some other area. The Soviet-East European bloc is, I think, a possible candidate, representing a "socialist" structure of capital accumulation that is potentially cheaper on the world market, but the China-Southeast Asia region might be a more likely target zone for future accumulation, although the kind of model that we have proposed does not predict where new hegemonies are likely to appear. The thesis of shifting centers of accumulation has been cogently argued in an important work by Ekholm (1977, 1987).

9. The longer-term tendencies in the system have been, at the global level, the increasing concentration of capital, first financial and then industrial, so that there has been a gradual shift from the export of money capital to the export of industrial capital. But the export of capital reflects a shift in the central states from industrial to financial accumulation, the inverse of the pattern of export.
10. The effect of national capital accumulation on its own continuation is clearly a major factor in international capital movements. It appears that national accumulation always becomes costly relative to the possibilities afforded by capital export. At the same time as capital is exported (perhaps earlier), it shifts increasingly into speculative and fictitious accumulation at home. The latter is a normal cyclical phenomenon that may in fact be offset by massive capital export if the latter brings back enough money capital in order to maintain credit levels in an increasingly unproductive national economy. A longer-term tendency that spans a number of normal cycles is the internal growth of the national economy itself, which raises costs of reproduction relatively to less developed areas. An enclave economy has, by its high level of exploitation, the best chances for rapid capitalist growth. The more self-centered structure, a necessary development given the consumption possibilities of a wage labor structure and, more generally, of the previously accumulated and internally circulating capital, is also ultimately less profitable in the world market as a whole.

11. It might be suggested here that the model of shifting accumulation is more general than the so-called capitalist mode of production, that is, a model based exclusively on wage labor. On the contrary, it would appear to be applicable to any system in which
   a. The accumulation of capital defined as abstract wealth (a general equivalent or specialized commodity hierarchy, for example, cauries or gold) necessary for local reproduction can be based on a number of relations of exploitation, including wage labor.
   b. The increase and maintenance of accumulation depends very largely on external demand in the long run. → still: Luxemburg
   c. Costs of reproduction are registered directly or indirectly in the market price or total value of the final products. ibid.

Such properties apply to a large number of systems that have existed in the past as well as to our own capitalism. The way in which the properties are linked may vary greatly without, I think, upsetting the general developmental pattern. The same kind of argument might be made for such patterns as the Kondratieff cycle, whose periodicity clearly depends on the specific structure of production, but whose existence is of a more general nature. The study of pre-capitalist systems of accumulation based on capital (the Middle East and the Mediterranean for perhaps the past two thousand years) might teach us a great deal more about the phenomena analyzed above than the study of the specificity of capitalist production based on wage labor. The center/periphery phenomenon and shifts in accumulation might then be seen as processes so general that the emergence of Europe as a center of accumulation could be understood in terms of the development and transformation of its relation to former centers of accumulation in the Middle East, where the emergence of wage-labor capitalism on a large scale is a dependent function of this larger "global" transformation (Lombard 1975).

NOTES

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1. Again, ~~we took up~~ this area of study in the 1970s, long before it was reiterated in the globalization literature.

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Part II

GLOBAL PROCESS AND LONG-TERM CHANGE

The argument for a global systemic anthropology began with the introduction of the centrality of the concept of social reproduction. This concept undermines the notion of local determination, of structural functional totalities and of materialist reductionism. It stresses the dominance of social intentionality in the constitution of material rationality as well as the material constraints, themselves configured by a particular socially dominant structure, on the conditions of existence of that structure. These constraints are the constraints of the field of social reproduction in all its vastness. They concern not only such well-known ecological and technological limits, but also the global or regional limits of a particular social form of reproduction. The question of the origin of particular kinds of social worlds is in this approach one that can be answered only by history. No social structure can be understood in terms of its current conditions of existence, since the latter specify only limits of the possible and not the specific forms that emerge in real time. The critique of functionalism as of reductionist causality follows directly from the analysis of social reproduction. The origin of structure is a question of historical transformation. Within a particular social existence, the past can exist only as representation. The latter is a partial classification within the ever-present contemporaneity of social life. Historical continuity is simply the reproduction of socially structured worlds over time. Of course there are differences that can be demarcated in temporal sequences. But this does not imply discontinuity except for those who stand outside the real process of history and classify them into new and old, before and after, modern and traditional. All such terms are culturally specific in ways that are in fact more expressive of contemporary identities than of historical process. We are not arguing that there is no temporal dimension because all people live only in presents, since the presents are also located in historical time. On the contrary, we are arguing that historical process is all that there is, that social life is a temporal process and that its transformations "take time." This is to say that *there is time in structure, just as there is* *structure in time.* The historical relation between an organization of life and accompanying representations that existed some hundred years ago and contemporary social realities is not one that can be likened to the imposition of a former structure on or in the present. This position sometimes presupposes historical discontinuity, that is, that there are distinct historical structures or cultural models that organize contemporary realities. This is, however, only the case where such past structures are abstracted and reified *in the present* and used or practiced in *present* situations. This is the model of mythopraxis, as when traditionalist social movements seek to impose a contemporary model of the past on the present. Such phenomena do occur, of course, but it would be a mistake to assume that this is the essence of historical process. It is noteworthy that inventionists ("the invention of tradition") make use of an identical model of historical discontinuity in their criticism of cultural politics, claiming that attempts to create a present out of the past or to find a past in the present is simply an error of contemporary understanding. This has now become a generalized notion in some anthropological approaches. It is claimed, for example, that modern witchcraft is entirely a product of the "modern" condition as if the latter were a discrete reality as opposed to nonmodern realities. This notion of discontinuity has found its way into arguments concerning the nostalgia of anthropologists who find real historical continuities in their materials (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000) and who proclaim that even our contemporary capitalism is a new phenomenon, a "millennial capitalism," made just for us, here and now. In this way the contemporary becomes an entirely discontinuous reality made safe for those who claim to be the masters of its understanding.[1]

In the following chapters we argue for a structural and transformational approach to historical process, one in which history is a necessary component of a social reproductive approach where all social processes are temporal, that all organization is the product of temporal stabilization and institutionalization. Most of these chapters, some of which date back to the 1970s and early 1980s, concern long-term historical process, and they make use of archaeological, linguistic, historical, and ethnographic material. They emphasize the critical importance of global and regional relations and processes in the transforming and thus the forming of particular social and political forms. They also stress the long-term continuities and repetitions that characterize historical process, the prevalence of capitalist accumulation, and the prevalence of imperialist organization. Capitalist civilizations can be understood as a family of variations in space and time, in which each particular case is a kind of recombination of invariant elements. The chapters in this part outline some of the most general processes that characterize world system history. It should be noted that historical models are always problematic insofar as they are also representations of a past produced in the present. There is always a potential mythical aspect of historical narratives, but such narratives are unlike the sort of discourse represented by the chapters in this part. Narratives are concrete stories that link events and actors and collect them in strands that lead to a specific end point. Historical narratives are social acts that are part of the ongoing historical process, but they do not constitute the totality of this process. Representations of this kind are embedded in social reproduction and are part, of course, of the object of our analysis. They can never be properly engaged by anthropologists and historians who are investigating what really happened. The truth function of Western historiography is, in this sense, no different from other historical narratives. While they have become bones of contention in recent anthropology, they should not be confused with the kind of accounts that characterize chapters 3–7. The latter are, strictly speaking, not narratives, but models and hypotheses concerning the nature of historical process. They are not claims to historical truth but hypotheses about the way things work. They deal primarily with ancient civilizations, their emergence, and the cycles of expansion and contraction that characterize their history. Chapter 3 is a general theoretical discussion of the contradictory nature of global systems, examining the specific nature of their fragility, the process of growth and decline, and the shift to new centers of development. Chapter 4 presents a hypothesis concerning the emergence of commercial civilization, one that returns to kinship-based polities and analyzes their dynamic tendencies up to the emergence of several variants of imperial and commercial orders. Chapters 5 and 6 represent an early article on the political economy of ancient civilizations and a further development concentrating on the middle and late Bronze Age and the final collapse of the thirteenth century BC. Chapter 7 is a more comparative chapter, in which similarities between contemporary and ancient developmental processes are compared, including here the formation of common categories that enable us to perceive the nature of historical continuity and of historical repetition.

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3

The Study of Risk in Social Systems

An Anthropological Perspective

Kajsa Ekholm Friedman

THE SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RISK

The study of social risk can best be understood in terms of the couple risk/catastrophe. The latter refers to the time-dependent aspect of social development seen from an "as if" perspective. Risk is thus catastrophe in its latent form. Risk research stands in opposition to both fatalism and voluntarism insofar as it is predicated upon the possibility of predicting future catastrophes in order to plan around or against them.

Anthropology's contribution to this kind of research is to lay bare the kinds of risk that have emerged and that emerge in social evolution. The relation between risk and catastrophe can be visualized as shown in figure 3.1.

This diagram presents the field of analysis of social risk in terms of two components. Social catastrophe, which we take to refer to structural disturbances of critical proportions, cannot be understood within the bounds of a given society and its peculiar development. As development is a process that occurs at a global level, any analysis must include two kinds of totalities, *the local society* and *the larger system* in which the latter is integrated.

The study of the future can be meaningful only on the assumption that social change is a lawful process whose properties can be known. This lawfulness, however, is largely due to the fact that social evolution is blind and beyond the grasp of consciousness. Man has never understood, or had control over, the conditions of his social existence. He has thus been the tool rather than the subject and producer of history. It is, in fact, this self-victimization that makes a social science possible. But insofar as the latter can, in its turn, produce knowledge that can be effectively employed in the continual reconstruction


future situation
catastrophe
social structure F
development process
present situation
risk
social structure P

Figure 3.1. The relationship between risk and catastrophe

of social relations, we may ultimately be able to escape the "laws" of history.

The future cannot be a self-contained object of research quite simply because it does not exist. There is no empirical basis for futurology other than in the understanding of the past and the present. The future can be made comprehensible only as part of a general social science, one which has a totalistic perspective that is only barely emerging today. Our basic assumption is that social reality does not consist of autonomous bits and pieces but forms an inclusive totality which today is represented by the world system and which can, I think, be traced back, through smaller global systems, to the very origins of civilization. A general social science has as its field the development of global systems over time as well as precivilized systems that have traditionally been the province of anthropology and archaeology. This field straddles a number of present academic divisions whose isolation can only be a hindrance to the kind of research necessary in such an approach. A general social science, in overcoming such divisions, would enable us to arrive at a clearer perspective of our own present and future (figure 3.2).

The results of futurological research have not been exactly impressive. Constructions of the future have usually been so vague that they cannot be shown to be false. Where they *have* been more precise, they have often been wrong.


the future
the present
Development process
the past
The larger social system
General social science
Futurology
Social Sciences
History
Archaeology

Figure 3.2. The relationship between the social totality in time/space and academic fragmentation

One of the most significant kinds of error can be found in M. A. Adelman's forecast in 1969 that the price of crude oil would continue to fall throughout the 1970s and that Middle Eastern countries would never be able to overcome their internal conflicts in order to arrive at a common policy. We need not comment upon this painfully typical misjudgment in order to see that there are fundamental problems with the kinds of projections made. The critical weakness of most futurological research is that it consists essentially of projecting current trends into the future without providing any analysis of the mechanisms that might generate them. Without an adequate theory of the dynamics of the present social system we are as likely as not to make projections that are false.

In order to predict the trajectory of a social structure, we need a precise description or model of the structure at time *p* and at time *f* in the future as well as a model of the developmental process connecting the two structures. It might appear that, since we are dealing with one and the same society, the mechanisms of change ought to be endogenous. We shall be suggesting that this is not the case; that societies participate in larger systems of reproduction, which largely determine both their conditions of existence and the direction and form of their development. In order to grasp the nature of global processes, we need models for both society, the politically bounded unit, and for the global system.

SOCIETY

There are already numerous models of society as a totality. Typical for social anthropology is the classic structural functionalist model dividing social reality into ecology, economy, social structure, and ideology or religion. Historical materialism maintains categories similar to those of cultural materialism. Structural functionalism merely contends that the parts form an integrated system, whereas materialism tends to envisage all levels as functions, in one sense or another, of the economy or forces of production. Some Marxist models also include the importance of internal contradictions as the motor of development, but for most of them, contradictions are mere dysfunctions caused by the development of the forces of production. Although the materialist model is, I think, seriously flawed due to its focus on the individual society as a sufficient unit of explanation, there are clearly aspects of both this model and the more general structural functionalist approach that can be redeployed. It is necessary in the construction of models of society to grasp the interrelatedness of processes, from the socialization of individuals to the interaction of economy and state (where such categories exist) in terms of social reproduction. In such a framework, society is understood as open to a larger process, and its internal structure is constituted by relations among institutions as well as among the human-mediated processes of construction and destruction of institutions.

GLOBAL SYSTEMS

Totalistic models of global politico-economic systems have been emerging in a number of fields, including anthropology and archaeology (Ekholm 1976, 1980; Friedman 1976, 1978; Ekholm and Friedman 1979, 1980; Kohl 1978), economic history (Braudel 1973, 1977; Wallerstein 1974, 1980; Lombard 1975), and economics (Frank 1978, Busch 1974, Schoeller 1976, Fröbel, Heinrichs, and Kreye 1977). Even within system theory there has been work on a formal model of contradictory global systems (Barel 1969).

From the emergence of the earliest civilizations (i.e., Mesopotamia 3000 BC) we find ample evidence of larger economic systems (Ekholm and Friedman 1979, Kohl 1978). In fact, it can be argued that civilization is largely coterminous with the emergence of center/periphery structures in which highly developed polities producing manufactured goods on a mass scale exchange with relatively underdeveloped zones that produce largely raw materials. The perseverance of such regional inequalities throughout civilized history is rooted in the nature of development itself. The latter has never been based on exclusively local resources, but upon what might be called a *supralocal environment*. Civilization is a machine for the transformation of raw materials from a large region into finished products at one location within that region. The definition of the center is thus simultaneously the definition of an underdeveloped periphery. The essential characteristic of social evolution has been the discontinuous shifting of centers of development from one geographical area to another. There are always center/periphery relations, but they have never been geographically stable. Areas that have experienced high culture have also had their dark ages and have been peripheries to other centers (figure 3.3).



Figure 3.3. Two aspects of development: general evolution versus local discontinuity

Thus social evolution can be understood in terms of two essential aspects: a general growth in scale and complexity as a continuous process, and a local discontinuity that takes the form of geographically shifting rises and falls. Regional discontinuity results from the loss of control by centers over their supralocal resource base. In order to maintain such control, centers of civilization need to maintain a monopoly over industrial production in the larger system. The centralized conversion of a region's raw materials into re-exportable finished goods is possible only if the periphery has no other access to such manufactures. In spite of the monopoly basis of this fundamentally unequal redistributive system, there has always been a tendency to a decentralization of manufacturing in the long run. In his description of the Roman Empire, Walbank (1969:50) uses the very words *decentralization of industrial production* to the provinces in his analysis of the undermining of the power of Rome. Decentralization need not be the direct result of the export of capital or of real production. The economic expansion of Western Europe after AD 900 consisted in setting up the same types of industries as could be found in the dominant Arab centers of the period, that is, textiles, glass, and paper. The Middle Eastern connection is evident here, and the European export to the same markets as those once monopolized by the Arabs seems clearly related to the contraction that overcame the Middle East in the 1100s. Although the Arabs played a role in this decentralization, especially in the Mediterranean and Spain, credit is due to the Europeans themselves.

The loss of monopoly over industrial production implies (1) loss of central position, which (2) leads to loss of supralocal environment, which (3) leads to a decline in production in the center, which (4) leads to a process of underdevelopment and decline in living standard.

The decentralization of production in the larger system is, then, equivalent to the decline of the center. The latter takes the form of a series of crises. First there is marked increase in the level of competition in the system as a whole, a competition wherein the center is at a great disadvantage due to its high costs of production. This is accompanied and followed by a series of social crises, class and other conflicts among social groups, and, ultimately, that radical transformation of society that has sometimes been described as the advent of the dark ages.

THE LEFT AND THE FUTURE

The Left critique of futurological research is founded on the association of state planning in capitalism with an attempt to adapt national societal structures to the needs of capital in crisis. As such, it can be no more than an ideological or political exercise in social control rather than a real contribution to social problem solving. In a recent work (Dencik and Dencik 1976) such criticisms are combined with a blind faith in the natural evolution of capitalism to socialism. "How can the route be altered when the train is already in motion and we are on it" (Dencik and Dencik 1976:297).

For historical materialists and orthodox Marxist economists there is no need to research the possibilities of the future since it is given by definition. No change is necessary; we need only wait for the socialist millennium, which must necessarily arise from the ashes of the present capitalist world crisis. If any action is necessary, it is that which might hasten the crisis and the final transformation. The ideological basis of this kind of analysis is that social development is essentially a national phenomenon and well within the potential control of the nation-state and that socialism is the necessary outcome of capitalist decline. Because the larger system is not taken into consideration, the possibility of economic devolution and misery is not even included within the realm of discourse.

When it is realized that the present crisis of the West is not simply another depression or a contradiction of capital accumulation within each Western nation, but the expression of a shift of capital accumulation out of the West as a whole and a decentralization of world accumulation, then the whole question of the development of socialism is upstaged by the impending threat of poverty.

It is often assumed that the state is somehow identical with the interests of capital, especially in "late capitalism." Although this may sometimes be the case in terms of strategic decisions, it is absurd to suggest that the nation-state as an institution exists in a harmonic relation to capital. The multinationalization of capital is, as we have suggested, the essential process behind the present crisis of the state in the West. The reproduction of capital is, in fact, secured by its non-identity with the state, that is, its possibility of free mobility in the world. State-controlled forms of accumulation, as in state capitalism or Soviet-type economies, are successful only to the extent that they, too, maintain their position in the world market. The nationalization of capitalist industries in periods of crisis is not, in our analysis, a progressive step. Capital moves out because it cannot survive at home. Its nationalization only proves the point.

Structural Crises and Economic Regression

When we speak of expansion and contraction, we refer to economic phenomena. While some kinds of societies are so placed in larger systems that they have been able to reproduce themselves and expand on the basis of trade profits alone (that is, the medieval Italian cities), their very existence has depended upon the fact that most societies base their development on the expansion of production. Historical materialism is certainly correct in insisting that production is the basis of the entire social formation. But this is only half the story. We must also ask what it is that determines the economic base. At least since the emergence of civilization, it is safely said that the productive base of society is a great deal more fragile than in primitive conditions. History is full of examples where the economic base of society has simply vanished. The reason for this is that the reproduction of production depends upon factors beyond the direct control of society, that is, upon supralocal exchange. Sweden as a subunit of the world system is above all an import-export node whose continued existence depends upon the maintenance of crucial ratios of exchange.

Production and trade are equally necessary parts of the same structure, although production is local whereas trade is supralocal. However, international exchange is the weak link in the structure insofar as its stability, which is not a simple effect of production, determines the conditions of functioning of the producing society. This is related to the fact that economic reproduction is intimately dependent upon the combination of export production and a supralocal resource base. Sweden exports approximately 40 percent of its industrial output. It would thus appear to be more dependent on the world market than countries such as the United States or the countries of the former Soviet Union. This quantitative difference does not change the structural necessity of industrial export for economic development. Production for the home market is structurally secondary to the export sector. This might explain why decline in external trade cannot be meaningfully offset by expanding home markets. Keynesian policies seem to function only in periods when external markets are expanding. The evidence is clear for Europe.

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN SWEDEN

After World War II, Western Europe experienced a rapid economic growth, largely due to the massive import of American capital and the expansion of the world market. For the first two decades it was truly a seller's market (Norgren and Norgren 1970:12). From the beginning of the 1960s, however, this expansion slowed, leading to increasing competition within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In order to increase competitiveness, the Swedish government undertook a program of structural rationalization, the reduction in the number and increase in the size of enterprises and their geographical concentration to a few locations, resulting in widespread demographic and social dislocation. This reorganization did not,

Table 3.1. Sweden's Volume of Production 1969–75 (Index 1968 = 100)

Year	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Production	107	114	115	118	127	134	131

Source: Statistical Yearbook 1976, p. 140

however, overcome the fundamental problems of higher costs, and from 1975 production began to decline (table 3.1).

In 1976, factories began to close down at an alarming rate and export industries ran into great difficulties. Rising relative costs of production combined with technological changes that lowered the necessary qualifications of labor (e.g., in special steel) are the main factors that shook the entire Western world. An essential element in the decline of production in Sweden is the export of capital. In a report from 1976, the Swedish LO (Confederation of Trade Unions) states that Swedish foreign investments did not lead to increasing demand in Sweden since foreign branches tended to buy from non-Swedish firms rather than from the mother company. The report also shows that although Swedish direct foreign investment had increased by a factor of five in the past fifteen years, foreign investment in Sweden had all but stagnated (LO-Kongressen 1976:131) (figure 3.4).



Figure 3.4. Swedish direct foreign investment (LO-Kongressen 1976:132)

The statistics from 1976 demonstrate a clear continuation of the above trends. Foreign investment in Sweden declined by 95 million kronor in current prices, and the export of capital soared to new heights. This trend is quite normal: if Swedish capital moves out to avoid rising costs, there is no reason that foreign capital should take its place in this increasingly disadvantageous position. There is a general tendency for capital that produces world market goods to move to areas of low costs. But there is also a tendency to set up production in areas, especially within the West, where increasing competition has made it necessary to protect former export markets. This is also a cost-reducing mechanism that accounts for the high level of direct investment in the United States, Germany, England, and Denmark.

As the deindustrialization of Sweden continues, the state loses income at the same time as costs are increasing, placing a heavy burden on the welfare system. Unemployment will certainly become a problem. Conflicts between classes and between ethnic groups will be exacerbated. Alcoholism, drug use, and criminality will all be on the rise. The stability of the social order will be placed in serious jeopardy. Social catastrophe is just around the corner from the economic miracle (SOU 1975).

THE GENERAL PATTERN OF ECONOMIC REGRESSION

To get some idea of the direction of economic regression today, we can look to similar processes in earlier periods of history.

Deindustrialization

This is the beginning of an end. It is, as we have said, not a local process, but a local expression of the shift of centers of accumulation. It results from successful competition from newly rising industrial centers whose costs of production are significantly lower, and which, historically, have often been located in former peripheral zones. The high costs of production in the center are themselves mere expressions of development as such. They reflect high levels of consumption, a differentiation of activities in a direction leading to a high ratio of nonproducers to producers, a great deal of money in circulation relative to real production, and so on. The decline of industrial production in the Middle East during the period 1000 through the 1100s was largely due to increasing competition from Western Europe which had, until that period, been a raw material and slave exporting periphery of the Arab-dominated world economy. The continuing decline of the Middle East was not, of course, a smooth process but led to a crisis in the system as a whole, including Europe.

Technological Regression

Insofar as developed technological processes depend on the presence of a supralocal resource base, the disappearance of the latter leads to real regression in the former. One of the earliest examples of such a process occurs in the Old World crisis of 2300–2200 BC, when bronze vanished and was replaced by cold-hammered copper in Mesopotamia, the result of the breakdown of the tin trade. The more advanced the technology, the more dependent it tends to be upon external resources. Even the agricultural base of today's Western societies has become technologically dependent on its center position in the world economy.

Ecological Crisis

Economic crisis is usually associated with ecological crisis. This is primarily because it becomes simply too costly to offset the destructive effects of technological intensification, a possibility that still exists in periods of expansion. England was able to change from wood to coal as an energy base during the Industrial Revolution, an ecological crisis that never materialized. Our own ecological crisis, however, is part of a much larger economic crisis. The ecological destruction of Southern Mesopotamia at the end of the third millennium BC was largely the result of salinization caused by intensive irrigation. It is sometimes implied that this salinization was the major cause of the Mesopotamian crisis of about 2300 BC. We would suggest, however, that it was the effect of an overintensified and overstrained economy. Ecological crises can be overcome only in expansive economic conditions.

Demographic Crisis

When the economy crumbles, the former balance between population and resources is suddenly disturbed. Overpopulation is not an absolute phenomenon but can be understood only as a relation to a systemically determined economic base. It is more the product of declining resources than of increasing population. Carrying capacity is a socially organized threshold and not a simple techno-ecological phenomenon. The cannibalism reported from many areas of the so-called primitive world by early travelers is to a large extent the result of economic collapse following in the footsteps of European expansion. Where the social organizational basis of production disintegrates, as it did for large parts of Africa and the Americas, decline is often violent. If such relatively small-scale systems collapsed with such bloodshed, we can only speculate on the catastrophic effects of a declining high civilization such as our own.

Social Relations

A traditional explanation for the fall of civilization is the so-called barbarian invasions. Closer analysis, however, usually reveals that civilizations are perfectly capable of self-destruction without outside help. In fact, many so-called invasions are no more than the apparent form of regional conflicts within the same system (often between hegemonic centers and their former clients or even peripheries). Imperial structures are prone to dissolution when the financial means of their maintenance fades. The result is a feudalization or fragmentation of the former power structure, a process all too familiar from the decline of the Roman Empire. The self-contradictory structure of the system becomes clear in periods of crisis. Warfare between central states is accompanied and followed by internal war between classes, estates, and/or other opposed groups. Even interindividual relations are placed in jeopardy. Societies are not mere victims of crises in larger systems. They seem rather to take the latter as cues to begin dismembering themselves.

Science and Ideology

It is to be expected that economic regression will effect a general cultural disintegration, especially as the latter takes the form of institutional organizations that have a certain cost of maintenance. Scientific research tends to become too expensive to maintain, and general standards decline. There are many historical examples of the emigration of the technical and cultural core of a society to areas where conditions of existence are better. In the period of the decline of classical Athens and the rise of the Hellenistic states, there is an exodus of large numbers of handicraft masters and intellectuals to the more prosperous cities of the Orient. Today, there is a tendency for qualified individuals in semi-peripheral developing areas to receive increasing amounts of outflowing capital. As the head of a leading Swedish chemical company remarked with respect to recent plans to establish a research institute in India, "An Indian researcher costs a fifth of a Swedish researcher" (Dagens Industri: 1977). Insofar as cultural organization as well as scientific research is reproduced by the economy, it, too, disappears in periods of decline.

There is not only a decline of scientific activity but a general disintegration of the organization of knowledge. Literacy disappears, the means of recording is



Figure 3.5. General model of the contemporary global arena

often lost, and anti-rational cults may emerge that invoke supernatural forces in an attempt to understand and control a reality that has become uncontrollable.

The Modern Global System

The center/periphery structure of the world system today is similar to that of previous periods, but it is very much larger in scale. The center is divided into a "private" capitalist Western bloc including the United States, Japan, and Western Europe, and a state capitalist or "socialist" Eastern bloc including the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (excluding Yugoslavia and perhaps Poland, which has been peripheralized in the past decade). Each bloc has its own periphery with which it exchanges manufactures for raw materials and where the arms trade has been and is the leading sector (figure 3.5).

China has had a special position in this system insofar as it remained, for a number of years, closed to the rest of the world economy in its attempt to develop itself on the basis of its own resources. This closure, of course, was a political act that occurred after more than a century of peripheralization within the Western-dominated world economy, and it has now ended abruptly since the replacement of the Maoist regime. Although at present a periphery of sorts, it contains a whole world economy within itself and has the potential to rise to center status.

The above representation of the system is inaccurate insofar as it is static and does not contain the mechanisms causing crisis, shifts in power, and structural transformation. Its usefulness lies only in the simultaneous presentation of a number of fundamental relations within one global structure. Three basic kinds of relations are expressed here:

1. Relations within the West, between Western Europe, Japan, and the United States
2. Relations between West and East, between the two competing blocs in the center
3. Relations between center and periphery

It is in the examination of these relations that changes in position can be detected. Our central hypothesis is that the West is currently losing its center position and that this is due to a decentralization of industrial production in the system as a whole beyond limits compatible with the maintenance of a center/periphery structure. The processes involved here deal a severe blow to dependency theories of imperialism that exclude decentralization by definition. Here, after all, we have a developing situation in which it is no longer clear that the center is still the center and the periphery still peripheral.

At the same time as industrial development has accelerated in certain parts of the Third World, the West has been plagued by a growing economic crisis, one that began to take on serious proportions at the end of the 1960s. Its most obvious expression has been a contraction in the industrial sector, a phenomenon noticed by both Marxists and non-Marxists:

> The classic definition of an economic crisis under capitalism is an interruption to production and to the process of growth. This happened in 1974—the first time since 1945 that economic activity declined in all parts of the capitalist economy simultaneously. A period of generalized recession began, which was expected to last until the end of 1975. (Gamble and Walton 1976:6)

This decline, however, did not reverse itself at the end of 1975, nor in 1976, and it does not appear that an upswing is imminent today. The immediate cause of the crisis, of course, is not a decline in production, but a contraction in markets for final consumption. Increasing unemployment follows from declining production, whether disguised or not. Inflation is another symptom, increasing from low levels in the 1950s and 1960s to an average of over 10 percent in the 1970s. In the UK, it rose to 19 percent in 1974 and 27 percent in 1975. Finally, there has been a general decrease in real income and a liquidity squeeze that has led to increasing use of credit in a situation that could only provoke a catastrophically high level of debt in consumer, producer, and state spheres. The result is the economic crisis of the state as well as of the individual. The working-class reaction to crisis, via strikes and higher wages, has been totally offset by the general inflation.

The wave of U.S. investment in low-wage zones came in the period between 1958 and 1967. It began with simpler forms of industry: shoes, textiles, leather goods, and electronic assembly. The products were re-exported to the United States, where they outcompeted home production. In Lynn, Massachusetts, for example, the number of shoe factories was reduced from thirty-six to twelve (Barnet and Miller 1975:157). There is a vicious circle that leads from the export of industrial capital to the decline of home production (via cheaper imports) to a demand for increasingly cheaper imports when incomes decline (Roberts 1975:94).

> As inflation racked the United States in the late 1960s, billions of dollars' worth of foreign goods poured into the American market; higher-priced U.S. goods found it increasingly difficult to meet competition in foreign markets, the inflated dollar grew weaker and weaker, periodically upsetting the international monetary system. (Roberts 1975:94)

The first wave of foreign direct investment so weakened the central economies that it created the conditions for the massive outpouring of more advanced productive capital in the 1970s. Rapid technological developments, themselves the outcome of increasing competition, are instrumental here. Forms of production, such as that for special steel, that formerly required highly skilled labor can now be organized using unskilled labor (and computer technology) in more backward areas. Industrial capital finds itself forced to move to cheaper areas in order to survive. The result is a deindustrialization of important sectors of the Western economy.

DECENTRALIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: GENERALITIES

Industrial decentralization is nothing new in the history of capitalism. In 1820, the UK stood for approximately 50 percent of the world's industrial production. Following this, production decentralized rapidly, largely as a result of English investment in Europe, Russia, and the United States. Swedish industrial development in the nineteenth century is largely a product of British investment. A principal reason for large-scale export of capital is the emergence of profit gradient linking a rich and increasingly expensive center to poorer and cheaper peripheral areas. By 1870, the British share of world production had fallen somewhat to a still sizable 32 percent, but now the United States and Germany had become major competitors. This early decentralization of industrial accumulation led to the first of industrial competitions, the elaboration of colonial empire and the major confrontation of World War I.

Table 3.2. Average Annual Growth of Gross National Product (GNP), 1950–73

	GNP			
Country	*1950–60*	*1960–65*	*1965–70*	*1965–73*
USA	3.3	4.9	3.5	3.5
Belgium	3.0	5.2	4.9	5.0
France	4.4	5.9	5.8	5.8
Holland	4.5	5.1	6.0	5.6
Italy	6.1	5.1	6.0	4.9
England	2.8	3.3	2.5	2.5
Sweden	3.4	5.1	3.9	3.1
Switzerland	4.4	5.1	3.6	4.0
West Germany	7.9	5.0	4.8	4.6
Japan	8.7	10.2	12.4	10.8

Source: World Tables, 1976, p. 398

By the end of World War II, the United States had largely taken over the position occupied by Britain in the nineteenth century. The emergent U.S. hegemony was highly predicated on the destruction of large parts of both European and Japanese industry. A new wave of decentralization began immediately. By 1950, U.S. investment abroad had risen to $1.7 billion. In 1959 it stood at $5.3 billion, and in 1969 it was as high as $21.6 billion. There was a marked economic growth in this period, especially in Europe and Japan. The United States was much weaker, experiencing a number of recessions (table 3.2).

From 1899 to 1957 there was a general decentralization of production in the world. This can be expressed (table 3.3) in the comparative percentages of the world market for industrial manufactures. In 1899, Great Britain controlled 33 percent of the world market, Germany 22 percent, and France 14 percent. By 1967, export production was significantly redistributed. The above three countries' share of the market has fallen from 69 percent to 39 percent, that is, a 30 percent decline. The United States now had 20 percent, Italy 7 percent, and Japan 10 percent. The category "others" had increased its share from 13 percent to 22 percent. There were also some important shifts in ranking. The United States increased its share until 1950 but then began to decline. For both Britain and France, there was a continual decline. Between 1950 and 1970 West Germany, Italy, and Japan made the most headway on the world market.

It appears that at first the decentralization of production was limitless and unproblematic, but this, of course, could continue only so long as the capacity of the market increased. After 1960, the limits of expansion began to make themselves felt. Competition increased at the same time as capital was exported at an accelerating rate. Although more regions of the world entered the supply

Table 3.3. Share of the World Export Market for Industrial Manufactured Goods

	Share of World Export Market (%)					
Country	*1899*	*1913*	*1929*	*1937*	*1950*	*1967*
USA	11.7	13.0	20.4	19.2	26.6	20.6
UK	33.2	30.2	22.4	20.9	24.6	11.9
Germany	22.4	26.6	20.5	21.8	7.0*	19.7*
France	14.4	12.1	10.9	5.8	9.6	8.5
Italy	3.6	3.3	3.7	3.5	3.6	7.0
Japan	1.5	2.3	3.9	6.9	3.4	9.9
others	13.2	12.5	18.2	21.9	25.2	22.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Magdoff 1974, p. 283

* 1950 and 1967 values for Germany refer to West Germany only. In 1937, the West German share was approximately 16.5%

side, there was a decrease in the number of firms in the center's industry and a centralization of the capital that remained.

There are three main types of foreign direct investment: (1) in raw material production, (2) to protect former export markets in conditions of increasing competition, and (3) in areas with lower production costs for industry.

The first type of investment corresponds to the classical form of imperialist structure and need not interest us here. The second type has increased dramatically since the 1960s and is largely a response to decentralization itself (the third type), especially within the center where the major consumer markets are located. The third type of investment is the fundamental mechanism behind industrial decentralization, since it lays the foundation of the export of direct investment from the center as a whole.

THE MOVEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION FROM CENTER TO PERIPHERY

Until quite recently, dependency theory reigned supreme. Underdevelopment was accounted for in terms of the bond between periphery and center. It was, and is still, assumed by many that the development of the Third World depends on breaking the link to the West and that if this does not occur, the only result can be increasing polarization between the poor and rich nations. Third World ideologists, representatives of emerging upper classes, have tended to make dependency theory into a new dogma geared to the forced transfer of wealth from the West to the rest (the New Economic Order). It is ironic that this

Table 3.4. Average Annual Growth of Industrial Production 1937–59

Country	*Average Annual Growth* *1937–50*	*1950–55*	*1955–57*	*1937–57*
North America	5.2	4.5	1.9	4.7
Western Europe	1.7	7.1	4.9	3.3
Oceania	4.3	5.2	4.9	4.6
Latin America	5.2	5.3	5.6	5.3
Asia	−0.6	12.4	16.0	4.1
Total	3.6	5.7	3.9	4.2

Source: Warren 1973

development should occur in a period when the dependency model is being falsified by the expansion of industry in the periphery (Friedman 1978). As far back as 1973, Warren analyzed what appeared to be a reversal of the underdevelopment trend (Warren 1973). He showed that while there has been a slow increase in the share of Latin America, Asia, and Africa in world industrial production since 1937 (from one-ninth to one-seventh that of the West), industrial growth in the Third World began to accelerate in the 1950s. While, for example, U.S. growth from 1955 to 1957 averaged only 2 percent per year, Asia had an annual growth of 16 percent. Throughout the 1950s, in fact, Asia was by far the fastest-growing economic region (table 3.4).

From 1951 to 1969 the distribution of industrial expansion in the periphery was not, of course, an even one. It was limited to a number of countries in Asia and Latin America with average annual industrial production growth rates for 1951–1969 as follows (Warren 1973): Brazil, 7.8 percent; Iran, 11.2 percent; South Korea, 16.9 percent; Singapore, 14.8 percent; Thailand, 8.7 percent; Taiwan, 14.8 percent; and Venezuela, 10.5 percent.

Industrial production as a share of total production has also increased significantly, from 14.5 percent in 1950–1954 to 17.9 percent in 1960–1964. The latter figure is almost two-thirds that of the developed capitalist world (31.3 percent), an indication of the degree to which the Third World has developed an industrially based economy. It has also been shown that industrial export has grown faster in the periphery than in the center in the 1960s; 14.3 percent against 10.8 percent. The export of machinery and transport equipment has grown by nearly 20 percent (Adam 1975:99). This development indicates that there is indeed a decentralization of world industrial production, one that must be included in any model of the world economy that hopes to go beyond the simple structural description of a particular historical period (see also Rowthorn 1971).

MECHANISMS AND PHASES IN THIRD-WORLD INDUSTRIALIZATION

At the end of World War II, the United States was the world's dominant industrial nation. It had, however, two major competitors in the world arena: a weakened Europe and the USSR. From the end of the 1940s the United States attempted to take over large portions of the former colonialized zones. It was also necessary to contend with the then-expanding politico-economic power of the USSR. Large sums of money in the form of aid found their way to selected areas. Gifts of arms were also a crucial method of gaining clients throughout the world. In the case of Iran, for example, where the United States outmaneuvered the UK for control and where Soviet troops were never far away, large sums of American money began to flow into the country from 1949 onward. Iran turned into a powerful military machine that, by the 1970s, with the emergence of OPEC, was undergoing a rapid industrialization.

Aside from the flow of money and arms, the usual import of cheap raw materials was maintained in this period. The major forms of new industries were those aimed at local consumer markets. From the 1960s onward, the pattern changed. Now industrial production exported to the periphery was dependent on Western mass markets. It began first with the export of simpler forms of technology and then was supplemented by the movement of more advanced production. The reason for these changes can be found in the increasing competition in the center, which was itself a result of the decentralization that occurred there. Since it was the United Kingdom and the United States that were the least competitive in terms of home production, these two countries were the major exporters of capital to low-wage zones (table 3.5).

Table 3.5. Expansion of Sales (%) 1957–65 Accounted for by Manufacturing Firms

Country	*Exports*	*Overseas Production*	*Overseas Sales*
USA	2	13	15
UK	12	20	32
France	6	1	7
Germany	14	2	16
Italy	24	5	30
Netherlands	27	17	43
Canada	33	13	46
Japan	17	2	20

Source: Rowthorn 1971, table 22

The export of capital was accompanied by, and expressive of, stagnation at home. The first recipients were small countries such as South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, all under close Western supervision. Later, larger and more independent lands such as India and Brazil became important investment areas. Adam (1975:98) has argued forcefully that technology has developed in such a way that "almost anything can be produced in any country," resulting in a tendency toward a global reorganization of production that is apparently self-reinforcing. While Adam interprets this as a qualitatively new phenomenon, we would argue that it is merely an expression of a general shift in world accumulation. The driving force here is the vicious circle leading from increasing multinationalization to stagnation in the center to accelerating multinationalization. A decade ago it could be argued that the center could still maintain a monopoly over advanced sectors of production. This was, and still is, seen by some as a basic characteristic of continuing imperialism. All that is changing rapidly today. It has been contended for some years that "modern technology in some industries is such that relatively unskilled labor can be combined with fairly sophisticated equipment" (U.S. Tariff Commission 1973:118). Today, large sectors of the West's mass consumption industries are moving out: textiles, clothing, electronics, and automobiles. The age of the private multinational giant is not merely a further evolution of capitalist organization, but part of a major decentering of the world economy. The tendency is strong enough to affect even state-owned industries. Sveteco, the Swedish state-owned textile industry, decided in 1977 to move production to South Korea in order to escape the high Swedish wage level. A state in economic crisis because of the decline in national production must ultimately be forced to act as a private capitalist.

THE CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES OF THIRD-WORLD INDUSTRIALIZATION

That the West shall continue to grow richer while the Third World sinks deeper into the depths of poverty is a fundamental assumption of standard imperialism theory. Amin (1974), for example, distinguishes between capitalism in the center, which developed internally, and capitalism in the periphery, which is merely an externally implanted appendage to the center's self-centered economy. We have indicated that this is an ideological representation in which both capitalism and imperialism are essentially Western phenomena, so that the expulsion of Europeans and Americans and their replacement by a local elite should solve the problem of underdevelopment. Such a model of reality is more than coincidentally suited to the emerging elites themselves.

The classical model is also absolutely static since the center/periphery structure is included within the very definition of capitalism. The only development in this approach is increasing polarization. Although authors such as Amin (1974) and Palloix (1975) have recognized that there has been industrial development in some parts of the periphery, they can only interpret this as an expression of increasing exploitation by the West. For Palloix (1975), what is, in fact, a massive export of productive capital appears as a means for the center to rid itself of traditional (backward technological) industries while maintaining a monopoly over the most advanced sectors. But as we indicated earlier, this is no longer the case. Secondly, it seems to have gone unnoticed that the so-called traditional industries are, in fact, the major mass-consumption suppliers. The control over advanced nuclear technology is insignificant economically when compared with the textile or automobile industries.

Finally, the significance of industrialization in the Third World is minimized because it is connected to the world instead of the national market. As the growth is not based on internal consumption, it is notc onsidered to be real capitalist growth. Thus, it has been suggested that Brazil's mass consumption is restricted to only 2.5 percent of the population (Annerstedt and Gustafsson 1976:114) and that while the elite (1 percent of the population) saw a 112 percent increase in per capita income in the 1960s, the lower half of the population saw an increase of only 7.5 percent. But to use facts to argue against the existence of industrial development by comparing it with the internal mass markets of today's West is absurd. The industrialization of Britain was not based on internal mass consumption. On the contrary, it was more dependent on a single leading export sector, the textile industry, whose markets were for the most part not only outside of Britain, but also outside of Europe. The Industrial Revolution was systemically linked to the mass poverty of a growing semi-employed proletariat.

The general pattern to be found in industrializing areas of the Third World is one that combines an almost exclusive export orientation with mass underconsumption. The latter is not a sign of weakness, but the basis for the attraction of capital. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, while maintaining significantly higher standards of social security, have a similarly low level of internal consumption. In both cases, low consumption is equivalent to cheaper costs of production, something that has proved to be an important competitive advantage in the world market, both for the sale of goods and the attraction of capital.

The increasing industrialization of the Third World, via multinational production or other forms of capital export, does not imply a simple shift in center. On the contrary, the movement is contradictory in its essence and tends toward a general crisis of overproduction on a world scale. The process can be summarized as follows:

1. A general contraction in the size of the center's export market is effected by the earliest type of capital export, which takes the form of import substitution industries. This begins with simple consumption goods such as cloth, shoes, soap, cooking oils, and so on and advances to more sophisticated goods.
2. The differentiation of costs of production in the world market is the basis for the general increase of multinational production. High profits and rates of investment in low-cost zones results in a combined increase of multinational and decrease in national production for the center. The former increase is greater than the latter decrease, of course, given the advantages of low-cost production. As a result, there is a rapid increase in the number of producing areas and total products on the market. But since the basis of this expansion is low wages, it remains largely dependent upon the Western market. But the latter is either stagnating or contracting due to the lack of investment and to industrial decline in significant sectors. The reality of this situation is only forestalled by the generation of great amounts of credit and fictitious capital, which add fuel to the fire in the long run.
3. Increasing production in the periphery (some members of which are now classified as semi-peripheral) and a stagnating Western market lead to even more competition, especially in the West, which is at the greatest disadvantage. This is abetted by growing tendencies in the Third World for the emergence of new market connections, a further contraction of the center's export possibilities. The result is a further increase in the export of industrial capital and an amplification of the whole contradictory process.

Thus, the acceleration of multinational production, or the decentralization of production in general, accelerates the growing contradiction between total supply and total buying power. Underconsumption, the basis of lower costs, increases the competitiveness of the individual firm, but it undermines the expansion of the market. An eventual crisis of the Western economy, then, will drag its periphery along with it.

NOTE ON THE OIL CRISIS

In terms of the perspective presented here, the oil crisis does not appear as a mere random event that suddenly changed the conditions of operation of the world economy. Rather, it is one of the essential discontinuities or "catastrophes" in the continuous process of decentralization of capital accumulation. First, the initial price rises on crude oil began before the activities of OPEC in

1973, and it is known that the big oil multinationals had a major role in subsequent developments. However, it is also clear that there has been a gradual shift of control away from the oil companies who owned 90 percent of the Middle East's production at the start and now own only 20 percent. The emergent politico-economic power of OPEC is itself an indication of the loss of control by the central powers over their economic conditions of reproduction:

> Even in the case of the oil prices, the declining world power of the United States has played a role. As long as this country enjoyed a virtual monopoly on economic, political and military power, it could depend on a supply of cheap raw materials. Because of our weakened international position, however, it was impossible to prevent the oil-producing countries from quadrupling the price of crude oil in the fall of 1973. (Crotty and Boddy 1975:86)

The rising cost of energy (as well as other raw materials, also increasingly controlled by Third World alliances) has certainly amplified the world crisis, with Europe and Japan being the worst hit. Enormous national debts have appeared in the West (note, though, that the United States already had such a debt before the oil crisis). Trade balances have been strained to the limits. Bankruptcies have multiplied. Financial markets have become increasingly unstable, and we have been dangerously close to crisis/collapse several times. This has all been accompanied by an equivalent accumulation of capital in OPEC countries and in some cases has led to a rapid industrialization. It has also speeded up the realignment of political power and influence (for example, in the UN) to the detriment of the West. The oil crisis and the rise of the Middle East as a semi-periphery with claims to central status is an expression of the decline of the Western-based world economy with all the dislocations that it implies, as well as the potentiality for new centers of world accumulation.

THE EASTERN BLOC AND THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY

While the Middle East does not seem a likely candidate for the shift in world accumulation, and while the Eastern Asian industrial development at the moment appears dependent on Japan and the West for markets and capital, the Soviet/Eastern European area does appear to have possibilities for assuming hegemonic status after the West. Structurally, the Eastern bloc is not dependent on the West to the same extent as the current Third World. While Eastern bloc countries export raw materials and import industrial manufactures in their relation to the West, they also have their own periphery which they have removed from Western control and which has been expanding since the end of World War II. There is, further, a developed trade in manufacturing and raw materials within the bloc itself that has remained relatively isolated from the Western economic network (except, of course, Yugoslavia). The low cost of labor, the disciplined workforce, the lack of speculation, and fictitious capital in a state-controlled structure of accumulation all make for highly competitive production. In spite of technological problems in certain crucial areas and bureaucratic bottlenecks, the real profit on "capital" is high. Centralized state accumulation is an efficient contender in the world market.

It is often assumed that the Eastern bloc is essentially a periphery of the West and not an interesting economic challenge to its dominance. In support of this, it is pointed out that the Eastern bloc is dependent on the West for almost all its advanced technology. On the surface, this might appear similar to the recent relation between the West and industrializing areas of the Third World, but on closer examination there are important differences. The capital import to the Eastern bloc is essentially a question of building heavy industry and not merely a decentralization of production for Western mass consumption. Entire factories are imported in connection with activities such as the industrialization of Siberia. The industrial investments reach very large proportions even by Western standards. Thus, a French-Soviet joint venture in aluminium production "will be the largest aluminium complex in the world, to cost $1,700 m., with an annual production capacity of 500,000 tons" (Wilczynski 1976:91). And a petrochemical venture with Occidental Petroleum, "involving investment of $20,000 m., is the biggest non-intergovernmental deal concluded in history" (Wilczynski 1976:94). While the Eastern bloc export of manufactured goods to the West was only 42 percent of the total compared with 72 percent export in the opposite direction in 1973 (Wilczynski 1976:99), they are as, or more, advanced in several important branches of industry, "particularly in metal-working machinery, metallurgical equipment, electric generators . . . oil drilling gear, communications equipment, welding apparatus, shipbuilding, certain types of aircraft and helicopters and nuclear equipment and fuels. These countries have become exporters of sophisticated items not only to less-developed areas but also to the industrialized West" (Wilczynski 1976:61).

It is, of course, true that the Eastern bloc is tremendously indebted to the West. It is also true that the debts may never be paid off (who would collect them?). What we have here is a growing industrial power, which is also, perhaps, the world's strongest military power, its number one weapon exporter, and the only sector of the world system that is expanding in both the political and economic sense. The fact that they import a lot of industrial capital may be an indication of their rise to hegemony rather than their dependency.

CONCLUSION

We have argued in the limited space of this chapter that there are fundamental similarities between processes involved in today's world crisis and those of previous declines of civilizations. To be able to think about the possibilities of intervention in a period of crisis, it is necessary to understand the structure and dynamics of the system in which it occurs. It is on this basis that we have criticized traditional econometric futurology for its lack of theory and historical materialism (as well as macroeconomics in general) for its misunderstanding of the fluid and shifting nature of world accumulation over time. A precise model of the system would, of course, be needed if one were to try to come to grips with phenomena as apparently distant from one another as Third World industrialization and the increasing social malaise, drug addiction, alcoholism, and criminality in the West. We *can* do no more than suggest some of the characters of a longer-term research project. If, however, the current capitalist world system is no more than a subset or variant of a more general global system, a larger and more technologically explosive one, then our ultimate strategy must be elaborated with respect to the whole history of civilization on earth and not merely to the present. What has to be changed is the entire catastrophe-generating nature of human "civilized" systems. To avoid this ultimate problem is to run the perhaps terminal risk of repeating ourselves one more fatal time.

NOTE

This article is a summary of a longer work (Ekholm 1977) written for the Swedish project on the generation of risk in a social perspective. As such, it is based on statistical material gathered not later than 1976. The only more recent items added in the English translation are bibliographic references that are relevant to the general arguments of the article.

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4

Notes toward an Epigenetic Model of the Evolution of "Civilization"

Jonathan Friedman and M. J. Rowlands

This chapter was originally published by Friedman and Rowlands in their 1977 edited book, *The Evolution of Social Systems.* The argument was an important step in the development of a global systemic approach, but it is still an argument from within the critique of neo-evolutionism. That step consisted in moving from a conceptual structure in which different kinds of phenomena were linked in terms of function or cause to one in which they are aspects of a process of social reproduction. The framework of the analysis remains within the kind of structuralist Marxism that we had been using at the time (Friedman 1972, 1975, 1979, 1998). In the preface to the second edition of *System, Structure and Contradiction: The Evolution of "Asiatic" Social Formations,* I discuss the shortcomings of the Marxist categories used in that period, not least for their total lack of orientation to the lived, phenomenological aspects of social process and for their exclusive focus on strategies of accumulation. The critique is not an argument for replacing the analysis of the structures of social reproduction, but for a broader account of such relations that would provide a framework for the creative practices of cultural production. This version is revised to a certain extent, primarily by a series of annotations that refer to more recent work. The substantial section dealing with archaeological and textual evidence from China, Mesopotamia, Central America, and South America has been omitted here primarily on the grounds that it needs serious updating. Some of the annotations should provide an insight into the way in which the approach enables the development of more adequate models and in the way former models can be criticized. This kind of critical testing is a crucial tenet of the approach that we have advocated from the start.

In 1949 Julian Steward published his seminal article "Cultural Causality and Law: A Trial Formulation of the Development of Early Civilizations," in which an attempt was made, for the first time to integrate archaeological data and anthropological theory into a set of general hypotheses about the evolution of early civilizations. His work has been the cornerstone of the neo-evolutionary school in American social anthropology (for example, Service, Fried, and Sahlins) as well as providing the impetus for the development of the processual school of American archaeology.

Steward's cultural ecological approach, which has greatly influenced a number of American archaeologists, is based on an attempt to account for social institutions in terms of adaptation to specific techno-environments. In discussing the results of his trial formulation, he stresses that, "In the irrigation areas, environment, production and social patterns had similar functional and developmental interrelationships" (Steward 1955:199). Continuing this line of argument, he further stresses that in different environments, the same developments are unlikely to occur: "The eras are not stages which in a world evolutionary scheme would apply equally to desert, arctic, grassland, and woodland areas. In these other kinds of areas, the functional interrelationship of subsistence patterns, population, settlements, social structure, cooperative work, warfare, and religion has distinctive forms and requires special formulations" (Steward 1955:208).

While this formulation is subtler than that of other materialists, Steward is unable to be more systematic about the "functional and developmental interrelationships" because he is unconcerned to determine the specific kinds of relations that link production to the other institutions of society. We find an ambiguity similar to that of White with respect to the nature of determination.

But while White stresses culture as energy capturer and transformer, Steward, emphasizing the adaptation to particular techno-environments, must search for more rigid correspondences. He has constructed an ordered series of economic stages that are meant to be linked to levels of sociopolitical development. These stages, which have served as a working model for much recent archaeology, are:

- Hunting and gathering
- Incipient agriculture
- Formative (peasant community to state)
- Regional florescent states
- Initial empire
- Dark ages
- Cyclical conquests
- Iron Age

As we might expect with such an unclear notion of determination, the above classification mixes technological and social features. Everything from the formative down can be characterized as a progressive development of irrigated agriculture, the freeing of labor and its reintegration into an expanding division of labor. Crises ("dark ages") occur as the result of overexploitation of the environment, overpopulation, and subsequent economic collapse and political fragmentation. They appear to alternate with periods of expanding empire until the onset of the Iron Age, or rather the incorporation of iron technology into basic processes of production. The fact that a significant number of evolutionary stages (five out of seven) occur in the absence of direct technological determination appears to contradict the general hypothesis of techno-ecological adaptation. In fact, Steward's penetrating presentation of the material seems to indicate that the social forms themselves may have had their own internal laws of development, which, as in the case of cyclical conquests/dark ages, may have been maladaptive with respect to environmental conditions of reproduction. But this aspect of his work is never developed theoretically and has thus remained marginal to his more general formulation of the correspondence between techno-environments and social formations.

In the final analysis we are left with a series of stages, which are more or less isolated from one another. For while Steward often had important insights into the structural continuity and transformational relation between stages (as in his discussion of theocratic chiefdoms and states), these were necessarily peripheral in a framework where each stage should have been, at least in principle, a specific cultural adaptation to a given techno-environment.

In subsequent years, mechanical materialism was purged of Steward's occasional insights into the processes of structural transformation so that cultural evolutionary stages were reduced to a series of superstructural "boxes" linked by time's technological arrow.[1]

In the 1970s the inadequacies of this approach came under attack even by those who had been customarily associated with the older cultural materialist tradition (Flannery, Wright).[2] In the approach adopted here, an attempt is made to reconstruct the structures of reproduction of particular social forms. These are the social structures that dominate the processes of production and circulation and which therefore constitute the socially determined form by which populations reproduce themselves as economic entities. A system of social reproduction is characterized by a *socially determined* set of productive relations (which should not be confused, as in Steward and more recent materialists, with the organization of work) that distribute the total labor input and output of a population and organize immediate work processes and the exploitation of the environment within limits established by a given level of



Figure 4.1. The local population model of the interaction between dominant relations and structural constraints

technological development. The local population model can be represented as in figure 4.1.

Each level of the social formation is structurally autonomous in such a way that the properties of one level cannot be derived from those of another. While structurally independent, the levels are inextricably linked in the material process of reproduction by two kinds of intersystemic relation. From ecosystem up is a hierarchy of constraints that determine the limits of functional compatibility between levels—hence of their internal variation. This is essentially a negative determination since it determines only what cannot occur. Positive determination would exist only where we could find necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of a given structure, that is, where only one set of productive relations could dominate the process of reproduction. This would appear never to be the case. Working in the reverse direction, relations of production, as we have defined them above, organize and dominate the entire process of social reproduction and determine its course of development within the limits of functional compatibility between levels. When these limits are reached, breakdown in the system is imminent. The limits are themselves determined by the internal properties (as a function of time) of the subsystems, which make up the larger reproductive totality. It is absolutely necessary in this model to distinguish between institutional structures and the material structure of reproduction that they form in combination with each other. Thus, a kinship structure can be infrastructural if it distributes the labor input and output of society. Similarly, money may be merely superstructural if it is used only in children's games. This does not deny the fact that the internal structure of an institution determines the way it will behave in whatever functional position it occupies in material production.

As the properties of reproduction can be defined only with respect to time, the model is necessarily a dynamic one. Dominant relations of production determine a given developmental pathway, and functional incompatibilities in the larger totality generate divergent transformations over time. Change in cultural form as well as place in material production occur simultaneously in the process of reproduction so that evolutionary stages are always generated from previous stages in such a way that we might speak of epigenesis—structural transformation over time in which the nature of the trajectories is determined by the properties of an arbitrarily chosen initial state under given conditions of reproduction. As noted above, we make use of Marxist categories such as relations of production. This latter term has been used in many ways, some more reductionist than others, and it is to be appreciated that the very term *relations of production* indicates that these are relations of productive activity. We would stress today that what the term refers to here is not production itself but the relations of accumulation, relations involved in the extraction and reproduction of wealth. The term *relations of reproduction* might be more adequate, but it should be noted that in Marx, production was not industrial production as such, but the production of life itself, of people and of their relationships under, we might add, specific conditions of existence. The specificity here refers to what might be called the cultural. Thus, while capital might be reduced in some interpretations to the exploitation of wage labor by a particular capitalist class, for Marx it referred to a large array of accumulative forms, and the motor of the entire system might be interpreted to be the accumulation of fictitious wealth. This is the case in Volume III of *Capital.*

It is for this reason as well that the model proposed is not limited to local societies but to the total systems of reproduction that include the latter. Localized units are units in larger systems rather than autonomous totalities in themselves.

The model as presented thus far may appear to be localized to a particular concrete society where production and reproduction are determined by a local set of productive relations. This, however, is not the case, for we must take into account that reproduction is a real phenomenon in which a number of separate social/political units are linked in a larger system. As production for exchange seems to be a constant factor in history, we must deal with a system larger than the local political unit, whether it be a tribe or a state, if we are to understand its conditions of existence and transformation. This is all the more evident when dealing with developments in which production within the local society does not correspond to the conditions of reproduction of that society.

In such cases "external" relations must necessarily be considered. Growing interdependency is an emergent phenomenon in systems where internal specialization and increasing demand create conditions in which the maintenance of local socioeconomic activities depends upon access to a wider productive area. Thus, it is generally misleading to think of relations of production as organizing production and distribution only within a single political unit since the reproduction of that unit may depend on production that occurs outside of it.

More generally, it should be evident that when discussing a particular stage, we tend to abstract the properties of a particular social form for discussion without realizing that the social form represents a local society, which does not develop in a vacuum but always in relation to a number of other societies, and where the nature of the relation between the units largely determines the conditions of transformation of any one of them. Thus, the expansion of a tribal into a state structure occurs in the presence of other tribal structures connected by exchange and warfare to the evolving unit and which may, for example, be transformed into a politically acephalous periphery of the emergent state which imports a large portion of its labor force and part of its product. Similarly, long-distance trade between emergent chiefdoms and states may help stimulate local intensification of production and the political development of local centers at the expense of their immediate peripheries.

A complete evolutionary model would have to be a time/space model in which transformations over time are related to variations in space. Thus, the specific evolution of social formations depends on the internal properties of local systems, upon the local constraints, and upon their place in a larger system. This kind of analysis would require more space than we have here, and it has not been undertaken. We stress, however, that the structures with which we are concerned should not be confused with the local societies in which they are manifested. The structures of the larger regional systems are determined by the dominant relations of production that make them up, that is, the internal potential demands of local systems and the spatial distribution of constraints which determine the relative potential for development of the individual units with respect to one another. The specific model that follows may seem to be more or less unilineal. This is because we have chosen to analyze only one line of evolution determined by the successful expansion of a particular tribal system that we have taken as our initial state. An epigenetic model is one that appears to be unilinear only in a fixed set of initial conditions. These conditions, which at the outset are related to the possibility of the intensification of production, will be apparent in our discussion of the actual sequences. If, however, such conditions are altered, internal functional incompatibilities must generate divergent development pathways. Where we indicate cases of devolution, or where their relations to more dominant systems transform local systems, we should also expect to find different kinds of subsequent evolution.

The unilineal character of the analysis, then, is due to our focus on the development of early civilization in a few major centers without regard to later developments which were often accompanied by a spatial shift in geographical area and which began in formerly peripheral systems. Thus, our unilineal development is more or less extracted from a multilineal developmental process in which the longer-term structural transformations can be understood only in terms of the larger system.

MODEL

The aim of the present model is to account for a number of evolutionary developments in widely different geographical areas where many of the cultural traits are quite dissimilar. It might easily be objected that a single model could not possibly encompass such broad variation. It might seem more reasonable to try and construct separate models for each of the areas in turn, North China, Mesopotamia, Mesoamerica, and Peru. This has not been done here because we feel, at least tentatively, that the separate culture-bound models would be no more than variants of the general model, that is, that the underlying structures, especially those essential for generating later stages, are the same. It is from the properties of a single tribal system that we shall attempt to generate the properties of later systems. Given the scope of this preliminary formulation, we shall not be able to go into a great amount of detail. Instead, we have chosen to present the main outlines of the evolutionary model in the abstract, using sequences of comparative data to exemplify particular stages and processes. As suggested below, it is important to note that as this formulation is epigenetic, it is also limited in scope. As its developmental properties are associated with a particular initial structure, it has only limited applicability to trajectories that historically fall outside the range of social forms that it generates. The nature of this kind of hypothesizing is to order the field in such a way that better explanations can be forthcoming, but explanations that are of equal social complexity as well. More recently we have suggested other kinds of trajectories, which begin with more organized production for exchange and with prestige-good sectors from the very start, some of which might be more adequate to accounting for archaeological and historical records in the different regions that we discuss. This shall be evident in our additional comments below.

THE TRIBAL SYSTEM

The tribal system's basic production, exchange, and political units are local lineages. The latter contain no more than four or five households linked by a set of rituals to a founding ancestor. The local unit is similar in form to Sahlins's characterization of the "domestic mode of production" (Sahlins 1972). But if the unit is largely self-sufficient in the short run with respect to material reproduction, it is linked to other groups by matrimonial alliances, which make it *socially* dependent on a larger society for even its own *biological* reproduction (that is, exogamy). While Sahlins is perfectly aware of this kind of relation, it is necessary here to stress that the alliance structure may be a fundamental or even dominant relation of production in these societies since it is, as we shall see, a major factor in the distribution of total social labor. We can, however, follow Sahlins's distinction between a domestic *level* of production, which corresponds to the cost of social reproduction in such a society, and lineage surplus production, which is generated by the larger alliance structure. We assume for the purposes of the model, that is, its generative capacity, that the local lineage is patrilineal and patrilocal so that it is groups of men who exchange women.

The structure linking production and exchange determines the specificity of the tribal system. To comprehend this structure we must describe the social form of production since the specificity of the latter determines the nature of the material flows in society as well as the developmental properties of the social structure. Economic activity in this system can be understood only as a relation between producers and the supernatural. This is because wealth and prosperity are seen as controlled directly by supernatural spirits. The latter, however, are not separated from the world of the living in any absolute way. On the contrary, the supernatural is no more than an extension of the lineage structure so that ancestors are spirits whose function it is to communicate with higher spirits in order to bring wealth to the group. In fact, the entire universe is usually envisaged as a single segmentary structure in which the most powerful deities are no more than more distant ancestor-founders of larger groups. The logic of this structure is one in which all local lineages are linked in a single segmentary hierarchy in which wealth produced at the lowest level appears to be the "work of the gods." A local lineage that produces a surplus is able to convert it into a community feast in which prestige is gained, prestige whose cultural content is very different from that in our own society. The lineage that is able to produce a large enough surplus to feast the entire community can do so only because of its influence with the supernatural, and since influence is defined as genealogical proximity, the lineage in question must be nearer to such powers. This genealogical differential is expressed in terms of relative social age. Within the local community, such a lineage would be an older lineage, a direct descendant of the territorial founder ancestor spirit of that larger group. Thus, status is first gained in the feast-distribution sphere. It belongs to all the members of the producing group. It is not the possession of some tangible form of wealth but rather the social value attributed to the ability (which may in later stages be linked to the control of dependent labor) to produce such wealth. Women are then given to other lower status groups in exchange for a bride price, which measures the social value of the wife-giver. This relation is one in which a given quantity of real wealth is exchanged for a kinship connection (matrilateral link) to the source of wealth. In such a system marriage will tend not to be reciprocal so that differences in prestige are continually converted into the relative ranking of lineages. A common form of this relation between lineages is generalized exchange or asymmetric alliance, defined here not in terms of marriage to a specific kind of cousin (matrilateral cross-cousin), but by the combination of local exogamy plus a proscription on reciprocal marriage. The lack of reciprocity implies that bride-wealth goods must enter into the circuit, flowing in a direction opposite to that of women. The asymmetry of this form of exchange permits the differential social valuation of local groups in such a way that interlineage rank is expressed by the differentials in bride price. The existence of valuables, a category of means of circulation, is very important in the development of the tribal system, as we shall see, and its place in the processes of accumulation and hierarchization is diagnostic of the type of system with which we are dealing. As we have defined the present tribal system, such valuables have a more or less symbolic function. Their possession is an indicator rather than a source of status.

Briefly then, we might describe the system in terms of three relations of production. At the bottom is the social appropriation of nature by local lineage production. Appropriation must always be conceived of as a socially and not technologically determined phenomenon, since it defines the control by a local group over its immediate production process and its capacity to dispose of the output of that process. The relation between lineages is defined by matrimonial exchange which, however, involves the transfer of other products, including food.[3] Along such links flow debt payments, bride price, and food at matrimonial and funeral ceremonies, and the various services and tribute that flow from lower- to higher-ranking lineages. Since the wife-giver/wife-taker relation is the social form of ranking, we can conclude that asymmetrical marriage of some sort is the dominant exchange relation. We might also suggest that from the point of view of the process of production and circulation, the superiority of wife-givers and the patrilineal nature of the local group are aspects of a single process. Since the status of a lineage is an attribute of its members and not the result of its possession of some tangible form of wealth, the valued "object" is the individual representative of the prestigious group. Thus people-givers rank higher than people-takers, and as the people given are women, the local group is patrilocal. The third relation of production is that between the lineage and the community as a whole, the conversion of lineage surplus into distributive feasts. It is this sphere in which prestige is created in the manner discussed above.

Articulation of Relations of Production

The above three relations of production combine to form a single structure of social reproduction whose properties generate an evolution toward a specific type of state/class formation.

Surplus is increased along two pathways: (1) by feasting, it is transformed directly into status, and (2) then into relative rank via increased bride price for lineage daughters as well as other obligatory prestations between affines. The initial outlay is thus more than compensated for by the increased control over other lineages' labor and product. Through this intensification of economic demands, more surplus is produced and accrues increasingly to emerging lineages of high rank. Surplus can also be converted directly into more wives and thus children, resulting in an expanded family labor force.

The above cycles are restricted to the growth of familial labor force and the transfer relations of goods and services between such groups. *A necessary factor in the expansion of the system, however, is the accumulation of dependent labor: internal debt slaves who are unable to meet affinal obligations and external captive slaves.* The two above flows can be combined in a single system as in figure 4.2.

This positive feedback structure leads to increasing affinal rank differentiation. The result, however, is only a relative ranking of wife-givers and



Figure 4.2. The logic of "tribal" dynamics

wife-takers in which formerly egalitarian marriage circles are transformed into a spiral in which rank levels are defined by the ability to meet similar obligations.

The final step, and the one most crucial for further evolution, is the conversion of relative affinal rank into absolute rank. This occurs as an immediate result of the segmentary kinship structure and its place in the ritual economic system. As we saw previously, the form taken by interlineage ranking is one where affinal superiority is expressed simultaneously as "age rank" or a closer genealogical link to the founder ancestor of the larger group so that the wife-giver/wife-taker relation is a relation of seniority between consanguineal ancestors. This form of ranking determines the structure taken by the chiefdom where a particular line, dominant in feast giving and affinal exchange, becomes identified as the direct descendant of the territorial deity (Friedman 1972:189–93; see figure 4.3).

The emergent social form here is the conical clan headed by a chiefly lineage, nearest descendant of the local deity, where all rank relations are redefined in terms of absolute genealogical distance from that deity. We have suggested that the emergence of the chief is no more than the identification of a local lineage with the territorial ancestor-founder. This promotion, however, operates a significant change in economic relations. In the more egalitarian context the community makes offerings to the local ancestor-deities, who in return maintain and increase the group's wealth. As a living lineage comes to occupy the position of mediator in this activity, it is entitled to tribute and corvée as the cost for performing the necessary function of seeing to the welfare of the community. Thus, through his monopolization of the imaginary conditions of production, the chief is able to control a sizable portion of the total labor of the community. This is a new vertical relation of production between a lineage and the community as a whole, one that emerges directly from the previous structure. The conical clan is not to be seen, then, as a particular institution, but as an emergent form of tribal society.

The tribal system is expansionist in nature. Alliance and exchange relations are continually extended into a wider region. The system is politically open at the top so that the development of chiefdoms at local levels is at the same time their alliance on a supralocal level (see figure 4.4). In effect, the range of the alliance network depends very much upon social rank so that it is only the emergent chiefs who maintain long-distance exchanges.

This implies that chiefs have access to valuables from the greatest distances in a pattern of development in which access to different kinds of goods depends on one's place in the social hierarchy so that only those at the top can get hold of the whole range of valuables. Thus, there is increasing internal control over both the local labor force and its output as well as the wealth objects that normally


DEITIES
second mediation
HIGHER UNITY
first mediation (vague ancestry)
LINEAGES
PRODUCTION
APPROPRIATION
DEITIES
second mediation
CHIEF'S ANCESTORS
CHIEFLY LINEAGE
HIGHER UNITY
first mediation

Figure 4.3. The cosmological-political hierarchy


CONICAL DOMAIN
INTERDOMAIN
INTERVILLAGE LEVEL
VILLAGE LEVEL

Figure 4.4. Structure of exchange in the conical domain

circulate for payment of debt, bride-price, funerals, etc. Because the nature of payments is a function of rank, the development of chiefly hierarchies is linked to an inflation that enables powerful aristocratic lineages to accumulate increasing control over the total wealth in circulation at the same time as they gain more direct control over the total labor of the community, all of which is used in the expanding external exchange network.

The growth in the demand for surplus in such systems is greater than any that could be forthcoming from a closed population. There is, therefore, a tendency to import labor in the form of captured slaves from surrounding groups. This creates a regional pattern in which centers of power expand at the expense of surrounding societies which may have had similar structures but which are reduced in the process to acephalous societies. Internal competition in the conical chiefdom diminishes as most of the potential wealth comes to be controlled, though not consumed, by the paramount chief. From this point the major stimulus to production may depend on interchiefdom exchange and competition. This is simply a continuation of a process that first occurs at the more local level.

The developmental situation of the chiefdom depends much on techno-ecological conditions, assuming that the degree of regional specialization is not very marked at this stage. In montane areas, for example, where soils are shallow and runoff a major problem, chiefdoms based on swiddening technology will tend to collapse in the course of their expansion due to decreasing productivity in an economy demanding accelerating surpluses. In such areas there may be cycles of growth, expansion, and collapse of conical chiefdoms, with a minimal development of class stratification in certain phases of the cycle. This should be the effect of a situation where territorial expansion is blocked, often by other expanding societies, and a consequent increase in density is incompatible with the technological conditions of production. It is important to note that the evolutionary process is not a unidirectional phenomenon. When we take a whole range of local conditions into consideration as well as the relations among a number of societies, all of whom may have similar internal structures, the result is bound to be one of variation in time and space. Acephalous societies, or big-man societies in areas of dense population, may be one of the devolutionary effects of the functioning of similar systems in differing conditions (Dupré 1973). Societies such as the Naga of Assam and some New Guinea Highlands big-man systems may be the end products of such a devolutionary pattern. We cannot in so brief a space be concerned with this kind of process, but it is of the utmost importance to take account of such phenomena in a more complete evolutionary model.

It is noteworthy that we have not taken account of specific technologies in this section. According to our general model, there is no direct causal relation between technology and social forms of appropriation of nature. Thus it is perfectly possible that the kind of tribal evolution that we have described can occur in very different technologies. If, for example, agriculture developed out of some form of intensive gathering activity under the pressure of certain ecological constraints, it might well be argued that this transition was itself selected for by the demand for increasing surplus of an expansionist tribal economy such that the latter was maintained and the technological base altered in order to preserve the social system. This might help to account for some of the proposed models of agricultural origins based on various forms of demographic and geographical expansion, but where such expansion is generated by the socially (culturally) specific properties of the economy of the tribal system and not merely a natural, biologically based phenomenon.

In this section we have considered one possible line of evolution determined by a particular, perhaps arbitrarily chosen, tribal structure. It is a system in which local production predominates in the development of differential prestige and ranking and where an independent exchange sphere of valuables or prestige goods does not exist. Such goods do, of course, circulate, and the more hierarchical the societies become, the more distantly produced valuables enter into the exchange cycles. We have assumed, however, that such articles have merely sumptuary value and are not in themselves subject to independent accumulation nor a source of direct economic control. This is the kind of structure that we find in many parts of Melanesia and Polynesia as well as northern Southeast Asia, where prestige goods are only symbols of status and cannot be attained systematically outside the agricultural production cycle. In Indonesia, Melanesia, and Africa, however, there are also a great many societies in which the control over certain kinds of valuables is in itself a source of prestige and power.[4] In the Trobriands and Admiralties, for example, control over "elite" goods that circulate over wide areas is the basis of political-economic power because such goods are necessary for the marriage and other obligatory payments of all groups. In this way the prestige goods accumulated through long-distance contacts are converted directly into control over labor. This kind of phenomenon is widespread in Island Melanesia and also in areas of Africa where lineage heads or elders monopolize the cloth and other goods which their dependants need to reproduce themselves as social units. The long-term evolutionary potential of such systems is not clear. Meillassoux, in his classic 1960 article, "Essai d'interprétation du phenomène économique dans les sociétés traditionnelles d'autosubsistence," describes a situation of control that applies only within the domestic unit. Fathers control the labor of their sons by controlling their access to bride-price goods. It is perfectly possible that interlineage ranking could develop in such a system as a result of differential access to external trade, although this is difficult to envisage at a level lower than that of the local community. Where big men exist, that is, a minimal social differentiation, the use of such status to control access to foreign prestige goods might be the basis for a development of increasing hierarchization. This is undoubtedly a widespread phenomenon and may have been quite significant in the prehistorical periods referred to here. As noted earlier, we have not chosen this kind of a model as our initial starting point, in part because we assumed that it would require a massive production of valuables at a very early point in the archaeological record, well before the development of state structures, and this did not seem to be the case. Nor did it seem that such development is necessary, as is borne out by the comparison of Polynesia with its highly developed political structures in the relative absence of elaborate prestige-good systems and Melanesia with precisely the inverse state of affairs. We suggested that the kinds of societies referred to develop on the periphery of larger states where there is trade in precious raw materials or slaves and where the original source of demand is the larger state.[5] We now consider that this is not the case and that prestige-good systems and the one described here may vary over time and space in a more flexible manner. However the epigenetic argument generates a different order of appearance of prestige good-based control (e.g., chapter 6). The prestige good-based polity, as we shall see, seems to develop out of the early "Asiatic" state forms but presupposes an already established state monopoly over local production and long-distance exchange.

Archaeological Evidence

The patterns in the archaeological data that one would expect to find for such a complete model of a tribal system are, of course, difficult to investigate—especially for the earliest stages generated by the model. North China, in fact, seems to offer the only example where there is a continuous sequence from a clearly pre-state level through all the other developments that we discuss here. The earliest Yangshao cultures display a pattern of small hamlet settlements with little indication of social hierarchy but where a new pattern emerges in which village houses are systematically grouped around a centrally located "long house" that appears to be a chiefly dwelling. That this is not simply a ceremonial construction on the order of a New Guinea men's house is demonstrated by the internal division of the structure into a number of small compartments that have their own hearths and seem to be living quarters for individual families. Without further evidence we might only suggest an interesting ethnographic parallel between this pattern and Southeast Asian chiefdoms (e.g., Kachin, Sema Naga) where the chief's house is a very long, centrally located building in which live his wives and dependents and a variable number of slaves and slave families. On the basis of his evidence, Chang has suggested for these early Chinese societies that there was a lineage organization as well as some form of ancestor worship and fertility ritual (Chang 1968:103). These are all features which follow from the model.

A possible case of devolution also occurs in the ecologically marginal zone of Shensi. Here the settlement pattern is not concentric but diametrical. In this relatively large site we find two rows of houses which face each other across a narrow street a pattern similar to that found in parts of the Naga Hills of Assam and Burma, where it has been argued that in conditions of relative overpopulation, villages are characterized by an unstable reciprocity internally (including reciprocal marriage) and by a high level of intervillage warfare.

Where successful expansion of the tribal system occurs we should expect to find increasing social differentiation, economic intensification, and wider and more elaborate exchange networks controlled by emergent paramount chiefs. We should also expect a certain increase in violence since the labor-hungry chiefdom must continually raid its hinterland to obtain captives. All these characteristics seem to be present in the Lungshan period in North China. It is, as it should be, difficult to differentiate the chiefdom from the state formation since these stages are but arbitrary cross-sections of a developing system. The development of class structure occurs throughout this period along with the elaboration of the theocratic institutions of the tribal system. Chang speaks of a "theocratically vested ceremonial pattern," which, no longer the common property of the entire village, was focused upon a selected portion of the villagers (Chang 1962:184). Larger amounts of luxury goods, elaborate pottery, shells, jade, and some bronze are found. Along with the large ritual sacrifices of animals, there is indication of differential distribution of their remains in human burials (Chang 1968:172). There is clear indication of ritual and some craft specialization. All the structural elements that we find in the later state forms are already present in this period.

In all the areas considered here, this period is characterized by the development of central places in settlement patterns, ceremonial centers that are associated with ritual activities related to the fertility of nature and economic welfare. There is evidence of increasing social differentiation and an expansion of exchange networks so that more exotic goods are found in burials of high-ranking individuals. These kinds of phenomena correspond to developments in Mesopotamia from 6000 BC through the Ubaid period, and in Peru from about 2500 BC to the Initial period (2000–1800). It is significant that for Peru this development was not based on agricultural technology but relied mostly on a highly productive fishing economy.

"ASIATIC" STATES

The "Asiatic" state emerges from the tribal system and develops on the basis of the same kinds of mechanisms. It is for this reason that we assume that the conditions of local production are a crucial factor permitting such a development. Thus, in fertile valleys and riverine plains the evolutionary tendencies of the tribal system are able to work themselves out to their fullest.

It is in the developing conical clan structure that rank defines the relations between lineages in terms of genealogical proximity to a single central line. In a fully formed conical structure, rank is absolutely determined in a way that necessarily undermines the function of local exchange. In the previous system, wife giving was a means of establishing relative rank, but now, as social position is determined from the start, hypogamy must lose its former function. On the contrary, wives will tend to move from lower to higher ranks as a form of tribute. This is merely a generalization of a form of exchange that already occurs in the chiefdom between the paramount and lineages of definitively lower status, especially in the case of secondary wives. The difference here is that *all* rank is definitive. Hypogamy continues to occur only where alliances to particularly powerful lineages are necessary, to the extent that the system is not entirely centralized. In any case, this occurs only at the highest levels of the hierarchy and serves as a means of political integration—some of the sacredness of the central lineage is bestowed upon another lineage in recognition of its power and importance. Hypergamy, on the other hand, is merely a recognition of the absolute superiority of the wife-taker. It is an expression of the conical structure of the state. Hypogamy is an attempt to extend that structure. The redistributive system loses its former function as a means of converting surplus into status in an act of generosity. Since status is *pre-established* or "given by birth," such generosity is now reduced to an expression of segmentary position. The conical clan chief or king is entitled to tribute and corvée on the basis of his necessary function in the ritual-economic process, not because he might return all this accumulated wealth in the form of feasts. Increasing surplus is no longer redistributed in the same manner as previously. While feasts have great ritual importance and while they are often very large in scale, a major portion of that surplus is absorbed in the transformation of the old tribal aristocracy. While tribal aristocrats are economically still commoners in that they till their own fields with only a few slaves, if any, the increasing surplus linked to successful intensification accentuates the verticalization process whereby wealth appears as the result of the supernatural power of the chiefly ancestors and their descendants. In this way, the status of aristocratic lines is raised and their economic importance is increased. All ritual is hierarchized, and all aristocratic lineage ancestors are incorporated into a single segmentary structure headed by the deified ancestors of the paramount. Necessary ritual functions logically entitle aristocrats to a share of the surplus product. We also expect to find the development of bureaucratic functions within the new upper class. The doubling of genealogical ranking by an ordered series of administrative-ritual functions reinforces status differences with a largely imaginary division of labor that tends to reduce internal competition by defining necessary activities for each segment in a larger bureaucratic entity.

The evolving structure, then, is a conical clan-state in which all noble lineages owe their position in their kinship relation to a single sacred royal line and where the new class is identical to the state in a way closely resembling Marx's notion of the "Asiatic" mode of production. This geographical term is clearly problematic, especially given the fact that it is applied to all parts of the world, but the concept to which it refers is more precise than that of the "theocratic state" or "segmentary state" because it stresses the dominant economic function of the monopolization of the supernatural. It is this control or imaginary function, religious in cultural content, which determines the nature of the class relation and is the means by which surplus is appropriated. In the "Asiatic" state, there is a crucial change in dominance, from a formation in which economic flows are organized by affinal and feasting relations to one where surplus is absorbed in the vertical tributary relations of the conical structure.

In this period there is a growth of large ceremonial centers surrounded by hinterlands of villages and smaller centers (perhaps a two-tiered pattern). The tribal domain evolves into a somewhat larger political unit in which a central domain dominates several smaller domains, which are themselves the product of the political and/or demographic expansion of the central unit, that is, by sending non-inheriting sons out to establish settlements or by the in-marriage of weaker neighboring domains. The internal structure is one in which a main line of chiefs or kings leads a quasi-sacred aristocracy dispersed throughout the territory of the state, where the focus of control centers on a local deity at each level, and where the latter are linked to the capital by the same segmentary hierarchy that links the local chiefs to the paramount. Thus, beneath the ruler who has an absolute monopoly on the highest gods are those nobles who are sent out as sons to begin new domains or those that are linked to the center by marriage alliance. There is a tendency for allies (affines) to become agnates since submission to the central ruler entails submission to the patrilineal gods of that ruler, and in a conical clan structure such absorption is equivalent to a change of name.[6]

The exploited class that emerges in the formation of the state contains both commoner lineages that are increasingly excluded from the ritual upon which they depend and "slaves," produced both by debt and capture, who tend to be integrated as a single category of dependents. The separation of the nobility from the peasantry is reinforced by the switch from hypogamy to hypergamy. The latter marks a change in strategy in which status is absolutely fixed, especially for the highest lineages and where economic resources are passed upward in exchange for a "good" marriage, and only a limited number of lineages are able to participate.[7] This is often reinforced by increasing class endogamy. As such, the kinship links between commoners and noble ancestors are increasingly severed so that the former are, socially, totally dependent on the latter.

The internal economic structure of the "Asiatic" state is characterized by:

1. A tribute/corvée relation between local lines and local chiefs and between the former and the paramount. The rights of local chiefs to a portion of the surplus depends entirely upon their genealogical connection to the paramount.
2. Chiefly estates and especially a royal estate maintained by debt slaves and captives with some contribution of corvée.
3. A tribute relation between nobles and the paramount. This is a political relation within the upper class that depends upon the exploitation of the peasantry by the nobility.

The internal functioning of the state economy is in many ways a continuation of that of the tribal system. The level of intensification is very high. Ceremonial feasting takes place at all local centers, but primarily at the top, where the highest deities are lodged. While competition at lower levels is largely halted due to the crystallization of rank, it remains a principal aspect of the economy at the interstate level. The growth in the potential agricultural surplus permits an increased division of labor. Artisans are brought into the center to form a full-time class of specialists.

This is not so much a change in technology as a reorganization of the existing one. Once accomplished, however, it fosters the elaboration of new and more productive techniques that are called forth by the increasing demand for wealth objects and massive public works for the purposes of external exchange and ceremonial activities. It is in the framework of the "Asiatic" state that specialist craft production first begins to develop on a large scale (bronze, cloth) located around and controlled by the center, and where large quantities of valuables are utilized by the elite in ritual, burials, and matrimonial and other forms of short- and long-distance exchange. There is an elaboration of sumptuary items that may serve to mark distinctions in rank and class as well as in function. There is a substantial increase in ritual items destined for temple ornamentation and religious activities.

Interregional exchange develops markedly in this period, and the quantities of exotic objects found in any one center increases several fold. The precise nature of such exchanges is not clear, but we may assume that they are similar to the competitive exchanges of the tribal period and may be linked to marriage alliance. The regional pattern is thus one where a number of relatively small states are interconnected at the top by elite exchange, and where, since growth occurs at different rates in different areas, and if some areas are reduced to exploited suppliers of captive slaves, the larger region must be seen as the necessary field within which expansion is realized as a larger system of combined development and underdevelopment. It would appear, however, that insofar as regional specialization is not yet developed to any great extent, the major selective factor for growth in a situation of competitive state exchange is agricultural productivity, which permits greater concentrations of labor in production for exchange and public works. Thus, we would expect to find the dominant "Asiatic" states in those areas of greatest potential productivity.

The centralization of production that occurs in this period may include more than simply luxury goods. The production and distribution of certain tools may also be controlled by the state (Wheatley 1971:76). Further, the monopoly over imports may, as in the case of Mesoamerica and Mesopotamia, amount to a control over crucial raw materials such as obsidian, which replace older and usually less efficient materials in tool production.

The increase in production for exchange within the theocratically oriented state provides the center a new kind of power, a direct control over the production of wealth objects and access to foreign trade. This structural development is, as we shall see, crucial in the transformation of the "Asiatic" political structure.

The "Asiatic" state is a relatively small affair and should not be confused with the great "Oriental despotic" empires, which are often grouped under the heading "Asiatic mode of production." The latter are based on a developed division of labor, a private commercialized economy as well as a state sector, and the existence of several conflicting forms of property in the means of production. The apparent sacredness of the ruler seems to be more of an ideological reinforcement of direct political control than the immediate basis of the class structure. The notion of Asiatic state is restricted here to the earliest state formations, the size of which may not exceed the area of a twenty- to thirty-kilometer radius with a population numbering perhaps in the ten thousand range. The size of the political unit depends largely on the ability to centralize the economy and to prevent accumulation of labor and surplus in peripheral areas. As this is usually difficult in a system based on ritual hierarchy, there is a high probability of fission as the size of the local domain grows. There is, thus, a tendency for a number of similar units to be generated in the normal process of territorial growth. Any expansion beyond a given limit would presumably require some stronger politico-economic link. A territorial extension of this sort might necessitate a distribution of centrally controlled luxury items to peripheral chiefs in order to maintain their loyalty. This new kind of relation, unlike that occurring in the center, appears to become a dominant form in the next stage of development. In fact, the use of luxury goods as a reward to subordinate lineages in return for tribute is clearly a mark of the weakness of the "Asiatic" state, either as the result of economic crisis or internal competition.

The problem of succession within the royal lineage proves to be a major area of conflict as the "Asiatic" state develops. We stated earlier that bureaucratization may effectively neutralize the claims of lower-ranking lineages by associating them with subordinate functions in the bureaucratic hierarchy. But there will undoubtedly be a growing conflict among closely related sibling lineages. This results from the combination of patrilineal succession and the fact that a king tends to have a great many wives, producing a situation in which the relative rank of sons may be extremely difficult to determine. A great many claims tend to be made not on the basis of patrilineal descent but through the matrilines established by royal marriage. The problem is all the more acute where there is royal endogamy or marriage between lineages of the same name. This and other forms of rank endogamy produce an effective cognatic structure within the conical patriline so that matrilineal and patrilineal ties become equivalent means for making claims.[8] Such conditions necessitate new means for making rank distinctions among the aristocracy. Upper-class kinship would appear to become more bilineal in this situation, both in terms of claims and ranking. As rank, from the start, was linked to affinal relations, the emergence of matrilineality is really no more than a reification or institutionalization of previous relations. It is also likely that lower-ranking, non-inheriting males will become more matrilocal so that the difference between high and low ranks will coincide with the distinction between patri- and matrilocality. We might suggest that the access to prestige goods may itself be a basis for internal competition. While the king nominally controls such goods, there are probably lower-ranking lines involved in the actual exchange activities, giving them possibilities of accumulation and, in certain cases, a degree of executive control (i.e., where they are officially in charge of trade relations).

As with the previous system, there is a potential contradiction between the economic relations that generate increasing population density, especially in the vicinity of the capital, and the capacity of the techno-environment. In areas where agricultural intensification is difficult, for example, the development of the "Asiatic" state is strictly limited. Where, as in Mesopotamia, intensification is relatively easy, it might still be argued that the variation over time in the costs of maintenance of local populations will determine the location and geographical shifts of dominant centers. Where food cannot be imported, this intersystemic relation is extremely important in determining where and when the large states develop and the length of their duration. Where there is a decline in productivity, the resultant pressure on the economy may induce various forms of specialization as well as a transformation in the socioeconomic structure. Where specialization occurs, the selective factors involved in political development might include geographical proximity to communications networks or to sources of raw materials. In a system with a high demand reinforced by increasing taxation, the ability of the society to survive depends on successful intensification and/or profitable specialization in conditions of increasing density.

As we saw above, the development of prestige-good production is at first compatible with the "Asiatic" structure as such goods serve only as luxury and ceremonial items which reinforce ritual superiority since the enormous royal accumulation of wealth is proof of the supernatural effectiveness of the ruler. With the increase in competition, however, prestige goods can begin to represent an entirely new form of control. Where such goods serve as a general exchange good for bride wealth, funeral payments, and other payments, the control over their production or importation can become a direct means of economic control and one different from the situation with respect to bride-price goods in the tribal system. In that system, the accumulation of prestige goods is a function of agricultural output and its conversion into feasts. Here prestige-good production is independent of agricultural production and represents an autonomous economic sector. The control over such goods depends, of course, on a pre-existent hierarchy, but once the latter is established, it permits a new kind of domination, one which depends not on segmentary position (i.e., genealogical proximity to the gods), but on the monopolization of valuables that are necessary for the social reproduction of all local groups.

Archaeological and Textual Evidence

The pattern in this period is characterized by a substantial elaboration of ceremonial centers, large-scale politico-religious constructions, an increase in local population, developed craft specialization around the center, and a settlement organization in which large centers are surrounded by a number of small villages or hamlets (two-tiered hierarchy). Three- and four-tiered settlement hierarchies are more characteristic of the next period, in which the territorial control of the ceremonial center would seem to be greatly expanded. We have stressed that these early states are rather small in size and that they retain many of the principal traits of the former chiefdom economy.

In Shang China, in late Ubaid and early Uruk in southern Mesopotamia, and at sites such as La Florida in Peru, we find fairly large agglomerations, perhaps towns, centered about a number of ceremonial buildings. These centers are in turn surrounded by a hinterland in which population is more dispersed in villages, many of which have small ceremonial complexes. The Shang states show evidence of very large-scale feasting activity:

> Énorme richesses sont consacrés au culte (animaux domestiques, métaux, produits de l' agriculture, gibier, prisonniers de guerre) et presque tous les biens que possède cette société font l'object de dépenses somptuaires lors des funerailles des rois et des grands nobles.... Des offrandes de 30 ou 40 boeufs à un seul ancêtre ne sont pas exceptionnelles et il existe des caractères speciaux d'écriture pour désigner les sacrifices de 100 boeufs, 100 porcs, 10 porcs blancs, 10 boeufs, 10 moutons.[9]

The areas of political control, however, do not appear to be of very great extent. The regional pattern in this period is an extension of the chiefdom regional exchange network where long-distance trade takes on a more important role. We would also expect to find that large ceremonial center states can develop only at the expense of surrounding populations so that from a situation in the early tribal period where there may have been a large number of competing groups we arrived at one in which there are a smaller number of states surrounded by dominated "underdeveloped" tribes that are a major source of captive labor for the centers. This relation between local center and periphery is developed to a much greater degree in the next period.

Exchange between the centers consists primarily in luxury goods whose production is increased throughout this period. These goods are apparently destined for use by only the highest levels of the aristocracy, in ritual, in temple construction, and in elite burials. There is no evidence that the valuables produced for exchange circulate anywhere but within the highest levels of the social hierarchy.

There is evidence from China of some form of conical clan organization in both the Shang and Chou periods. There is similar evidence from Mesopotamia, but as it is much weaker we shall not discuss it here.[10] Most of the Chinese data are difficult to classify with regard to the period of reference, but there are a number of social structures that are common to both the "Asiatic" and subsequent periods. There is evidence that religion and ritual power have a fundamental role in the conical structure (Maspero and Balazs 1967). Aristocratic lineages are associated to locally ranked deities in such a way that the gods are ranked in terms of the same genealogical structure that unites all noble lineages with the royal line. Lower-ranking nobles that marry into the kingdom may attach their genealogies to that of the ruler as a sign of their subordinate position within the larger domain. This act is equivalent to the acceptance of the ancestor spirits of the local ruler as providers for the newcomer's wealth and prosperity. Among the highest ranks there is evidence that wife-giving could still be used as a form of subordination of competing lineages.

> Il arrivait qu'un chef dont le nom 'grandissait' imposait à un de ses proches de même 'nom', de le reconnaître pour son seigneur, non pas seulement à titre de chef d'un groupe domestique, mais à titre de chef d'un clientèle. Comme marque d'alliance et de subordination, l'agnat vassalisé recevait alors de l'agnat reconnu seigneur, une fille en marriage. Il devenait (par violation de la règle exogamique et substitution d'une consubstantialité infeodante à une consubstantialité communautaire) un gendre, et même un gendre annex; un mari-gendre.[11]

This pattern is in contrast, but not contradictory, to the usual pattern in which lower-ranking nobles will give wives "up" as a form of tribute. The latter situation is, however, one in which the difference in rank is pre-established in a rather absolute way, unlike the case reported above in which an equal is converted into a subordinate. The evidence for crisis is difficult to establish. In China this seems to have occurred toward the end of the Shang period, and it is not unreasonable to postulate that the society dominated by Anyang is transitional to another kind of system.[12] Evidence that central authority declines is linked to an apparent increase in the use of "benefices" in exchange for political and economic loyalty. This kind of relation also occurs where the kingdom expands beyond its normal patrimonial borders. If such benefices are similar to later Chou practice, they probably include various sorts of valuables as well as titles (Wheatley 1971:61). It is likely that a number of changing conditions would favor the shift to a more direct form of exchange relation between central areas that become increasingly able to control the production of highly valued craft goods and external trade, and subordinate but potentially powerful nobles, especially those on the periphery who may have the means to create their own autonomous centers.

The next period thus begins with an expansion of the old domain to new territories and a creation of a new kind of political hierarchy.

PRESTIGE-GOOD SYSTEMS: DUALISTIC STATES[13]

Centrifugalism

The emergence of an economy based on prestige-good production is related to the expanded use of such goods in the political alliance structure. This is a phenomenon that already begins to appear in the former period as a result either of the attempt to expand territorial control or to maintain the loyalty of subordinate lineages. Such a transformation would seem to be associated with a greatly expanded regional trade network where the monopoly over certain kinds of production or trade enables a central group to maintain an advantage in the larger region. In such a system we would expect to find an increase in



Figure 4.5. The exchange structure of the prestige-good system

the production (mass production) of specific types of goods at the centers and their distribution over wider areas. As the goods are passed down to lower ranks, they enter into the local exchange networks, where they are necessary for bride price, funerals, and many other ritual transactions. The structure of such a system is one where there are centers of control over specific kinds of luxury goods and where access by local populations to these "necessary" goods depends on the establishment of alliances to the center, either directly or through subordinate local centers (see figure 4.5).

In this way the former tribute relation becomes a somewhat more reciprocal relation between the central royalty and more peripheral aristocrats, who in exchange for goods from the center maintain a supply of local products to that center. In this period we should expect to find a clearer settlement hierarchy in an area larger than that for the "Asiatic" state. This in turn should be associated with a quantum jump in the level of trade and especially in the quantity of prestige goods produced.

The form of expansion of such systems depends on a major structural change in the aristocracy. Territorial growth may result from the outward movement of lower-ranking aristocrats in a pattern reminiscent of that described for certain matrilineal kingdoms where expansion is not so much a question of moving into formerly unoccupied land as a political subordination of a large area to a single center. Here, local groups may be ranked according to their distance from the center. The alliance network connecting the royal patriline to numerous external aristocrats establishes matrilineal links between royal "sons" and their maternal homelands in such away that royal offspring can be ranked within a single patriline in terms of matrilineal origin. This structure may provide a mechanism for the sending off of sons to rule in the provinces. It is also likely that conquest may play a role in this period, but following this an alliance is established between incoming aristocrats and their local counterparts. The kind of model proposed by Ekholm for the Kongo kingdom may be relevant to this period (Ekholm 1972).[14] In her model, uxorilocality is dominant at all levels except the top, and it is combined with asymmetrical marriage so that higher-ranking men move into the groups of lower-ranking women. Thus the local group will contain the men of one lineage who are outsiders and related as MB and ZS and their wives who represent the local matrilineage. Such a situation reflects a social and ideological dualism opposing higher-ranking men/lower-ranking women, patriliny/matriliny, nobility/commoner, outside people (invaders)/original inhabitants. It is further expressed in a spatial concentric dualism which opposes center to periphery in terms of the relation father/son = royalty/vassals.

In the center, the previous competitive situation within the royal lineage may break down into a pattern of rotation between matrilineal heirs to the throne. Where matrilineal links are stressed, there will be a dualism at the very top of the state structure in which the highest-ranking wife-taker of the royal line also provides the heirs to the throne. There are, of course, innumerable variations on this theme. What is crucial, however, is that the bilineal determination of rank provides a finer means of distinguishing among potential heirs than the former unilineal succession. Where a particular wife-taker provides the future king, all other "sons" are excluded by definition.

The development of the prestige-good economy and its use in maintaining political-economic relations undermines the former source of control based on genealogical proximity to the deities. Monopoly over the sources of prestige items is a new form of control that becomes differentiated from the older ritual-economic form. Within the royalty this would correspond to the development of dual power. The theocratic state apparatus that monopolizes trade as a single entity is at the same time functionally split into two halves, one of which would appear to represent ultimate religious power and another that is increasingly occupied with external politico-economic relations. This dualism of function might be compared to the development of bilineality that we described above since both correspond to the prevalent dualism in the ideology. It might easily be argued that the emergence of this new form of control can be contained within the former theocratic structure, and it appears that the degree of dualism is indeed quite variable. We might suggest that the stress on bilineality is a necessary condition for the clear emergence of dualism in the political and ideological structures. The importance of matrilineal linkages in the determination of rank is that at least two lineages are recognized in the definition of royal status. If the determination of the king's status depends as much upon his mother as his father, then we are clearly faced with the existence of two very high-ranking lineages whose respective statuses may be equivalent in some way. The common division, in such a situation, between political versus ritual position expresses a functional differentiation within the elite that institutionally polarizes the bilineal status ambiguity within the royalty.

In any case, this dualism is not at first expressed by a distinction between religious and secular. Rather, it may begin as a split within the theocratic structure itself, as a dual specialization in respectively ritual and political activities (king/prime minister, head of temple hierarchy versus political chief, etc.). There is a marked dualistic development in the structure of the supernatural. In the "Asiatic" religion, sky and earth, male and female are all combined in a single supreme deity. There are from the very start, of course, many lesser spirits, including local territorial agricultural gods, but all are linked in a single segmentary hierarchy. In the "Asiatic" period matrilineal links are ideologically incorporated within the patrilineal-conical structure.

Patriliny is the "encompassing structure."[15] In the prestige-good system, on the contrary, there is a separation of sky and earth gods, just as there is a separation of male and female principles in the ideology. In effect, what is occurring is the emergence within the sacred nobility of a new economic form made possible by the previously established conical structure.

Throughout this period there is, as we have seen, a truly massive increase in production for exchange. This implies a high demand for labor that is obtained by the importation of slaves who are employed directly at the center. We might suggest that a center traded for slaves, raw materials, and other products of the local areas. This kind of relation, which also characterizes the connection between the Mediterranean states and their northern European neighbors in the Bronze and Iron Ages, might help account for the sudden population explosion in the developing political centers during this period as well as the one following.

As this period is characterized by a political hierarchy linking a number of centers and subcenters, while we would expect population to increase in all centers there is bound to be a greater increase in those dominant centers that have the most wealth and power. The hierarchy of centers tends to extend itself so that larger areas are brought into a single political domain. Thus, at this stage, expansion is geopolitical as well as demographic, and while centers may all increase in size, there is a tendency for new centers to form which are directly linked to politically dominant larger centers according to the pattern described at the start of this section.

The general increase in production in this period may be linked to the beginnings of product differentiation, especially within the elite-good sphere. There is evidence of a large increase in the production of specific kinds of goods, often in standardized form (cloth, bronzes), and there would appear to be a whole range of items that are socially ranked, from the highest elite goods to those, such as certain kinds of cloth, for example, that circulate as a kind of money, accessible to the whole population.[16]

The instability of the prestige-good system is due to the difficulty of maintaining a clear regional monopoly over long-distance exchange contacts. In the next section, we shall see how the same basic structure in conditions of internal competition leads to a breakdown in the regional hierarchy, a contraction of population into a number of competing urban centers, and the beginnings of a commercial city-state economy.

ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND TEXTUAL EVIDENCE

Various sources of evidence indicate a clear reorganization in the political structure during this period. The Western Chou period is spoken of as feudal as opposed to the former "patrimonial" Shang era (Wheatley 1971:118; Bodde 1956). Investiture was a matter of exchange in which valuables; bronze vessels, cloth and clothing, weapons, and chariots were distributed by the capital in exchange for a steady flow of tribute and, it is assumed, a pledge of loyalty. To the extent that production of the most important valuables, or their importation, was monopolized at the center, it served as a means of control. Not enough is known about cloth production in China, but from at least the Western Chou period it appears to have been necessary for bride price and other payments. Granet claims that it was an early form of money (Granet 1959:93). It is also quite probable that from this time on (although we have only later Eastern Chou sources), relations between lower and higher ranks were characterized by a reciprocal exchange in which tribute went up in return for different kinds of products (Granet 1959:92–93).

The Inca use of cloth may give us some insight into the functioning of prestige-good systems. The production and distribution of massive quantities of cloth of different types is a well-known feature of that society, and the royal control over the most highly valued *cumbi* cloth seems to have been a significant form of political-economic power (Murra 1962, 1956). "The simple fact that a fine cloth like *cumbi* had come to be defined as a royal privilege made it possible for grants of it to be highly appreciated by the deserving" (Murra 1956:135). Cloth in the Inca empire was a primary means of exchange in which socially necessary payments such as marriage prices were made. High-quality cloth, produced under royal control, was distributed to local nobles in return for various local products that were paid as tribute.

This period is characterized by a politico-territorial expansion of significant proportions—not the formation of new settlements so much as the unification of formerly independent centers. There is a quantum jump in trade activity and a concomitant growth of specialized production. Dominant centers increase in size, but there is also a general population increase, most likely an increase of imported slaves. Population triples on the Susiana plain in the early Uruk period with the development of what we define as a prestige-good system, and there is evidence that "there was a greater concentration in the larger, centrally located area" (Wright and Johnson 1975:275–76). In the Ubaid to middle Uruk periods there is a transition from a pattern of single large centers of "capitals" surrounded by small villages and hamlets (two-tiered) to a larger regional settlement hierarchy in which there is a transitive dependence of smaller centers on larger centers and where the entire region is linked to other more distant areas through the capital (Johnson 1973:51). In Chou China, this kind of expansion is apparently linked to the sending out of nobles to rule in the hinterland or at secondary centers (Maspero and Balasz 1967:7). Similar connections of members of the royalty or lower-ranking nobles to specific geographic areas outside the capital is also found among the Inca (Zuidema 1964:3).

The bilineal character of the kinship structure is documented for the Inca. Zuidema describes a situation in which the political hierarchy might be depicted as a dispersed patriline and where residence is, except at the top, more or less matrilocal: "In the capital the succession of kings was patrilineal, but we may assume, from the data on the North Coast, that the local connections of the twelve sons of the second king were due to matrilocal influence" (Zuidema 1964:12). This is because sons were sent out from the capital to rule in subordinate centers, perhaps their matrilineal places of origin. The *ayllu* seem to have been patrilineal conical clans divided internally into ranked matrilocal groups, rank that was expressed in generation terminology (F/S/SS). In his major work on the organization of Cuzco, Zuidema argues for the prevalence of asymmetrical marriage (Zuidema 1964). This would seem to correspond quite well to the form of ranking of matrilocal groups sketched above, especially if sons did, in fact, move out every generation to their mothers' groups. This might account for the evidence that lower rank coincides with greater distance from the capital. As Ekholm has shown, if sons move out every generation and marriage is asymmetrical, the patriline is dispersed over a wide area consisting of local matrilines, and the generational ranking of groups will be expressed in terms of spatial distances.[17]

In Western Chou there is similarly an indication that matrilocality or avunculocality played an important role. The ideology seems to have been one which opposed a matrilineal commoner population to a patrilineal nobility, a common representational form in this kind of system (Gernet 1970:42; Granet 1939).[18] Granet speaks of the "separation des garçons de leurs soeurs et pères" and their life "auprès de leurs oncles (maternels)" (Granet 1939:173). The pattern, however, is not clearly established, and the most we can do is stress the apparent importance of relations in the matriline as well as the patriline.

The structural significance of this kind of phenomenon finds expression in the ethnographic material from Polynesia. Here, a transformation from "Asiatic" to prestige-good systems might be demonstrated in a comparison of Hawaii and Tonga. Hawaii is a comparatively late development relative to Tonga, yet it is taken as a classic example of the Polynesian state at its height. The Hawaiian aristocratic hierarchy combined political and ritual power in which those of highest rank were thought to be sacred. High "priests" were "members of the royal line," and there is no clear distinction between secular and ritual power (Granet 1939:173). Descent ideology tended to be patrilineal, especially in the highest ranks, but affinal, that is, matrilateral, and matrilineal connections were of utmost importance in making claims to rank positions. The political structure was represented as a segmentary organization in which patrilineal seniority was the sole determinant of relative rank, or at least where relative social age was the only means of expressing such rank. The situation, however, may have been undergoing significant change, for while "specific historical evidence for Hawaii points to the characteristic Polynesian pro-patriliny as the older tradition," it appears that matrilineal relations began to take on increasing importance—so much so that some authors "believed that the inheritance of rank—the real issue in linearity—had become pro-matrilinear." (Goldman 1970:215). The suggestion that acute conflict in the area of rank succession and competition between local potentially paramount lines generates a series of variant strategies of heirship finds some support in the evolving Hawaiian state, where there is evidence of a pattern, "according to which upper rank propatrilocality is matched by lower rank promatrilocality (Goldman 1970). In Hawaii, status bilaterality had in fact upset the sheer patrilocality of the upper ranks. Thus the pronounced matrilocality of low-rank families in

Kauai may be represented as a response to a pattern of status differentiation (Valeri 1972).

Tonga by contrast provides us with an institutionalized form of bilaterality in rank determination: "Tonga combined traditional grading of ranks by relative seniority with a pattern of bilateral ranking based upon the constant superiority of a sisters' to a brothers' line" (Goldman 1970:216). Goldman tends to see this in terms of the opposition between eastern and western Polynesian society, but the contrast is quite significant in terms of the structural model under consideration here: In eastern Polynesia, families stood to one another as senior-junior, regardless of their public rank, simply by virtue of relative seniority of brothers. In Tonga, relative seniority was joined by the constant hierarchy of the sexes. Eastern Polynesia followed through the implications of seniority consistently; Tonga juxtaposed the seniority principle with one of an entirely different character. There is, however, some indication that the difference between Hawaii and Tonga might be accounted for in terms of a more historical structural approach. Goldman speaks of an early period when the paramount ruler *Tui Tonga* "may be presumed to have been more completely religious" (Goldman 1970:287). The next period, beginning circa 1200, in which secular power seems to have become more prominent, is marked by an apparent dual division between sacred and secular authority. This is also the period of political expansion into Samoa and Fiji. Ritual authority remains in the *Tui Tonga* line while secular authority is delegated to junior lines such as *Kanotoplu*, wife-givers to *Tui Tonga*, who became the politically dominant line in the kingdom. We might suggest that the Tongan type structure evolved from a previous structure that was closer in form to that found in Hawaii. Tonga appears to have become engaged in a much larger exchange network than that of Hawaii. There is evidence of a large-scale craft organization controlled by the paramount and seriously involved in production for exchange. Goldman stresses the "focus on exchange and on the circulation of goods rather than on display" (Goldman 1970:301).[19] It is important to note here that our interpretation changed significantly, as can be seen in chapter 9. There we argue that the Hawaiian structure of theocratic feudalism is not a precursor but a development from the prestige-good system characteristic of Tonga, one related in fact to the decline of long-distance trade and the political implosion of the dualistic hierarchy. It might be argued, of course, that there is a pre-prestige-good system in Tonga that is more theocratic and unilineal in nature, but it might also be argued that the prestige-good system in less hierarchical form was characteristic of the earliest Lapita pottery-based polities. The evidence, we think, supports the latter model. This should be taken as an example of the necessity to continually confront models with data and to move on to new models.

An important aspect of the development occurring in this period, in virtually all the cases where there is information, is the division within the ceremonial center between sacred and more secular elements. The Inca capital of Cuzco, for example, was divided into two moieties. The palace of the upper moiety, associated with political power, external relations, and invading conquerors of the original population, was "situated beyond the true center of the town" while the lower moiety, associated with sacred authority, with the interior, and with the original inhabitants, had its official buildings in "the center proper" (Zuidema 1964:243). In southern Mesopotamia, in the middle to late Uruk period at Uruk proper, and in the early Uruk period at Susa, a dual division of function appears within the theocratic complex. A structure separate from the temple appears to be increasingly associated with external trade and internal administration, the gradual development of a more secular form of political authority.

The archaeological data are not clear for China, but there is some basis for claiming that from western Chou times there exist "double cities," and in later material it appears that the outer enceintes are associated with commercial or trade functions (Eberhard 1957:3). While the king resides in the center, the "prime minister" lives in the outer city, and it is interesting in this respect that this person is often a close affinal relative of the king. A similar pattern of development occurs among the Maya where, toward the middle to late classic period, a palace is constructed alongside the temple, in a period when external trade seems to be greatly expanded and where ritual goods seem to be replaced by more secular luxury items (Webb 1973:392).

TERRITORIAL AND CITY-STATES

Centripetalism

It is the very expansion of the prestige-good system that encourages the development of new centers capable of their own autonomous production. This should be especially marked where centers can specialize in local products of high value that are controlled directly at the local level. This situation is generated by the high demand for different kinds of special products in the increasingly larger trade system. Thus, the very existence of a prestige-good system undermines the centralized control that is its foundation by increasing the regional division of labor and the ability of subcenters to become independent in a region larger than that of the politically dominated area. Where this occurs, the political hierarchy breaks down into a number of centers that compete over labor and perhaps land. This competition is likely to begin between older centers and those that grow up on the peripheries of their former domains. The general intensification of production which occurred previous to this creates a situation where specialization in craft production becomes increasingly dependent on (1) labor to produce artisan goods and (2) agricultural land and labor to support the increasing nonagricultural workforce. This double demand for labor and the related demand for agricultural land causes conflict over both territory and population and leads to a state of warfare in which large nucleated and fortified cities appear.

Where the portion of the population engaged in craft production is greater than that which could be supported by local agricultural output, the importation of food becomes an absolute necessity, that is, the conversion of a portion of the craft goods into subsistence imports. This can occur, however, only where there exist larger trade systems within which some societies specialize in the production of agricultural surpluses for foreign exchange. In any case, the level of interdependency that develops in such urban forms greatly increases the risk factor. Purely commercial city-states become totally dependent on their trade networks in order to survive. Irrigation-based city and territorial states must maintain a constantly high level of labor input in order to prevent disastrous breakdowns in what becomes a very complex technology.

The Emergence of the Commercial Economy

With an increasing shift toward the maintenance of the local political system through participation in external trade, the emergence of important administrative institutions at the center focuses on the articulation of long-distance trade with the production of craft items and the elaboration of a local exchange network to ensure increased food supplies and local raw materials for the center. The ceremonial center, therefore, now takes on the function of a central place,[20] and the growing external sector will foster new divisions of labor. Hence the conditions for intensifying external exchange lie in the capacity of the system to maintain an increasing number of non-food-producing specialists from the surplus of a more intensive subsistence production or the importation of food, which presupposes a more specialized regional system. This is regulated by the development, begun in the previous period, of institutions that directly control flows of manufactured products from the center to the countryside, the organization and storage of surplus foodstuffs and other goods and their redistribution to non-food-producing specialists, the organization of craft production at the center through the control of raw material supplies, and the administration of external exchange.

The scale and complexity of decision making at the center therefore increases in proportion to the degree to which the maintenance of the local political unit depends upon control over external exchange. There is a clear tendency for the previously dispersed segmentary hierarchy to be drawn into the center. All the heads of subordinate conical clans will be drawn in as a kind of topological transformation of a dispersed structure. This implies that the population that does remain in the more distant hinterland of the center loses its semi-autonomous political status and is directly dependent on the subordinate chiefs now resident in the capital. As a result, there will be a second tendency for dependent clan members to move into the center, within the constraints of the subsistence economy. This will be so particularly where competition exists between centers for control of population. The abandonment of dispersed settlement and an increasing nucleation of population around an urban center is therefore a rapid or even sudden development. Since the conditions for intensifying external exchange lie in the capacity of the system to maintain an increasingly nucleated population within a tightly circumscribed area, the limits of the process are dependent, in the first instance, upon the degree to which agricultural intensification is possible. Where such possibilities are not severely limited, for example, irrigation agriculture, population will rapidly become fully nucleated. Intensification is a self-reinforcing process whereby division of labor is increased, amplifying in turn the range and scale of external trade.

We suggest that the emergence of urban territorial states will occur in techno-economic conditions where there is a combination of effective land scarcity plus the possibility of extreme agricultural intensification. Effective land scarcity should not be confused with real overpopulation in a homogeneous region. Rather, it is linked to the competition for labor, land, and external trade resulting from the expansionist nature of the state economies. The same kind of nucleation process occurs where there is an intensification of the production of high-value craft, industrial or luxury goods, whose value makes it possible for them to be exchanged for large quantities of lower-value agricultural goods. This creates a pattern of autonomous urban centers, each specializing in the production of certain craft goods and/or foodstuffs for which they may have a comparative advantage in external exchange. Pure specialization in commodity production or middleman activity depends on a previous development of highly productive agricultural areas. Thus, these kinds of states are, logically speaking, a secondary development (see below).

Thus both intensive irrigation and the production of high-value exchange goods can serve as the basis for the development of compact urban forms. Over time it is likely that the former will appear first and be transformed in part into the latter since irrigation city-states may be faced with an increasingly costly subsistence base and the possibility of disastrous breakdowns. With dangers of inefficient drainage, soil deterioration, and declining yields, there will be a constant tendency for trade in foodstuffs to become increasingly important in the external exchange relations of city/territorial states.

Although we have been discussing trade states along with the irrigation-based states in order to stress the various conditions for the formation of compact settlement, it must not be forgotten that pure trade states are not a primary form in the epigenetic model we advocate here. The agriculturally based urban state is the only structure logically implied in our model, while the trade state is by definition a secondary development which depends on already elaborated state exchange networks in which the division of labor on a regional scale is relatively advanced.

The emerging urban state will at first be organized into wards or sectors belonging to each of the conical clans now resident at the center. Each ward will contain the residences of the clan chief and other aristocrats and clan members together with the temples or shrines to the clan deities and ancestors. The wards and temples may be ranked in terms of the respective positions of the chiefs in the political hierarchy. The centripetal movement of the aristocracy creates the conditions for a more "egalitarian" form of government, especially since the central lineages gradually lose their absolute control over the economy. As the royal line is now surrounded by the chiefs of formerly dispersed clans, its power, based on its previous nodal position in the distribution of foreign goods within the local region, can no longer be maintained. Decision making will often rest with a council of chiefs or clan elders, each of whom is responsible for the internal affairs of his ward. Control over land will be increasingly emphasized, given the importance of subsistence production for maintaining the system as a whole. This will be so particularly with the increasing weight attached to rights in land in an intensive system of agriculture.

The growing trade sector in the economy will foster new divisions of labor, especially in the production of craft and luxury items. Some of the former prestige items will tend to become increasingly generalized and take on the functions of commercial money to facilitate the growing number of exchanges. With growing economic specialization, the possibility occurs of individual accumulation of money and other forms of wealth. A class of wealthy individuals emerges, mainly from the old aristocracy, since it is they who had access to wealth at the start. Aristocratic control over external trade tends to increase but will suffer from the inroads made by middlemen, who are involved in various areas of the rapidly growing complex exchange network, and by lower-ranking officials to whom a good deal of the administration of trade must be delegated. These categories of individuals will continually have opportunities for personal profits through entrepreneurial gain. Land, as a scarce and increasingly valuable commodity, becomes alienable, and a new emerging class converts wealth gained through exchange into land and labor, which represent an independent source of wealth and status. Growing commercialization tends to encourage the emergence of local markets. The ceremonial center of previous periods remains, but outside this circle we are likely to find a number of industrial and craft areas as well as an urban market.

The class structure goes through a major transformation throughout this period. The nobility, until this point, had depended first upon genealogical access to the sacred royal lineage, and then upon access to centrally controlled prestige goods, that is, through matrilineal links which were themselves ordered by the previous rank structure. The collapse inward of the prestige-good economy, the emergence of new points of accumulation of such goods, and the generalization of these goods as a commercial currency permit the accumulation of other factors of production as well as new forms of slave labor. The new wealth-based class which emerges primarily out of the former aristocracy becomes increasingly dominant. Throughout this period there is competition between the new oligarchic class and the "natural" nobility of past periods. The conical clan structure must inevitably be destroyed as clan lands are now alienable. Private estates emerge alongside clan and state land. Commoners are transformed increasingly into landless laborers. With the emergence of landed property, degrees of freedom and lack of freedom develop which did not previously exist. The former slave category, that is, those who were outside kinship, tends to be merged with the new category of landless labor to form a single class of expropriated producers.

Within the oligarchy there are those who control the means of production of the artisan industries or who are directly involved in trade, and those who own land. To the extent that agriculture remains the dominant sector, the majority of the oligarchy will also form a landed aristocracy. This is the state of affairs in all areas where the low productivity of labor (i.e., relative and not absolute surplus) prevents the freeing of a large portion of the workforce for increasing industrial specialization. Those communities that concentrate more on production for trade, even for basic foodstuffs, may tend to develop purely commercial oligarchies. Where this is not the case, however, there will be a tendency for accumulated commercial wealth to be invested in land and dependent labor.

The most important feature of this latest transformation is the separation of the "relations of production" from the state structure. This implies a further differentiation of "economics" from "politics" so to speak, which corresponds to a shift of the state into a more "superstructural" position (a change in function that is not, of course, meant to imply a diminished importance). As economic control becomes increasingly independent of position within a social- or kinship-defined hierarchy, that hierarchy loses a great deal of its stability. The state sphere is now an arena for political manipulation, where decisions with respect to economic relations do occur but where the economic relations themselves are predefined. Where bureaucratic structures existed based on kinship rank, these positions become increasingly filled by a wealthy landowning aristocracy. Administrative and governmental processes may become formally instituted at this stage. Assemblies, councils, and the like will appear, peopled by the members of a de facto oligarchy where ranking is no longer significant. In more compact urban forms, democratic institutions may emerge as an extreme form of this kind of political (superstructural) decentralization.

The religious dualism of the earlier period is elaborated into a more complex structure. The mythical landscape contains a great number of characters that were formerly spirits in a single segmentary hierarchy. The separation of religion from the relations of production may lead to a depersonalization of the former principals embodied in the deities so that natural forces become separated from the figures that once represented them. This occurs with the destruction of the segmentary structure of the supernatural. The former hierarchy of spirits beneath a paramount becomes a pantheon of gods and goddesses that may tend to be increasingly anthropomorphic.

The three relations of production, which we have discussed, "Asiatic," prestige good, and monetary/property, are all present in this stage in terms of cultural content but not in terms of material function. Strict monopolization of the supernatural as in the "Asiatic" state no longer implies direct control over labor but only a share in the surplus product distributed by the royalty. The dualism that develops in the prestige-good period between secular and religious control becomes completely asymmetrical. The royalty now owes its power to its ability to maintain control over a substantial sector of the labor, land, and currency of the society. Its legitimacy may still depend on sacredness or even descent from the highest gods, and the religion may still be an expensive affair linked directly to the imaginary maintenance of the well-being and prosperity of the larger community. These institutions, however, are now ideological, and if they serve to consolidate state power, they are not in themselves a form of economic control. The latter depends on the ownership of land and the direct control of labor. Where the royalty loses such control, a phenomenon can easily occur in which the money economy becomes strong enough to alienate the majority of clan and state (another form of clan) land, and the kingship becomes a purely political position with no effective dominance over the labor process, replaced entirely by the emergent oligarchy. The ruler may often be no more than the strongest member of such an oligarchy, and the strength of the royalty will ultimately depend on its ability to assume control over means of production and labor directly, in opposition to the oligarchy. There will be a tendency in this kind of system for an oscillation between periods of political fission, in which local accumulation destroys centralized power, and recentralization, where an element of the wealthy aristocracy takes control of the larger economy by expanding the direct economic prerogatives of the state. In the city-state this is expressed in the opposition between democratic and autocratic phases. In the more dispersed territorial state it is an opposition between feudal and despotic phases. The disappearance of the royalty appears to occur only in such secondary formations as the trade states of the Mediterranean, where land ceases to be technologically crucial for the local population even if it is politically necessary in defining social position. In those states where irrigated land is still the basis of other forms of production, it might well be argued that the ideological function of the fertility-prosperity centered religion remains in full force so that the state's control over the land represents a political element of utmost importance and will be in opposition to any economic fragmentation resulting from private accumulation of wealth. In a more obvious way, the fact that the land remains a major source of wealth implies that the state-class structure of previous periods never disappears entirely, although its function is changed. Thus, the alienation of state lands in any but a purely commercial-based system is likely to have strict political limits.

As spatial systems, city and territorial states are quantitative variations on the same theme. The difference between the city-state and the more or less compact urban-dominated territorial state is a difference in degree and not in kind. The underlying condition permitting the formation of compact urban forms is the high productivity of a given territory, either through trade or the intensification of the subsistence base, which reduces the amount of surface area necessary to support a given population. Thus the whole political system is reduced in spatial scale, and the formerly dispersed segmentary political structure is collapsed into a small urban area. This phenomenon will be most marked where subsistence depends entirely upon imports.

The larger region containing competing city-/territorial-states is not politically stable, but rather an arena within which trade alternates with warfare. An important characteristic of this period is the cyclical formation of empires by conquest, a pattern described by Steward (1955) and others. The formation of such empires is linked to the attempt by individual states to establish a more secure basis for their own reproduction by converting trade relations into tribute relations. This need is itself a product of the increasing material dependence of individual political units on wider productive regions for their very survival. Empires in this period tend to be short lived insofar as they are not accompanied by radical reorganization of the regional political and economic structure. As long as the basis for the existence of politically autonomous urban states is not destroyed, the ability to maintain hegemony over a number of similar politico-economic units is severely limited.

Only in the next period, which we do not discuss here, are more stable empires and larger national states formed. It is noteworthy that this period is marked by the earliest conscious attempts to eliminate local autonomy, to reorganize entirely the regional economy—often by acts of extreme violence—in such a way that a given center becomes a necessary administrative instrument for the maintenance of a vast territory.

Archaeological and Textual Evidence

Most evidence for this period indicates the emergence of a fully commercialized economy in which the previous ceremonial center becomes a market center as well as a unit of commercial production in a larger trade network where dependence upon external exchange, in order to maintain a given complex of social and economic activities, becomes almost absolute. In the transition from the prestige-good economy, the reorganization of the larger economic region is of utmost importance. New centers of accumulation of wealth and power develop on the periphery of the prestige good-centered systems. This is clear in the Mesopotamian material where, just before the centripetal movement that gives rise to city-states, we find that formerly peripheral centers at the bottom of the settlement hierarchy grow much larger than they should if still under the dominance of a single capital. These peripheral settlements become the new cities of the following phase of contraction and competition. Territorial- and city-states develop out of a more dispersed organization by a rapid process of concentration, which takes place at a number of points of attraction. This is not, therefore, an isolated affair, but would appear to occur simultaneously throughout a region formerly connected by a redistributive network. The pattern occurs in Mesopotamia throughout the Jemdet Nasr and Early Dynastic (ED) periods, in Peru at the end of the Chavin period and the beginning of the early Intermediate period,[21] and in China in the Eastern Chou period. As indicated above, the actual formation of a group of urban-based states occurs in an area formerly integrated by a more centralized exchange network. The connections between such networks (long-distance) and their rate of expansion and development both affect the moment of their transformation so that urban development occurs at varying times in the larger region. Thus, urban centers emerge at different times in different parts of Mesopotamia. The highland development of city-states in the early Classic period of Mesoamerica is much earlier than the recently documented process of urbanization in the late Classic Maya period. This latter case is, in fact, one of our best examples of the transformation of a larger regional hierarchy of centers into a situation of competing autonomous centers—where former peripheral polities on the coast and inland break away from Peten control and begin to enter long-distance trade independently of Tikal, a development which is itself linked to changes in the highlands.

The formation of the city-state is accompanied by a quantum leap in intensification. In areas where local agricultural production provides the basis of increasing specialization and division of labor—in Mesopotamia, Peru, Mesoamerica, and China—there is a marked intensification of technique, especially in the form of large-scale irrigation works. In more specialized trade networks, subsistence surpluses from more distant regions become the basis of local intensification of manufacturing and commerce in the absence of large-scale local agricultural development. This seems to have been the case in much of the Mediterranean, and Athens is its classic example, where in the fourth century "perhaps two thirds of its wheat" (Finley 1973) was imported as well as the great majority of its raw materials. In all cases there is a development of specialized craft production and, usually after some time, a market area within the city (Finley 1973:133). In Peru there is evidence in Moche, for example, of a textile factory, with a number of weavers working under the supervision of a foreman (Lanning 1967:125). A similar development of large workshops occurs in all the major urban areas.

There is evidence of private property in land and other means of production in Mesopotamia, Eastern Chou China, and Greece. For the more purely commercial city-states such as those of Greece, more democratic forms of political control emerge, with councils of "citizens" replacing the older aristocracy. Such democracy that exists primarily for the new oligarchy usually alternates with periods of despotism in which a particular faction of the wealthy class assumes more direct control. This is especially prevalent with the formation of empires. In the agriculture-based city-states, oligarchic councils exist alongside the royalty, which never disappears, and tends, with increasing warfare and the development of empires, to become a dominant despotic institution. In the more dispersed territorial states such as that of Chou China, the emergent power of the oligarchy, which replaces the older nobility, is documented by Hsu. In this period when "land becomes a purchasable commodity," the new wealthy "great families" tend to replace those with kinship ties to the royalty and to exercise an increased authority over the affairs of state (Xu 1965). Here, however, the oligarchy has the appearance of a more rural gentry rather than a commercial elite.

The emergence of city- and territorial-states is characterized by the formation of a fully developed real economy in which the local centers become increasingly dependent upon the production of a wider area. The formation of empires often seems to be an attempt to ensure control over the circulation of goods outside the local territory. The Aztec method of transforming trade into tribute by military force is an excellent example of this phenomenon, and it appears that in earlier Teotihuacan, the same kind of extension of control was attempted.

The formation of stable empires in the next period is related to the tendency described above, but where there is a conscious attempt to destroy all forms of local autonomy. This is clearly the case in Akkadian Mesopotamia and in Ch'in and Han China, where local aristocrats are usually replaced by appointed officials and where former states are reduced to administrative provinces of the larger state. Thus in China, "des circonscriptions administratives sont peu à peu substituées aux anciens fiefs" (Gernet 1970:82). And in Mesopotamia, the nomes ceased being traditional self-governing states and became administrative districts headed by royal officials whose title *ensi* was now a mere sound. The regional economy is completely reorganized as well as the political structure in such a way that local units become more completely interdependent on one another and on the directive control of a central authority. It is this last period, which is properly characterized by the term *Oriental despotism*, in which a powerful state dominates a very complex commercially oriented economy, and it should not be confused with what we have referred to as "Asiatic" states.

EXTERNAL EXCHANGE

On Epigenetic Models

It is usual, as we have said, in evolutionary theory to treat stages as if they were objects, abstractions from particular types of institutions. We have suggested that an ordered juxtaposition of types such as band, tribe, chiefdom, or state is in itself inadequate for the problem at hand. This is not to deny that social institutions can be classified in such categories. Rather, it is a question of the kind of theorizing that results from such preliminary categorizations. Most attempts at explanation have singled out factors such as technological improvement or population growth as causes of evolution; factors which can be shown to be variables whose values cannot be independently determined. We know that technology can develop and that population can grow. We also know that technology does not develop itself and that the birth rate, which appears increasingly to be the dominant factor in systematic population growth, is socially and not biologically determined. Such factors must be accounted for in terms of dominant social relations and cannot be treated as independent variables. Multivariate models constructed along systems theoretic lines may avoid some of the above problems, but since they are normally restricted to such abstract categories as population size and density, technological organization, trade, and warfare, they are not specific enough to account for the actual transition from one social form to another. This must necessarily be the case where the models in question contain no social properties. It is the integration of the above categories in a social formation that determines their specific effectivity. In this very tentative chapter we have attempted to overcome the above-mentioned problems by defining, at the outset, specific social forms of the reproduction of populations. A form of reproduction is one in which social institutional properties are imprinted upon the production-distribution cycle in a way that necessarily defines a dynamic system, that is, one whose properties can be expressed only as a function of time. In this way what we have chosen to call stages or periods are not discrete entities. Rather, they are those sections of a continuous developmental and transformational process in which it can be said that a particular social form dominates material reproduction. We use the notion of epigenesis to indicate the specific quality of this kind of model. That is, since the structures with which we are concerned are the structures of processes and not of institutions, we must deal with systems of trajectories in which elements are internally transformed as they take on new roles in the larger system of material reproduction. In this way we expect to be able to predict the dominant forms of social reproduction in the next stage in terms of the properties of the current stage. This is possible because the reproductive process is itself directional and transformational.

The properties of the "Asiatic" state, the definition of politico-economic control in terms of monopoly over the supernatural as an economic necessity, depend upon the tribal structure, in which production and the supernatural are already linked in a way that determines the "Asiatic" or theocratic character of the hierarchization process. The emergence of the prestige-good system is more difficult to demonstrate structurally, but the elements that we suggested are all contained within the former system. Thus, the control over production for exchange is established on the basis of the former theocratic control. The progressive centralization of craft production is linked to the specific form of interstate competitive exchange, and the increase in the production of elite goods, linked both to temple and exchange activities, is the foundation for the expansion that occurs in the next period. This development is in turn linked to the necessary internal conflicts over succession in a highly polygamous royalty, the difficulty in maintaining a monopoly over the increasing quantity of wealth items, and the ensuing re-emergence of exchange as a means of political domination. It is clear that the early "Asiatic" states are extremely limited in size and power, and the prestige-good system may itself be an early form of politico-economic expansion as well as a new means of internal control. The dualism that develops in the former theocracy—documented for almost all areas—indicates again a differentiation within the pre-existent state in which a new form of politico-economic control emerges from the transformation of the older system. The formation of political hierarchies in larger regions, on the basis of the monopolization of the production and import of prestige goods, generates in a relatively short time a subsequent transformation into city- or territorial-states. This form of control is not politically strong enough to prevent the development of new political units capable of entering the larger interregional exchange system independently of the former monopolist. The interregional network is greatly expanded throughout this period as prestige goods and more useful craft items circulate in great quantities between redistributive centers. The intensification in craft production creates demands for specialties from different areas, and goods controlled by the dominant center are usually exchanged for a tribute of local goods and food from the subordinate centers. The very expansion of such systems will enable certain secondary centers, which are in a potentially advantageous position, both with respect to local production and exchange (geographically), to compete with the original center. The ensuing breakdown is accompanied by the formation of compact urban forms that compete for land and labor. The emergence of monetary wealth begins in this period. The monetary form itself is a development of the former prestige good that is generalized in conditions of competition following the breakdown of monopoly. This is at first a question of extension and not a change of form. The earlier prestige goods were themselves ordered in different "denominations" with measurable relative values, and it appears, as in ethnographic and historic examples of such systems, that they were already not so restricted a form of money. The centripetal movement of the period destroys the geographic basis of the former centralized power, and the existence of a number of points of accumulation of wealth becomes the basis for a process of commercialization. Land, which as a result of the same contraction of population becomes a scarce and valuable commodity (especially where it is irrigated), is subject to sale. There develops a final form of politico-economic control based on property in the means of production and labor (slaves).

We have suggested that evolution might be conceived as a single set of homeorhetic[22] processes in which there is a certain structurally determined order. As such, our "stages" are always described in a terminology of becoming, that is, they are time periods within which the process of change is dominated by a particular structure and within which that structure emerges and is transformed throughout the stage. Thus it would be difficult indeed to find a fixed set of institutions for any one stage because they are no more than cross-sections of a complex of processes. For example, when we discuss the emergence of the city-state we describe a number of developments which do not occur simultaneously but which are connected over time. The emergence of a commercial economy and the development of property in the means of production and labor are much more gradual than the actual formation of urban states. On the contrary, this change in relations of production develops fully only after the formation of compact cities. Thus what we mark off as a new stage is the beginning of a period in which new dominant structures *emerge*. It is not simply


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Figure 4.6. (a) Tribal system; (b) Hierarchy; (c) Dualism (devolution)



Figure 4.7. Asiatic State

a question of describing a stage by a list of static traits. Furthermore, it should be evident that dominant structures are not simple transformations of such former structures, since change in material function is equally as characteristic as change in form.

By considering societies in terms of forms of reproduction, we are brought to a re-evaluation of space as well as of time. Just as stage theory in evolutionary anthropology abstracts institutions from the larger processes of which they are a part, so it abstracts social entities from the spatial systems to which they belong. Thus, it must be recognized from the start that evolution is not stable in space. It is usually characterized by a spatial shift in centers, very often one that is, more specifically, a shift from center to periphery. Such would appear to be the case in the sequence leading from western Chou to eastern Chou, from Chavin to Nazca and Ica valley cities, and from single-center dominated Uruk to multicentered systems where formerly peripheral settlements such as Umma and Lagash become major centers. These cases, which belong to the transition from prestige-good systems to urban states, are perhaps the most obvious examples of a systematically produced shift in dominance, since it is the prestige-good system itself that encourages the development of powerful subsidiary centers.


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Figure 4.8a. Prestige-good system



Figure 4.8b. Evolution of centrifugal to centripetal



Figure 4.9. The urban implosion

Tribal and "Asiatic" systems have different modes of areal integration, usually of a more limited kind. In the tribal system, areal integration is part of the expansion process itself. Exchange networks expand at the same time as hierarchy increases. The accumulation of captive labor also increases and is linked directly to the competitive nature of intertribal exchange relations, which themselves may be transformed into political relations of dominance and subordination. The same kind of regional integration characterizes the "Asiatic" state in its early stages, but there is increasing intensification as production of craft goods is more centralized. A tribal periphery tends to develop which specializes in supplying local products to the dominant center in exchange for titles and goods from that center. This may be an area where prestige-good systems develop, such as western Chou on the periphery of Shang development or the highland suppliers of goods to the Olmec. Where these peripheral societies are already emergent "Asiatic" states, they may become the dominant centers of the next period.

The "competitive" exchange of elite goods continues into later periods as well as the massive expenditure on ritual institutions. Granet's description of the prestige contests of the "warring states" period is similar to the types of exchange that we presume to have existed in the earlier "Asiatic" period. In the later urban states, however, it represents only a fractional part of a much larger economy that is dominated by strictly commercial transactions.

All this external exchange, which tempts us to signal the importance of the larger regional system, is not simply a fortuitous juxtaposition of local societies. From the point of view of reproduction, the local society only rarely has at its disposal all the means, *materially or socially*, necessary for the maintenance of a given social form of existence. While earlier tribal societies may have been more locally autonomous, this certainly did not remain the case for very long. This is not essentially a question of ecology nor of basic resources, though it is surely the case that relative access to certain kinds of goods may provide the basis for a necessary exchange relation. The kind of phenomenon that concerns us here is a social one. The development of states, the absolute increase in production and its growing differentiation, imply from a very early period the necessity of exchange over wider areas in order to maintain social systems. The precise kinds of needs, the use to be made of imports, and so on, are, of course, dependent on the structures that develop within societies, but the larger network is the condition of reproduction of that local system and can have a strong selective effect on internal structures.

The development of the early central civilizations clearly depended on the productive activity of very large areas, and in order to fully understand the evolutionary process it is necessary to take account of these larger systems of reproduction. The transformation of societies does not occur in a vacuum, and the relation between units in a larger system may determine the conditions of evolution of any one of them. The type of development that occurred in the city-states of classical Greece depended on their place in a larger areal system that enabled them to obtain food and other necessary items to maintain their economy at a given level. Generally, the development of complex trade systems tends to increase the internal dependency of the political units involved. Mesopotamian societies could and did use tools made of locally produced clay in early periods, but the more complex stone and metal technology, which depended entirely on importation and which determined the level of development of productivity as well as ensuring centralized control over the factors of production, demonstrates the extent to which the maintenance of a given level of development depends on a wider regional system. It is, of course, this same phenomenon that accounts for the complementary development of large-scale manufacture for exchange in the evolving centers.

If the pattern we have presented here appears to be unilineal, it is because we have dealt with the properties of only one system of trajectories where we believe that a single set of structural properties dominates the developmental process. But this evolution, if it occurs in a number of places, occurs only in a given "structural" time period, in specific local and regional conditions, and does not apply to the evolution of later centers of civilization. Social forms which developed on the periphery of the early civilizations discussed here may well have different structural properties so that when the centers of development shift to these areas (or at least when they begin to develop on a large scale), we have to deal with a new set of developmental pathways. It is clearly this kind of process that Childe was alluding to in his discussion of the emergence of secular urban centers on the periphery of the major centers of Near Eastern civilization (Childe 1954). This process in turn may have seriously affected northern European tribal systems that were incorporated into the extensive trade networks as suppliers of local products, especially raw materials. Although Childe's excessive diffusionism has recently been criticized[23] on the basis of revisions in dating and specific items of cultural content (megaliths, burial practices, etc.), it would be unacceptable to ignore the relations between these tribes and Mediterranean societies as of decisive importance in later European prehistory. The early commercialization of this area, for example, in late La Tène, before the emergence of any centralized state control may be significant for understanding later feudal developments and the particular decentralized feudal/mercantile formations that led to European capitalism (Frankenstein and Rowlands 1978). The mercantilism that developed in Mesopotamia may also be the economic basis for the later growth of a great number of commercial city-states and trade empires of varying sizes that dominate the subsequent history of the Indian Ocean and the Middle East.

This admittedly superficial examination of some consequences of the model is meant only to suggest some possibilities for further, more intensive research. In effect, we have ourselves restricted our analysis to only one aspect of the larger framework with which we should like to work, concentrating specifically on a single set of evolutionary processes. What is required in the way of an abstract model would best be represented by some kind of topological space in which social forms of different types were integrated into larger structures and where the structure of the space changed over time in such a way that the evolution of local forms could be comprehended within a transformation of the total space. This is not to imply that the larger structure is dominant, but only that it comprises the total relevant universe for the analysis of evolution, where both internal dynamics of local societies and local and regional conditions of reproduction are clearly articulated in a larger system. It is by attempting to construct such larger models that we will come to a clearer understanding of the necessary and sufficient determinants of long-term historical transformation. We have suggested that it is the dynamic process of social transformation that provides the core for any understanding of what has up to now been referred to as social evolution.

NOTES

Reprinted from *The Evolution of Social Systems*, edited by J. Friedman and M. J. Rowlands (Duckworth, 1978), 201–276.

1. See Harris (1968); Fried (1967); and Binford (1962).
2. See Flannery (1972) and Wright (1978: 49–68).
3. Bride service is also a possibility, and many societies combine the two. The transfer of valuables, however, is subject to a wide range of variation which would be

rather limited if there were only bride service (that is, without profoundly altering the residence structures). Lineages in such cases would become husband-givers to some extent, and with matrilateral marriage this would imply matri-uxorilocal residence and perhaps a matrilineal inflection.

4. The Trobriands, as well as a number of societies of this type in Indonesia and Africa, combine a stress on rituals of agricultural productivity with a stress on external trade in a distinct fashion, which we discuss later in this chapter.

5. Such developments may have occurred in the European late Bronze and early Iron Ages; see Frankenstein and Rowlands 1978. It might also be the kind of phenomenon that occurred in pre-colonial West Africa as well as in parts of Melanesia, where external trade stimulus seems to have played a fundamental role.

6. Granet describes a situation where "lignées mineurs disposées hierarchiquement autour d'une lignée majeure, ce groupe comprend, des non-agnats qui sont des vassaux, nobles ou non . . ." and when these nobles may keep their ancestors only "qu'en raison de leur participation au culte des ancêtres seigneuraux." Granet (1939).

7. This is in contrast with the tribal system, where hypogamy is a way of establishing relative rank for a wife-taker and is a way of inserting status into real social superiority for a wife-giver, since the *wife* represents the social value of her group vis-à-vis the husband's group.

8. For examples of this kind of conflict in state structures of this type, see Valeri (1972) and Kuper (1975).

9. "Enormous amounts of wealth are consecrated to cult activities (herd animals, metals, agricultural products, game, prisoners of war), and almost all goods possessed by this society are the object of sumptuous expenses at the funerals of kings and nobles. . . . Offerings of 30 or 40 cattle to a single ancestor are not unusual, and there are special written characters to designate sacrifices of 100 cattle, 100 pigs, 10 white pigs, 10 cattle, 10 sheep" (Gernet 1970:52).

10. See Adams (1966), pp. 85, 88. He deals with a somewhat later period, but there is a strong probability that this form of organization predates the period from which his evidence comes.

11. "It often occurred that a chief whose name was 'becoming great' forced one of his close kin to recognise him as his sovereign, not only as a domestic chief, but as chief of a clientele. As a symbol of alliance and subordination, the vassalised agnate received a wife from his superior. He became (by violation of the rule of exogamy and the substitution of a feudal for a communal consubstantialism) a son-in-law, and even an annexed son-in-law: a 'married-in-husband'" (Granet 1939:122–23).

12. See Chang (1968), pp. 243–44.

13. The current discussion of prestige-good systems is derived largely from the theoretical analysis of Central African societies by K. Ekholm (1972) and the chapter in this volume. Other areas where aspects of her model have been recognized include large parts of Indonesia (Fox 1980, Friedberg 1977, Schulte Nordholte 1971), the Inca (Zuidema 1964), and parts of Melanesia and Polynesia. While Ekholm's model is somewhat modified here, its general outlines correspond to an apparently widespread and general structural phenomenon.

14. See Ekholm (1972, 1977). The evidence of dualism (to be discussed shortly) is quite variable and much clearer in the material from China and Peru than from Mesopotamia.

15. For the notion of "encompassing," see Dumont (1970).

16. The word for *slave* in Sumer meant "hilliman" or derived from the word for a foreign country (Adams 1966:96). By the later Early Dynastic, however, slaves were obtained from neighboring city-states and from impoverished freemen (cf. reforms of Urukagina of Lagash).

17. See Ekholm 1977.

18. For an African example, see Bonafé (1973).

19. See also Kaeppler (1971).

20. In the sense of market center.

21. Using Lanning's (1967) terminology.

22. For a definition of *homeorhesis*, see Waddington (1968), pp. 12–13. In homeorhetic processes, what is constant or stable is a structure defined with respect to time and not a specific systemic state.

23. For example, see Renfrew (1973).

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5

"Capital" Imperialism and Exploitation in Ancient World Systems

Kajsa Ekholm Friedman and Jonathan Friedman

The title of this chapter may appear provocative to those who would maintain that capital is, by definition, wage-labor capital, that imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism, and that before the Industrial Revolution there were only "embedded" economies whose goals were related to the gaining of prestige, conspicuous consumption, and the maintenance of alliances for social reasons (Polanyi 1947; Finley 1973:130, 158). This is because our argument is aimed at a tendency in anthropology and anthropologically influenced history and archaeology to divide the world's history into distinctive market/nonmarket or capitalist/precapitalist systems. We feel that such substantivist and historical-materialist categorizations are based on false abstractions from reality that obscure some of the essential continuities of social evolution from the rise of the first civilizations. Our own point of view is that there exists a form of capitalism in the ancient world, that there are world economies, and that many properties of the dynamics of such systems are common to our own world economy. This is not to take a stand for the formalist approach in economic anthropology. The entire substantivist/formalist debate, which centers on the question of market rationality versus socially prescribed non-optimizing behavior in precapitalist society, is very much a distortion of the original primitivist/modernist debate. The latter was not concerned with general models of individual behavior but with the macrostructure of ancient (not primitive) economies (Bücher 1893; Meyer 1910; Rostovtzeff 1957; for a discussion, see Humphreys 1970). The opponents of the primitivists did not stress the praxeology of individual maximizing agents, but rather the substantive existence of a kind of capital accumulation in the ancient world. Their argument was, in Polanyi's own definition, a substantivist one insofar as they attempted to characterize a specific social system and not to assert a basic propensity of the human species.

We do not deny that there are important differences between industrial capitalism and the ancient systems. It is clear that the modern system in which industrial capitals compete for survival by direct investment in the productive forces implies a kind of dynamic unknown in the past. The accumulation of [illegible] form of [illegible] a truly ancient phenomenon. [illegible] his ancie[illegible]tal economic role is not to say that it functioned directly in the production process, but that its accumulation and control were dominant features of those economies. The system to which we refer is characterized not only by an accumulation of capital, but also by the emergence of an imperialist pattern: center/periphery structures are unstable over time; centers expand, contract, and collapse as a regular manifestation of the shift of points of accumulation. These phenomena are, we think, more general than modern capitalism. Similarly, the world economic crisis that we are experiencing today can be understood in terms of processes more general than a capitalist mode of production, processes that constitute a disastrous dynamic that has been the driving force of "civilized" history.

Our point of departure is that the forerunner of the current kind of world system first emerged in the period following 3000 BC in southern Mesopotamia. Here we can describe the first example of the rise of a center of accumulation within a larger economic system and the development of an imperialist structure.

GENERALITIES

We refer repeatedly to "larger economic systems," to center/periphery relations, and so on. Our object of analysis here is not the institutional structures of society, but the processes of reproduction within which such local structures are formed and maintained. To the extent that a society is not a self-contained unit of production and consumption, it becomes necessary to take up the larger system within which that society, in conjunction with others, reproduces itself. It is at this level that we can grasp the total economic flow, the dynamic, and the conditions of existence of the society in question.

Supralocal exchange systems existed long before the rise of the first civilizations, and, when considered as systems in evolution, they are crucial to an understanding of the emergence of civilization. A great many examples from late Palaeolithic and early Neolithic Europe and the Middle East demonstrate the existence of trade over rather wide areas. The obsidian trade of the Near

East predates the formation of urban settlements by several thousand years, and the total process of exchange that accompanied it is clearly linked to economic growth in the area (Wright 1969; Lamberg-Karlovsky 1972,1975). Early tribal systems may have differed from later systems insofar as the exchange was not absolutely necessary to the maintenance of local productive forces but was socially necessary to the maintenance of internal group relations in the local population—that is, as when prestige goods necessary for local transactions (bride price and other services) and defining social position were imported objects. Ethnographic examples of such systems can be found throughout Africa, Melanesia, and Indonesia (Ekholm 1972, 1977a; Friedman 1975; Friedberg 1977).

With the rise of civilization we have a new situation in which we may speak of a technologically integrated system. The emergence of a developed center of "high culture" depends on the accumulation of resources from a wide area so that the very economic base of the locally developed society is likely to be the result of its center position within a larger system. Civilization is here coterminous with the existence of a center/periphery relation (Ekholm 1976, 1977b).

Generally speaking, the center is the center of most advanced industrial production based on raw materials and semi-finished products imported from the periphery, which in exchange obtains some of the manufactures of the center.[1] The very maintenance of the center depends on its ability to dominate a supralocal resource base. Mesopotamia is the clearest example of the extent to which a center's industrial base can be imported. To insist, as is usually done, that the evolution of high cultures is based on the agricultural surplus of intensive irrigation is systematically to avoid the problem that surplus grain cannot be locally transformed into bronze, cloth, palaces (of imported stone), fine jewelry, and weapons—hallmarks of the great civilization. Even stone and wood were imports in the case of Mesopotamia.

Center/periphery relations are not necessarily defined in terms of their import-export pattern. Thus, it is unnecessary that a center be the sole locus of industrial manufacturing in the system or that the periphery be the sole supplier of raw materials. A relation based on a technical division of labor does not correspond to either the mechanisms of development or the functioning of global systems. Center/periphery relations refer, rather, to different structural positions with respect to total accumulation. The possession of extremely valuable commodities such as silver (Athens) makes it possible to accumulate a disproportionate part of the production of the larger system. If Athens only imported and exported goods, it would never have become a great center. Its accumulation of wealth was, in the first instance, a result of large-scale military tribute taking and plunder, mercantile profit, and the export of silver. This primary accumulation laid the foundation for a formidable expansion of industrial production. Generally speaking, industrial production is not the means by which centers accumulate initially, and accumulation of wealth from the larger system proceeds well in advance of home production. This initial and often continual primitive accumulation has always taken the form of tribute, booty, and enormous mercantile profits.

It is usually argued that capitalism can be reduced to the production of industrial capital to the exclusion of all other accumulative activities. Imperialism in such a system is a logically secondary phenomenon related to the needs of *self-expanding* industrial capital. This construct is opposed to the ancient economy where the struggle for prestige and political power predominated, thus where industrial growth, imperialism, and profit were marginal phenomena. It is assumed that capitalism is a self-igniting and self-accumulative process while the ancient economy was a more embedded system in which production for specific social uses determined the degree and form of growth. This distinction builds upon the subjectivity of the industrial capitalist in one case and on that of the classical Greek and Roman aristocrat in the other. In neither case is the structure of the total reproductive cycle taken into account in the definition. In the modern capitalist mode of production, for example, the accumulation of money capital is not a dependent function of production but rather operates parallel and in contradiction to production. The purpose of production here is the accumulation of money, and it is certainly not the only means, although it establishes the limiting conditions of that accumulation. Large portions of the total liquid wealth of capitalist society are invested in nonproductive and even noncommercial activities. Similarly, while it is clearly the case that the landed aristocracy and, later, the imperial bureaucracy may have been the dominant class faction in ancient society, their power depended upon the enormous wealth and profit gained in commercial agriculture and their direct involvement in urban and international commerce, as well as their access to imperialist tribute. This situation is not different in kind from the medieval Arab economy or early modern Europe. It is often overlooked that mercantile Europe operated very much like Rome in its expansion, that it accumulated and squandered great amounts of wealth, not primarily by producing, but by pillaging large parts of the globe, and that capitalist production only began *within* this larger imperialistic process upon which it was, materially speaking, entirely dependent. That a capitalist mode of production became dominant in Europe is, of course, related to specific local structures. The emergence of wage labor in one place and slavery in another is dependent on a difference in initial conditions, and the resultant social forms may be worlds apart.

Our argument is that the general properties of imperialist mercantilist expansion are common to ancient and modern worlds irrespective of specific local forms of accumulation. The growth of industry and commercial agriculture by whatever form of exploitation occurs within an already constituted imperialist structure and is not a local and closed process.

Center/periphery systems are, by definition, imperialistic insofar as the center of a system accumulates wealth based on the production of a wider area. While the existence of larger exchange systems is linked to and reinforced by the emergence of local hierarchy and class domination, the center/periphery relation further integrates such local class structures into a differentiated pattern where the central class becomes increasingly elaborated into factions: landed aristocrats, bureaucrats, merchants—exploiting by direct taxation, slavery, and even contract and wage labor, while the peripheral class structure is more or less restricted to a chiefly or feudal elite (that may become more elaborate in the development process) which mediates the export of raw material and controls all imports.

The kinds of structure that develop internally depend, as we shall suggest later, upon the regional structure of the larger system. The center need not be a single political unit that would, in fact, require an extraordinary degree of direct control over the accumulation process. More often it tends to consist of a number of competing and/or exchanging political units, one of which may exercise hegemony within the center. Galtung (1971) represents a generalized imperialist structure.

Center/periphery structures are drastically unstable because of the vulnerability of centers in the external (supply/market) realm, which is so difficult to control. The existence of a production/resource area wider than that of the political unit, which must be maintained by it, is the fundamental weakness of such systems. Evolution is, as a result, a necessarily discontinuous process in space. Centers collapse and are replaced by other areas of high civilization. The development of total systems is not equivalent to the development of individual societies. On the contrary, the evolution tends to imply the shift of centers of accumulation over time. The "rise and fall" phenomenon is thus a manifestation of a more continuous process at a higher level of organization.

Imperialism is the characteristic of a center/periphery process that tends to reproduce simultaneous development and underdevelopment within a single system. "Empire" is a political mechanism, the control over a larger multisocietal region by a single state. Empire, in functional terms, is a political machine for the maintenance and/or direct organization of imperialistic economic processes. In other words, it consists in the direct control over an *already existing* larger economic network.

THE EVOLUTION OF INTERLOCAL STRUCTURES

The Early Dynastic period in Mesopotamia represents the earliest emergence of a center/periphery structure that is at all well documented. The import of wood, copper, stone, and later tin as well as increasing quantities of precious metals and stones (silver, gold, lapis lazuli) is an indication of the degree to which Mesopotamian civilization must be defined in terms of a larger system.

The Early Dynastic period is also the period of the formation of large walled cities in the center,[2] emerging from a period in which population is more evenly distributed in smaller settlements of varying sizes probably organized in larger regional political hierarchies (Wright 1972). The urban implosion leads to the formation of many compact, warring city-states.[3] If we compare Mesopotamian development generally with that, for example, at Susiana in the fourth millennium BC, there is a striking contrast between the settlement hierarchy in Susiana, where a single center apparently controlled the external trade for a whole local region, and the final situation in the plain, where a number of neighboring centers all competed autonomously in the same larger network.[4]

The decentralized or city-state organization of a center results from the impossibility of monopolizing the relations between the center as a whole and the rest of the system so that instead of a local control hierarchy, there is competition among equals. Mesopotamia emerges as a dense trade network linked to Anatolia and the Mediterranean in the West and to Iran and India in the East.[5] There are no local resources within Mesopotamia that can be monopolized and no single trade route out of the area. From the start, the main export is food; then textiles and manufactures produced from imported raw materials; this is possible for all cities.[6]

Egypt, as opposed to Mesopotamia, is an isolated area with respect to external trade networks. Trade can move up and down the Nile, and there are several points where raw materials, especially gold, might conceivably be controlled, although, as these areas are parallel to the Nile, local access is not clearly determined. There are, however, two areas that are crucial in terms of the larger system. In the north, control over the delta area means control over the only real access to the Mesopotamian-Mediterranean trade area. In the south, control over the raw material and labor resources of Nubia is crucial as a means of economic power—as a supply zone for the larger area. What is crucial here is the absence of a multitude of points of access either to important raw materials or especially to external trade.[7] Egypt is not, like Mesopotamia, located in the midst of a vast trade network. Rather, it opens out at only a very few points, thus permitting the maintenance of a monopoly over the area's relation to the larger economy. As a result, internal competition and decentralization do not occur—no city-states emerge. Theocratic and bureaucratic structures are increasingly elaborated. The redistributive structure based on various forms of direct taxation is extended. No private economic sector develops outside the state sphere, and the upper class continues to be identified with the state itself.[8]

The different evolutions of Egypt and Mesopotamia, perhaps from similar original structures, are of great significance. The former is based on central monopoly and territorial annexation; the latter, on political fragmentation, competition, warfare, and empire. The latter is apparently the more dynamic: the early and explosive developments of bronze, advanced weaponry, commercial techniques, and abstract-formal writing all emerge in Mesopotamia long before they are introduced in Egypt.

Without here describing the precise nature and social categories of functioning of the Early Dynastic economic system, we can link together some fundamental external characteristics. The economy is clearly expansionist in nature. The form of expansion implies continuous increase in the workforce by the mechanisms of slavery (captive or in other ways imported). Agricultural production is intensified, both to supply export needs and to support an increasing division of labor linked to the elaboration of textile, metal, and stone production, much of which is clearly for export. Such economic growth and differentiation lead to territorial expansion and a resultant conflict between political units of similar type.[9] Warfare leads to the intensification of weapon production and to its technological development, instrumental, perhaps, in the very evolution of bronze technology (bronze is harder and clearly superior to copper as a material for weapons).[10] The growth of weapon production implies a further division of labor entailing a double demand to increase subsistence goods to support specialized labor power and to increase exports in order to obtain copper and tin. This, in turn, leads to a further effort to increase the area of land in agriculture, to territorial expansion, and to interstate conflict. As a result, the very survival of the city-state in this system becomes totally dependent upon the secure control over the external resource base necessary for the maintenance of the production apparatus, especially the growing military sector, which is the foundation for the defense of all other economic and political activities.[11]

Externally, that is, without considering the social form of the system, it can be said that the center as a whole comes increasingly to be the major exporter of manufactured goods, final consumption goods, and arms in exchange for the necessary materials for the very production of those goods. The principal effect of this development is the increased need for *control over the external conditions of local reproduction.*

The expansion of the center as a whole is based on widening rather than deepening of the production/consumption area. As the system is directed by an upper class that remains the principal consumer, there is no room for market expansion except in the realm of long-distance trade. This is partially offset by the expansion of wage sectors in the military and the bureaucracy and by the increase in monetary circulation in urban areas. The principal tendency is expressed in the fact that the expansion of the Early Dynastic system eventually incorporates the entire region from the Indus to the Mediterranean in a regular trade network.

CAPITAL AND EXPLOITATION: THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE

As it is difficult, on the basis of our familiarity with existing data, to analyze the specific categories of the operation of the economies of Mesopotamia, we can attempt to offer only some tentative characterizations of the way they may have developed.

To contrast Egypt and Mesopotamia again, we venture to say that from the start they are both temple-dominated, conical, clan-type structures. This implies that the upper class is a theocratically defined, hierarchically organized group of aristocratic lineages that dominate a population distributed into a scalogram of larger and smaller centers.

1. The upper class is identical to the state.
2. The accumulation of wealth is centralized at the top of the hierarchy.[12]
3. The top of the hierarchy is thus in a position of control over external trade, export production, and the local distribution of imports (Johnson 1973).
4. The forms of exploitation in this predynastic structure consist of direct taxation of "commoners" and the use of varying forms of slavery—internal debt-slaves and imported—in expanding sectors of production, that is, in temple agriculture and some craft sectors.

The strategy in the early system was one based on a temple economy fulfilling ritual functions, where, within the larger region, control depended upon the accumulations of "means of circulation," prestige goods—obsidian, metals, and so on—necessary for the social transactions of all local kinship or corporate units. The centralized control over the flow of such goods implies control over aristocrats inhabiting the hinterland and secondary centers, as well as over real wealth and labor power.[13] The control over such circulation by a central group depends upon a monopoly over external relations. Wealth measured in prestige goods is equivalent to control over labor whose surplus product reproduces the ability of the ruler to maintain his nodal position between local production and the production of other areas.

This kind of structure breaks down throughout the Early Dynastic period, but not in Egypt, where continued control over interregional trade enables the conical structure to become increasingly elaborate. The same kind of phenomenon that occurs within the region occurs within the evolving city-state. With the whole aristocracy now in the same enclosed area and with increasing economic competition, possibilities for a more decentralized accumulation of wealth emerge within the ruling class. The increasing acquisition of formerly monopolized means of circulation by other members of the upper class is part of a crucial differentiation in the economic system. While previously, religious, political, and economic power were one, they now begin to be differentiated.

1. A class of wealthy aristocrats (great families) develops alongside the temple. Their access to liquid wealth enables them to buy land and set up estates, apparently as early as 2700 BC (Diakonoff 1959:9).
2. A secular palace sector emerges out of the temple, specializing in political-administrative, trade, and warfare functions. This corresponds to a sector of the upper class with access to a share of the total wealth and, in this case, direct control over industrial production, as with the temple.
3. A merchant class increasingly monopolizes the interregional circulation process and is able to accumulate substantial portions of the total wealth through mercantile profit.
4. The differentiation of wealth accumulation in the upper class is reflected in the division of production into private and public sectors. The forms of exploitation, about which there is much debate, include labor that is directly dependent on the state ("helots" in Diakonoff 1977), private and state slaves, and a free population exploited by taxation. There is also evidence, perhaps in the free labor sector, of contract or wage labor connected with skilled or more specialized tasks. The nonfree classes are only different from one another with respect to the degree to which their members exist as property.[14]

The significant internal phenomenon here is the development of a process of wealth accumulation as a private or, at least, as an extrastate process. While it is, in fact, the members of the state class who first engage in such accumulation, the end product of internal differentiation is the development of several potentially opposed upper-class factions.[15]

We use the word *capital* to refer to the form of abstract wealth represented in the concrete form of metal or even money that can be accumulated in itself and converted into other forms of wealth: land, labor, and products. It is this abstract form that increasingly becomes the economic organizational basis of control in the system, competing with the older direct forms of state control, taxation, and slavery. Capital is not tied to a specific form of exploitation. It is, rather, the forerunner of, or perhaps identical to, merchant capital in its functioning. What is important here is that it is an independent form of economic wealth and power and not merely a means of circulation or a measuring device.

Private capital is probably not a major driving force in itself. It is not directly invested in production nor linked in a necessary cycle of production and realization. The state is in fact the major investor as well as the major producer and consumer, and, while the accumulation of abstract metallic wealth by the state is necessary to pay for the maintenance of the system, the accumulation includes direct taxation in kind as well as the proceeds of import-export activity. We may, however, speak of a kind of state capital in this system to the extent that the accumulation by the state of abstract wealth becomes increasingly necessary to maintain import flows and the internal system of payments. This fund of wealth reveals its importance when there is a decline in other forms of production for export (e.g., in the Roman empire).[16]

In decentralized center/periphery structures where competition and warfare are necessary components of the functioning of the system, arms production tends to become the leading sector in the economy. The state-palace sector in such a phase of development tends to dominate the rest of the local economy, and it may be in severe conflict with the temple and private sectors.

A significant dialectical mechanism in this economy consists in the complementarity/contradiction among the economic goals of the different sectors:

1. Private accumulation removes necessary wealth from the state sector, striving to reproduce this privilege. But the conditions of private accumulation depend on the successful functioning of the state sector, which is the source of manufactures and military power.
2. The merchant class is necessary to the realization of state-produced goods in the larger system, but its increased accumulation removes wealth from the state sector that, in turn, is necessary for the political and economic maintenance of mercantile activity.

With the development of the city-state economy, various forms of exploitation accrue to the former tax/state-slavery combination: private slavery on private estates, forms of contract and wage labor in craft and military sectors, and some form of corporate guild structure in the mercantile sector are common developments.

INTERNAL STRUCTURES AND THE LARGER SYSTEM

Dense trade networks correspond to competitive centers. Sparse networks correspond to hierarchical territorial structures. In Mesopotamia, the Aegean, and eastern Mediterranean, territorial hierarchies break down due to the impossibility of monopolizing trade in the larger region. The increasing density of trade may also have led to the transition from Western Zhou hegemony to the Warring States period in China.[17] Similar kinds of phenomena have been observed at various levels of economic organization. Thus, recent analyses of the evolution of Melanesian social systems in terms of trade networks would seem to indicate a fragmentation of larger political structures with the increasing density of trade (Allen 1977; Ambrose, 1976).

Compact city-states correlate with the loss of monopoly over the local economy by a state class and the development of a structure of class factions. In Phoenicia and Greece, there is an apparent transition from a palace-based (or royally controlled) economy to an oligarchic class structure (Starr 1977). While there are conflicts between state and private sectors in Athens, the private sector is clearly in command in the Classical period (this is also true for Phoenicia).[18] In Mesopotamia, the state sector and its bureaucratic membership remain a powerful force, maintaining a monopoly over industrial, if not agricultural, production.

There is a clear differentiation between agricultural-based production states and trade states within the larger system. The latter are, by definition, later developments that necessarily have to import subsistence goods to support their specialized labor. Mesopotamia (southern) represents an agricultural-based production center surrounded by trade states such as Assur in the north and Phoenicia in the west. Trade states specialize in specific forms of industrial production, the carrying trade, and middleman activity between other production areas. They must necessarily control the larger market network to which they belong. Dense local network conditions generate competitive expansion in the form of colonization. Empires in such systems as Athens are, again, political-military devices for maintaining control over the larger network. It would appear, however, that the absence of a previous state-bureaucratic sector in such systems implies the continued dominance of the private, oligarchic class and the continued furthering of its members' interests. The establishment of empire can take on a more or less bureaucratic form. In southern Mesopotamia the empire is the work of the state bureaucracy, and its interests, in terms of its own level of consumption and military needs, take precedence over the interests of private accumulators. The result is a great bureaucratic machine and a strictly controlled economy, centralized at the expense of private interests.

DYNAMICS IN EMPIRES

Empires that develop in the core/periphery systems that we have described are political mechanisms that feed on already established forms of wealth production and accumulation. Where they do not overtax and where they simultaneously maintain communication networks, they tend to increase the possibilities of production and trade in the system, that is, the possibilities for all existing forms of wealth accumulation.

Empires maintain and reinforce core/periphery relations politically, by the extraction of tribute from conquered areas and peripheries. But insofar as empires do not replace other economic mechanisms of production and circulation but only exploit them, they may create the conditions for their own demise.

This occurs where the revenue absorbed from the existing accumulation cycles increases more slowly than total accumulation itself. In such a case, an economic decentralization sets in, resulting in a general weakening of the center relative to other areas. The classic example that is well documented is the decentralization that occurs in the Roman empire, resulting in the virtual bankruptcy of the center itself, which becomes a net importer, and where its costs of imperial maintenance far outstrip its intake of tribute. In the case of Rome, where the class of private capitalists and landowners is dominant, the decentralization process is probably much more rapid and uncontrolled than in Mesopotamia, where the state sector can maintain stricter surveillance of the private sector and where a large portion of production is state monopoly. It is the Roman upper class itself, after all, that is largely responsible for the decentralization of the economy.[19]

Grossly stated, the balance of empire is determined by:

(booty + tribute [tax] + export revenue) – (cost of empire + cost of imports)

The maintenance of the center position in an empire depends on the mechanisms that determine the net economic flows in the larger system. When the empire does not organize those flows directly, there will be a tendency in the "capitalist" structure, referred to above, for the center eventually to decline.

CONCLUSION

Our aim has been to present the sketch of an argument and not a definitive analysis of any kind. Our point has been to stress the fundamental continuity between ancient and modern world systems. We have repeatedly stressed the larger-system aspect in opposition to models that take society as the sufficient unit of analysis, thereby, as we see it, implicitly eliminating the question of dynamics, evolution, and devolution. In such a short space we have not attempted to take up more specific aspects of the available data, choosing instead to state a number of points that we feel are important areas of further discussion.

The general properties that we have discussed apply, at a sufficiently high level of abstraction, to all systems of "civilization." We are, perhaps, talking about the same system. The forms of accumulation have not changed so significantly. The forms of exploitation and oppression have all been around from the earliest civilizations, although, of course, they have existed in different proportions and in varying combinations. Even in our own recent past, a major form of the accumulation of capital was by means of slavery, and it might be argued that today's Eastern bloc economies are but another (ancient) form of exploitation linked to the same process of accumulation (Frank 1977). There are, to be sure, a great many differences, but the similarities are, perhaps, a more serious and practical problem.

POSTSCRIPT

This article was published for the first time in 1979, in part as the result of work carried out in the framework of an interdisciplinary seminar on exchange systems in a historical perspective. It was also a product of the application of a global systemic anthropology that was emerging in our cooperative work in that period.

Just as there was heated debate concerning our general approach, there was quite some debate about this particular presentation. Moses Finley was one of those with whom we, quite understandably, had several heated discussions in the late 1970s. All this was a reflex of the dominant society-centered focus of the social sciences at the time.

Since that time we have had little chance to return to the issues of ancient civilizations, although many of our colleagues have continued to develop the global approach in ancient history and prehistory (Spriggs 1988; Rowlands, Larsen, and Kristiansen 1987; Thomas 1989). Since the publication of our article, other research has applied the global approach to the prehistory of Oceania (Friedman 1981, 1982, 1985) and to the relation between global processes and the emergence in the nineteenth century of social and cultural forms in central Africa that are today regarded as traditional (Ekholm 1991). Given the initial skeptical reception of the 1979 article as well as a number of similar endeavors (Ekholm 1975; Ekholm and Friedman 1980, 1985), it is indeed gratifying to discover that it has now been incorporated into a growing field within anthropology and in archaeology and related subjects. After quite a few years of global anthropology in the field (Ekholm 1991; Friedman 1992a, b), we have been prompted to begin looking again into the data of ancient societies and of prehistory in general. At present we can do no more than confine ourselves to several brief remarks concerning the status of this chapter today. A more systematic summary of our work is forthcoming in *Review* (Friedman 1992c).

The general argument of this chapter consisted in the assertion that the dualist division of world history that was so prevalent in anthropologically inspired economic history following Polanyi and disciples, in Marxist economic history, and even in the then-emergent world-systems theory of Wallerstein (also partially informed by Polanyi), one that envisioned world history as divided into pre- and post-European Renaissance eras, was an ethnocentric misunderstanding. Frank and Gills have recently developed a similar theme, perhaps more extreme, that the past 5,000 years of world history can be understood as the continuity of the same system. In another article published at about the same time (1980), we emphasized the degree to which global systems are multistructural, that is, that they contain numerous articulations among local and global processes and that *system* refers to the systemic properties of globally open processes rather than to an operationally definable empirical entity. This has been further elaborated in a series of articles dealing with the relation between global processes and cultural processes (Friedman 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991). In another article from the early phase of our work it was suggested (Friedman 1979) that the so-called transition from feudalism to capitalism was essentially a shift of capital accumulation from East to West in a declining Middle-East-dominated world system in the Middle Ages. This argument was taken from the pioneering work of Maurice Lombard, and since then Abu-Lughod (1989) has brilliantly made this kind of argument definitive, thus effectively forcing other researchers to rethink if not eliminate previous discussions of the internal transition in Europe.

While clearly sympathetic to the gist of the argument advanced by Frank, we think it should be reframed in more hypothetically interesting terms lest the notion of system become so diluted as to be nearly useless as a theoretical tool. Frank has claimed that we have sometimes shied away from the assumption of a single world-historical system. In this chapter we do not make it a central issue since the empirical foundations are quite lacking. We suggest it as an avenue of research and concentrate instead on the issue of continuity. We have attempted to understand the degree to which such continuity exists. This is a more complex problem than the enduring appearance of empires, world markets, the accumulation of capital, and cycles of hegemony. It is also related to the nature of the local structures as well as the degree to which they are products of the same larger system. It is necessary to understand how different kinds of local organization arise, why caste here and ethnic pluralism there, why class in one situation and region and ranked estates in another. We have gone so far as to suggest that different kinds of social-identity formation are related to differences in the degree of capitalization of social relations, differences in the degree of resultant social individualization, that western ethnicity is, as a result, a product of what might be called the culture of "modernity" understood as a general phenomenon, as opposed to the kinds of cultural identity that we find today in India and Southeast Asia (Friedman 1991). That so-called modern ethnicity may have appeared in an earlier period, for example, in Classical and Hellenistic Greece, might have significant implications for the continuity hypothesis. If Protestant ethics are more general than Christianity, as they would appear to be, this is also an important argument for continuity. There is more to the configuration of global systems than simply the general economics of wealth accumulation. One might, for example, take up the issue of the emergence of feudal structures as opposed to what we have described elsewhere as kin-based prestige-good systems on the peripheries of commercial civilizations. One might ask whether different proportions of different dominant forms of accumulation of wealth, mercantile (abstract wealth) versus control over products and/or labor, affect the dynamic properties of the overall system. We are not saying all this in order to play a Tilly-like role (1984) of devil's advocate, but because these are absolutely fundamental issues for the understanding of how global systems or the system function(s) and change(s).

The question of system versus systems is not as simple as Frank defines it, although we are sympathetic to his point, since we have ourselves argued that the similarities are "a more serious and practical problem" (Ekholm and Friedman 1980) in political terms. It is necessary to come to grips with the questions of transformation even while assuming continuity. We have suggested on several occasions that the similarities between empirically delimited systems are great enough to warrant a continuist hypothesis. But this does not eliminate the need to understand the conditions for the emergence of modern industrial capitalism and with it, those aspects of modernity that diverge from earlier social orders. If the family resemblances we discover enable us to talk of variations within the same system instead of the emergence of new systems, this remains a complex empirical and theoretical problem of boundaries (not geographical). That China need not have been dynamically connected to the India-Mesopotamia-Mediterranean nexus in the third millennium BC for us to say that their regional histories can nonetheless be seen as dependent on one another ought not to dismay us. The New World was not, in all probability, systemically connected to the Old in any strong sense until quite late. But it clearly displays global systemic processes of a similar order. In our argument the continuity of global systems concerns the continuity of global processes and not of a physically delimited portion of the globe. Contractions in such systems have not infrequently created "isolates," "untouched primitives," and Shangri-las. These are, of course, global products, but they are not globally connected in the sense demanded by Frank's model. Conditions and structures of reproduction must be examined in order to ascertain the way in which empirical global systems are constituted, the way in which regions and populations are linked, the degree to which the local is produced rather than simply connected to the larger whole, and the degree to which its historical trajectory is tied to that whole. We are still operating with a working hypothesis, and there is no obviously established 5,000-year-old system, even if there might be much to suggest the existence of a system variable in extent and connectivity over time.

On the other hand, there is also much to suggest that world history is like a Kafkaesque nightmare of repetition compulsions, more a scenario of imprisonment in larger systems than one of self-directed and empowering evolution.

NOTES

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This chapter first appeared in 1982 as "'Capital' Imperialism and Exploitation in Ancient World-Systems," in *Review* 4 (1) (Summer): 87–109.

1. The center need not, of course, be the originator of new technology. It need only concentrate that technology within its boundaries. While a good deal of military technology has been invented by peripheral nomadic groups, it is only in the centers that it has been mass-produced on a large scale.

2. Before the Jemdet Nasr period, there are virtually no walled settlements. By the Early Dynastic (ED) period, all cities are walled (Adams 1971:581; Adams 1972).

3. Young (1972:832), for example, states that the "concentration of population into the larger urban centers appears to take place at the expense of the countryside."

4. Extensive discussions of the predynastic situation in southern Mesopotamia can be found in Johnson (1973, 1976) and Johnson and Wright (1975), where a case is made for the existence of hierarchical control over trade. We feel that the evidence they present can be interpreted in this way in spite of the perhaps unwarranted use of central-place theory.

5. The import of raw material is already evident in the Ubaid (Stigler 1974:114).

6. Crawford (1973) points out that there is little clear evidence of large-scale production for export in the ED period in spite of the massive import of raw materials. In her argument for the existence of invisible exports from Mesopotamia which do not leave clear material traces, she stresses the importance of grain and dried fish in the initial periods. Spindle whorls are found at least as early as the Ubaid period (Kramer 1970), but it is difficult to determine exactly when textiles become an exported item. Later in

the ED period, at Lagash there is mention of two hundred slave women engaged in the various moments of textile production (Deimel, cited in Adams 1971:5114). Adams (1971:583) also mentions the export of tools and weapons.

7. It is, in fact, only in the delta area, where there are several possible outlets to the Mediterranean, that there was any serious competition between centers.

8. A long line of scholarship has stressed this specific property of Egyptian civilization. Weber (1976), for example, emphasizes the long-term maintenance and development of a bureaucratic state-class as opposed to the more mercantile and decentralized structure of Mesopotamia. Notable in Egypt is the lack of an urban civilization and its expression in walled towns, the very restricted use of a monetary medium up until a relatively late date (Janssen 1975a), the state monopoly over external trade, also until very late, and the lack of an independent class of "great families" or a merchant class. For further discussion, see Janssen (1975a, 1975b), Morenz (1969), Kemp (1972), O'Connor (1972), Smith (1972), and Uphill (1972).

9. It might be hypothesized that territorial expansion was the direct outcome of competitive export of food (possibly the first major export) before ED in exchange for raw materials and that this export of agriculture was a key factor in the territorial conflicts that led to the formation of walled city-states.

10. Metal was relatively rare in ED I, but there is a clear development of metallurgy in ED II, and the "lost wax process reached a climax in ED III when armorers made heavy and efficient weapons of war, axes, spears, and adzes" (Mallowan 1971:239.).

11. The importance of warfare is stressed in Childe (1952), who refers to the first example of "organized homicide" (30) in circa 3000 BC.

12. In the Jemdet Nasr period and earlier in Susa, there are large storerooms attached to the central temple (Frankfort 1971:84). "It has been said that the larger Ubaidian settlements were probably market towns as well as religious centers, both for the local satellite communities and for wider trade" (Stigler 1974:114). See also Adams and Nissen (1972).

13. Long before bronze technology, copper makes its appearance in the form of copper beads in Iran at Ali-Kosh from 6750–6000 BC (Hole, Flannery, and Neely 1971:278) and in Egypt circa 4000 BC (Stigler 1974:135).

14. Diakonoff claims, *contra* Gelb (1971), that state sector "slaves" or helots are the equivalent of patriarchal slaves at the state level and not of serfs. They are, in any case, quite unlike the classical slaves of Greece and Rome. It is not clear that his attempt at differentiating ancient Mesopotamia from the Mediterranean classical period is theoretically valid, especially in light of the massive expansion of the slave sector following 2000 BC.

15. The existence of a sphere of private capital accumulation is well documented for areas that are traditionally thought to be characterized by theocratic centralized economies. Thus, Larsen (1967, 1976) has shown that Assur, for example, in the Old Assyrian period, is very much a private commercial economy. His analysis of caravan-procedure texts, of costs and methods of trade, demonstrates the existence of a considerable profit-oriented private sector. Similar evidence exists for Ur (Oppenheim 1954) and for Lagash (Lambert 1953). Adams (1974) has discussed how the *damgar*, merchant, who begins as a state official, becomes an increasingly private

operator (1974:248). Farber's material (1978) demonstrates the very high degree of commercialization of the Babylonian economy (the existence of parallel movements of prices of different goods and services and wages, a general price level, and economic cycles).

16. Hopkins's (1978) work represents a sophisticated attempt at developing a model of the dynamic of the Roman economy that shows the fundamental importance of the imperialist drive of the state in the fueling of the other forms of accumulation in the system (see also Duncan-Jones 1974, Jones 1974). The classical discussion of the relation between the decentralization of capital accumulation in the Roman empire as linked to the crisis of the state can be found in Rostovtzeff (1957).

17. A general discussion of the breakdown of trade monopolies and the development of city and territorial states can be found in Friedman and Rowlands (1977). Hsu (1965) discusses the internal transformations in China in the Zhou period, especially the emergence of private accumulation and the breakdown of the earlier aristocratic bureaucracy.

18. There is, however, a large-scale regional oscillation between private and state-controlled economies in the long run. Thus, the development of the Hellenistic states marks the emergence of state control after a period of more "democratic" oligarchic rule in the Mediterranean.

19. A pattern in the Roman imperialist system which may be common to all such systems is one that we can clearly see in modern imperialism. The first period would consist of military or military-backed expansion where large areas are taxed at exorbitant rates. Such areas, for example, Greece in the Roman period, being short of means of payment, borrow from Roman capitalists, a phenomenon reminiscent of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The result is a double flow of tribute and debt service payments back to the center and a deindustrialization of the periphery. The enormous accumulation of capital in the center leads to a great deal of unproductive as well as productive investment. But the generally high rate of accumulation compared with the increase in production leads to increasing costs at home, increasing taxation, and conditions generally unfavorable for home producers on the world market. At this point the pattern shifts from a center/periphery structure toward a decentralization of production as well as accumulation. Rome's relative monopoly over certain mass-production items for the empire is lost in the Imperial period, and its ability to maintain its increasingly expensive social complex at Rome becomes a serious problem, leading to a more or less continual crisis of the state. It has been observed by some (Ekholm 1977b; Friedman 1978; Fröbel, Heinrichs, and Krey 1977) that a similar deindustrialization of capital accumulation is occurring today and that it, too, is directly linked to the present general economic crisis and to the crisis of the state in the West.

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6

Structure, Dynamics, and the Final Collapse of Bronze Age Civilizations in the Second Millennium

Kajsa Ekholm Friedman

The following analysis is an effort to examine the reasons for the collapse of the Bronze Age civilizations of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East in c. 1200 BC. These civilizations constituted the core of a larger global system that also included a less advanced periphery. My preliminary assumption is that collapse is best explained as an aspect of development, that is, as a consequence of the development process that preceded it, not as something new, an externality with respect to that process. This is especially important to keep in mind given the obvious role played by invasions from peripheral areas.

My interest in the Bronze Age is anchored in my concern for the world of today. In my understanding of world history, which I share with a group of colleagues (Ekholm and Friedman 1979; Friedman 1992; Frank 1993; see also Chase-Dunn and Hall 2000), the global (or world) system is five thousand years old, not five hundred years as suggested by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974). This does not, of course, imply that nothing has changed, but that there are fundamental systemic parameters that exhibit a strong continuity. If we accept the long-term continuity argument, we have an important advantage in the study of the nature of dynamics and of the causes of decline that tell us a great deal about the present as well as the past.

The year 2000 BC is somewhat arbitrarily set. We enter the scene after the widespread crisis of the period 2200. The collapse of 1200 marks the end of a certain type of global system. When the core region eventually recovered, in the Near East earlier than in Greece (Osborne 1996:38), the Bronze Age was over, and the political landscape looked significantly different. The Bronze Age of the second millennium was an "era of internationalism" (Knapp 1988:xii,



Figure 6.1. The spatial order of integration

135). The global system extended over a vast geographical area where societies at great distances from one another were interconnected by international trade. This was to a large extent a consequence of the dependence on bronze and thereby on copper and tin.

In its widest geographical extension the global system was held together by mechanisms of international trade. *Trade* is here defined in broad terms as exchange of goods and resources. For the second millennium we may distinguish between three types of integration: *social, political,* and *economic* (figure 6.1), corresponding to society, empire, and trade. There is a striking discrepancy throughout the period between the wide extension of economic integration and the restricted character of political integration.

In the thirteenth century there were four or five superpowers, or great kings. In an often-quoted Hittite document from Tudhaliya IV's reign (ca. 1237–1209), the scribe writes: "And the kings who (are) of equal rank with me, the king of Egypt, the king of Karadunia (= Kassite Babylonia), the king of Assyria, the king of Ahhiyawa . . ." (Bryce 1999:343). The scribe has then erased the last name, which apparently stands for a Mycenaean power of somewhat unclear identity, as if uncertain it really belonged to the category of highest-ranked kingdoms. Ahhiyawa was probably a confederacy headed by one of the Mycenaean states (see Mee 1998:143). It was active for some time in western Anatolia and was then, at the end of the thirteenth century, disestablished by the Hittites. From the Hittite horizon there were thus only four superpowers: the Hittite kingdom, Egypt, Assyria, and Babylonia.

Mainland Greece was not included in the core of the system until the mid-seventeenth century, when Mycenaean civilization emerged. Minoan Crete, on the other hand, was already a major civilization at the beginning of the second millennium. It provided crucial impulses to the development of the former area and was then, in ca. 1450, absorbed into the political realm of the mainlanders. Hittite Anatolia also emerged relatively late, ca. 1680, preceded by a pattern of relatively developed city-states.

At the end of the Late Bronze Age (LBA) the core region thus embraced a vast region, although quite unevenly developed, in the eastern Mediterranean and the Near East. This pattern was the result of a particular global process; it did not exist at the beginning of the second millennium. At this time there were instead a number of smaller global systems and regional exchange networks, partly linked to one another (if at all) (cf. Kohl 1987; Frank 1993; Sherratt and Sherratt 1991). The global process leading up to the collapse of 1200 was characterized by the continuous destruction of old structures and the emergence of new ones. Earlier cores (southern Mesopotamia and Egypt) declined, were temporarily replaced, and then eventually amalgamated into a considerably extended core of a much larger global system.

The Bronze Age civilizations of the second millennium had certain features in common. They have been described as palace-based "command economies" (Sherratt and Sherratt 1991:376), that is, more like the former Soviet Union than the capitalist West. The state was one with its ruling elite, whose projects predominantly concerned trade and warfare in external relations and the subjugation and exploitation of slaves and peasants in the domestic arena. They were complex and dynamic societies. Magnificent buildings were constructed, requiring considerable amounts of material resources, large labor forces, technical skill, and a great deal of planning and organization. They built ports, roads, bridges, and fortifications. They had writing, were advanced in metallurgy, organized large-scale production of manufactured goods, to a large extent by slave labor, and their skilled workers produced amazing objects of art and crafts. In all major political powers we find an expanding military complex. The three innovations, horse, chariot, and the composite bow, appeared in combination at the turn of the third millennium (Watkins 1989:27).

In LBA, this military novelty was spread over the entire core region and even to peripheral areas. Horses and chariots were found in, for example, continental Europe as early as the mid-second millennium (Sandars 1978:81). Egypt had no horses before the Hyksos (Lewy 1973:708; Yurco 1996:88). Early in the history of the New Kingdom, the Egyptians took horses as booty from Canaan before breeding their own. Horses were apparently imported to both Crete and mainland Greece in the sixteenth century (see Chadwick 1976:164).

However impressive these civilizations may appear, they proved to be of fragile construction. Paradoxically as it may seem, the final collapse of 1200 occurred when development was at its peak, as if it all went to pieces when Egypt, Hittite Anatolia, Assyria, Babylonia, and Mycenaean Greece were at the height of their development.

The collapse is not an entirely clear-cut phenomenon. It was more pronounced in Mycenaean Greece and Hittite Anatolia than in Egypt and Assyria (Osborne 1996:38). In the former areas, the collapse was followed by large-scale movements of people, massive depopulation, and at the end of the process, the disappearance of civilized life and a return to primitive conditions.

Osborne (1996:32) provides a picture of mainland Greece after the collapse that could as well be applied to other areas:

> The general impression that we get is of contracted horizons: no big buildings, no multiple graves, no impersonal communication, limited contact with a wider world. After the collapse of the Mycenaean system, things seem to be reduced to an individual level. . . . [W]ith the end of the palaces, not only the political units, but also the whole social and economic organization, broke up; individuals' livelihood came to depend solely on their own efforts, and no dominant individual or group extracted a surplus from the rest of the population.

What he describes is the transformation of civilization into a more primitive society, the loss of complexity. The state structure broke down, palaces and elite groups were wiped out, material culture declined, horizons contracted, and individuals were left to survive on their own. In Greece, the dark age lasted hundreds of years, until the ninth century. By then Mycenaean civilization was gone, and a new type of social formation had come into existence.

The collapse affected the entire core region of the system and was more than a regional shift of hegemony. Central Europe experienced development in this period (Bouzek 1973; Coles and Harding 1979:336), but by no means of an amplitude that compares with the civilizations in the Near East and the Aegean. The collapse of 1200 marked the end of a certain type of global system. In the first millennium BC when development regained its momentum, the locally more common iron had replaced bronze.

THE STATE'S OVERARCHING PROJECT

Civilization is a system of structures, an order of orders, without which its grandiose projects cannot be maintained. Under primitive conditions, people are certainly capable of generating cultures that are in many respects impressively imaginative (as shown by anthropology). Yet these cultures are always materially undeveloped. Tribal life is, *by definition*, circumscribed because under such conditions people are confined to their own muscles and brains and to the resources provided by their local environments. Therefore, their projects are always restricted in scope.

Elites in civilizations operate under entirely different conditions. Through their access to external resources and to other people's labor and skills, they are able to transcend the limits of what is culturally and materially possible in a closed and socially undifferentiated local society. Civilization adds, one might say, both human capacity and material resources to individual social actors. Ruling elites are nothing in themselves. They obtain their creative capacities through their structural position in the larger system. The maintenance of their projects depends, therefore, ultimately upon their ability to uphold this position.

In developing a structural model of the Bronze Age global system it seems reasonable to start by distinguishing internal and external relations, as seen from the perspective of the society as a unit (figure 6.2). In this manner we may discern the general construction of society/polity as well as the various types of external relations in which it is embedded.

Society consisted in this period of a *central sector* and a *rural sector*. The former harbored *state* and *ruling elite*, usually in the form of a palace, commanding *peasants* in the rural sector and, more directly, *craftsmen*, *slaves*, and *soldiers* in the central sector. Large estates became increasingly common where states, temples, or landed aristocracies engaged in export production.

Noting that societies are directed from a central sector harboring state and ruling elite, linked to the outside world by international trade and foreign policy, and in command of peasants, craftsmen, and slaves, does not, however, tell us very much about their modes of functioning. We need to grasp structures in motion.

One might speak of an overarching project, directed by the state, and encompassing foreign *trade* and *warfare* in the international arena. States either relied on trade, or they went out taking what they wanted by military means. States/elites engaged in international ventures simply because they were compelled to do so. They *needed* the resources of others. Civilization can neither be created nor reproduced on the basis of merely local resources; rather, it is dependent upon an inflow of resources from external areas.


External Relations
Trade
Merchant colonies
Exchange of goods between rulers
Political alliance (which may imply above)
Military campaigns
Colonization (political and economic)
Vassalage/tributary relations
Internal Relations
Central sector
State/ruling elite
Rural sector
Peasants
Craftsmen, artisans, soldiers, slaves

Figure 6.2. Internal and external relations in the state order

Trade and warfare are two very different strategies of relating to the surrounding world (figure 6.3). They represent, at least in theory, opposing methods of attracting wealth and resources from the outside. Trade is a peaceful act of exchange, while warfare is a nonreciprocal and violent act that aims at conquest, subjugation, and plunder. However, as we will see, these two activitiesh ave a great deal in common (cf. Driessen 1999:19). The border between them is both vague and pervious.

Included in the state's overarching project in the international arena are also the various forms of political integration listed in figure 6.2, that is, alliance, vassalage, and conquest. The latter two belong to the warfare sector because they depend on military force. What unites trade and warfare is *the struggle for resources*. Warfare was sometimes only a temporary act of plunder and destruction of foreign lands, but it could as well lead into a more permanent colonial relationship where the transfer of goods was no longer booty but took the form of taxation and tribute. The strategy of political alliance is also clearly linked to both trade and warfare as it usually aimed at strengthening one's own



Figure 6.3. The overarching project of the state

position in the competition for resources and the control over international trade.

Distinguishing the existence of an overarching project enables us to see that both trade and warfare have an external as well as an internal component. While being enacted in the international arena, they both had to be anchored in the domestic arena.

Ships and caravans, after long and sometimes dangerous journeys, arrived at their destinations in foreign lands where the transaction called international trade took place. This activity was always part of a more inclusive project. The trader had to have goods to offer in exchange. *Trade* in the international arena, therefore, required *export production* at home (except in cases of transit trade). In the second millennium this type of production was usually effectuated in workshops under state control. Trade is in this respect more than exchange taking place in external relationships. Workshops had to be built, workers and raw materials had to be obtained, and work itself had to be organized. Maritime trade also required shipbuilding and the construction and maintenance of ports.

Warfare, on the other hand, did not require export production, at least not directly, but had to be anchored in a domestic *military complex*. For states to be successful at plundering and conquering neighboring territories as well as defending themselves against attacks, they had to build up military capacity at home. Thus, the overarching project included on the one hand trade and warfare in the international arena, and on the other hand their corresponding domestic components: export production and the military complex.

Core elites here faced a dual problem. In the international arena they had to play the common game as skillfully as possible, in competition and in conflict with other elites. Success depended on the strength they were able to muster in their domestic arenas. Even if foreign resources could be procured by repeated plunder of alien territories, these resources still had to be converted into development at home for the predatory behavior to be continued. The elites had to keep in mind that trade and warfare were fundamental facets of their overarching project. They had to pursue an active foreign policy (cf. Warburton 2001:74), including diplomacy and the establishment of alliances, but ultimately, the maintenance of their empires and vassalages relied on military capacity.

Core elites had also to address problems of social order and social integration, or cohesion. Social integration is never automatically attained but has to be continuously reproduced. Development implies an opening toward the external world. It means exploration and expansion into the unknown, and also, in this process, the constant dissolution of old structures. On the other hand, it requires a certain amount of closure, preservation, and social order.

As all civilizations harbor serious, objective conflicts due to the very structures of dominance and exploitation that constitute both internal and external relations, the maintenance of peace has never been easy. Relying on a permanent use of violence is never a good idea, if at all possible. Instead, state religion in one form or another performs wonders internally because it offers an immediate interpretation of social reality according to which the latter appears both natural and desirable. The "unfair" relationship between core and periphery is evidently more difficult to mystify and thereby to legitimate. The Egyptians in the New Kingdom developed an imaginative strategy. They took young boys from elite families in colonized Canaan who were brought up in Egypt and then sent back as supposedly loyal functionaries in the Egyptian state's service.

It is said about Hammurabi in mid-eighteenth century Babylonia that: "For whatever cause, his years between the eleventh and the thirtieth were . . . given up to defensive and religious building and to digging canals" (Gadd 1973:177). There are in general three main areas of state intervention in the domestic arena: defensive arrangements, religion and religious buildings, and the control of water for agriculture.

In periods of development, the building of temples and tombs seemed to guarantee the maintenance of order and stability. No gods have, however, been able to secure prosperity for more than a limited period of time. As development led to population increase (see below), expanding states were compelled in one way or the other to increase their supply of food. The growing need could to some extent be met by harsher taxation of the rural sector, but when need exceeded rural capacity the state would either have to import food or engage in more efficient agricultural production. The large-scale production of grain is a characteristic feature of civilization. In Ur III there is written documentation, from the province of Girsu, on a unit engaged in the manufacture of grain-based products with approximately one thousand workers (eighty-six men, six hundred sixty-nine women, and one hundred three adolescents), which produced 1,100 tons of flour in one year (Roux 1995:200). Expanding states produced and exported grain. They did not import except during periods of acute crisis.

In southern Mesopotamia, where irrigation was common, rulers from Ur III and later boasted about the digging and repairing of canals, thereby providing the people with water: "[T]he great arteries of water were provided and maintained by the pious care of kings" (Gadd 1973:201). When a new ruler appeared on the scene after a period of decline, he usually had started his reign by restoring the irrigation system. An intensified agricultural production, not only for domestic use but also for export, led here as well as in other parts of the core region to ecological degradation. Large areas in southern Mesopotamia are today salty wastelands where only the most salt-tolerant plants can be grown (Pollock 1999:37).

In phases of decline, which in Mesopotamia were often accompanied by invasions, the irrigation system was both seriously neglected and often intentionally destroyed. Warfare usually involved the destruction of habitations and plantations. At a recovery, when development regained momentum, the digging and repairing of canals was therefore a necessary action of the new ruler.

TRADE I: THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF CORE AND PERIPHERY

For the material foundation of Bronze Age civilizations certain resources were more crucial than others. Core civilizations needed above all: (1) base metals (i.e., copper and tin), (2) manpower, and (3) precious metals (i.e., gold and silver). *Bronze* was of decisive importance as it was used for the production of weapons and tools: "Bronze . . . was of critical importance for weapons, for tools to build palaces and ships, and for prestige objects—that is to say, bronze was of critical importance to the security, economy and prestige of the palaces" (Wiener 1991:327).

The effectiveness of bronze was first and foremost of significance within the military.The second millennium was a period of constant warfare. Toward the end there is an escalation of the arms race and devastating military confrontations between the superpowers. The production of bronze presupposed mining and then the transfer of the required minerals, *copper* and *tin*, from supply zones to production centers. Because both copper and tin were rare, tin especially so, bronze was incompatible with isolated, self-sufficient societies.

Geographically extensive exchange networks certainly existed earlier, but with bronze as the strategically crucial metal, the dependence on international trade became an absolute material necessity without which the system, in its specific form, could not survive (as is the case with oil today). It generated a constant prospecting for the required minerals and led thereby to a continuous geographical enlargement of the system.

The core region also required *manpower* for public works, for the military complex, and for the large-scale production of manufactured goods, that is, both workers and soldiers. The civilizations of the second millennium relied on the import of workers. Before the Industrial Revolution there was no significant way of expanding the volume of production than by increasing the workforce. All expanding economies were therefore dependent upon the import, or inflow, of foreign workers. There was never a sufficient supply of locally generated manpower. We know that economic development in this period was accompanied by population growth. This growth was artificial in the sense that it implied an import of people. The idea that common people started to give birth to more children when ruling elites suddenly needed workers in their mines, quarries, and workshops is not very convincing. How, then, were these foreign workers procured? They were sold and bought, taken as war captives, and deported from troublesome areas—often under conditions that suggest the word *slavery*. But some of them could obviously immigrate of their own will and might also be better treated in other states.

Gold and *silver*, finally, were of crucial importance because these metals could be converted into other kinds of resources and used as a form of "money." With silver and gold it was possible for elites to get what they wanted from the outside. We know from later phases of world history that it has never been a good strategy for civilizations to pay in precious metals for their imports. For precious metals to spur economic development, they had to be used for obtaining material and human resources from the outside that could be put to work in a production generating what Sherratt and Sherratt (1991) call "added value."

There were other essential resources, although of less-general character. Egypt needed timber for its maritime trade, and because there were no tall trees suitable for shipbuilding, timber had to be imported. Egypt sent trading expeditions to Byblos along the Levantine coast as early as the Old Kingdom in order to procure this valued resource. The first ruler of the Fourth Dynasty, Snefru, claims he brought home forty ships filled with wood (Marcus 2001:408). The contact was interrupted at the decline of the Old Kingdom but was then resumed in the Middle Kingdom. In LBA, during the New Kingdom, Egypt evidently imported timber even from Crete, "sous forme de planches et de poutres" (Faure 1997:250).

The Complementarity of Core and Periphery

To obtain material and human resources from the periphery, the core region had to offer something in exchange. In principle it offered manufactured goods, such as weapons, textiles, luxuries, and processed agricultural products. These products were in high demand in both core and periphery. Advanced weaponry and military equipment has throughout world history been predominantly produced by civilizations. In the second millennium it was, however, possible for peripheries with access to base metals to develop their own metallurgical industry and weapon production (e.g., continental Europe in LBA).

Trade gave rise to an organic relationship between core and periphery (figure 6.4). There is an intimate relationship between the large-scale production of manufactured goods in the core region and the exportation of raw materials and manpower from the periphery. This complementarity appears as a form of division of labor. It also necessarily implies unequal degrees of complexity.

Civilization is usually identified with the manifestations of elite consumption and civilized lifestyle—palaces, frescoes, objects of art, luxuries. This aspect of civilization must not, however, conceal the more fundamental structures of social and economic development. More adequate, in fact, would be to


Production of weapons and textiles
CORE
Manufactures, weapons, textiles
Material resources, manpower
Natural resources
PERIPHERY

Figure 6.4. Core/periphery relations

define civilization according to the size of its workshops and the number of its workers/slaves.

Textiles were one of the major export products of civilizations in the second millennium. Egypt and Mycenaean Greece produced linen while Babylonia, Assyria, Syria, and Minoan Crete all produced woolen cloth. There is textual evidence of large-scale production of textiles in all the major political centers of the second millennium, in, for example, Ur III, Old Babylonia, Assur, Assyria under Shamsi-Adad, Syria, Egypt in both the Middle and New Kingdoms, and the kingdoms of Pylos and Knossos at the very end of the period. Core states traded, or exchanged, with one another. Each specialized in certain types of textiles. The fine woolen textiles of Crete were, for example, held in high esteem in Egypt. Part of the textiles produced were certainly also used in their trade with peripheral, tribal societies.

The problem with cloth in archaeological contexts is its organic and therefore perishable nature. Although it has left few traces archaeologically, we still might assume that cloth was one of the major export articles from core civilizations in both the third and the second millennia.

If redistribution has any significance for the Bronze Age, it would be in the relationship between core and periphery. The latter supplies raw materials to the former and manufactured goods are then "redistributed." The complementarity between core and periphery in this respect means that the large-scale manufacturing of, for example, textiles entirely depended on the maintenance of the global system and peripheral demand. If peripheral markets for some reason were lost, textile factories with their thousands of workers would consequently be plunged into economic crisis.

The importance of textiles as an export article from the core region might be explained by peripheral elites desiring fancy clothes from civilizational centers. In addition, cloth was perhaps used as "money" (or prestige goods) for which necessities, such as metals and slaves, might be traded. A more recent example of such a pattern is the African slave trade between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries AD. Cloth was a crucial factor in the transatlantic slave trade, produced industrially in Europe and exchanged for people in, for example, the Congo region (Ekholm [Friedman] 1972). Cheap European textiles replaced African-produced cloth, which earlier had functioned as a kind of "money" that was exchanged for human beings. England's textile industry became in this way the engine in economic development at home as well as in the destructive slave trade of Africa.

The relationship between manufactured goods from the core region and the supply of manpower and metals from the periphery is important as a model for international trade, especially where the archaeological material leaves us with no traces of these articles. In third millennium material we often see that contacts existed between two areas but not what they were all about. Branigan (1970:182) has discussed this problem with respect to Crete's international trade in the third millennium. Archaeological evidence indicates contacts with other parts of the Aegean; Egypt; the Levant; and even Italy, Sicily, Malta, and Sardinia in the west. In the latter areas, contacts with Crete and other parts of the Aegean are visible in, for example, tombs, stone figurines, and ceramics found in these places (Branigan 1970:180–87).

The evidence of contact in this context is very sparse, and what is found is predominantly luxuries, or prestige goods. These items can, says Branigan, hardly explain what actually motivated the contact:

> If we look back over the list of Minoan "exports" we find that there is little there to argue for extensive Minoan trade in the Aegean and east Mediterranean, during the early Bronze Age. Daggers to Cyprus, seal-stones and amulets to the Aegean and a few pots here and there! A worthwhile foreign trade could hardly have been based on the market for sealstones and amulets. (Branigan 1970:189)

Crete's trade with distant areas must have been lucrative. It is hard to believe that people traveled over vast tracts of land and sea only to offer an amulet or a vase. If this were the case, trade would be a meaningless activity, with no deep impact on the socioeconomic structures of the societies involved. The plausible explanation is, says Branigan, that the objects found are merely "the by-products of a trade in more valuable but less durable commodities" (1970:189). Other items, not detected in the archaeological material, must have been involved—for example, metals and manpower from Italy, Sicily, Malta, and Sardinia in exchange for weapons and textiles from Crete.

Conversely, we might argue that if a peripheral area were contacted by a more developed area, it must have offered something in exchange. If tribal chiefs obtained textiles, weapons, and processed agricultural products from core traders, with what did they pay? We might assume that metals and slaves played a central role. That was what the core demanded and what the periphery's elites could easily give away.

Slaves were both captured in war and procured by purchase. According to the Linear B tablets (Chadwick 1976:79, 80, 150–52), female slaves were used in textile production for export in both Knossos (woolen) and Pylos (linen). They are mentioned in connection with rations from the royal stores. These women had children but no husbands. In Pylos they are defined according to their geographic origin, for example, "women of Miletos," interpreted by Chadwick as imported from this particular site. Miletus was a trading post in Ionia with Mycenaean settlement. Other localities appear in the same kind of constellation: "women of Knidos," "women of Lamnos," "women of Zephyros," and "women of A-swi-ja." Purchase seems more likely than capture, both because the Mycenaeans traded in these areas and because the reference to geographical origin seems to indicate a more permanent relationship between supply and demand zones.

The Predatory Nature of Development

Civilization is an imperialist project that for its maintenance is dependent upon trade and ultimately upon war. What unites trade and warfare is, as noted above, the struggle for resources. Competition is here a basic mechanism. As core civilizations were characterized by inherent expansionism and depended on the inflow of scarce resources from the outside, they had to compete with one another. In this sense, development always presupposes competition.

Societies undergoing growth (or development) resemble in certain ways growing biological organisms. Social development is, one might say, a local growth process based upon the incorporation of resources/energy from the outside and their conversion into a kind of complexity that further augments the ability to attract resources from the outside. Tainter (1988) uses the word *complexity* for the structural constitution of civilization, and includes a growth perspective:

> Complex societies are problem-solving organizations, in which more parts, different kinds of parts, more social differentiation, more inequality, and more kinds of centralizations and control emerge as circumstances require. Growth of complexity has involved a change from small, internally homogeneous, minimally differentiated groups characterized by equal access to resources, shifting, ephemeral leadership, and unstable political formations, to large, heterogeneous, internally differentiated, class structured, controlled societies, in which the resources that sustain life are not equally available to all. This latter kind of society, with which we today are most familiar, is an anomaly of history, and where present requires constant legitimization and reinforcement. (1988:37)

Complexity as such is perhaps a self-evident feature. We see how "complex societies," or civilizations, within the framework of global systems, become increasingly internally differentiated. Tainter refers to "the growth of complexity," something of "an anomaly of history" that recurrently fails. The collapse of civilization is defined by Tainter (1988:4) as "a rapid significant loss of an established level of sociopolitical complexity." What I would like to add to this vision is civilization's centripetal impact on peripheries, in order to account for the dynamics of the life process in which both core and periphery participate.

Similar to biological organisms, growing, complex societies are negentropic and feed on their surroundings. When human and material resources were adequately incorporated and turned into added value, it made the complex society even more capable of attracting and consuming its social surroundings. It now demanded more but was also stronger.

This social form of "eating," in which core states import raw materials and slaves and put these resources to work, is no easy metabolism. On the contrary, it gives rise to constant commotion. The civilizations of the second millennium were highly complicated enterprises in which the ruling elites had a number of fundamental tasks to fulfill. As noted above, they had to continuously attract material and human resources from the outside, put all these new assets to work in an expanding integrated organism, and repeatedly recreate order and cohesion. "Complex societies" require, says Tainter in the quotation above, "constant legitimization and reinforcement." They do not appear by themselves. They are "problem-solving organizations." They, or rather their ruling elites, constantly need to adapt to changing conditions by finding solutions to new problems. They are part of a process that either leads to further growth or to decline and even collapse.

TRADE II: DESIRING A CIVILIZED LIFESTYLE

Certain resources were certainly more crucial than others in the sense that no civilization could maintain its complexity without them. International trade involved, however, other types of items to an extent that requires further reflection. In fact, elites often seem more interested in things that have nothing to do with necessities or civilization's *centripetal complexity*. Quite early, international trade included a great variety of luxury products: precious and semiprecious stones, jewelry, vases, objects of art, and processed agricultural products such as olive oil, perfumed oil, wine, opium, medicines, and so on.

This is, it seems, a separate phenomenon although intimately linked to trade in necessities. Elites were primarily interested in establishing and maintaining *a civilized lifestyle*. What they wanted was a life in luxury and pomp, segregated from the impoverished and wretched populace. This is, of course, also a form of competition: to distance oneself from the village people by, in collaboration with clan brothers, seizing power and lifting oneself above the gray masses. The elite desired palaces, beauty, servants, women, amusements, elegant clothes, jewelry, exotica, delicious food, and good wine.

The civilized, aristocratic lifestyle meant extravagance. In the palace of Mari, with its two hundred sixty rooms in the eighteenth century, the imported wine from Syria was even chilled with ice from the mountains (Gadd 1973:219). Palaces often had baths as well as sanitary drainage. The palace of Knossos is in the second millennium outstanding for what it reveals of the splendor of the aristocratic lifestyle. It has even been called (Hall 1927:46) "a modern building," unparalleled to the Roman days and then to the nineteenth century AD. Where wealth was spread to an influential merchant class, there were also well-equipped private houses, or villas, outside the state realm (Drower 1973:498, for Syria in LBA; Watrous 1998:82, for neopalatial Crete).

They went very far in beautifying their bodies. The Egyptians used malachite, extracted from mines in Sinai, in powder form as eye shadow (Bottéro 1973:356). Their constant demand for turquoise, also from the mines in Sinai, was due to the fact that old stones lose their bright color. The Egyptian upper class wanted only the best.

Core elites also had a taste for the exotic. Kings obtained exotic and wild animals from peripheral areas and sometimes passed them on to other kings as diplomatic gifts. The king of Mari, for example, received a cat from Elam and a deer plus a bear from Susa (Lion 1992:359, 361). The Egyptian pharaoh received blue monkeys from Punt and transferred some of them to his friends in the Aegean. Such monkeys are represented on wall paintings at Knossos and Santarino (Faure 1997:252). The kings were also collectors of objects as well as of rare plants and trees (see Hall 1927:240). According to Nathalie Beaux, the specimens depicted in the so-called Botanical Garden at Karnak represent "floral species encountered by Thutmose III in those foreign lands in which he warred" (Bianchi 1997:90; see also Drower 1973:481).

These are all products obtained by core states from peripheral areas. The most important products required for a civilized lifestyle were, however, produced by the core and used in its exchange with the periphery. In their paper "From Luxuries to Commodities: The Nature of Mediterranean Bronze Age Trading Systems" (1991), one of the main sources of inspiration for my own work, Sherratt and Sherratt quote Pliny, who emphasized the role of wine and oil for our comfort. *Duo sunt liquores humanis corporibus gratissimi*—that is, "There are two liquids most pleasing to human bodies," and these are *intus vini, foris olei,* "wine inside and oil outside" (1991:359). Processed agricultural products—such as wine, olive oil, perfumes, spices, and aromatics provided by the core—occupied a central position in international trade. Only core states had maximum capacity for this type of production. In this respect it resembles the manufacture of textiles (cf. Shelmerdine 1998:292). They were not just ordinary agricultural products that any village people were able to produce. By means of "additional labor inputs" they were reworked and refined into civilized products in highest esteem by core and peripheral elites alike.

> Vines and olives were crucial to the developed Mediterranean economy because they could provide desirable manufactured products as well as raw materials; they could absorb the added value of labour to produce not only wine and oil but quality wine and special oil. Similar considerations apply to the cultivation of spices and aromatics (saffron, coriander, sage) and potential narcotics (opium). (1998:359)

The production of processed agricultural products had serious effects on land use. Peasants were thrown off their land, which was turned into estates producing agricultural items for elite consumption.

"Trade I" and "trade II" are related to each other in quite an interesting way. To obtain the luxuries connected with civilized lifestyles, core elites had to go via production, international trade, and the military complex. Centripetal complexity is, in fact, what ultimately makes civilized lifestyle possible. People do not, in general (there are, of course, exceptions), engage in manufacturing or international trade for the sheer joy of it, or by human nature, but because they are compelled to do so. They would rather skip these tedious and time-consuming enterprises if they could get all the things they desired directly. Why bother to produce in such an ideal situation?

That is exactly what peripheral elites can do. The desire for a civilized, luxurious life is certainly the same in the core and the periphery alike. The difference is that peripheral elites can obtain these items without being burdened with production, while core elites necessarily have to engage in production. The same pattern is found in today's world. African elites are able to import luxuries and modern weapons from the core region in exchange for the latter's access to raw materials. Peripheries return raw materials to the core, or open their territories for extraction, and obtain finished products. Yet it is possible for peripheries to terminate this type of relationship.

Core states even exported grain. The Sumerian city-states in the third millennium used grain in their foreign trade, in exchange for metals and stones from the mountains in northwestern Iran (Kramer 1963:269–275). In the second millennium the export of grain is reported from, for example, Egypt during the Middle Kingdom (Hayes 1973:388) and Babylonia during the Amorite period (Gadd 1973:194). Major civilizations were in a favorable position for producing food for the masses (i.e., grain). They had the manpower, the organization, and the technology.

"Why do people want goods?" ask Sherratt and Sherratt rhetorically (1991:354). There are two aspects of this issue. The demand for wine and perfume is, at least to a certain extent, "natural." It feels good and it smells good. The other aspect concerns the meaning and symbolism of material goods. Elites want elegant clothes—but what is elegance? How do people know what to consume? They know by watching other elites, especially the highest ranked. This is a basic mechanism in the diffusion, or globalization, of culture. Bronze Age Greece started, as noted by Sherratt and Sherratt (1991:354), as a periphery, impressed by the consumption patterns and material culture of the more developed civilizations in the Near East. The Mycenaeans did not simply engage in trade with the Orient; they also absorbed "the language of ostentation and display, in architecture, food and drink, clothing, and bodily appearances and smell." Elites' basic interest in enjoying a civilized lifestyle is a dangerous tendency because they become immunized from the fact that their luxurious existence depends on production, on trade, and ultimately on military force. The civilized consumption pattern takes over, and they blindly dedicate themselves to luxury. Amenhotep (or Amenophis) III is an illustrative example. He became pharaoh in 1405 (to 1367) when Egypt was "at the pinnacle of its political power, economic prosperity, and cultural development" (Hayes 1973:338) due to its exploitative relationship with its colonial dominions. After a few years engaged in more physical activities, such as hunting expeditions, Amenhotep III "appears to have given himself over to the pleasures of the harim and the banquet hall and to have devoted his attention to the rebuilding and beautification of Thebes and other favoured sites" (1973:339).

The previous period of constant warfare now seemed to be over, and king and elite thought they could enjoy "the many pleasures and luxuries which life now had to offer them," indulging "to the full a truly oriental penchant for opulence and display" (1973:338). Amenhotep III engaged in luxury consumption to the extreme and in costly building activities while showing little interest in his empire. Diplomacy had now "largely replaced warfare in Egypt's dealings with her neighbours" (1973:338). This was apparently an impossible equation. His "indolent neglect of the Asiatic provinces paved the way for the decline of Egypt's control over Syria" (1973:340).

Here Egypt did not take its dependence on the periphery seriously enough. The so-called Amarna period, during the second part of the fourteenth century, is described as "a serious blow to the Egyptian economy" (Redford 1992:182). It already started, as we see, with Amenhotep III, and it continued during Akhenaten's reign (1367–1350). The tendencies toward economic decline and political disintegration became increasingly manifest, and Egypt lost, for some time, many of its external sources of supply.This period was characterized by Hittite pressure in the area accompanied by revolts of Egyptian vassal towns in the north that "fatally weakened Egyptian power" (Kenyon 1973:527). Egypt's control was then reestablished during the Nineteenth Dynasty when King Sethos I "marched up the coast, across the plain of Esdraelon and across the Jordan" (Kenyon 1973:527). The thirteenth century meant, however, a less powerful position for Egypt.

Elites may think they have obtained what they need and can therefore simply enjoy the good life. They may be unaware of the fact that civilization is built upon the use of foreign resources and cannot be maintained without them. What is established in their domestic arenas does not stand on the firm ground of local assets. Instead, it is dependent upon relationships of domination and exploitation, and if these are not carefully maintained, the social construction of civilization deconstructs.

After successful conquests, rulers tend to become peaceful and soft. This phenomenon was taken up by Ibn Khaldun in the fourteenth century AD (1377–1381), who noted that rulers in his part of the world tended to be increasingly addicted to luxuries and opulence and thereby became easy prey to warlike, ambitious nomads from the desert (cf. Tainter 1988:65). Elites face a true dilemma in this respect. They want to maintain their own lifestyle while having friendly relations with their less-fortunate neighbors. The problem is that their civilization has to be constantly defended. They can neither neglect the imperialist relationship between core and periphery nor the competition with other core states without endangering the complexity of their own society, and, even more serious, without endangering the global system as such.

TRADE III: THE EVER-INCREASING DEMAND FOR RESOURCES

There is an additional aspect of the transfer of resources from one area to another. In LBA, Egypt seems to need increasingly more from its peripheries, not only metals, manpower, and luxuries, but even grain, livestock, and manufactured goods that it previously produced in large quantities in its own territory. These transactions took place to a large extent within imperial structures. This is a quite general feature of LBA. In this period there is a successive concentration of growth and development to a few superpowers, or more precisely to a few centers of these empires, while their immediate surroundings are increasingly underdeveloped.

Let us look at what Thutmose III and his army brought back to Egypt after the battle of Megiddo in 1482. There he defeated, after a siege of seven months, a coalition of Retinu[1] "princes" who had gathered under the leadership of the king/prince of Kadesh. From the annals of his military campaigns, carved on the walls of the temple of Karnak (Pritchard 1973:175–82), we learn about the Egyptians taking booty and how the subjugated princes, who surrendered in Megiddo, had to hand over various types of goods and resources to their conquerors. The catch included silver, gold, precious stones, military equipment (a great number of horses, chariots, suits of armor, and bows), and prestige items belonging to the defeated enemy, such as his chariot with gold finishings and his bronze coat of mail. It also included prisoners of war and necessities, such as grain, cattle, goats, and sheep.

This particular relocation of goods and resources from today's northern Israel was not an isolated event. Thutmose III himself undertook several campaigns during his reign and managed to establish Egyptian control over most of Syria-Palestine. Throughout most of the following century the pharaohs constantly campaigned in this area, and "each campaign produced wealth in the shape of booty and tribute" (Drower 1973:477).

Egypt became with the New Kingdom and the Eighteenth Dynasty a highly militaristic power focused on expansion and empire building. The new empire included an African as well as an Asian province from which enormous amounts of resources were constantly drawn into the center. From Nubia it obtained, above all, gold, but also semiprecious stones, building stone, cattle, wood, ivory, and slaves (see Vercoutter 1987:192). From the Sudan came ostrich plumes, perfume, oil, ivory, and slaves. The Egyptians used Nubian and Sudanese slaves as workers, servants, soldiers, and police (Hayes 1973:352). From Canaan, its Asiatic domain, the imports were even more substantial. Resources were transferred to Egypt in the form of booty, taxes, and tribute. The vassals were commanded to regularly send tribute, or taxes, to the pharaoh. In the last years of the reign of Thutmose III, they even came to Egypt "with their tribute and kissed the ground before him" (Drower 1973:459).

In the fifteenth century the Egyptians took from their Asian domains base and precious metals (copper, gold, silver), various kinds of wood (cedar, fir, juniper, boxwood), a great variety of agricultural products (both grain and processed products), livestock (cattle, sheep, goats), manufactured goods of all kinds, and military equipment (horses and chariots). They also absorbed huge amounts of manpower (Drower 1973:478–81; Redford 1992:210–13). In addition, the Egyptians in this period had access to flourishing international trade via the coastal towns.

The northern part of Canaan was a developed manufacturing center when it was brought under Egyptian control. Some of its goods were locally produced, and some were obtained through the position of this area as a crossroads for international trade. Both the ports along the coast and the Syria-Palestine corridor, connecting the coast with the interior, were important channels for international trade (Redford 1992:209ff).

Egypt's need of manpower may well seem overdimensioned from the very beginning of its territorial expansion, but it still increased over time. Foreigners, both men and women, were drawn to Egypt in the form of tribute and as prisoners of war to be used as workers or soldiers. Slaves were also purchased (Hayes 1973:375, 388; Drower 1973:478; Redford 1992:209–13).

The massive inflow of manpower continued into the thirteenth century "as frequently as before"; "boatloads of Canaanite slaves were regular arrivals in Egyptian ports" (Redford 1992:209).

According to Redford (1992:207ff), Egypt engaged in massive displacements of rural communities from the time of the Old Kingdom. By "uprooting and transporting to Egypt whole communities," the state attained two goals. It served to punish rebellious populations as well as to increase Egypt's labor force. Nubia was early affected by this policy, and so was Canaan in LBA.

In the latter area, the Egyptians deported "a sizable segment of the population":

> Thutmose III carried off in excess of 7.300, while his son Amenophis II uprooted by his own account 89.600. Thutmose IV implies that he carried off the inhabitants of Canaanite Gezer to Thebes, while his son Amenophis III speaks of his Theban mortuary temple as "filled with male and female slaves." (Redford 1992:208)

Some of the people carried off from their homelands to Egypt were thus deportees, and the main objective might not have been the need for manpower. On the other hand, as noted by Redford, the state thereby accomplished two goals. A large number of the imported foreigners were evidently used as workers on crown and temple estates, in mines and quarries, in construction activities, and in various crafts.

An increasing need for manpower can also be found in other parts of the core region. The Hittite king carried out veritable "repopulation programmes" (Bryce 1999:50) to account for those areas where people apparently had disappeared. Large numbers of people were deported from conquered areas and settled on land in Hittite territory. These deportees remained under the control of the state and provided "the extra man-power" that the Hittite empire "increasingly needed" (Macqueen 1986:75).

Toward the end of the era there was, according to Liverani (1990:139), a centripetal and massive movement of manpower as well as material resources to the Hittite center; in this process the Hittites were too preoccupied, he says, by their own need for manpower to care for the depopulated conquered countries. In this manner both the Hittites and the Egyptians devastated their immediate peripheries.

Even the Assyrian state absorbed populations from conquered areas during its expansion westward. In the second half of the thirteenth century, Assyria deprived the Hittites of both copper resources and people. Tukulti-Ninurta claims the deportation of 28,800 Hittite subjects from their land. In a document he declares: "In my first year I deported 28.800 people of the Hatti-land from beyond the Euphrates, and I brought (them) into my land" (Liverani 1990:93).

He moved them into his own lands; this is what he himself claims. Liverani suggests that we cannot take Tukulti-Ninurta's own words as proof of anything. Perhaps he was only boasting and had his own reasons for doing so. This we cannot know, of course—but even if his statement is false, it nevertheless indicates that such an act would have been a highly desirable and appreciated deed.

All the major powers attracted manpower from both immediate surroundings and more distant peripheries. They all employed foreign mercenaries in their armies. The northern weapons found in Greece might have arrived with mercenaries from continental Europe. Sandars (1978:94) associates the Mycenaeans' interest in obtaining foreign soldiers with increased feuding in Greece. In this situation, "it would have been natural to scan the north for manpower and metals, where both abounded."

There are three reasons why the civilizations of the second millennium constantly needed foreign workers: increased specialization, increasing volume of work, and the problem of survival and reproduction under harsh conditions. The former two, visible in the material, are mere aspects of economic growth. The third is not as easily detectable in the material. We generally know very little about the living conditions of slaves. Elites were interested in them only as instruments in their own projects. Yet the problem of their survival and reproduction must have been an important factor.

If we assume that workers/slaves were exploited to their maximum capacities and that their work environments were often unhealthful and dangerous, it is near at hand to suppose that they had problems with simply staying alive. What we have of evidence is the fact that all the expanding states were increasingly manpower hungry. They kept on importing people as if there were never enough of them. Foreign slaves were consumable supplies that lasted for only a short period of time due to unrestricted exploitation, but they could quite easily be replaced with new imports.

In Egypt, slaves were used in mines and quarries, organized in minegangs "whose lot was a hard one." Besides "prisoners of war" and "slaves," they consisted of "convicted criminals." "Consignment to the mines of 'Kush' was evidently regarded by the Egyptians as a very severe form of punishment" (Hayes 1973:351, 374). The hard life for mine workers is also hinted at in a piece of information from copper-producing Cyprus. The king of Alashiya (Cyprus) writes to Rameses II: "Dear brother, do not take it to heart that there is so little copper, since in my country plague has killed all the people, and there is nobody left to smelt the copper" (cited in Sandars 1978:47).

Sandars comments by saying that the "dangerous conditions under which primitive smelting was carried out may have caused this shortfall, rather than a common epidemic" (1978:47).

There is, in fact, a more direct indication of the problem of reproduction from late New Kingdom Egypt. "Houses of female slaves" were established, devoted to the "industrial production" of children, that is, to the production of slave labor (Loprieno 1997:208, 209). These kinds of houses, where female slaves gave birth to new generations of slaves, must have been the outcome of elite recognition of the problem. Whether it succeeded or not is another issue.

To our portrayal of the difficult situation for slaves and the necessity of constantly replacing them, we may add the indications of flight from exploitation and oppression by significant numbers and the invasions of migrants. The social category of *Apiru* is, in documents from both Egypt and the Near East, described as heterogeneous crowds of uprooted, nonuseful people at the margins of civilization. They seem to be generated even in earlier centuries, but in significantly growing numbers toward the end.

At first, the core states forced foreigners to enter state domains on a large scale to be used as workers and soldiers. Then, suddenly, toward the very end, they all seem terrified by migrants trying to settle down in their lands. Why did they not welcome the newcomers who now came by themselves instead of being forced into core areas? Obviously, it was because these people could no longer be used.

Invading Migrants

The most conspicuous aspect of the collapse of 1200 is the large-scale migrations that affected most of the core region. Here, writes Redford (1992:243), occurred "one of the largest and most important migrations in history." Some of these migrants came by sea and have in the Egyptian context been called "the Sea Peoples": "It is no exaggeration to claim that the movement of the Sea Peoples, to anticipate a term to be coined for them in Egypt, changed the face of the ancient world more than any other single event before the time of Alexander the Great" (1992:243ff).

Large-scale migrations leading to demographic changes have throughout world history had profound effects on culture and society. In this case they ended the Bronze Age system. At the end of the thirteenth century, "massive movements of peoples... swept through Anatolia, Syria and Palestine, and across the eastern Mediterranean to the coast of Egypt" (Bryce 1999:367), leading everywhere to disaster and the "collapse of complex society" (Tainter 1988). The process seems to have started in the north, affecting both Greece and the Hittite kingdom at an early stage, and then to have spread southward. "In the course of a few years not only Greece, but Anatolia, Egypt and the whole of the Levant fell into total disarray" (Sandars 1978:29).

Bryce, primarily focusing on the Hittite kingdom, although he also provides an excellent overview of what happened in other parts of the region, connects the invasions with a general weakening of state structures, of which there are numerous signs: "internal political instability—severely depleted defence capabilities—communication networks and supply lines in disarray —critical shortages of food and other resources" (1999:379).

Suddenly the Hittite kingdom was unable to uphold vital functions. The migrant invaders were, he argues, not in themselves the main cause of the collapse of the Bronze Age kingdoms. "Rather they were associated with the gradual disintegration of these kingdoms, and were at least in part the victims of it" (1999:373). This is an important point of departure for our understanding of the collapse.

All core civilizations broke down, not only those who were invaded by Sea Peoples. Babylonia began to decline at the end of the thirteenth century and finally succumbed in the middle of the twelfth century under pressure from Assyria and Elam (Knapp 1988:159; see also Munn-Rankin 1975:286–87). Assyria deviated from the general pattern by being able to take advantage of the weakening of its powerful neighbors (especially Hatti) and pursuing an aggressive, expansionist policy against adjacent areas longer than the others. Finally, however, it was struck by contraction and decline like the others. It recovered relatively soon. Already in the ninth century there was a powerful Neo-Assyrian kingdom, which in the seventh century even conquered Egypt.

So-called barbarians have constituted a recurrent nuisance to civilization. They tend to desire the wealth of their civilized neighbors and seem inclined to attack whenever they see an opportunity. As long as civilization preserves its strength, the barbarian problem is usually kept under control. It does not become a deadly threat until civilization is struck by crisis. This is common wisdom in world history. But who were the troublemakers of this particular period?

There are a number of suggestions concerning the area of origin of the Sea Peoples (for an overview, see Niemeier 1998). Bryce (1999) proposes western Anatolia, as do many others, while Niemeier points to the Mycenaeanized Aegean (Niemeier 1998:17); western Anatolia was, after all, itself invaded by Sea Peoples.

However, there was seemingly not a single locality of origin. The socalled Sea Peoples were not a homogeneous group. They came from various parts of Anatolia and the Aegean. Besides, the invaders were not all Sea Peoples. The migrants were instead a heterogeneous crowd, coming from all directions, some of them by sea and others by land. This was indeed a period of general turbulence when many "peoples" were on the move.

The last we know of the Hittites from the historical records is an account of naval battles off the coast of Cyprus. Then there is silence. Archaeological evidence indicates that Hattusa, the capital, was violently destroyed, "consumed in a great conflagration." Following this the eastern and southern parts of the Hittite empire were invaded "from almost all directions" (Bryce 1999:378–79).

Large parts of the Levant were affected in the same way. The Hittite vassal states in northern Syria fell at the same time as Hatti. From the kingdom of Ugarit there is textual evidence indicating early attacks by what appear to be the Sea Peoples. Some of the "tablets of the kiln," that is, the set of clay tablets placed in the kiln just before the town was destroyed, mention enemies in ships. One tablet refers to a group of attackers that had been plundering coastal settlements when the king of Ugarit was still young. A letter from Cyprus to Ugarit contains information about enemies "who had already attacked people and ships of Ugarit and who are now preparing—with 20 ships—for new hostilities." In a letter by the king of Ugarit, he informs the king of Cyprus about the disastrous situation; hostile ships had already destroyed a number of settlements by fire. Soon after, Ugarit was destroyed (Klengel 1992:150–51).

In Egypt there is a quite prolonged period of recurrent attacks and attempted invasions. During the reign of Merneptah (1224–1214), the country suffered from attacks by both Sea Peoples and groups from Libya. In an inscription at the temple of Karnak, the groups are identified as Libyans, Sherden, Shekelesh, Ekwesh, Lukka, and Teresh. All of them, except the Libyans, seem to come from Anatolia or the Aegean. There are, of course, few alternatives. Sherden are said either to come from Sardinia or Sicily or to have originated in Anatolia and then moved to Sardinia/Sicily (see Bryce 1999:369). In these early confrontations between the invaders and the Egyptian state, the latter was apparently quite successful. After Merneptah's death, a period of instability prevailed, with factions of the royal family competing for power. Political order was temporarily reestablished with the Twentieth Dynasty at the beginning of the twelfth century. Under Rameses III, who reigned between 1182 and 1151, there were a number of attacks from Libya, from the Sea Peoples, and from the Levantine coast. Inscriptions from the temple at Medinet Habu mention Peleset, Tjekker, Shelelesh, Weshesh, and Denyen (see Sandars 1978:105, 198–201; Redford 1992:243). Peleset are probably the Philistines who were later given permission to settle in Palestine (see Bryce 1999:370). Rameses III was the last true pharaoh. With his death, "the glory departed, and Egypt was never again an imperial power" (Faulkner 1975:247).

The decline of 1200 is apparently quite a sudden collapse. Yet there are clear signs of looming danger during the second half of the thirteenth century.

In Greece new fortifications were built, an indication of increasing "internal warfare and feuding rather than external invasion" (Sandars 1978:62). Pylos, in the southwestern Peloponnese, was not fortified, but there are nevertheless signs of a pending catastrophe in the last years of its archive; "a sense of emergency pervades the whole archive," says Palmer (1961:132). Their worries concerned the military situation and especially the threats of attacks by sea. There were other signs as well. Increased competition and conflict led to military confrontations between the major powers, Hatti-Egypt and Hatti-Assyria. These wars seem by no means to have made the world more secure. On the contrary, there was an increasing security problem for merchants and emissaries. Conditions were "less and less favorable to peaceful commerce" (Stubbings 1975:338).

The problem of Sea Peoples seems, in fact, to be quite old. In Egypt they are mentioned as early as the fourteenth century (Amenophis III). Akhenaten somewhat later complains in a letter to the king of Cyprus about attacks from the Lukka lands (Anatolia). Sherden (from Sardinia, Sicily, or Anatolia) appear in texts from the beginning of the thirteenth century. They attacked Egypt during the reign of Rameses II and were, after being defeated, enrolled in his army. Barbarian attacks were not a new phenomenon. They started as a minor problem but became increasingly difficult for the core states to deal with.

Who, then, were these invaders? Even if the Sea Peoples seem too heterogeneous a crowd to have a single point of origin, they must have come from Anatolia and the Aegean—if they did not emanate from Sardinia and Sicily. When Bryce suggests western Anatolia, it is because this area is the first to reveal tendencies to disintegration in the Hittite empire. "For this seems to have been the region where the political structures established by the major Bronze Age powers first began to crumble and disintegrate" (1999:372).

Western Anatolia was a subjugated, immediate periphery where the Hittites experienced great difficulties in maintaining control. The Sea Peoples were, ostensibly, uprooted people from immediate peripheries. Development generated uprooted and violent people at the margins of civilization as an integral aspect of the system by destroying the existing social orders in these zones (see Singer 1988:44). Egypt's massive exploitation of Canaan created the same kind of problems. There were invading migrants even in inland areas, so it is not sufficient to focus on the sea.

Barbarian attacks seem earlier to have been sporadic events. What was new for the invaders of the late thirteenth century is that they seem determined to settle down. They came in search of new land. It should be stressed, says Bryce (1999:371), that "the invasions were not merely military operations, but involved the movements of large populations, by land and by sea, seeking new lands to settle." "What neither Egypt nor Palestine had experienced heretofore . . . was an outright invasion of *peoples* from the Aegean, intent on settling down" (Redford 1992:250).

The invaders' intent to settle in Egypt is indicated by the fact that they "brought their families and household goods with them." Some of these migrants came from the west, from Libya, and some of them marched "down the Syrian coast with their women and children in ox-carts, for this was an invasion to occupy and settle in the lands overrun, not merely a raid on a large scale" (Faulkner 1975:233, 242).

Barbarian attacks can thus be understood as part of a more general crisis. Bryce (1999:379) enumerates (see above) a number of signs, or symptoms, of this crisis in the late Hittite kingdom; "internal political instability—severely depleted defense capabilities—communication networks and supply lines in disarray—critical shortages of food and other resources." Even Egypt experienced both economic disorder and political instability at the end of the thirteenth century, referred to by Knapp (1988:184) as "administrative incompetence" and "active disloyalty." In both kingdoms there is evidence of food shortage. In a letter to the king of Ugarit, the Hittite king asks for grain: "The matter is said to be very urgent, i.e., of 'life and death'" (Klengel 1992:149). In Egypt the first strikes in world history are reported among skilled workers who did not obtain sufficient food rations from the royal storehouses (see Faulkner 1975:246). When the complex construction of the political system broke down, people were left to survive on their own.

THE EXHAUSTION OF THE BRONZE AGE SYSTEM

My assumption is, as noted earlier, that collapse has to be understood as an aspect or consequence of development. I shall argue here that the collapse was basically a political problem rooted in the general development strategy of the Bronze Age. It has already been suggested that the invasions came from immediate peripheries where modes of existence had been fundamentally altered by the development of the "palace-urban complex" (Liverani's term—1987:69).

Tainter (1988:42) enumerates eleven themes in the explanation of the collapse of civilization:

1. Depletion or cessation of a vital resource or resources on which the society depends
2. The establishment of a new resource base
3. The occurrence of some insurmountable catastrophe
4. Insufficient response to circumstances

5. Other complex societies
6. Intruders
7. Class conflict, societal contradictions, elite mismanagement or misbehavior
8. Social dysfunction
9. Mystical factors
10. Chance concatenation of events
11. Economic factors

Some of these explanations refer to factors defined as beyond the direct control of the affected state: natural catastrophes, ecological problems, loss of vital resources, and barbarian invasions. The rest of them concern conflicts or failures of various kinds. Tainter's perspective is in general limited to society (the complex society) as such, even if the fifth explanation does indicate the importance of interstate relations. What makes the collapse of 1200 so intriguing is that it involved a number of civilizations, linked to one another as well as to peripheral areas by economic and political relations. Here an entire system collapsed, not only a single civilization. Therefore, we should not look for explanations of the collapse in circumstances that are specific to the single society. There must be a higher-order problem here. All these societies were attacked by barbarians. All experienced conflicts in external and internal relationships. We discern economic problems, elite mismanagement, and what is clearly "insufficient response to circumstances." But what did these civilizations have in common; what united them all? The most obvious answer is the international relations connecting them to one another.They were parts of the same system, and of the same core region, and they operated according to (basically) the same mechanisms.

Tainter (1988:92–108) proposes "declining productivity of complexity" as a general explanation of the collapse of complex society. Development means, he argues, a continual investment in sociopolitical complexity, but this does not work for more than a limited period of time. Eventually, it reaches a point where the benefits for such investment begin to decline. Declining productivity can, he claims, be noted in agriculture and resource production as well as in information processing and sociopolitical control and specialization. It means that "complexity as a strategy becomes increasingly costly, and yields decreasing marginal benefits."

In a very general sense, both "declining marginal returns" and disintegration seem to be crucial aspects of the collapse of 1200, but neither of them can, in fact, explain why the collapse occurred and why, for example, all the centers succumbed at the same time. Taking the entire core region into account means more than a simple extension of the perspective. It means dealing with a unit of a different type from society. It is here necessary to search for basic development mechanisms within the system itself.

I shall next propose a preliminary explanation of the collapse, where the point of departure is taken in the system as such. It includes three perspectives that are aspects of the same development process. The collapse is seen as a political crisis generated by the specific development strategy of the system with important consequences for both international trade and for the increasingly excluded masses.

1. The Problem of Competition and Conflict

Competition may be a major driving force in social evolution, but it obviously has clearly destructive consequences. As new structures cannot be created without the destruction of old ones, there is perhaps no reason to be concerned about the collapse of civilizations. Still, for the people involved, catastrophes are, just the same, catastrophes even if they pave the way for new, more efficient structures.

The complementarity of core and periphery discloses the organic nature of the system. We are dealing with parts of one and the same system, not with separate, autonomous units. From this it follows that the core always carries the responsibility for the survival of the system, on which both rulers and commoners in both center and periphery depend. Peripheries may obstruct, may struggle for liberation and independence, but, because of their position, they cannot engage in reconstructions and modifications of the system as such. The core is always to blame for the collapse. It is there that we have to search for explanations.

Competition and conflict characterized the entire second millennium. Fortifications, as a response to the problem of military insecurity, are found all over the region; their absence is exceptional. There is, however, a clear difference between MBA and LBA in the portrayal of the international arena in which competition and conflict took place.

Zimrilim, the ruler of Mari in the mid-eighteenth century, wrote a letter to his father-in-law, the king of Aleppo, in which he complained about being involved in endless warfare with his neighbors: "Now, since I regained my throne many days ago, I have had nothing but fights and battles" (Kupper 1973:10). His enemies are described as being of three kinds: competing kingdoms, rebellious vassals, and nomads "at the edge of the desert."

These three conflicts continued in the later period, between core states, between core states and their colonial dominions, and between civilizational centers and barbarians. They were, however, all enacted in a much wider international arena. The first type of conflict, the core-core conflict, was, in the particular situation of Zimrilim, staged in a quite circumscribed geographic area. In Syria and northern Mesopotamia of the eighteenth century, small neighboring states were involved in constant competition with one another over the control of trade routes. Their conflicts led to incessant warfare that weakened them as it implied a constant exhaustion of resources (cf. Durand 1992:102).

In LBA, the core-core conflict appeared in quite a different form. In the thirteenth century it embraced a number of superpowers and their immediate surroundings of colonial dominions and vassal states. The major powers were Hatti, Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, and Mycenaean Greece (the latter including several states). The Mycenaeans incorporated Minoan Crete in their political realm in the mid-fifteenth century and represented a powerful force in maritime trade in the late phase of LBA. Mitanni had been outcompeted in the fourteenth century.

These powers were turned against one another in competition for power and resources. Major battles were fought between Egypt and Hatti as well as between Hatti and Assyria. It is worth noting, however, that these wars were a late phenomenon, probably due to increased core-core competition as a result, in its turn, of decreasing resources. In the beginning of LBA the core states instead engaged in empire building and the transformation of surrounding areas into exploited peripheries.

The second type of conflict, in relation to rebellious vassals, was well known to the major powers of LBA. Both Egypt and Hatti had to repeatedly force vassals into obedience by military means. The relationship between major powers and vassal states was of a different nature compared with Zimrilim's situation. It had developed into a core-periphery relationship where the vassal played the role of medium for colonial exploitation. In Zimrilim's time, the various kings had their allies and their enemies, and they could attack and destroy one another, but they did not develop empires, as in LBA, when massive transfers of goods and resources took place in the form of taxes and tribute.

The military complex, based on horse-drawn chariotry, occupied a central position in all the major states, requiring a great deal of organization, specialization, and imported resources:

> Such combinations of a chariot and a team of four highly trained horses were extremely expensive to establish and to maintain and required a skilled team of driver and warrior. Their presence in the field was underwritten by the complex logistics of horse breeding and training, a small army of wheelwrights and chariot builders, composite bow makers, metal smiths and armourers, and the support teams on campaign who managed to spare horses and repaired damaged vehicles (Watkins 1989:28).

The chariotry was a major expense. Both soldiers and horses had to be well trained, housed, and fed. Stables had to be constructed and then manned and maintained. Raw materials had to be constantly procured from the outside and specialized workshops had to deliver manufactured products, such as weapons, chariots, and armor. When Egypt and Hatti collided with each other at the battle of Kadesh in 1285, the Hittite king was in command of 2,500 chariots, each of them manned by three (Vermeule 1964:272).

The military complex and the use of military force were an absolute prerequisite for empire building, but at the same time the former gradually undermined the imperial structure. It was extremely costly, in fact too costly (see Redford 1992:160, for Egypt; Macqueen 1986:48, for Hatti). When warfare became a primal concern, it began to swallow a large part of society's resources. It required a constant and massive inflow of both material and human resources from the outside as these were repeatedly destroyed and had subsequently to be replaced. This compelled the core states to increase the demands on their dominions. Here they entered a vicious circle. Increased pressure was met by resentment and revolts in the subjugated territories, which led to new military campaigns, which led to the destruction of more resources, which increased the need for resources, which led to increased taxation and oppression in the subjugated territories, and so on. As wars are extremely expensive, they must be income bearing. In the later phase of LBA, such was certainly not the case. On the contrary, the intensive use of warfare weakened the major powers considerably (see Singer 1988:244).

The imperialist project was successful up to a certain point. When the costs became too high for maintaining the imperial structure and social maladjustment proliferated in the periphery, the system cracked at both ends.

The interstate arena was one of intensive competition. Egypt, Hatti, and later Assyria practiced direct appropriation from their surrounding areas. Mycenaean Greece was different in this respect, possessing a strategy of trading colonies; but the latter are, of course, dependent on international trade and, thus, on the wider system, that is, well beyond their own domains. The disintegration process apparently began in Greece and Anatolia. It is here that we witness the first destruction of centers, and the first Sea People seem to originate here. People violently marginalized become uprooted, leave their homes, and reappear as pirates and invaders. This leads to "a chain reaction" (Sandars 1978:201), a domino effect of destruction.

2. Decreasing Trade

Competition and conflict initially spurred the expansion of international trade, not only of empire building and the military complex. Egyptian trade extended far down into Africa. The Mycenaeans took over Minoan trade colonies in the central Mediterranean as well as along the Anatolian coast and in the Levant. The objective of these colonies was apparently to connect with trading networks in distant arenas. The Mycenaeans also controlled the two main trade routes leading to metal-rich parts of Europe, one up through France to the British Isles and the other to central and eastern Europe via the Adriatic Sea. From these areas the Mycenaeans imported copper, tin, and gold (Piggott 1973:120, 134, 137). Hatti controlled another trade route from eastern Europe coming in through western Anatolia (Macqueen 1986). Along the Levantine coast, there were a number of flourishing trade centers at the crossroads between the Mediterranean and various parts of the Near East.

The collapse of 1200 was, however, preceded by a general disruption of communication and trade (see Sherratt and Sherratt 1991:373). There was either expansion or contraction, never an equilibrium. Mycenaean trade with both Anatolia and the Near East decreased at an early juncture (see Shelmerdine 1998:292).

The various states seem to have been extremely concerned about international trade toward the end of the period. According to Liverani (1987:68), the fleets active in the eastern Mediterranean were geographically limited in their activities more or less as a consequence of a political system in which states exercised a high level of control over external trade. Syrian ships were blocked by the Egyptians from going beyond the eastern delta, and ships from Egypt and Asia were blocked by the Mycenaeans from direct contact with Europe and the central Mediterranean. In the thirteenth century there was more in the way of competition and open conflict among the major powers, and attempts were made to further control and restrict maritime trade.

The Hittites evidently managed to cut off the Mycenaeans from the Anatolian coast (Bryce 1999:343) and even prevented their ships from reaching Syria (Stubbings 1975:340). They even seem to have been subjected to a trade embargo (Cline 1991:6–9; see also Mee 1998:143). As the Mycenaean expansion was, to such a great extent, engendered by its "vigorous trading activity" in the eastern Mediterranean, the recession of this trade is, says Stubbings (1975:338), also "one of the most obvious symptoms of the Mycenaean decline." Sandars (1978:184) makes the same connection between recession in trade and mounting problems in Mycenaean Greece:

> If the comparative peace and real prosperity in which the Mycenaean rulers of the 14th and early 13th century lived... depended much upon their relationship to Egypt, Cyprus, Ugarit and, less directly, the Anatolian powers, then when trade was no longer welcome and the stuff of exchange was not there to handle, these lords of Mycenae and the islands were at a loss.

The Hittites also tried their best to prevent the Assyrians from gaining access to the ports of the Mediterranean. In his attempts to stop their westward expansion, the Hittite king concluded a treaty with the ruler of the Syrian state of Amurru wherein it was declared that no merchants of Amurru were allowed to go to Assyria, and no Assyrian merchants to enter or to pass Amurru (Bryce 1999:349–50). The conflict between Hatti and Assyria over resources and the control of international trade led somewhat later to a military confrontation (1999:351) where the Assyrian king claimed to have taken 28,800 subjects from his enemy.

In a situation of shrinking trade, the worst possible strategy is, of course, to limit the participation of other actors. Instead of solving the problem, it aggravates it. International trade decreased because the empires crumbled. Raw materials and manufactured goods were no longer transferred in channels defined by the previous power structure but could now be captured by groups on the move, operating to begin with at the margins of civilization and then increasingly closer to its centers.

3. The Exclusion of the Masses and Disintegration of Imperial Structures

From the fifteenth century onward the core region underwent rapid and massive development, concentrated, however, to a number of palace-urban sectors and leaving surrounding areas materially and socially impoverished. Development, based as it was on a project run by elites and oriented toward elite consumption, split society into two very different spheres: an elite sector monopolizing nearly all available resources, and a thoroughly marginalized popular sector. Elites were the dominant actors, using various categories of workers in their own enterprises: the military complex, the construction of glorifying buildings, and the production of luxury items, including wine and perfumed oil, for export as well as for domestic use.

Development implied the expansion of international trade, of central bureaucracies, and of a costly military complex. It is worth noting that many of the specific aspects of development are presented as possible explanations of the collapse of 1200. This is especially common with respect to Mycenaean Greece. The Mycenaean kingdoms have been described as overspecialized, too top-heavy, overpopulated, and too dependent upon trade (see Sandars 1978:78ff, 183, 211). It has been explicitly suggested that the fatal crisis was caused by agricultural overexploitation, by an overextended palatial system, and by excessive building activities (Kilian 1985). The developmental process, however, invariably took this general form. Mycenaean Greece was by no means an anomaly.

This type of process, driven by competition and conflict, led, due to the import of slaves and soldiers, to a problematic swelling of the population in the palace sectors. In order to expand, for example, their production of wine and perfumed oil, elites needed more land that, in principle, had to be taken from the village communities. This mechanism resulted in an increasing imbalance between the two sectors. The phenomenon has been discussed at length for the Syria-Palestine area. Liverani (1987:69) describes an escalating social polarization toward the end of the Bronze Age. "An accentuated concentration of luxury goods and conspicuous consumption" took place in the royal palaces while the village sector, due to "the growing consideration of land and work as merchandise," was degraded and depopulated. Economic growth thus aggravated the situation for villagers as it meant expansion of a type of production that gradually encroached on village land.

There occurred a successive enlargement of royal (or temple) estates where specialized agricultural and manufactured goods aimed at foreign aristocracies were fabricated. The temple of Amun, for example, owned, even before the Amarna period, "[h]undreds of thousands of acres of the country's best farmland" (Hayes 1973:325), and it certainly did not produce for popular consumption. It had its own fleets of ships designed for "traffic with the Syrian and Red Sea coasts" where its products obviously were sold. Foreign conquests in this period provided the temple with raw materials and slaves.

Peasants who were deprived of their lands by the establishment of the large estates had few options. They could be absorbed by the estate economy as workers, or they could try to survive as "uprooted" people. In Syria, the palace sector "took on a hypertrophic character at the close of the period" at the same time as there were fewer people involved in material production to support it (Heltzer 1988:15). This is, of course, an impossible equation. The palace-urban complex could certainly not survive on its own. It had no autonomous life but depended entirely on the existence of external sectors. A growing number of people became "runaways, seeking an escape from their economic plight" (Liverani 1987:69). While the elites expanded their luxury consumption, life among the exploited and oppressed became increasingly unbearable.

The various states affected by the problem of disinclined workers responded by treaties of reciprocal extradition. In documents from the thirteenth century, the runaways appear as an urgent issue. In a treaty between Hatti and Amurru, the vassal king promises, by oath, to send back fugitives to Hatti, Hittites as well as people who had been deported to Hatti from their own lands (Pritchard 1975:44ff). In another case, an agreement between Alalakh and Tunip, the text specifies how the problem of fugitive slaves shall be dealt with; those who help a slave to hide "are considered thieves and their hands are cut off, [moreover] they will pay 6.000 [shekels of] copper to the palace"

(1975:46). Such an agreement also existed between Hatti and Ugarit (Heltzer 1988:9).

The collapse of the system seems to have two main sources. First is the escalation of exploitation and exclusion, leading to a rapid decline of the labor force. It weakened the palaces. If both members of village communities and workers in the palace sector in one way or another disappeared, it would necessarily create serious problems of maintenance. We know that there occurred a food shortage during the second half of the thirteenth century in several parts of the region.

> [D]roughts succeeded one another over a period of several years, and the necessity of feeding a large number of royal dependents in the non-productive professions created a situation leading to a social and economic crisis, which weakened the society from within. (Heltzer 1988:14)

Heltzer's work, where this quotation is to be found, is an analysis of "the royal service system" in the Hittite Empire, Syria, and Mycenaean Greece. He adds that even southern Canaan obtained lesser amounts of cereals than usual (1988:15). There was, according to Heltzer (1988), from 1500 forward, a "relatively large-scale defaulting in the matter of taxes, conscription, service, etc." The defaulters became *habiru,* or *Apiru* (see above), living outside the society, organizing their "own free communities." Here we see the emergence of a new dichotomy, still elite and people, but now dangerously disconnected from one another. The "uprooted" not only ceased to work for the elites but were even in conflict with the elite sector.

The second main source of the collapse is the disintegration of imperial structures. The major powers had in LBA incorporated surrounding areas as vassal territories of their own political realms. The imperial structure created, one might say, the integration needed for the system to function. It had, however, to be constantly reestablished and secured. There were, as noted above, recurrent rebellions that had to be crushed by military force. At the end of the thirteenth century these structures could no longer be maintained. The states lost control over their imperial domains. When empires and political networks disintegrated, a growing number of lesser actors appeared on the scene, in areas formerly dominated and controlled by the major political powers.

Here the system broke down in the immediate peripheries. Western Anatolia seems to be the homeland of many of the Sea Peoples, a fact that is explained by Bryce (see above, 1999:22) in terms of social disintegration; it seems, he says, "to have been the region where the political structures first began to crumble and disintegrate." Singer (1988:243) points to its geographical position between "two rival great powers," Hatti and Ahhiyawa, both considerably weakened toward the end of the thirteenth century.

When immediate peripheries, such as western Anatolia, broke free of the system, the palace sectors were in acute danger. The new actors, in the form of pirates, bandits, and the so-called Sea Peoples, detached themselves from the system but still, of course, depended on it for their survival. Their activities were therefore focused on predation and plunder of both trade routes and wealthy settlements wherever they were to be found. Assyria, so energetically expansive in the fourteenth and early thirteenth centuries, suddenly found itself surrounded by enemies. In a prayer to the god Ashur, the Assyrian king Tukulti-Ninurta indicates that "revolt was widespread." "In the prayer he speaks of the ring of evil with which all the lands surrounded his city Ashur. Those whom he had helped and protected threatened Assyria, and his enemies plotted its destruction" (Munn-Rankin 1975:293).

One might well interpret the great number of runaways and invading migrants, the so-called barbarian invasions, as the revolt of the poor, and even the eventual victory of the oppressed and excluded. Could this be humanity's victory over the "Matrix," the civilizational machine? This was not, of course, the case. A better world did not await beyond the horizon of 1200, but collapse, more destruction, if more decentralized; and then following the dark age, the rebirth of the same machine, like a phoenix, ever more efficient and powerful, out of the ashes of decline.

NOTES

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1. Syria-Palestine was called "Retinu" or "Canaan."

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7

Transnationalization, Sociopolitical Disorder, and Ethnification as Expressions of Declining Global Hegemony

Jonathan Friedman

The title of this chapter may appear somewhat misleading insofar as it uses terms such as *ethnification* and *transnationalization*, which would imply that it was a question of the modern world system. However, the research perspective for which I shall be arguing would maintain a transhistorical global framework while modifying the terms that are related to what have been argued to be essentially modern phenomena. There are good reasons for attempting to maintain such a framework. The most important of these is that many of the problems, conflicts, and tragedies of the contemporary world, or that world that is usually referred to in terms of modernity, are issues that have a long and repetitive history. I would go further and suggest, as many others have done, that a full understanding of what is happening in today's insecure existence, in which culture wars and clashes of civilization abound, can only be understood as a phenomenon that has occurred before and whose mechanisms are not part of some recent evolution.

The analytical frame for this discussion is a global process model of hegemonic expansion and contraction (Friedman 1994). In periods of expansion, an emergent center establishes a dominant position in a larger established realm and becomes a focus of identification for the larger arena. The establishment of a global hegemony is thus the establishment of cultural dominance as well, either via homogenization or the ranking of differences. The contraction of a hegemonic center which is accompanied by the tangential rise of centers in new geographical areas in the midst of a period of political and economic fragmentation (increasing competition) is also a period of combined cultural renewal and disintegration of the larger cultural whole. The current emergence



Figure 7.1. The cycles of hegemony and cultural identity

of postmodernism and neotraditionalism are expressions of precisely this kind of breakdown of a formerly hegemonic cultural space. It is accompanied by instability and increasing cultural politics, a competition of identities in an arena in which dominance is no longer clearly exercised. This kind of process can be exemplified as in figure 7.1.

The figure is meant to show, as simply as possible, the inverse relation between cycles of hegemony and cycles of cultural identity. In reality, these relations can be very much more complex since such cycles can be distributed within smaller regions of a larger hegemonic order that is in a process of transformation. And if some regions may be declining and fragmenting, others may be rising and integrating. Thus, while fragmentation is common in the declining imperial structures of Eastern Europe, homogenization, often violent, has been occurring in Indonesia and China.[1] In other words, hegemonic cycles can be relatively local and embedded in larger cycles. A few words about some of the terms is in order here since several approaches and research traditions are involved in this endeavor. The terms *modernity*, *modernism*, *postmodernity*, and *postmodernism* are, in my usage, structural rather than historical. That is, they are meant to be useful in transhistorical analysis. This assumes that modernity emerges in the right kind of social conditions that have been replicated several times and in several places in world history. I do not like the use of definitions, since words such as *modernity* are meant to open rather than stifle exploration. Modernity is a kind of identity space or field of alternative identities that is structured by certain parameters such as individualization and developmentalism, which are themselves generated by the rise of a hegemonic power or zone in a system based on commercial reproduction. The disintegration of larger kinship or other holistic social



Figure 7.2. The identity space of modernity

orders (Dumont 1983) leads to a number of new cultural tendencies, a particular distinction between public and private, the separation of state from cosmos, of secular from religious, of role from subject, of achieved from ascribed. It also, as a product of the above separations, implies the advent of a logic of personal and social development in which individual mobility finds its analogy in social evolution.

Foundational for modernity as an identity space is precisely radical alterity, what Campbell (1987) has called the Walter Mitty principle, of being or desiring to be what one is not. This implies everything from voluntaristic lifestyle politics to increasingly collectivist identifications as expressed in communitarianism, ethnic and religious movements, and the like. In my discussion of this phenomenon (Friedman 1994) I have used an identity space defined by four polarities (figure 7.2).

Here modernism, traditionalism, primitivism, and postmodernism are four poles of potential identification that define a space of identity variation. Modernism, which dominates in periods of hegemony, is based on rationalist developmentalism where both the cultural and the natural are regarded as barriers to be overcome—no filthy desire, no hampering traditions. In periods of decline there is increasing polarization in which neotraditional investment in cultural roots and religious identity may tend to dominate tendencies toward a more naturalistic primitivism (as in youth cultures) and a more cynical postmodernism, restricted to intellectual elites. The graph implies that traditionalism, primitivism, postmodernism, and modernism are part and parcel of the identity space of modernity rather than external to it. So when I use the term *postmodernity*, in contrast to *postmodernism* (figure 7.1), I am referring to the decline or transformation of the entire space, that is, the establishment of new nonmodern conditions of identification.

INTERSECTION OF SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTIFICATION

The question of ethnicity and of forms of sociocultural integration such as empire or nation-state have rarely been explored in a systematic world historical and comparative perspective, and I do not propose to do more than offer some suggestions in what follows. In an earlier work (Friedman 1994) I suggested a division of forms of cultural identification into a continuum bounded by a holistic/segmentary identity at one end and an individualist/citizenship identity at the other. In figure 7.3 the relation between individual and social identity is traced through the continuum from holistic to commercial capitalist civilizations.

Here the nation-state can vary from the more formal citizenship model of individualist modernism, in which voluntary identification and an instrumental


Social identity
Individual identity
– Culture
Homo aequalis
+ Culture
Homo hierarchicus
Citizenry
Lifestyle
Substantive identity
Segmentary identity
Nation-state
Open individualist
Nationalist ethnic
Holistic
Cultural pluralism
Ethnic puralism (exclusive)
Social pluralism (inclusive)
Commercial capitalist
Kinship and "holistic" civilization

Figure 7.3. The intersection of collective and individual identification

view of the state is dominant, to an ethnified version, in which the nation is dominant, where the nation-state is converted from a contractual to a familistic-ascriptive field. The question of national solidarity and the experience of "organic" belonging are central to this phenomenon. European nations, with the possible exception of Great Britain, are ethnic states, in which a particular rooted population or peoplehood is associated with statehood. I have suggested that the degree of ethnification of such states is dependent on globally determined conditions of existence (Friedman 1994). The United States and other nation-states based on mass immigration are quite different insofar as they lack the clear association of an ethic identity with the state. In the United States, ethnicity is commonly a practice of individual identity in which subjects define themselves in terms of several generations of ancestors from X, Y, and Z (Waters 1990). Mixed ancestry is, logically, an individual issue in such societies, and it is at odds with ethnic group formation. In periods of ethnicization even such groups seek collective identities, as in the recent middle-class hybrid and mixed-race movements in the United States. This seeking does not imply that national societies such as the United States, Australia, and Canada are entirely different from the societies of Europe, but that the forms of identification are at variance with one another. Cycles of assimilation and multi-ethnification occur in both cases, but the consequences have been somewhat different; and the immigrant societies have been much weaker in their cultural assimilation than the ethnically based nation-states. National identity in the United States is very much about the state itself—the flag, international success, democracy, and opportunity—while in continental Europe it is more often a question of nature, community, and national roots or history.

In more general and ideal-typical terms, there are certain general and common characteristics of commercial civilizations. These are a function, also variable, of the degree of individualization, the degree to which the internal capitalization of society disintegrates local kin, community, and local-regional sodalities (see above). The liberation process creates a vacuum with respect to collective identification. This vacuum is filled with both individualist modernism and national identity. The nation-state in this sense is a product of the Western sector of the modern world system, but it has, I shall argue, its analogues in the ancient world. Modernism is an identity that, paradoxically, denies all fixed and rooted identities, in the sense of culturally defined and essentialist, that is, ethnic. It may be national, but in a political-territorial sense rather than an ethnic one. Modernism (which is not identical to *modern* [Friedman 1994]) is based on the notion of supersession, of growth and development as a general process appplicable to both individuals and societies (see figure 7.2). Fixed identity in such terms is a kind of neurotic paralysis, and tradition is reduced to the repetition compulsion. Modernism reigns supreme in the hegemonic realms of the modern world system, but when hegemony declines, it is a difficult project to maintain. The concomitant of declining modernist identity is an increase in narcissistic tendencies that have become the focus of works like that of Lasch (1979) and where collective identities become a solution to the threat of ego disintegration. It is in such conditions that roots, ethnicity, religion, and postmodernism become increasingly dominant and that individualism is replaced increasingly by what is sometimes referred to as a new tribalism (Maffesoli 1988), not only in its ethnic form, but as a form of social organization in which a fragmented public sphere becomes increasingly divided into clientelistic hierarchies. This is the "new Middle Ages" referred to by political scientists (Minc 1993). These variations are predicated on a well-developed individualization in which community and tradition, or gemeinschaft, become essential aspects of the modern fantasy of the world we have lost. Communitarianism is in this sense a phenomenon of modernity rather than a leftover from the past.

At the other end of the scale are holistic identity formations. These are based on very different and historically more common constructions of the individual subject, in which variations on abrupt weaning and a strong socialization into a cosmologically organized structure of authority located outside the individual body generates a different kind of ethnic belonging. A segmentary structure of encompassment leads from local kin groups through increasingly inclusive structures up to the state. These are not simple categories of membership, but dynamic principles that constitute the subject in powerful ways. Bruce Kapferer's milestone comparison (1988) of Sinhalese and Australian forms of nationalism demonstrates clearly how the Buddhist state in Sri Lanka is internally organized into individual selfhood in ways that account for the particular nature of ethnic violence.

COMPARATIVE INTEGRATION

By comparing processes of integration one can gain some insight into the nature of the differences suggested here. In much of the work on Southeast Asian societies there is an understanding that individuals and groups can change their identity. Thus Kachin of highland Burma may become Buddhists as they settle among the valley-dwelling Shan, with whom they identify, and take up irrigation agriculture instead of their former swiddening (Leach 1954). At a lower segmentary level, in-marrying men in patrilineal societies, who cannot afford bridewealth payments, are often integrated into their new lineages by a process of adoption which may require powerful rituals and a great deal of transformative work on the self. In both cases, the integrative process is one that turns X into Y. Ethnicity here is situational. It is about the practice of social relations with particular people in a particular place. It is not a question of lifestyle—"Today I think I'll be Balinese." Nor is it a question of "blood" or any other traits that are inherited from generation to generation.[2] The subject is not the bearer of several different essential identities because ethnicity is not located in the body, but in the social context. This does not mean that it is instrumental or "thin," as can be seen by the Sinhalese example, but that it is the context itself, rather than the body, which is the site of the investment of the self.

In larger imperial organizations, the segmentary nature of incorporation becomes salient. It can take a variety of forms of what has usually been referred to as pluralism. Such states and empires have been characterized by hierarchy among constituent groups. In South Asia this hierarchy is most elaborate in the caste system, in which a similar set of principles organizes the hierarchical incorporation of a great variety of social and ethnic groups, all of whom are ranked in a homogeneous scale of purity/impurity. Studies of the expansion of the caste system into marginal areas provide evidence of the way this assimilation to a hierarchical order via Hinduization may have occurred historically. Other more loosely organized models are typical for the great East Asian and Middle Eastern empires, most recently exemplified in the Ottoman *millet* system. In the latter there is no need for assimilation in the modern sense because the society is founded upon difference. In large parts of the world, this was not merely a cultural difference, but a difference of relative social autonomy.[3] Many multi-ethnic empires were effectively multisocietal empires linked only by centralized taxation and/or economic specialization and exploitation. Note, however, that this differentiation is extremely hierarchical in terms of power and privilege. The state, in such systems, is not a representative of the people, but an ethnic or multi-ethnic class whose primary characteristic is that of authoritarian rule over a great multiplicity of peoples.

It is in city-states and in nation-states that one finds a strong tendency to both individualization and homogenization. In such states, there is a tendency of the state itself to be transformed from a ruling class to a governmental body. It becomes representative of a "people" that may become a population of citizens as the result of the power struggle linked to the emergence of democratic organization. Questions of loyalty, legal equality, and solidarity become central issues. These are issues of social homogeneity, that is, the establishment of criteria of trust among citizens. These issues also imply a practice of boundedness, the notion that, "This is our society, our state. It is a function of our will and our sovereignty. It does not belong to everyone, that is, to outsiders," who might include foreign traders and a large slave population. While authors like McNeill (1986) have discussed this continuity between nation-state and city-state, they seem to argue that the city-state develops out of a real community of farmers, so that it is no more than an outgrowth of an original homogenous society. But the history of ancient city-states does not corroborate this scenario. Rather, they seem to emerge out of protracted struggles in which state-class elites are gradually transformed into something closer to governments in a context in which sovereignty passes from the elite to the people.

MULTI-ETHNICITY IN HISTORY

The argument that multi-ethnic societies have been the rule rather than the exception in history is, of course, true, but this is because the history of the world has been the history of empires and segmentary states, and such social organizations, however multi-ethnic, were also ethnic hierarchies. It is, perhaps, the latter aspect of such societies that is the secret of their relative ethnic peace. Significant, from our point of view, is that multi-ethnicity is a phenomenon that emerges and disappears rather than a fixed type of organization. Thus, the emergence of the Hellenistic empires was a movement from a city-state national ideology to a cosmopolitan and multi-ethnic ideology. The same transformation characterizes the movement from the Roman Republic to the Empire, and it is clearly reflected in a whole series of changes. The emergence of Cynic philosophy provided an entire discourse, interestingly postmodern in character, for this shift, disavowing all social institutions, including marriage and property. The Cynics recognized only the natural world as a socially relevant fact. And in the world all men are equal—whether rich or poor, Greek or barbarian, citizen or foreigner. However, since the Cynics surmised that most men were also fools, and therefore incapable of using their freedom and equality to full individual advantage, they had to conclude that only the wise could actually be cosmopolites and make the world their city (Bozeman 1994: 103).

The Ciceronian system of education, republican in origin and based on the cultivation of Roman virtues, was transformed by the time of Augustus to one more accommodating of the Empire, in which all were to be citizens of Rome and where there was even a growing fear of foreigners, to which I shall return below. As communities that practice homogeneity expand into empires, they also move toward a hierarchical heterogeneity. But as the latter begins to decline, the heterogeneity begins to assert itself as a political force. This takes us to the central theme of this discussion, the relation between cycles of expansion and contraction in global hegemonies and the forms of transnational or trans-state relations.

GLOBAL PROCESS AND EQUIFINALITY

All these variations, and even discontinuities, in the way in which populations can be integrated and in the way cultural differences are maintained, do not necessarily help in accounting for the issues outlined in the title of this chapter. Part of the reason is that they pertain primarily to the global systemic, and as such are products of a dominant commercial and urban organized central zone. There is no transnationalization without nation-states, or at least without some analogous type of organization, such as the city-states that date back to antiquity. Ethnification is a more serious issue, for while it may be organized in different terms, that is, segmentary and inclusive versus essentialist and exclusive, the practice of identification and differentiation can lead to similarly violent outcomes. In fact, it is logical for essentialization to accompany ethnification no matter what the social and cultural conditions.

The claim that ethnicity is a product of modernity is true only if by ethnicity we mean a form of cultural identity that is essentialist, homogenizing, and exclusive in conditions of peace. The idea that the individual is an *X* because he contains the substance (blood) of *X* may well be typically modern, but it also the case that stereotypification in conditions of conflict is practically universal (Lévi-Strauss 1952). Disorder is, of course, a universally recurrent phenomenon, along with many of the forms that it takes such as social fragmentation, individual crises, new collective identifications, and what I have referred to as ethnification. When a social arena becomes disordered by crisis, particular reactions vary as a result of its variable constitution. Among the tribal and chiefly societies of highland Burma and Assam, a series of phenomena are unleashed by protracted crisis (often endogenously generated), including head-hunting, witchcraft, the appearance of were-tigers, antifertility and antichiefly ideologies, and revolts. Such phenomena may invert the entire workings of former expansive societies in astonishing ways (Friedman 1998). Phenomena such as cargo cults, witchcraft epidemics, and cannibalism (Ekholm-Friedman 1992) are widespread reactions to crises in societies organized primarily by kinship. While these are surely quite specific local forms of action, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that they are not as specific as has usually been assumed. Societies in crisis are often societies in which people "cannibalize" one another in various ways, in which hate and fear rampage through the arenas of everyday and public life and sow the seed for violent conflict. So rather than argue for the existence of entirely different phenomena, I would suggest that there are interesting family resemblances at work.

EXPLORING THE MODEL OF HEGEMONIC DECLINE IN GLOBAL SYSTEMS

Rather than recapitulating the entire model of global systems (see Friedman 1994), I would like to suggest the existence of a series of interlinked phenomena that seem to occur in periods of hegemonic decline. To begin with, I do not assume that decline in hegemony is anything like a general decline in the larger global system. On the contrary, periods of hegemonic decline are periods of commercial expansion, due to the process of decentralization itself. In fact, it is the decentralization of capital (abstract wealth) accumulation in hegemonic organizations that is the basis of hegemonic decline. And it is the hegemons themselves that are the source of such decentralization because of the existence of a gradient of profitability or economic advantage that emerges in periods of strong centrality. The movement of wealth out of the hegemonic center is expressed in the processes of relocation of industrial production, not the least of what are called modern mass production industries. Old centers become more oriented to consumption, to high levels of welfare spending, and to postindustrial and postmodern forms of wealth (so-called culture and information industries, residential land, and financial instruments and other forms of speculation) while new emergent areas in the system take over larger percentages of the former basic industrial activities, such as heavy industry and the production of mass-consumption goods. Historically, the movements of textile, pottery, and other production have been important indicators of both centrality and decentralization. Today textiles/clothing are still major indicators of such movements, but the entire gamut of mass-consumption goods in the world market follows suit to a large degree. Even so-called high-tech industries tend to globalize in today's world.

This is not, as in the common view of globalization, an evolution to a higher stage of economic development—"Before we were local, now we are global"—but primarily a phase that has occurred throughout the history of global systems (Friedman 1994; Ekholm-Friedman and Friedman 1987). Globalization is in such terms simply the phase of decentralization itself, in which a hegemony is replaced by a period of increased competition, political decentralization, and a shift of accumulation to a new region of the world system. The only factor that might alter this tendency to shift is the rapidity of the cycle itself. For largely technological reasons, not only in transportation rates, but also in the speed of financial transactions and the ability of capital to move quickly from one location to another, one might argue that the hegemonic periodicities of the system have become so short as to preclude the establishment of new hegemons. In such cases we have a new ball game in which a generalized global competition might become normalized.[4]

In any case, the tendencies at present are still somewhat old-fashioned with respect to the generalized global competition referred to above. The globalization of capital has led to the formation of a powerful Pacific Rim zone having the fastest growth rates in the world rather than a more even distribution of capital investment. Thus, an increasing degree of multinationalization should not detract us from understanding the differential flows of capital in the world system. In 1956 the United States had forty-two of the top fifty corporations, a clear sign of hegemony over world production. In 1989 that number had dropped to seventeen. Europe as a whole has a larger number (twenty-one) of the fifty top firms today than the United States. While production and export have increased unabated since the 1960s, the developed market economies have seen a decrease in their share of total world production from 72 percent to 64 percent, while in the developing countries it has more than doubled. Between 1963 and 1987 the U.S. share of world manufacturing decreased from 40.3 percent to 24 percent. Japan increased its portion from 5.5 percent to 19 percent in the same period. West Germany held stable at around 9 percent to 10 percent, but the United Kingdom declined from 6.5 percent to 3.3 percent. France, Italy, and Canada also declined somewhat in this period. "It is especially notable that in the East and Southeast Asian NICs manufacturing growth rates remained at a high level throughout the 1970s and 1980s whereas those of the leading developed market economies fell to half or less of their 1960s levels" (Dicken 1992:27). This is reflected in the changing rankings in the world arena, while at the same time the world leaders lost shares in the total world export of manufactured goods (see table 7.1).

Table 7.1. World Arena Rankings (1978, 1989) and Percentage of World Export Manufacturing (1963, 1989)

	World Arena Rankings			*World Export of Manufacturing (%)*	
Country	*1978*	*1989*	*Country*	*1963*	*1989*
Hong Kong	27	11	Japan	6	9
Taiwan	21	12	W. Germany	15	11
Korea	20	13	United Kingdom	11	5
China	33	14	United States	17	23
Mexico	40	20			

Source: After P. Dicken, *Global Shift: The Internationalization of Economic Activity* (London: Chapman, 1992).

THE QUESTION OF TRANSNATIONALIZATION

There are several uses of the term *transnational* in the various literatures on globalization. Most common and interesting is the political economy literature itself. Here some history is worthwhile. The literature begins as late as the late 1960s and 1970s, concentrating on the phenomenon of the internationalization of enterprise. The term *multinational corporation* is the most common, and this refers to what appears to be a new kind of power structure in which firms establish themselves increasingly in international arenas where advantages are greater than in the home market. The reasons for the internationalization of firms and its consequences for local labor and other economic factors were debated for quite some time. It seems to have been assumed in this period that such corporations had central headquarters that were nationally based. For some, multinationalization was evidence of increasing imperialism. I criticized this argument on the grounds that it would imply that profits were repatriated, which was contradicted by the fact of increasing capital investment in the global arena. The concept of the multinational corporation has been replaced by that of the transnational corporation, following an evolutionary argument in which the corporation is no longer linked to a particular place but, in some versions, hovers above the world in a transnational ether. The problem with this concept is that it often implies that there is a space corresponding specifically to the global, something more than the relations between localities.

The other notion of the transnational refers to the movement of people, information, and goods in the global arena. It is sometimes characterized as a movement of culture, a globalization of meaning, via the media, via diaspora formation (mass migration), and via the movement of commodities. This literature is clearly an expression of a certain consciousness of what appears to be a changing world order. The time-space compression to which Harvey (1989) refers is the background for such consciousness, but it is most explicit among intellectuals and academics whose professions have, via increasing global mobility, entailed a certain awareness of their own expanding horizons. In Harvey's terms, this is a quantitative rather than a qualitative change. It does not mean that the world has somehow and quite recently become a single place, an ecumene of interconnectedness as opposed to the former mosaic of separate cultures and societies. Another understanding of transnational globalization would place it in a cyclical historical framework. In the latter, globalization is a ubiquitous quality of global systems. What changes are the forms it takes as well as the modes of consciousness that accompany those forms.

SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL PARAMETERS OF DECLINE

The decline of hegemonic zones is accompanied by a general process of regional economic decline, increasing stratification, sociocultural fragmentation, mass migration, and a general increase in social disorder. It should be stressed here that disorder is not limited to the central zones themselves but may be especially severe in those dependent peripheries that are *not* the targets of outward moving capital accumulation. Thus, most of Africa and parts of western and central Asia are among the most unstable zones. The fact that there are valuable resources in such areas only amplifies the instability where there is no "development." The collapse of the Soviet empire has produced the same kind of extreme and violent disorder. It is also accompanied, as I said earlier, by increasing globalization, not only in economic terms but also in terms of the formation of global elites and elite global consciousness. I suggest in figure 7.4 how these factors are connected in a systematic way.

Disorder and Fragmentation

The decentralization of capital accumulation creates disorder in areas abandoned by capital. This in turns leads to downward mobility, and the economic


Global disorder via decentralization
Decline of modernism
Alternative identification
Ethnic
"Fourth world"
Religious
Balkanization
New social engagement
Economic decline
Increasing poverty
Regional disorder
Emigration
National disorder
Slummification, lumpenization
Social disorder
Personal disorder
Psychic crisis
Criminal identity

Figure 7.4. Disorder in the center of the global system

crisis generates serious identity problems. The decline of modernism is closely related to the impossibility of maintaining a future orientation based on liberation from the past. In this decline, there is a turn to roots, to ethnicity, and to other collective identities, whether regional, religious, or even gender based, that replaces the vacuum left by a receding modernist identity. This re-rooting is the resonating base of cultural politics and political fragmentation that spreads throughout the hegemonic center. It takes the following forms.

Indigenization

Indigenous populations within state territories begin to reinstate their traditions and to claim their indigenous rights. The fourth-world movements have become a global phenomenon, institutionalized via United Nations organs such as the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. The demography of this phenomenon is significant. The population of North American Indians more than doubled from 1970 to 1980; most of this was re-identification—five new tribes appeared during the same period.

Nationalization

The nation-states of Europe have become increasingly ethnic over the past five years, moving from a formal citizenship/modernist identity to one based on historicized roots. This has been documented via the rapid increase in consumption of historical literature. In France, the Middle Ages, the Celts, and everything that preceded the modern state were highest on the list from the late 1970s on. Much of this literature has an indigenous quality to it, especially where there is no competition from other indigenous populations. The so-called New Right movements in France, Italy, and Germany harbor ideologies that are similar to fourth-world ideologies. They are anti-universalist, anti-imperialist, against universal religions, and multiculturalist. Thus Jean de Benoist, spokesman for the French New Right states:

> Given this situation, we see reasons for hope only in the affirmation of collective singularities, the spritiual re-appropriation of heritages, the clear awareness of roots and specific cultures....We are counting on the breakup of the singular model, whether this occurs in the rebirth of regional languages, the affirmation of ethnic minorities or in phenomena as diverse as decolonialization... [whether in the] affirmation of being black, the political pluralism of Third World countries, the rebirth of a Latin American civilization, the resurgence of an Islamic culture, etc. (*Elements* 33, Feb–March 1980:19–20, translated in Piccone 1994)

Regionalism

Subnational regions have been on the rise since the mid-1970s. After several decades during which it was assumed that assimilation was the general solution to ethnic problems and in which social scientists calculated how many generations it would take for ethnic minority groups to disappear into larger national populations, the 1970s came as a surprise to many (Esman 1977). The weakening of the national projects of Europe became increasingly evident: Scotland, Cornwall, Brittany, Occitania, and Catalonia. Today they are being supplemented by the Lega Nord and a Europe-wide lobby organization for the advancement of the interests of a Europe of regions rather than nation-states. In the former Soviet empire to the east, the breakup of larger units is as rampant and violent as in Central Asia and Southeast Europe.

Immigrant Ethnification

Optimism with respect to regional identities in Europe was identical to assimilationist/integrationist predictions with regard to immigrant minorities, especially in the United States. What seemed to be a trend toward integration was broken and reversed in the late 1960s when multi-ethnicity implied by the rise of black- and then red-power movements was supported at both grassroots and elite levels (as early as the 1960s the Ford Foundation was heavily involved in ethnic community local control projects). Today this has become a major state interventionist project in many Western countries at the same time as identity politics has led to what some have called culture wars, in which the very unity of the nation-state, its very existence, is threatened. The much discussed diasporization process can be understood simply as the ethnification of transnational connections, so that communication, social relations, and economics become organized and even institutionalized across boundaries rather than immigrant groups becoming transformed into distinct local or national minorities. Diasporization is thus no more than the ethnification of the immigration process. It is unlike other processes of fragmentation because it structures itself in global terms, being both subnational and transnational.

The process of fragmentation has not been a peaceful one. In 1993, for example, there were fifty-two major violent conflicts in the world in forty-two countries, the most severe conflicts being in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Africa. Half these conflicts had been underway for more than a decade (UNRISD 1995:15). This is very different from the previous decades of the cold war when there was a simpler division and a much stronger degree of control in the world system. "All but five of the twenty-three wars being fought in 1994 are based on communal rivalries and ethnic challenges to states. About three-quarters of the world's refugees, estimated at nearly 27 million people, are in flight from or have been displaced by these and other ethnic conflicts" (Gurr 1994:350).

GLOBALIZATION, CLASS, AND ELITE FORMATION

Globalization in institutional terms entails the formation of international communities, however loosely knit, that share common interests. There is an interesting and, I think, still to be researched connection between the larger transformation of the global system and the emergence of new cosmopolitan elites. The aspect of that transformation that seems most interesting is the increasing proportion of the world economy that is concentrated in the form of public and private funds, primarily based on tax monies from Western countries. U.N. organizations, especially UNESCO, the European Union, and other similar organizations (primarily nationally based) form what might be called global pork barrels that finance institutions, consultancies, and various nongovernmental organizations, that pay enormous tax-free salaries to globalized bureaucrats and consultants, and which join in the ranks of other elites such as those of the international media and culture industries (to which we might add international sports, for example, the Olympic Committee, and other global sports organizations). These elites are very different from former industrial capitalist elites, not least because many of them are not owners of production but are instead dependent upon being able to milk such global funds. Robert Reich characterizes part of this new class (Reich 1992) as "symbolic analysts," who, in Lasch's words, "live in a world of abstract concepts and symbols, ranging from stock market quotations to the images produced by Hollywood and Madison Avenue" (Lasch 1995:35). In Lasch's terms, "They have more in common with their counterparts in Brussels or Hong Kong than with the masses of Americans not yet plugged into the network of global communications."

This is still an emergent phenomenon and is understudied. In economic terms it might be part of a general shift of capital from productive to unproductive investment, to the general increase in fictitious accumulation in the old cores of the world system. What is interesting is that a relatively coherent identity seems to have emerged in these elites. It combines a rather self-assured and superior cosmopolitanism with a model of hybridity, border crossing, and multiculturalism (however inconsistent). The cosmopolitanism of the elite is not modernistic, nor is it devoid of cultural identification, but, on the contrary, is postmodernist in its attempt to encompass the world's cultures in its own self-definition. This elitism distances itself from the people who represent the national, the unsophisticated, the racist, and expresses loyalty to humanity as a whole rather than to its own fellow citizens; or if to its own citizens, to immigrants above nationals. The urban upper middle class has become one of the principal focal points of this development. Sennett's *The Uses of Disorder* (1970) is a virtual handbook in global cosmopolitan multiculturality. The enemy is the fixed, boring gemeinschaft, and the believed-in future is something like the singles bar where people without strong social bonds can meet to indulge in mutually edifying communication and have fun without personal responsibility, except the responsibility to maintain plurality and the supposed creativity that ensues from it. The urbane, cosmopolitan, and multicultural are well expressed in CNN's advertising for itself. One well-known advertisement shows a series of images: an Australian Aborigine; a Tuareg nomad; several Northern Europeans; and Asians, all to a nostalgic theme which ends with a statement of CNN's globally encompassing network. All are part of the larger humanity of the CNN family. What is interesting about Sennett, as about CNN, is the normative aspect of their representations. The cosmopolitan multicultural world is a model of how things ought to be and is part of a concerted struggle against the red-necked, rural, essentialist-nationalist "people." Similarly, the wave of discourses on cultural hybridity (Canclini 1992; Hall 1996; Gilroy 1993) focuses on cultural elites themselves and on their discourses. World music may be taken up as an example of hybridization, but in spite of the name of this popular genre, a closer examination reveals that it is a metropolitan product and a media industry creation rather than a creation of a cosmopolitanized street. In other words, it can be argued that the ideology of hybridity is primarily an elitist discourse in a world that is otherwise engaged in the opposite; it is the drawing of boundaries to be defended, not only from land or region to land and region, but from street to street. Hybridization and balkanization are two simultaneous identification processes of the global shift in hegemony, but they occur at opposite ends of the social scale.[5]

GENERAL AND SPECIFIC PROPERTIES OF GLOBAL SYSTEMS: A PERSPECTIVE

I have suggested that there are numerous general characteristics of global systems that we ought to be able to locate in the historical material. If we limit ourselves to the issue of hegemonic shifts and their consequences, there are some interesting parallels.

Ethnification

In both the Hellenistic and Roman declines there is an increase in ethnic and religious identification. This is complicated somewhat by the fact that the cycles of growth and decline are different in ancient and modern world systems. Hellenistic expansion was part of the decline of the civilization of the city-state system. Athens and the other cities declined, economically and politically, having exported a large part of their total capital (free producers and artisans = capital), and the emergence of Macedon (perhaps the first territorial nation-state) led to a rapid expansion into the Middle East and Central Asia, colonization, and the formation of a Greek elite diaspora that imported its goods as well as its culture in the form of Greek academies, the Paidaiea, and that maintained a strong diasporic elite identity, at least at the start of the expansion period. Later on this dominance weakened, and the Greek colonists were replaced by what appears to be a local class who can be characterized as having a mestizo or hybrid identity. These were the so-called Hellenists, who led the decolonization and cultural differentiation of the Greek expansion into a number of autonomized provinces, more or less where the hybridization created new local traditions. They were a class who:

> in varying degrees, lived a life that straddled these two cultures and in many ways constituted the bridge between them. . . . Whereas the native populations in the Near East identified themselves mainly with their traditional heritages (hence Ptolemy was regarded as a Pharaoh), and the Greek stratum identified mostly with the Greek tradition (viewing Ptolemy as a Macedonian, or a Greek god such as Dionysus), the Hellenists created something between these two worlds. Their ideas of the state were thus a mixture of eastern and western concepts of statehood and nationality. For them the Hellenistic king was neither a Greek institution nor an eastern one. They lived in a world of religious syncretism and attempted to find the equivalents for Greek gods in the various pantheons available in the ancient Near East. Thus Toth became Hermes, Osiris became Dionysus, and Melkart, Heracles. In Egypt this group was even associated with the worship of a completely new Hellenistic deity called Serapis. (Mendels 1992:22)

These hybridizing classes may have more in common with the rising classes in Western colonial regimes than with the contemporary postmodern phenomenon, as I have suggested. But then, it is here that we may find the continuity between the colonial and the "postcolonial," as the latter is expressed in the current cultural studies literature. We should not, of course, expect exact parallels, but the similarities may indeed be due to certain common historical structural processes. The hybrid ideologies of the present owe much to and are in dialogue with mestizo and similar identities in the postcolonial world. The Hellenistic expansion produced similar processes of identification, but it is not clear whether the colonial and postcolonial are related in the same way as in the recent history of Western expansion. One aspect of this relation can be found in the cosmopolitan identity of the Macedonian rulers and their successors. In the expansion period itself there was a great emphasis placed on Greek ideals and the establishment of Greek academies. "The Greeks, for the sake of making civilization meaningful to the majority, had clung to the polis as the cornerstone of their political existence, in the conviction that any greater political community would not adequately contain the kind of life that they had found to be the most worth living" (Bozeman 1994:101). But the formation of the Hellenistic world was the formation of a highly stratified existence in which only the elite participated in the new cosmopolitan culture and where the ideal of social unity had all but disappeared:

> The disparity between cultural and political developments in the Hellenistic Age resulted partly because the common culture, with all its glittering attractiveness, had not—in its historically most decisive period—actually reached sufficient depth in human consciousness. It was consequently unable to generate the moral forces necessary to restrain war and support peace and unity. Indeed, wars were fought more bitterly and treaties broken more frequently than during any previous period of world history. This international society was perhaps further prevented from developing the moral strength that would have enabled it to survive because it was socially divided. While theoretically accessible to individuals from all civilizations and races, the culture in all its cosmopolitan richness was in practice one and meaningful only to the educated: the men who spoke Greek, and who liked to live the urban life that Greek culture had so eloquently advertised. (Bozeman 1994:100–101)

The Cynic philosophers, like the other schools that emerged in this period, have been described in terms of a reaction to the failure of the city-state as a political and moral institution. The Cynics, especially, might be compared to postmodernists in their combination of cultural relativism and elitist cosmopolitanism. What is significant is that the later Hellenistic elites were no longer Greek and that the Greek homeland was in continuous decline throughout the period. Rome is a clearer parallel. Here the export of capital begins explosively with the formation of empire. The civic national culture of Rome is replaced by a cosmopolitan orientation. This transition, which affected a transformation in the Roman legal code—the concept of citizenry—and the entire cultural edifice of the formerly hegemonic Roman worldview, is a clear expression of the disintegration of hegemonic position in an empire in which the decentralization of capital occurred from the very start.

> Italy's privileged position in the commonwealth over which Augustus had watched so jealously was thus gradually weakened. It was abolished by Hadrian (AD 117–137)—himself a provincial from Spain—who regarded the Empire as one indivisible state, rather than a conglomeration of civitates, and was therefore impatient with any national or local particularism, whether expressed in Jewish uprisings in Palestine or in Roman conceit in Italy. The development culminated in AD 212 with Caracalla's promulgation in the Constitutio Antonia, under the

> terms of which all freeborn inhabitants of the Empire were granted Roman citizenship. (Bozeman 1994:170)

It is this kind of transformation that was so much debated in the early years of the century, when Roman history was seen as a mirror of the contemporary world:

> . . . the immediate result of this complete revolution in the relations of nationality was certainly far from pleasing. Italy swarmed with Greeks, Syrians, Phoenicians, Jews and Egyptians, while the provinces swarmed with Romans; sharply defined national peculiarities everywhere came into mutual contact, and were visibly worn off; it seemed as if nothing was to be left behind but in the general impress of utilitarianism. What the Latin character gained in diffusion, it lost in freshness; especially in Rome itself, where the middle class disappeared the soonest and most entirely, and nothing was left but the grandees and the beggars, both in an equal measure cosmopolitan. (Mommsen 1911)

But this is not merely a twentieth-century interpretation of the ancient world. It is also present in the increasing xenophobia of the imperial period. Seneca, writing to his mother, says:

> Of this crowd the greater part have no country; from their own free towns and colonies, in a word, from the whole globe, they are congregated. Some are brought by ambition, some by the call of public duty, or by reason of some mission, others by luxury which seeks a harbor rich and commodius for vices; others by the eager pursuit of liberal studies, others by shows, etc. (Frank 1916:47)

This is a Roman Empire in which there is mass immigration, where according to some studies the population of Rome is substantially more than 50 percent of foreign extraction (Frank claims over 80 percent), in which the literature is described as "hybrid" (Rand 1975:571). The decentralization of the Roman economy led eventually to the transformation of Rome into a capital of imperial consumption, but no longer a center of production. This restructuring led to a series of financial crises and to the fragmentation of the empire itself.

CONCLUSION

The argument of this chapter has been that ethnification and social and political disorder are expressions of declining hegemony in global systems and that this relation occurs in spite of the fact that the societies involved might practice very different forms of ethnicity. Whether ethnification occurs on the basis of an essentialist or non-essentialist structure of identity, it has similar effects on the outcome of ethnic conflicts. However, global systems, insofar as they are based on commercial economies, tend to develop a high degree of individualism, at least in their urban centers, so that ethnicity takes on essentialist characteristics. The world of *hegemonic* growth is one in which hegemonic classes tend to form as the elites of culturally *homogenizing* states and where the multicultural is spatially relegated to lower-ranked peripheries. The world of decline is a complex world, one that combines balkanization and globalization of cultural and social identities, in which the multicultural invades the center, and central state identity disintegrates at the same time as new cosmopolitan elites identify with the larger world instead of with the former territory of the hegemon. New rising hegemonies become new zones of nationalization and homogenization where a former cultural and political diversity is less tolerated.[6]

NOTES

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1. Indonesia is a weak link, of course, which following the recent economic crisis has reverted to internal religious and ethnic fragmentation, while in China, the increasingly hegemonic center, there has been a combination of homogenization or at least ranking of difference within a larger state-centered order.

2. Ethnicity should not be confused here with kinship. Genealogical relations do, of course, constitute individual identity within the kin group itself, but here, too, adoption is a possible form of recruitment.

3. Autonomy here refers only to internal organization of religious and other cultural practices, as in colonial regimes.

4. When the original article was published, it was not as clear as today the extent to which China was emerging as a new workshop of the world.

5. Since the publication of this article, a number of works dealing with this phenomenon have appeared (e.g., Friedman 1994, 2002, 2004). See also chapter 8 in *Modernities, Class, and the Contradictions of Globalization* (Ekholm-Friedman and Friedman 2008).

6. In the database constructed by Ted Gurr (1997) (homepage: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/), the distribution of minority conflicts seems, on the surface, to reflect this distribution of forces in the current shifting world system. The great majority of conflicts in East and Southeast Asia appear to relate to problems of incorporation in which minorities are clearly at a disadvantage. In those areas of the West, and in Central Europe and Asia, with declining hegemonies, minorities have either become nations or are struggling to liberate themselves from larger units. In Africa, in which the larger political units were always rather weak and based on alliances and clientships, the major conflicts seem to be about control of the state, which is the entry point for

international funds or for control over natural resources, the major source of wealth and power in this region. In other words, in rising areas, integration of minorities would seem to be the major trend, while in declining areas, fragmentation is the rule. This does not mean that there is a difference in the degree of conflict, but that the outcomes are very different.

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Part III

STRUCTURE AND HISTORY: TRANSFORMATIONAL MODELS

This section focuses on one of the key areas of global systemic analysis, one that is central to anthropology since it deals with detailed historical and ethnographic material within the context of global processes, establishing the way the latter are implicated within the former. The notion of articulation refers to multiple logics that are linked to one another in larger processes of social reproduction. Several examples from the history of the Congo are used to demonstrate the way in which such articulation generates social transformation. Chapter 8 introduces the specific structure of prestige-good systems as they are manifested in Central Africa and the way in which their articulation to expanding capitalist strategies produces a set of social variations that enable us to understand the distribution of social and political forms in the Congo basin. These are variations that would have represented entirely separate social organizations (matrilineal, patrilineal, bilineal) and even "cultures," and this has been the usual way that they have been interpreted, that is, as a collection of different societies, different peoples with different systems of symbolism and social relations. The purpose of transformational analysis is to reveal the family resemblances among these societies, but more importantly to suggest that they are the products of differential articulation of a set of local logics to those of the larger global system, the differences being a function of differing regional/historical positions. The disintegration of the Congo kingdoms led to the gradual transformation of generalized to restricted exchange, the emergence of local variations on diametric dualism with all its hierarchical ambivalence, expressions of the development of new strategies of alliance related to changing political circumstances. What may have fooled anthropologists is that the newer social forms were still kinship organized so that they might be mistaken for what was thought of as simply cultural givens: "Population *X* has culture *Y* expressed in social form *Z*." It has been insisted that patrilateral cross-cousin marriage, for example, is simply the way Congolese culture is organized and to assert that this is not so historically is to commit a grave error. All this would be called essentialism today, but not for the same reasons. Anti-essentialism denies the value of structure on the grounds that it implies that everyone in a particular population does the same thing. It is a kind of individualistic critique of collective realities. It is a critique that has developed around the notion of culture, where the term *essentialism* refers to cultural cloning, the existence or even production of identical individuals, which is, of course, a more extreme view than one that merely maintains a notion of sharedness. But the notion of structure is quite different, referring rather to the properties of social fields. The problem in many of the accusations of essentialism is that their perpetrators are apparently unwilling to accept the existence of the social as external to the individual subject, reducing it instead to the cultural specifics of individual action. Our assumption is that structures, which do indeed exist (otherwise, we cannot assert that we live in a capitalist world), are historically variable in quite systemic ways. The same argument characterizes chapter 9, in which what is assumed to be simply a Central African culture is, in fact, a recent product of violent historical transformation. While Frazer and a number of contemporary anthropological studies have tended to turn sacred kingship into a timeless expression of a discourse of power or even a stage of political evolution, a premonition of real power to follow with the advent of the state, Ekholm Friedman argues that the actual historical process is exactly the reverse. The defeat of Congolese society with the onslaught of the regime of the Belgian King Léopold produced a disintegration of political hierarchy and its order of religious and ceremonial controls, and a transition to increasing disorder in which magic and witchcraft were the very form of this disordering. Sacred kingship is one expression of this disorder, which is further developed in chapter 11 where the generality of this process is explored. Chapter 10 explores the transformation of Polynesian societies in terms of a dynamics of endogenous regional systems. This and the following chapter, where it is further argued that the different cosmologies of Eastern and Western Polynesia can be understood as transforms of one another, are themselves related to changing configurations within Oceanic regional systems, which in their turn might account for the different ways they ultimately articulate with European expansion. Here a prototypical prestige good-based regional system in Western Polynesia is transformed into theocratic feudalism in the East and into increasingly small-scale competitive systems in Melanesia where big-man characteristics appear. These differences can be understood in terms of complexes of social strategies, clearly revealed in their encounter with Western actors. The nature of the encounters is clearly dependent on the way in which Western and indigenous strategies interact, but long-term processes of incorporation into the global system often lead to parallel results.

A theoretical framework for the understanding of these interactions that we suggested quite some years ago (Ekholm and Friedman 1980) stipulates a double process: cultural assimilation or integration of the Western into local projects, and material integration of the local population into the global cycles of Western capitalist reproduction. The interaction of the latter with the former produces variations of its own, from what we have referred to as endogenous transformations triggered by global processes to the restructuring of local societies in terms of imported institutions and social strategies. If the Central Africa of the sixteenth to the end of the nineteenth centuries represents the former, as do the first years of the nineteenth century for Hawaii, from the 1820s on, the latter process becomes dominant, a situation in which the political and social structures are replaced by Western organizational forms, from the state itself to plantations and ranches as well as a massive importation of laborers who become part of a new multi-ethnic order.

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8

External Exchange and the Transformation of Central African Social Systems

Kajsa Ekholm Friedman

THE PROBLEM OF PATRILINY VERSUS MATRILINY

The question of the development of matrilineal as opposed to patrilineal societies is one which has never been satisfactorily answered in the anthropological literature. In his article "Patrilineal and Matrilineal Succession," Radcliffe-Brown asserts that social anthropology lacks sufficient "knowledge and understanding" to ask the question "what general factors determine the selection by some people of the matrilineal and by others of the patrilineal principle in determining status of succession" (Radcliffe-Brown 1968:48).

Anthropologists have generally assumed the social structure to be given and have thus been content merely to describe the relations among its parts. An example of this approach is found in *Matrilineal Kinship*, where Schneider points out that his co-authors "for the most part... have chosen to take matrilineal systems as given," and instead of asking the question "Why?" have analyzed the "where" and the "how" (e.g., in matrilineal societies the bond between brother and sister is strong while that between husband and wife is weak; children belong not to their father's but to their mother's kin group; children inherit from their mother's kin group and not from their father's group; the father has only limited authority over them) (Schneider and Gough 1961: 656).

It is only the materialists who have specifically addressed themselves to the question "Why?" (Harris 1968; Service 1962), and their position is, briefly, that matriliny and patriliny are simply ideological reflections of more objective conditions such as residence patterns. A society in which cooperation among men in production and military activities is more important than women's cooperation becomes virilocal and therefore patrilineal, since members of such groups tend to be patrilineally related. Conversely, in a society in which cooperation among women is more important, matrilocal residence and matriliny will follow. Local groups will consist of matrilineally related women (mothers and daughters) and attached men. Service, for example, concludes that matriliny will be found in a very specific socioeconomic situation: "One notes first that uxorilocal-matrilineal tribes are widely scattered in the primitive world—in parts of North and South America, Melanesia, South East Asia, and Africa—but also that they are found typically in one kind of socioeconomic situation: rainfall horticulture where the gardening is done by women (Service 1962:120).

The materialist approach might be said to supply us with one set of possible explanations for the existence of matrilineal-matrilocal societies, but societies such as the Kongo, with matrilineal descent and avunculocal residence, do not fit this model since the local segment of the matriline consists not of mothers and daughters but of mothers' brothers and sisters' sons, that is, a group of brothers in the oldest generation plus adult sisters' sons in the following generation. In Kongo, sisters remained members of their own descent group throughout life, but upon marriage they moved to their husband's village, where their children resided until the day they left their father to take up residence with their mother's brother (Ekholm 1972:85).

This situation clearly contradicts the materialist theory, and, as with Fox, for example, we find an attempt to circumvent the problem by labeling the phenomenon a transitional form between matriliny and patriliny (Fox 1967:111). In Schneider we find a similar tendency: matrilocality is primary and generates matrilineal descent groups, but the matrilines can survive "under a variety of conditions which would not suffice to create them. The *avunculocal* and duolocal systems, which exhibit the most tightly organized matrilineal descent groups, must exist under conditions quite unlike those which promote the origin of matrilineality" (Schneider and Gough 1961:661).

There is nothing, however, which would imply that Kongo originally practiced matrilocal residence. West Central Africa displays a remarkable degree of homogeneity in both technology and basic production patterns (Vansina 1966a) and just as striking a degree of heterogeneity in organizational forms. All these societies practiced swidden agriculture as well as hunting, gathering, and fishing where possible. All had similar organizations of production. Yet we find "kingdoms" with provinces, districts, and villages, as well as "stateless societies" where the village was the largest political unit. The former were located in the savanna and the latter in the tropical forest areas to the north. Within the area as a whole, we find matrilineal, patrilineal, and bilineal societies.

The matrilineal regions include the Lower Congo, Kwango, Kasai, and Lunda. The patrilineal forms are found among the Mongo and Fang to the north, and among the Songye and Luba on the savanna. Bolia in southwest Mongo is considered to be bilineal.

Within the matrilineal region we also find a great deal of variation. Richards, in her article on matriliny, notes that within the "matrilineal belt" the "remarkable degree of uniformity as to the principles governing descent and succession" cannot be extended to other domains: "The Central African people differ in a rather striking way as to their family structure, and in particular as to the various forms of domestic and local grouping based on the family" (Richards 1964:208).

Among the Kongo, the matrilines are localized according to avuncular residence. Since the turn of the century, however, sons have tended to remain with their fathers, at least until the latter's death. Among the Suku, just east of Kongo, two-generation localized patrilines emerged within the pre-existent matrilineal structure in the early 1900s (Kopytoff 1964). Teke, according to Vansina, shows evidence of bilateral tendencies in matrilines of up to four generations (Vansina 1966b:134). And among the Bushong of Kasai, the village, rather than the matriline, functions as land-holding unit and is the locus of economic cooperation and religious activity (Vansina 1964:66). Finally, Douglas, in her comparison of Bushong and Lele, has clearly shown how significant differences in production and social organization can be present within a single cultural, technological, and ecological context (Douglas 1963).

Patrilineal societies display a similar heterogeneity. In *Introduction à l'ethnographie du Congo*, Vansina describes four kinds of political organization within a single ethnic group, the Mongo: in the southwest there are kingdoms or chiefdoms headed by *mkumu-ekapo*; in the southeast we find a "structure politique [basée] sur une organisation de lignages segmentaires" in which the title of *nkumu* carries no more than a limited measure of prestige; in the northeast we find "ceremonies d'initiation *lilwa*" similar to more easterly groups; in the northwest we find neither *nkumu*, developed lineage structure, nor initiation ceremonies (Vansina 1966b:83).

Mongo is usually classified as patrilineal and patrilocal. We find, however, that the northwest exhibits some cognatic tendencies, that the southwest has well-developed bilineal descent, and that the Ntomba Najale (also southwest) are matrilineal (Vansina 1966b:85).

These societies, however, are never unequivocally matrilineal or patrilineal. Nor can they be simply classified as kingdoms or stateless societies. A gradual centralization and hierarchization occurred, developing up to a point at which the macro unit tended to break down. Some hierarchies (e.g., the Kongo kingdom) broke down soon after European contact (the middle of the seventeenth century) while others maintained themselves or even evolved until actual colonization. Some of these societies appear to have oscillated between matriliny and patriliny. Ethnographic sources indicate that the Pende of Kwango changed relatively recently from a patrilineal to a matrilineal organization and that the patrilineal Ngombe and Mongo had, at an earlier stage, been matrilineal (Colle 1923; Haveaux 1954; Van der Kerken 1944). This, however, can hardly be considered decisive evidence. What we do know with some certainty is that matrilineal societies during this century have tended to become patrilocal and have lost most of their matrilineal traits.

In West Central Africa, matriliny during the pre-colonial period seems to have been associated with a more highly developed political structure as well as greater economic productivity. Europeans, on first arrival, found only matrilineal kingdoms; patrilineal kingdoms belong to a later period. These kingdoms, as stated previously, were limited to the savanna region while stateless societies were to be found in the forest area to the north, an area which was predominantly patrilineal. Schneider has pointed out that matrilineal societies in Central Africa are restricted to the zone south of the tropical forest: "South of the tropical forest is a high-grass savannah zone with few cattle and a fair number of matrilineal peoples. South of this is a scrub or dry forest area mostly occupied by matrilineal peoples" (Schneider and Gough 1961: 667).

There is, then, a clear correlation between tropical forest, patrilineality, and stateless societies on the one hand, and between savanna dry forest, matrilineality, and kingdom on the other. In those areas where the savanna penetrates the tropical forest, we again find matriliny carved, as it were, out of the surrounding patrilineal woodland (Schneider and Gough 1961:668).

One interpretation might be that the savanna/dry forest area has afforded an especially favorable setting for both matriliny and the development of kingdoms. Both Vansina and Suret-Canal have adopted this kind of explanation with respect to the distribution of kingdoms: the savanna offers better possibilities of communication; cultural exchange is facilitated, and the social contradictions accompanying increased social intercourse are multiplied (Suret-Canale 1969:112; Vansina 1966a:10).

But we have still to deal with the relation between matrilineality and the formation of kingdoms. Contrary to conclusions based on data from other areas of the world, matriliny in Central Africa seems to be associated with a more-developed rather than a less-developed form of political organization (Murdock 1937; Schneider and Gough 1961:670). This political form seems to have had difficulty in penetrating the tropical forest zone, but, in some cases, judging from the available material, the greater intensity of agricultural production might be said to have caused deforestation and succession to grassland. Nicolai, for example, reports that the Lac Léopold II region, classified ecologically as dense equatorial forest, contains a large tract of unnatural savanna which has "une estension étonnante" (Nicolai 1972:351). This savanna is located in the unquestionably matrilineal Kasai region.

SYSTEMS BASED ON THE EXCHANGE OF PRESTIGE GOODS

Material from West Central Africa suggests, as Leach has maintained, that matriliny and patriliny are by no means the significant categories they have been made out to be (Leach 1961). In the remainder of this chapter, we shall attempt to show the following:

1. Different organizational forms are but variations of a single underlying system. This is in direct opposition to the approach adopted by Terray (1969). The latter seeks an explanation for the "multiplicity of social and political relationships" encountered among "primitive societies," but rather than adopt a structural approach in which different organizational forms are seen as variations of a single underlying structure, he attributes to each individual society a specific combination of two or more "modes of production." He attempts to account for the existence of a specific social phenomenon in terms of the mere co-presence of another social or technological phenomenon. By restricting himself to the specifically empirical level, he places himself in the same situation as the functionalists, for whom there is no possibility of dealing with interstructural relations which are not visible phenomena.
2. The internal rationality of the system is not defined primarily by food production but by the production of prestige articles. Sahlins in his "The Domestic Mode of Production" has demonstrated how little technology and the organization of production can tell us about the "superstructure" in primitive society (Sahlins 1972). In Central Africa, power relationships are established, consolidated, and maintained through the control of prestige articles—products which are not necessary for material subsistence but which are absolutely indispensable for the maintenance of social relations. An individual needs prestige articles at a number of critical occasions during his life—at puberty rites, for bride price, as payment for religious or medical services, to pay fines, etc. (Ekholm 1972: 111).
3. Kongo's localized matrilines, consisting of mother's brothers and sister's sons, can only be properly understood as the result of the operation of a larger system.

Within anthropology, Kongo-type societies have been regarded as matrilineal on the grounds that the macro unit consisted of so many identical matrilineal descent groups. The macro unit is assumed to have the same structure as each of its constituent parts. Opposed to this view, students of alliance theory have stressed the relations between subunits—"the norms of social relations and the rules governing the constitution of social groups and their interrelations" (Schneider 1965:26). Here we must emphasize the importance of *starting* with the macro unit as such (consisting of both specific subunits and a structure which unites them) and with the internal dynamics of the system as a whole.

There are two structural elements common to virtually all West Central African societies: the kinship organized subunits and the political network which binds them together. The lineage is necessarily a mere constituent part of the larger unit, which is in fact neither patrilineal nor matrilineal.

Meillassoux has drawn attention to the importance of prestige goods for the elaboration of power relations within kin groups (Meillassoux 1960). The control of such articles, which, among other things, are used for the payment of bride price, enables the elders to establish and maintain a measure of dominance over the younger members of society. Meillassoux's model locates the principal contradiction *within* the subunit, between elder and younger. The relation *between* kin groups is described as one of alliance and cooperation between elders. We shall, on the contrary, suggest the existence of *two* types of contradiction: those *within* the subunit and those *between* different subunits.

The very nature of prestige articles in Central Africa implies a nonegalitarian relation between local groups. The possibility of accumulation is built into the system, and should one local group have at its disposal more prestige articles than its neighbors, it has the possibility of assimilating individuals from the economically weaker groups, facilitating its own expansion at the latter's expense. Prestige goods are converted into (a) wives and (b) slaves, and their increase amounts to an increase in the number of producers (of both food and prestige goods) as well as the number of warriors. Economic and military superiority, thus, tends to reproduce itself on an expanded scale.

In this type of society there is a contradiction between local and regional levels. The localized segment of the matrilineage, which is but part of a larger unit, has, in fact, no independent structural existence. Despite this, however, it tends to behave as an independent political unit in conflict and competition with other apparently identical groups. Thus, the successful expansion of one such unit can, as we shall see, undermine the very structural conditions for its own continued growth.

The characteristic of systems in which the accumulation of prestige articles plays a dominant role[1] is that women tend to move up the lineage hierarchy, wife-takers ranking higher than wife-givers. Those groups which control the sources, production, and distribution of prestige goods have a dominant position, and the flow of these goods away from the sources of control is by far the most important mechanism of intergroup ranking. Women and slaves flow in the opposite direction:

> The superordinate chief did not keep his prestige articles; he redistributed them. But it is not simply a question of circulating prestige articles; within this process we find the important element of *converting "money" into human beings*. The rich transferred prestige articles to subordinate groups in exchange for wives, i.e. they paid bride price, or for "slaves." There was political gain here, the higher chief always having the possibility of attracting more individuals from other groups than could a chief at the bottom of the hierarchy. (Ekholm 1972:136)

The relation between super- and subordinate groups is expressed as one between "men" and "women." In one of the Kongo origin myths we are told that Wene (the founder) came with his "men," conquered the indigenous population, and married its "women." In fact, most of the ideology of Central African societies is marked by a dualism in which it is imagined that the population consists of two groups, the conquerors and vanquished original inhabitants. The conquerors are "men" and their subjects "women" (Dolisie 1927; Rombauts 1945; Van Avermaet 1954:168). The women of (the highest) wife-taking groups also had the status of "men." They were allowed to choose their own husbands who, while not paying any bride price, were not permitted to take additional wives (Van Wing 1959; Cuvelier 1953; Pechuel-Loesche 1954). Among the Yanz (*kasai*), according to Malembe (1967), there were two categories of clans: *engom*, aristocratic and "masculine," and *nsaan*, subordinate (commoner) and "feminine":

> Seuls les Engom revendiquent l'attribut de virilité. Ce principe de virilité est non seulement l'apanage des hommes engom, mais même les femmes s'en réclament. C'est pourquoi les vraies cheffesses yansi choisissent elles-mêmes leur propre mari. Celui-ci doit rejoindre son épouse cheffable à Mbé et rester monogame.[2] (Malembe 1967:226)

Apart from this, there is also evidence of a transfer of women from higher to lower groups, but this concerns only chiefs and their principal wives (Doutreloux 1967:144, 192). In several publications de Sousberghe (1966, 1967, 1968, 1969) has shown that besides matrilateral cross-cousin marriage, that is, the asymmetrical flow of women from lower to higher groups, there is also patrilateral and bilateral cross-cousin marriage among the matrilineal societies of Central Africa. According to that author, the Kongo practice patrilateral cross-cousin marriage, an assertion which is born out in a number of proverbs as well as by the testimony of informants who claimed to be under pressure to marry into their father's lineage (de Sousberghe 1968:86). There is also evidence, however, of prescriptive matrilateral marriage (a fixed, asymmetrical relation between *tata* and *muana* groups): "Le marriage avec la fille du *Ngwa Kazi* [= MB] pourrait théoriquement conduire à une politique dite des échanges généralisées. Cette politique maintiendrait les groupes alliés dans une relation continue de *Tata* à *Mwana*, de père à fils" (Doutreloux 1967:143).[3]

As long as these groups remain ranked with respect to one another, it does not appear likely that a *muana* group can become wife-taker to its *tata*[4] (as this would imply a reversal of political rank). The reports of patrilateral cross-cousin marriage (presumably) date from a later period of Kongo's history when intergroup hierarchy had broken down and where, consequently, it was possible for groups to be simultaneously *tata* and *muana* with respect to one another. Where hierarchy was maintained, however, marriage was matrilateral[5]—subordinate groups gave wives to superordinate groups, and the two thereby redefined themselves respectively as *muana* and *tata*. Children belonged to their mother's lineage and were thus *muana* (= son). At a given age they moved to their mother's brother, wife-givers to their father, who was a member of their *tata* group (*tata* = father) (Ekholm 1972:63).

PATRILINEAL SOCIETIES: MONGO, FANG, SONGYE

In a system dominated by the production, exchange, and accumulation of prestige goods, patriliny would seem to be a most natural principle of descent. With patrilocal residence and patrilineality, prestige articles can be used to maximize the number of wives and therefore the number of producers and warriors. Reports from the earliest European contact with West Central Africa, however, contain no mention of patrilineal societies. All those kingdoms which Europeans first encountered were matrilineal. However, reports from the later part of the nineteenth century do reveal the existence of patrilineal societies which fall into two distinct ecological zones: (a) the tropical rain forest, and (b) the savanna to its south.

Organizational differences between the zones are immediately evident. Within the forest zone, the political units are small. Mongo patrilines, for example, undergo continual fissioning, new autonomous local groups constantly emerge, and relations between them are markedly weak: "Political fragmentation seems to be a rule" (Merriam 1959:376).

> Le besoin en terrains de culture et de chasse provoque l'éparpillement sur le territoire. Il s'ensuit le relâchement des rapports et la diminution de leur fréquence. L'arbre généalogique s'allongeant, on se sent de moins en moins apparenté.... Chacun des segments devient un groupe autonome avec sa propre autorité et son propre chef politique.... Cette segmentation progressive et continuelle qui forme toujours de nouvelles unités politiques, est une des principales caractéristiques de la société mongo.[6] (Hulstaert 1961:37)

This is also the case for the Fang during the twentieth century, for whom the village is a closed entity and where relations between villages were characterized by continual feuding (Tessman 1913:211). We find no trace of the complex alliance networks encountered in matrilineal societies (Balandier 1963:102, 139). The dynamic of the patrilineal system consists in the expansion and consolidation of the local group at the expense of the wider alliance network. Within a limited area, economically stronger local groups tend to assimilate their neighbors in such a way that a single large exogamous unit emerges. In the absence of increasing sources of prestige articles and possibilities of continued expansion, the resultant patrilineal unit is doomed to eventual stagnation and fragmentation, lacking the very means of its own reproduction as an exogamous group.

Mongo shows traces of a more elaborate alliance system, and Hulstaert goes so far as to assert the existence of "indices pour une organisation ancienne plus centralisée.... " (Hulstaert 1961). This assertion should be considered in light of reports that Mongo was matrilineal at some earlier stage. External stimulus in the form of trade serves to reinforce the centripetal tendencies which find their most extreme expression among the Songye during the era of the slave trade.

Vansina writes of the "particular pattern of Songye settlements in the nineteenth century: Most Songye 'tribes' occupied but one city. Exact figures are unknown but every town must have comprised thousands of inhabitants. City organization and overall political organization were practically synonymous" (Vansina 1966b:29).

Songye has "une densité extraordinaire" (*Congo Illustré* 1893:90), and we find reports of villages of up to 10,000 with streets of up to a kilometer in length (Van Overbergh 1908:196). Europeans were also impressed by their productiveness. Their fields are described as extensive and elaborately cultivated and the inhabitants as capable and industrious (Van Overbergh 1908:211ff.).

Here the patrilineal form appears to have been quite successful. Through contact with slave traders, foreign prestige goods were pumped in via the central power, resulting in the assimilation of individuals from peripheral areas and the establishment of dense population concentrations. By purchasing slaves from other populations (e.g., Tetela), Songye was able to obtain European goods without selling its own population. The patrilineal organization was also particularly well adapted to the conditions of slave trade since it tended to maximize military strength. Songye was essentially a creation of the slave trade. When the latter ceased, the political unit collapsed, and by the 1940s fragmentation had gone so far that each family claimed to head its own domain (Malengreau 1947).

MATRILINEAL SOCIETIES: KONGO

Let us now consider the functioning of a matrilineal system. Matrilineal societies with avunculocal residence seem at first to be a paradox since the accumulative mechanisms of the system are immediately neutralized. It is no longer possible to increase the number of one's dependents by increasing the number of one's wives. Children, rather than belonging to their father, are transferred to their mother's brother.

The system would also appear to be paradoxical from another point of view. From the perspective of the localized matriline it might seem remarkable that one group can literally give away its younger generation to another. Matrilineality, however, is but a secondary phenomenon. The patriline in Kongo-type societies is not localized but dispersed in such a way that each generation's sons in *A* move, at a certain age, to *B* (see figure 8.1).

Women are transferred from lower to higher groups, but their sons do not remain with their fathers. They are instead sent off, and as a consequence, male members of any one local group are related as MB and ZS.

This combination of matri- and patrilineality implies a corresponding duality in the ideological and political structures. Each group is at once a matriline



Figure 8.1. The movement of women and men in a hierarchical prestige-good system

and a subunit in a larger patrilineal structure, and all societies in West Central Africa recognize both matrilineal and patrilineal elements. In his work on the Vili, Pechuel-Loesche distinguished "die Familie, die Mutterreihe" and "die Stammbaumlinie, die Ahnenkette oder Vaterreihe" (Pecheul-Loesche 1954:467). This dualism is expressed ideologically as the combination of two ethnic strata, an original matrilineal population and a younger patrilineal conquering group (Randles 1968:37). It is said, for example, that the Bolia conquered an older matrilineal population and introduced patriliny (Phillippe 1954:51). The Mongo are also said to have found an indigenous population upon arrival in their present locality. After marrying, their children became patrilineally related to the immigrants and matrilineally related to the conquered group (Van der Kerken 1944; Vansina 1966a:164).

Matrilineality is, in effect, a way of counteracting the centripetal tendencies of the political economy. As we have seen for Songye, patriliny in the presence of external stimuli leads to dense population concentrations, and this is hardly compatible with the local technology of production. With swidden agriculture and long fallow periods, increasing population density leads to a decrease in available fertile land, overintensification, and finally soil degradation. We note here that wild game is extremely scarce in the patrilineal Songye area and that intensive techniques of cultivation such as the use of fertilizers are unique to this group (Vansina 1966a:164).

In myths concerning the rise of the Kongo Kingdom, we are told how the king one day ordered his sons to leave the capital and to occupy new land. The capital area had become overpopulated, and land for cultivation was scarce. The sons migrated in different directions: Mbamba to the southwest to found the province bearing his name, and Mpangu and his followers to the northeast, where he settled in Mbanza Mpangu and founded the province of Mpangu (Van Wing 1959:48--49).

This myth depicts the migration as a historical event, but, in fact, the same migration is repeated in each generation. Sons leave *tata* in order to occupy their own land. The myth, thus, expresses the relationship between *tata* and *muana*, and the kingdom as a whole is described as the result of demographic expansion from the center.

More important than the regulation of demographic inequalities is the political gain to be had from the extensive alliance network which emerges in the developing matrilineal structure. This has been clearly pointed out by Mary Douglas (1963, 1964, 1969) in her work on African matriliny. She writes:

> Matriliny is a form of kinship organization which creates in itself crosscutting ties of a particularly effective kind. This is not to suggest that societies with patrilineal systems do not have such ties: they can produce them by means of cult or other

> associations but matrilineal descent produces them by itself. This is in its nature. If there is any advantage in a descent system which overrides exclusive, local loyalties, matriliny has it (Douglas 1969:128).

Matriliny with avunculocal residence does not lead to the assimilation of economically weaker groups by stronger ones, but to the establishment of an alliance between the two. It is in the relations *between* local groups that the dynamic of matrilineal systems is expressed. *A* cannot grow numerically at *B*'s expense, but both can win in the larger political arena and can expand at the expense of a third party. Alliance is a means to external assimilation. This is an important point: *matriliny, with its elaborate alliance network and with its relatively autonomous local groups, is an expansionist form of organization that continually demands external areas from which to attract producers.* As long as the system continues to expand, the centripetal tendencies are directed against exterior groups. When, for one reason or another, boundaries or limits are reached, when expansion is blocked, forces are again directed inward and matriliny is weakened. This can be seen for the whole of West Central Africa. The tendency is most apparent for bilineal societies such as Bolia, but it is in evidence even in societies which are usually characterized as matrilineal. We shall return to this issue shortly.

Where the possibility of external assimilation does not exist we might expect to find a more or less even distribution of population. This, however, is not the case. The average village in the Kongo kingdom was small, but Mbanza Kongo and the province capitals supported a considerable population (Cuvelier 1953:24; Cuvelier and Jadin 1954:120–21). According to Pigafetta (1591), Mbanza Kongo, at the end of the sixteenth century, had a population of 100,000—a figure which appears to be greatly exaggerated. However, after considering other estimates, Randles settles for 20,000 to 30,000 at the beginning of the sixteenth century, which seems far more realistic (Randles 1972:892). In any event, this is a surprisingly high figure. Within these villages or towns there was a large number of slaves who were occupied in agricultural and other types of work, for example, water transport (Cuvelier 1953:135). These slaves were acquired largely through the channels of external trade. The royal guard, for example, was composed of slaves imported from Teke and other neighboring kingdoms (Balandier 1965:190; Pigafetta 1591).

The Kongo kingdom as a whole had a remarkably high population density. As Stevenson has pointed out, Kongo, with an area of 60,000 square miles and an estimated population of 2.5 million, averaged forty persons per square mile during the seventeenth century (Stevenson 1968:182). This high demographic density can with some certainty be seen as the result of the inflow of people from external areas. The Lower Congo area, in the early twentieth century, still had a relatively high density compared with other areas (Gourou 1955). The Mbe plateau, on the other hand, had, in the middle of this century, a density of only one person per 2 square kilometers (Sautter 1960:5). In earlier decades this was the home of the Teke (Tio) kingdom, one which we find mentioned in the oldest historical sources as a slave exporter to the Kongo. (Slaves from Teke could be identified by their characteristic tattoo.) The Ba-Teke were doubtless one of the more exploited partners in the regional competition between political units, and the depopulation it experienced can with some certainty be explained, as Sautter suggests, by the fact that Teke's chiefs had to sell their own population in order to maintain their position in the competition for prestige (Sautter 1960:39, 69).

This is in accordance with Stevenson's observation that "successful centers in the trade . . . tended to build up localized nodes of density," while less-favored areas were instead "systematically raided and depopulated" (Stevenson 1968:183).

MARRIAGE EXCHANGE, EXTERNAL TRADE, AND HIERARCHIZATION IN THE KONGO

With the basic properties of Kongo-type structures in mind, we can now examine the way the system might react in varying political situations. But first we must consider this structure and its expansive need in more detail.

We have said that wife-takers are ranked higher than wife-givers and that this ought logically to coincide with matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. This accords with Mertens's observations (see figure 8.2).

Anna Mafuta and Philippe Bebi may marry because the former is the MBD of the latter, and thus "la *kitata* de la fiancée et la *kanda* du garçon"[7] belong to



Figure 8.2. Matrilateral cross-cousin marriage as product of the political order

the same "clan" (Mertens 1942:192). We can envisage this arrangement as a transfer of women from *muana* to *tata*. But since the women remain with their fathers and the men move to them, it is in reality a question of the transfer of men from *tata* to *muana*, from super- to subordinate groups. Marriage between FF and SD which the early sources claim as an "anomalie choquante" again implies a simple transfer of women from lower to higher groups. SD belongs to *muana*'s own *muana* and with matrilateral cross-cousin marriage she should, in principle, marry a man from her *tata* group. There was a tendency, however, for highest-ranked groups to take its *muana*'s potential wives as well, that is, by taking wives from its wife-givers' wife-givers.

The lineage at the very top of the hierarchy can only be a wife-taker for there is no higher group to whom it can give women. In consequence this group retains its own women. Among the Suku these women were married with slaves "in order that they might remain in the capital" (Kopytoff 1965:459). In Loango they had very high status and, as stated previously, had the right to choose their own husbands. Aristocratic status implied that one's mother was "eine Fürstin, durch die allein sich Blut, Rang und Besitz vererben" (Pescheul-Loesche 1954:187). Royal succession in Loango was strictly matrilineal, unlike Kongo, where sons as well could succeed to political office:

> Le roy doit estre pris parmi les princes du royaume. Cette qualité de prince est attaché à une famille seule, et ne se communique à la postérité que par les femmes, de sorte que pour estre prince, ou princesse, il faut estre né d'une princesse. Les enfants du roy et des princes, ne conservent pas cette qualité à moins que leur mère soit elle mesme princesse.[8] (Cuvelier 1953:49)

Each unit in figure 8.3 consists of two groups, a subordinate "feminine" group and a superordinate "masculine" group. The dualistic ideology thus has a real foundation.

Those groups which are farthest from the center must, in order to survive, secure wife-givers of their own, that is, they must subordinate new groups in which they can place their sons. There is necessarily a losing party at the bottom of the hierarchy, and when it is no longer possible for the lowest-ranked *muana* to acquire still lower *muana*, they must lose their autonomy. The system, then, has no equilibrium state—there is either expansion or implosion.

In an earlier work I discussed the relation between tribute, redistribution, and the central power's monopoly over external trade (Ekholm 1972). Tribute is paid, usually once a year, to *tata*. Flowing in the opposite direction is a redistribution of equivalent but different products. There is not, then, a unilateral transfer from sub- to superordinate groups, but rather exchange of products between different levels (Ekholm 1972:22ff., 129). As we can see (figure 8.4),



Figure 8.3. The kinship structure of the prestige-good system: local matriliny and a political patriline

in order for the system to function, *A* must have an external exchange relation with *X*.

The relations to superiors and to inferiors are not symmetrical. There is but one group *A* above *B*, while under *A* there are several groups (six provinces in the case of Kongo). At each level, excepting the highest and lowest, the situation is identical: one group above and several below (figure 8.5).

This implies that if *B*, for example, has three subordinate groups, it must distribute three times as much as each individual *C*. Hence *A* ought to produce three times as much as *B*, *B* three times as much as each *C*, and so on. It is not likely that *A* could simply return its vassals' prestige articles as this would undermine its position as *tata.* The relation would then be the same as that between *A* and *X*—external trade instead of tribute redistribution. The



Figure 8.4. External exchange and political hierarchy



Figure 8.5. The asymmetrical structure of segmentation

highest-ranked groups must produce more than their subordinates, and herein lies the importance of control of natural deposits as sources of prestige goods. The centers of power in Central Africa are located in the vicinity of natural sources of prestige items, copper, salt, and *zimbu* (shells). But these kingdoms expanded relatively rapidly and crystallized into far more hierarchical polities than warranted by the actual level of surplus production. Even if the central power in Kongo could produce more than the provincial centers (the source material describes them as being about equal in output), the difference cannot have been as great as six to one, and it is here that external trade becomes instrumental. Through its exchange relations with X, A can change internal products for foreign products and can thus appear to be economically stronger than it is in reality, that is, in the production sphere. Kongo-type structures cannot exist in a closed space. An exterior world is a necessary prerequisite for several reasons:

1. Matrilineal relations and the development of alliance networks can be established only in the context of an ever-present exterior.
2. The character of wife exchange implies the possibility of expansion. If new links cannot be added, they are subtracted. If the last link does not succeed in securing its own *muana*, it cannot exist as an autonomous group and is assimilated by its *tata*. The *tata* group itself is thereby put in a precarious position, having lost the group on which it depends for its own autonomy.
3. The kingdom's social hierarchy is only in part based on real surplus and is to a large extent the result of the conversion possibilities of external trade.

CHANGES OF THE SYSTEM

We can now consider what happens to this structure when different forms of external influence and different political situations are encountered.

What would happen if, suddenly, a foreign agent *Y* began pumping in prestige articles via *A* (figure 8.6)?

We might expect here that the external relation between the equals *A* and *X* would be transformed into an internal *tata-muana* relationship. *A*, thanks to its acquisition of foreign prestige articles, becomes economically strengthened, and *X* would then be influenced to redirect its entire activity toward *A*.

This is what happened during the first stage of European-Kongolese contact. At the beginning, at least, almost all European goods were channeled through the central authority in Mbanza Kongo, and the result was a considerably expanded Kongo. Upon first European contact, Kongo consisted of six provinces—Mpemba, Mbamba, Mbata, Nsundi, Mpangu, and Soyo. In a letter to Lisbon, 1535, Afonso I, the reigning king of Kongo, introduced himself in the following manner: "Dom Affonso pella graca de Deus Rey de Comgue, Jbugu et Cacomgo, Emgoyo, daque et dale nazary, Senhor dos Ambudos e Amgolla, da Quisyma e Musur, de Matamba, e Muylly, e de Musucu, e dos Amzicos" (Brasio 1953:38).

He presented himself not only as the king of Kongo, but as Deus Rey of Bungu, Kakongo, and Ngoy as well, and Senhor of a number of neighboring kingdoms to the northeast, east, and south. As early as the end of the sixteenth century, however, his influence had already diminished. According to Pigafetta, the king of Loango was "traditionellement soumis au roi du Congo," but had become more independent with time and finally declared himself "son ami et non plus son vassal" (Bal 1963:23).[9] By 1607 both Kakongo and Ngoy are independent kingdoms, too (Brasio 1953:241ff.).



Figure 8.6. The introduction of new sources of prestige goods

If the king's monopoly over external trade is bypassed and his vassals are able to acquire European prestige articles through other channels, which is what happened after the initial phase of contact, the established hierarchy breaks down. As the prestige articles are transmitted to the local groups from outside and not via the hierarchy, the basis for this hierarchy disappears. We get secessions from the macro unit as the local groups begin competing and fighting with one another. The kingdom of Kongo collapsed in the middle of the 1600s, and thereafter we observe a continuous disintegration, where the political units "kept dividing and subdividing" until the end of the 1700s, when the largest unit was a *mbanza* of only a few hundred huts and a number of even smaller villages of about fifty huts (Vansina 1966a:190).

Alliances broke down and the military strength of the local groups became the most important factor. As we have seen, the dynamics of the local groups are associated with patriliny, and Kongo gives up much of its matrilineal character in this new situation. As the slave trade introduces serious conflicts between the local groups (European prestige articles were acquired in exchange for slaves, and every neighbor therefore became a potential object of slave raids and a serious threat to one's own security), they have to be strengthened militarily. During this period the chiefs do everything in their power to retain their own sons and acquire as many slaves as possible. Female slaves make patrilineal descent possible; they are stripped of their lineage membership and give birth to children who belong to their father, not to their mother's brother. These new political units are organized primarily for slave production. As Kongo increased its slave export, domestic slavery increased. Slaves were used in food production, but their most important function was as soldiers or "slave producers." "Wealthy persons were unable to invest their assets in anything but slaves," writes Laman (Laman 1953:151). And since the increase in the number of domestic slaves in turn resulted in an increase in slave production for export, each reinforcement of a local group resulted in a weakening of the area as a whole. The more successful the local chief, the greater the destruction and devastation.

Finally, a parallel process, which takes place simultaneously and which makes up but an aspect of the collapse, is that when the possibility of external assimilation no longer exists, the centrifugal tendency overcomes the centripetal tendency and economically stronger groups absorb and incorporate individuals from weaker groups.

We can clearly see this process in the descriptions of Bolia in the early twentieth-century literature. Bolia is designated as bilineal—descent is reckoned in both father's and mother's lines, and local kin groups contain individuals from both. There are two types of marriage arrangements: *esenga*, in which the children remain in the mother's "clan," and *isongi*, in which they become members of the father's "clan" (Van Everbroeck 1961:128). The presence of these two principles for descent has been interpreted as the result of the combination of two different ethnic groups, one matrilineal, the other patrilineal (Phillipe 1954:51ff.; Van Everbroeck 1961:135). What it actually entails is a process in which economically strong local groups, having a matrilineal organization, attempt to assimilate weaker groups. *Esenga* is the usual form of marriage; bride price is insignificant, and the children become members of the mother's descent group. But there is also the possibility of paying a high bride price and obtaining the right to one's own children. This is how *isongi* functions. Weaker groups, who have fallen into debt, can be given a woman in *isongi* marriage as payment (Van Everbroeck 1961:128).

Bolia uses the two kinds of marriages in order to maximize the size of the local group. One's own women can be married to slaves so that the marriage is *esenga* and the children belong to the mother's kin group. Men can marry female slaves so that the marriage will be *isongi* (Van Everbroeck 1961:135). Alliances are sacrificed in favor of local group expansion. We find the same situation in the Lower Congo at the beginning of this century. Laisne writes about "endogamous" versus "exogamous" marriage. The former gives "au groupe son accroissement numerique" while the other creates "alliances" (Laisne 1937:159ff.). As with Bolia, matrilines in debt were forced to pay with their own members, and in some cases, when prestige articles were lacking, tribute was taken in the form of slaves (Bentley 1900:43). The poorer groups, who could pay neither debts, fines, nor tribute, simply lost their members. Mothers' brothers gave away their sisters' sons (Bastian 1874:181; Dennett 1906:41; Laman 1957:43).

The Bolia had no possibility of expansion in the twentieth century. There were large villages, *bompenjele* or *botanda*, and small villages, *esselo*—the larger villages prospering and expanding at the expense of the smaller ones (Van Everbroeck 1961:133). Prestige articles were used to attract women in *isongi* marriages and put weaker groups in debt. The matrilineal organization presupposes external areas which can function as suppliers of producers. When those external areas are lost, the society combines matrilineality with patrilineality.

CONCLUSION

The reason that functionalists like Radcliffe-Brown and neo-evolutionists like Service failed to come to any satisfactory understanding of matrilineality and patrilineality is that they focused only on the descent group in itself. The answer to why mother's brother and sister's son live together cannot be found within the matrilineage, nor in the organization of production. The problem can be approached only from the point of view of the global structure. The lineage has no structural autonomy; it is but a subgroup of the society, the structure of which can never be reduced to the structure of its component parts. The relations between the different lineages are not just "alliances." They belong to the fundamental structure of the larger society—and the shape and form of the lineage can only be understood within that wider framework.

The Kongo kingdom with its hierarchies of matrilineages is basically a patrilineal society. The matrilineages are a secondary phenomenon, continuously reproduced by the process which separates the sons from their fathers. In the same way, the matrilateral cross-cousin marriage can be seen as the outcome of keeping daughters and giving away sons. The dividing of the matrilineage in two halves with the sisters in the superordinate and the brothers in the subordinate group will give the latter the position as wife-givers even if no women are transferred. When the perspective is shifted from the local level to that of the larger society, an entirely new set of questions emerges. What has to be explained is no longer the matrilineage but the society as a whole. As has been shown, all the different societies in West Central Africa can be seen as variations of a system where human beings are exchanged for prestige articles and where economic and political success depends on accumulation of wives and slaves. To account for a society, we must distinguish between its *mechanisms of functioning* and its *social form*, as the same mechanisms may manifest themselves in a number of different apparent forms due to the economic and political environment in which they operate.

Our final goal, however, is to analyze those deeper mechanisms, for in order to account for the distribution of societies in time and space, we must ultimately explain the "mechanical saw" whose camshaft generates that distribution (Lévi-Strauss 1976:79).

NOTES

Reprinted from *The Evolution of Social Systems*, edited by J. Friedman and M. J. Rowlands, Duckworth, 1978, 115–36.

1. Before European contact, prestige goods consisted mainly of shells, metals, cloth, salt, and ivory.

2. "Only the Engom claim to possess the attribute of virility. The latter is not only characteristic for men but also for the women. This explains why female chiefs among the Yansi can choose their own husbands themselves. The latter must join their chiefly wives and remain monogamous."

3. "Marriage to the daughter of Ngwa Kazi could theoretically lead to a policy of generalized exchange. Such a policy would maintain allied groups in a permanent relation of *Tata* to *Mwana*, father to son."

4. Cf. Leach (1954), on *mayu/dama.*

5. "In the majority of cases the husband lives in his village and the wives stay in their native villages" (Laman 1957). Here "his village" is the village of his mother's brothers and her "native village" is the village of her father, that is, his mother's brother.

6. "The need for agricultural land and hunting territory provokes the dispersal of groups within the larger area. This leads to a weakening of social relations and a reduction in their frequency. Genealogies are stretched and there is less of a feeling of kinship between groups. Each segment becomes an autonomous group with its own authority and political chief. This continual and progressive segmentation, which leads to the formation of new political units, is a principal characteristic of Mongo society."

7. *Kitata* is the patrilineal and *kanda*, the matrilineal group.

8. "The king must be chosen from among the princes of the realm. The princely quality belongs to only one family, and is communicated to posterity only through women, so that in order to be a prince one must be born of a princess. Children of the king and princes only maintain their status if their mothers are also of princely blood."

9. Pigafetta bases his evidence on information collected by Duare Lopez from the last half of the sixteenth century.

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9

"Sad Stories of the Death of Kings"

The Involution of Divine Kingship

Kajsa Ekholm Friedman

The work of the late Pierre Clastres has once more made primitive society a burning issue in anthropology. Are there or were there mechanisms that could prohibit the emergence of the state? Do such societies embody a wisdom with regard to their conditions of existence that we have long since lost in civilization? For Clastres the state represents the one crucial breakthrough and turning point in social development. Before the state there was power but no force, and society was absolutely democratic and egalitarian. Making use of his South American ethnography, he tries to demonstrate that a primitive chief is in essence an anti-chief completely imprisoned by the demands and obligations of his position. He is thus a mere tool of his people, their slave rather than their master.

The power of Clastres's argument was very much amplified in a situation where the notions of development and evolution began to be questioned, and where the model of the Soviet Union—of socialist state society—came to represent the absolute development of state oppression rather than the end of class exploitation. The demystification of the process of "real socialist" development implied that the state and power rather than economic classes were the essential problems for the human species. From an anthropological standpoint, however, Clastres's model is seriously misleading. The societies upon which it is based are in no sense primitive relics, but the result of several hundred years of marginalization, depopulation, and oppression. It is today fairly certain that lowland South American Indian societies were at one time very much more hierarchical and densely populated than they are today, after four hundred years of colonial control (Clastres has himself suggested this in 1974; see also Lathrap 1968). It is more probable that Clastres's anti-chiefs are a devolutionary phenomenon generated by the collapse of former political structures in the wake of the disarticulation of the regional exchange systems and the integration of autonomous territories into colonial and postcolonial states.

Anthropology is clearly in need of a global and historical perspective in the interpretation of its ethnographic material. It is within the framework of a global system that we can distinguish and analyze expansive as well as contractive processes. For the tribal systems of South America, Africa, and other parts of the Third World, integration within the larger system has entailed a long-term disintegration often referred to as underdevelopment. This general trend has not, of course, prevented the occurrence of temporary local expansions. Our particular focus here is in the structural and cultural transformations that accompany the articulation of local and global systems. This area of research ought to be of special interest for our own sector of the world, which is at present undergoing a deep structural crisis that has up to now been understood only in strictly economic terms.

SACRED KINGSHIP IN AFRICA

The phenomenon discussed by Clastres is in many ways similar to African sacred (or divine) kingship, especially as it appears in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In this period, the African king is similarly an anti-chief, divested of all real power and immobilized by a plethora of taboos. Among the most spectacular aspects of kingship is ritual regicide whereby the king is put to death after a definite term of rule, usually between four and seven years, or if he shows any sign of weakness or sickness. Randles, just as Clastres, interprets this as "une précieuse garantie contre le despotisme" and even asserts that it is surely the most democratic institution in all of Africa's history (Randles 1968:39).

Anthropologists have always been fascinated by the phenomenon of sacred kingship. At the end of the last century, Frazer began his magnum opus *The Golden Bough* (1928) with the story of the priest king in Diana's sacred grove in Nemi, who wandered aimlessly in anguish from tree to tree in dread of his murderer. The first systematic study of the phenomenon in Africa comes from the culture historians (Frobenius 1921, 1929; Baumann 1940; Lagercrantz 1944, 1950), who were primarily concerned with the origins of the institution. They argued that it was part of the "Late Sudanese Culture" (Lagercrantz 1944:130) and that it originally was "a Near Eastern element" that gained a foothold in Africa via Ethiopia (Lagercrantz 1950:347). This argument contradicted the older interpretation of the institution as a "Hamitic" element (Seligman 1913; Irstam 1944).

The value (if any) of this approach lies in the broad geographical perspective as well as the very extensive control of the literature. In Lagercrantz's work four elements are seen as crucial for defining the divine kingship complex: ritual regicide, the king's seclusion, the prohibition against the king's seeing the sea, and royal incest (Lagercrantz 1950).

Evans-Pritchard (1948) is responsible for the structural-functionalist contribution to the discussion. In his renowned work on the Shilluk he described divine kingship as an institution typical of lineage-organized societies "in which the political segments are part of a loosely organized structure without governmental functions." He questioned the very existence of regicide and suggested that it was nothing more than the expression of "dynastic rivalries" in a situation where the kingship had become identified with one segment, which necessarily led to its competition with the others (37–78).

More recently there has been a new surge of interest, this time from structuralists and symbolists (de Heusch 1962, 1981; Adler 1978; Muller 1975, 1980). The new discussion has been very much part of a new interest in the nature of power and the state (see, e. g., Sahlins 1981). The symbolist approach is entirely ahistorical and is primarily concerned with explaining divine kingship in terms of its internal symbolic structure. De Heusch, Adler, and Muller all speak of Frazer in the most complimentary terms and are similarly opposed to Evans-Pritchard. His attempt to understand the specific form of sacred kingship in terms of political relations is criticized as an attempt to reduce it "aux intrigues concrètes du social" (Muller 1975:163) and to assume a "primat à la base morphologique" (Adler 1978:29). Divine kingship exists in both centralized as well as decentralized societies, and it would, therefore, appear to follow logically that the institution cannot be said to be a necessary aspect of a particular type of social structure (Young 1966). According to de Heusch, who expresses only praise for Muller's work, the latter has definitively demonstrated "la vacuité des thèses" proposed by functionalists and Marxists alike (1981:790), who erroneously attempt to understand symbolic structures in terms of social organization.

According to the symbolists, divine kingship is an autonomous symbolic structure that can only be understood in term of its own internal logic. They refer to it as a "structure politico-symbolique complexe dont tous les traits sont interdépendants" (de Heusch 1981:69). Young's (1966) article on the Jukun is a major inspiration here. Young dismisses Evans-Pritchard's view of ritual regicide and claims that not only is the regicide most surely a real phenomenon, but it is also an essential element of the internal logic of kingship.

De Heusch is perhaps the anthropologist who is closest to Frazer, even maintaining an evolutionary perspective. Divine kingship is seen to represent the ultimate break with kingship-based society. Its internal symbolic structure contains the logical conditions for the emergence of the state—a symbolic organization of power defined in opposition to and as a higher instance with respect to kin groups. It is for this reason that Muller's work on the Rukuba of Nigeria is so important for him. The Rukuba have no state, but are instead divided into a number of chiefdoms no larger than villages, each with its own "sacred king." De Heusch can thus exclaim that divine kingship is *already* ("déjà") present in these small societies; "limitées à une petite communauté villageoise" (1981:80). But how are we to interpret this kind of ethnographic material? Muller's fieldwork is from the 1970s, and the Rukuba are part of a modern state. It ought to be obvious that they must be understood in terms of the modern context and not simply treated as a relic of the Stone Age.

In the following, I shall attempt, using ethnographic and historical material from the Lower Congo, to demonstrate that divine kingship is not an autonomous symbolic structure, unrelated to the larger social process. On the contrary, it will become apparent that it is a historical product which has undergone transformations connected to the general structural change that has turned Africa into an underdeveloped periphery of the West.

THE EXISTENCE OF SACRED KINGSHIP IN THE LOWER CONGO

The properties of sacred kingship listed by Lagercrantz have, more recently, been supplemented with the practice of royal witchcraft and cannibalism (de Heusch 1981:68). There would thus seem to be three principal categories of elements belonging to the sacred kingship complex: (1) *ritual regicide*, (2) a complex of *prohibitions and taboos* that greatly limit the king's freedom and contact with his surroundings, and (3) *supposed antisocial behavior* that expresses and defines the king's special nature.

All these elements are to be found in the Lower Congo, but not always together, and certainly not always in the same form nor to the same extent in all periods. Generally, it can be said that we at first have a king with real power and control over his sociopolitical environment, but who is ultimately transformed into a helpless figure, used by his own people as a fetish in their struggle against social disintegration and against the real threats to survival that they experience in a crisis-ridden world.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE KONGO KINGDOM

The Kingdom of Kongo is the first kingdom contacted by Europeans in West Central Africa, and it is the area which has yielded the best data from this early period (the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). The material we have concerning its internal structure is largely applicable to other kingdoms in the region—that is, Loango, Kakongo, Ngoy, Teke, and Angola.

The Kongo kingdom is, in all essentials, a kingship-organized society made up of localized matrilines with avunculocal residence, connected in a political (and marriage alliance) network. It consists of six provinces: Nsundi, Mbamba, Mbata, Soyo, Mpangu, and Mpemba, each of which is further subdivided into smaller territorial units (districts), villages, and matrilineages (Cuvelier 1946:297; Lopez-Pigafetta 1970:43; Cavazzi, cited in in Labat 1732:24, 33). The kingdom can thus be envisaged as a conical or segmentary hierarchy. At each level there is a political chief whose power and authority are delegated from above and whose obligation it is to transfer tribute in the opposite direction. At the top of the political hierarchy is the king, residing with his court in the capital, *mbanza Kongo*. He is *mani Kongo*, the political leader of the kingdom. There is also a royal council consisting of twelve members recruited mainly from the ranks of the provincial governors and whose functions include the election of the king himself. Kingship is not, then, passed on by direct inheritance. The provincial governors called *mani Nsundi*, *mani Mbata*, among others each have their provincial capitals which are also called *mbanza*. It is the king who appoints the governors, and he may remove them from their positions if they fail to satisfy him. Under the provincial governors are the district chiefs, who also maintain the title *mani*. In the villages, finally, there are political chiefs of the same type as at higher levels, who have local lineage chiefs as their subordinates (Cuvelier and Jadin 1954:134).

From later material it would appear that the hierarchical relation between matrilineages is expressed in patrilineal terms. The categories of reference are *tata*, *muana*, and *ntekolo*, or father, son, and grandson, respectively (Laman 1953, 1957; Doutreloux 1967). The logic of these categories is derivative of the fact that the *muana* are wife-givers to *tata* and that the sons born of such unions return to their mothers' matrilineages. As such, the male members of the *muana* groups are the sons of the men of the *tata* groups (Ekholm 1972, 1977). Matrilateral cross-cousin marriage is, furthermore, the dominant form of alliance, and in combination with Crow terminology provides an excellent example of the Lanes' thesis of the causal relation between ranked matrilineages linked by generalized exchange and such a terminology (1959). This is precisely the kind of relation we find between the king and his provincial governors. The king is *tata*, wife-taker, from his vassals. Throughout the history of the Kongo the matrilineage has always been an element within a larger unit and never existed as an autonomous group. This accounts for the fact that Kongo's ancestor cult is not directed toward matrilineal ascendents but toward those of the patriline and "paternal power," *kitata* (e.g., Laman 1916). The term *kanda*, furthermore, which usually means matrilineage, can also refer to the *kanda* plus its patrilineally linked *muana* groups.

The foundation of power, which we have discussed elsewhere (1972, 1977), is the control over the flow of prestige goods. The most important of these are shells (*nzimbu*) that are obtained from the island of Loanda off the coast, and which are the absolute monopoly of the king. Other prestige goods include cloth, copper, iron, salt, and ivory. Within the lineage, the monopoly of these items is the basis of the dominance relation between elders and young men. The latter must have them in order to make important payments such as bride price and can obtain them only via their lineage elder (cf. Meillassoux 1960).

Similarly, higher-ranked lineages control the flow of prestige goods to lower-ranked groups so that the prestige-goods hierarchy is identical to the political hierarchy. The king monopolizes external exchange as in a great many other African kingdoms. He maintains a direct control over the movement of shells as well as the copper mines in Mpemba. He also controls internal exchange insofar as provincial governors are prohibited from trading with one another but must instead pay tribute to the king. The governors come twice a year with their tribute of local prestige goods and other products whose value is judged at the royal court. If acceptable to the king, great joy erupts in the governor's entourage (Cuvelier and Jadin 1954:133). In return, the governors receive valuable prestige goods from the king. By maintaining this nodal position in the regional exchange network, the king thus ensures his power.

Europeans did not gain access to the interior of Central Africa until much later, but it does seem probable that the Kongo was one of a number of kingdoms connecting Central with East Africa, and further with the civilizations of the Indian Ocean. There are finds of Chinese porcelain in the Kongo area that most probably were traded via middlemen from the east coast.

Royal Authority

Royal authority in political, economic, jural, and religious matters, if we are to use our own categories, is a generalized phenomenon reproduced at provincial, district, and village levels, all of which are structured like the kingdom in miniature.

The king's political authority entails his ability to decide whether to make war or peace. The governors are required to supply troops in case of war (Cuvelier 1946: 299), but they may not maintain their own armed forces. Only *Mani Mbata* (governor of Mbata province) has the right to do so, but his position is rather special (Lopez-Pigafetta 1970:61) as his clan, which includes the *Mani Vunda* (see below), would appear to stand in a dualist relation to that of the king. The king himself has a special armed guard made up of "slaves" from beyond the realm.

The king's economic authority consists of his control of the most important resources in the land, especially those destined for the prestige-goods trade. His monopoly over external trade can be said to be absolutely crucial insofar as it is the mainstay of the entire political hierarchy.

The king's jural authority is expressed in his function as highest judge. At the *mbasi a nkanu,* the royal tribunal, located in the capital, the king metes out justice to his subjects beneath the shade of a great tree (Cuvelier 1946:73).

As for religious authority, the picture is rather unclear, primarily because the king began to institute major changes immediately upon European contact. It would appear, however, that there was dual power at the highest levels of the kingdom, a structure that was replicated at successively lower ranks. On an equal plane with the king, *Mani Vunda* or *Nsaku ne Vunda* (*Kitomi* at lower chiefly levels) belongs to the Nsaku clan, which is the dominant clan of *Mbata* province. He is the religious chief, the king's proxy and interregnum regent (representative of the dead king). He is a member of the royal council and one of the most important electors of the new king. It is only by his crowning of the king that the latter's power is legitimated. *Mani Vunda*'s role changes considerably after the advent of the Europeans, even though the general structure of the kingdom can be said to be unchanged from the end of the fifteenth century until the battle of Ambuila (1665) against the Portuguese, after which the kingdom ceased to function as a single politico-economic unit.

HISTORICAL TRANSFORMATION: GENERALITIES

The Kongo kingdom was not conquered by force. It crumbled as a direct result of trade with Europe. In the traditional system, prestige goods were exchanged for wives and slaves, and the control over the flow of such goods was the cornerstone of the kingdom's structure. It is not, then, surprising that the articulation of this system to European commerce might prove to be devastating. The Kongolese were from the start extremely interested in European wares, something that most certainly appeared extraordinary to Europeans themselves. The most usual goods were cloth, glass pearls, glass, weapons, and alcohol (Cuvelier 1946:22, 229; Cuvelier and Jadin 1954:86; Dapper 1670:557). When Andrew Battell came to Loango at the beginning of the seventeenth century, he had with him "all the commodities fit for that country . . . long glass beads, and round blue beads, and seed beads, and looking-glasses, blue and red coarse cloth, and Irish rugs" (Ravenstein 1901:9). The Europeans were constantly surprised by the intensity of demand for their cheap cloth and trinkets and by the qualitative variations in items demanded. "Each district has its peculiar tastes and fancies to consult, and you may starve in one place with bales of goods that would purchase kingdoms in another" (Johnston 1884:131).

The reason for this enormous demand for glass pearls and cloth—which became the principal disintegrative force in the history of the Kingdom—was, simply, the identification of such goods with indigenous prestige goods. Europeans could thus pump in cheap trade goods and receive human beings in exchange. The slave trade was not their invention—it was already latent in the Kongo system.

The King's virtual monopoly over external trade led, at the start of European contact, to a strengthening of his power in the capital, *mbanza Kongo*, as well as to a geographical expansion of the kingdom. In letters from the first half of the sixteenth century, the king refers to himself as lord of areas beyond the borders of the kingdom (Brasio 1953:38, 70). The loss of this royal monopoly marks the beginning of political dissolution. As the Kongo's center and capital lay inland, it was difficult for the central power to prohibit local chiefs along the coast from establishing their own trade alliances with Europeans. As a result, neighboring kingdoms such as Loango and Teke no longer recognized Kongo's superordinate status (Lopez-Pigafetta 1970:42ff.). Even Kongolese provinces began to liberate themselves (Cavazzi, cited in Labat 1732:25ff., 30, 33).

From the seventeenth century, the processes of change assume different directions in the different areas. The former capital, now renamed San Salvador, undergoes political decline and collapse. By the 1640s it is said that "le Congo n'est plus le Congo" (Bontinck 1964:85), and after the battle of Ambuila—against the Portuguese—in 1665, the Kongo ceases to function as a politico-economic unit. After 1665 begins a thirty-year period of anarchy, during which a great number of kings lose their lives in internal warfare (Jadin 1961:475). Around 1700, a king of the whole Kongo again appears, but his position is emptied of all real functions aside from ritual. He has neither the authority nor the power to collect tribute or make political decisions, a situation that continues throughout the century. San Salvador is no larger than a village. The king is poor and powerless, and no "vassals" take orders from him (Jadin 1963:370; Jadin 1957:328).

At the same time as San Salvador contracts, new centers of accumulation and power appear, and there are continual shifts of power from one region to another, mirroring the parallel shifts of trade. Soyo frees itself from the Kongo kingdom just before 1640 and is strong and expansive until the end of the century, when the "count of Soyo," as he is called, encounters difficulties (*Laurent de Luques 1700–1717* in Cuvelier 1953b:287ff.). In 1775, however, it is reported that the count, who is Christian and can read and write Portuguese, again maintains a court that is even greater than that of the king.

North of the Kongo River, Loango assumes a dominant position at first, but during the second half of the eighteenth century there is a shift of power toward Kakongo and Ngoy due to the lucrative slave trade that develops in the ports of that region. In 1780, Loango is the smallest of the three major kingdoms of the region (Degrandpré 1801:xxvi). At the start of the nineteenth century there is a relative decline in the slave trade, and when Tuckey visits the Loango coast in 1816, the African exporters are clearly in difficulty (1818:61). The slave trade again takes off and increases until the middle of the nineteenth century, when it again declines. It is, however, possible that the political contraction of the Loango is due to the emergence of Boma (San Salvador's port) as a major competitor.

The slave trade does not lead merely to cycles of expansion and contraction but also to an irreversible transformation of the sociopolitical structure. A new class of rich and powerful slave traders emerges as the traditional king and aristocracy lose their prominence. In Kakongo and Ngoy, the trade is organzied by special officials, the *mafuk* and *mambuk*, whose power is expressed by the fact that they recognize the king's sovereignty only as long as he does not meddle in their affairs (Proyart 1780:81; Cuvelier 1953a:48).

The nineteenth-century picture differs markedly from that found in the earlier literature. In the sixteenth century the land is described as densely populated and richly cultivated, containing villages and towns (*mbanza*) everywhere. The capital is said to have a population of about 100,000 (Lopez-Pigafetta 1970;65). Europeans are clearly impressed by the royal palace and court. There is mention of silk and velvet, of the glitter of jewelry and of the pomp of royal ceremony (Bontinck 1964:128).

By the beginning of the nineteenth century all this is a mere memory. The region is in a general state of decay. Population is thin and conditions are primitive, even decadent. When Burton visited the chief of Soyo in the 1860s he was struck by the contrast between the contemporary situation and that which was depicted in earlier descriptions of the "count of Soyo":

> This descendant of the "Counts of Sonho" in his dirty night-cap and long coat of stained red cloth, was a curious contrast to the former splendor of the 'count's habit,' with cap of stitched silk which could be worn only by him and his nobles, fine linen shirt, flowered silk cloak, and yellow stockings of the same material. (Burton 1876:74)

There are still "kings" in the 1800s, but the only real political unit is the small band led by a chief whose power is based on the trade in slaves, and which is made up entirely of the chief's personal followers and slaves (cf. Vansina 1963:197). Internal slavery expands enormously, a function of the increasing role of military strength in the establishment of political power. The new political groups are organized expressly for slave raiding and defense against other slave raiders. In such a situation the size of the local group is crucial, a factor that accounts for the constant investment of chiefly profit in acquiring new slave wives and male slaves (Laman 1957:31, 151).

Nineteenth-century chiefs are described as severe and cruel. MacGaffey provides a modern text designated for use in schools in which the power of chiefs is characterized as follows: "L'autorité des chefs actuels n'a pas la même étendue que celle des "Bamfumu" de jadis. Le Mfumu orgueilleux et cruel avait tous les pouvoirs et ses décisions étaient irrévocables. Ordonnait-il la mort de quelqu'un? On exécutait la sentence le même jour. C'est dire combine l'autorité inspirait la peur" (MacGaffey 1970:231).

These chiefs make their own law and have an executor at their sides who behead all transgressors. The skulls that are displayed around the perimeter of the settlement are proof for passersby that this is indeed the dwelling of a powerful chief (Laman 1953:21–22).

With the gradual disappearance of the slave trade at the end of the nineteenth century, the chiefs who had exploited it also vanish. This is the start of a new era. At the Berlin Conference (1884–1885) the nations of Europe divide Africa among themselves. The Kongo region is divided into three parts. The Belgian area is rather special at first. The Kongo Free State becomes Leopold II's private property until it is finally transferred to the Belgian state in 1908. Under the Free State, the local population is subjected to exploitation and violence to an extent that shocks the world when it is finally exposed. Villages are moved by force and destroyed. Their inhabitants are scattered, tortured, mutilated, and killed (e.g., Burrows 1903). The building of the railroad from Matadi to Leopoldville costs thousands of African lives, and a great deal of land is expropriated from local inhabitants.

There are still, however, some chiefs in the twentieth century. In the eastern part of the Lower Congo, chiefs are called *mfumu mpu* (*mpu* is the special cap worn by chiefs since the sixteenth century), a title translated as "chef couronné" (Van Wing 1959; Mertens 1942). Among the Yombe he is called *pfumu tsi* (de Cleene 1935) and more recently *mfumu a makanda* (Doutreloux 1967). The function of these chiefs is in principle restricted to the religious and the symbolic spheres, a fact that has led many to conclude that they have nothing to do with kingship but are instead modern descendents of *Mani Vunda* and *Kitomi* (cf. Hagenbucher-Sacripanti 1973).

Our twentieth-century chiefs exhibit precisely those attributes that are associated with divine or sacred kingship. The chief may not die a natural death but is instead strangled or smothered (e.g., Van Wing 1959:119). He is burdened by a great many prohibitants (Doutreloux 1967:171) and must hand over to the society's dignitaries the souls of members of his own matrilineage. This is accomplished by a magical act similar, it would seem, to witchcraft (Doutreloux 1967:169).

THE VICISSITUDES OF DIARCHY

The Kongolese were not only ecstatically interested in European commodities. They were also fascinated by their religion. The Kongo quickly became a Christian domain, officially, at least. The king and other aristocratic dignitaries were baptized, churches were built, and invitations were issued to missionaries.

The introduction of Christianity is primarily the work of Mvemba Nzinga, or Affonso I as he is called after his conversion, king of the Kongo from 1506 until 1543. In European eyes he has always distinguished himself as a very modern, clever, and pious monarch who tried in every way to civilize and develop his African kingdom. He is a king who Europeans can understand. He read his Bible, wrote numerous letters to Europe, sent Kongolese youth to be educated in Portugal, and encouraged the construction of churches and schools in his own country.

The enthusiasm for Christianity has, however, another side. At the same time as the former was introduced, the king led a veritable war against the traditional religion. As our sources regarding the occurrences of the early sixteenth century are rather thin, it is necessary to use later material on symbolism and religion in attempting to understand the situation.

The attack on traditional religion is expressed most clearly in burning of "fetishes" and "fetish houses" (Cuvelier 1946:68, 79, 120). All opposition meets with death. In a letter from 1526, Affonso writes that he has also allowed the cutting down of a sacred grove (Brasio 1952:47) for the purposes of building a church. In an earlier letter dated October 5, 1514, he asks for military help to burn down "a large fetish house" ("a casa grande dos ydolos") as he is afraid that such an act might so upset people that a revolt (riot) might ensue (Brasio 1952:296). The final onslaught is directed at the *Mani Vunda* (or *Nasaku ne Vunda*), Kongo's religious leader and complementary opposite, as an authority, to the king.

The struggle for the throne after the death of king Nzinga Nkuwu in 1506 becomes in effect a struggle between Christian and pagan forces. *Mani Vunda*, of course, is on the losing side. While Affonso kills his pagan rival (who is, in fact, his brother), he spares *Mani Vunda* and decides instead that he and his lineage shall in the future be charged with the building of churches and act as caretaker of Holy Water at religious ceremonies (Cuvelier 1946:105, 284). *Mani Vunda* is, therefore, not eliminated, but his position and function are redefined. An identical type of conflict between political and religious functions occurs among the Bemba in the mid-nineteenth century where, just as in sixteenth-century Kongo, the assault on the priesthood is correlated with the strengthening of the political paramount by means of expanding external trade (Richards 1969:33).

THE TRADITIONAL STRUCTURE

Mani Vunda's position can, at least at first approximation, be understood as that of religious chief as opposed to the king, who is political chief. He is the king's proxy while the former is alive, and interregnum regent after his death. He is a member of the royal council and one of the most important electors of the new king. It is he who crowns the king and who thus sanctions and legitimates his power.

The usual understanding held by anthropologists and historians has been that *Mani Vunda* or *Kitomi*, which is the more general title for chiefs of this type, is a religious chief who functions as "earth priest" and leader for an ancestor cult that is often said to be representative of an older, pre-royal, population (e.g. Balandier 1965:24–26, Vansina 1963:38, Randles 1968:42). In the origin myth of the kingdom, the relation between the king and *Mani Vunda* is described more or less as a relation between two ethnic groups, the autochtonous inhabitants and foreign invaders. Wene, founder of the kingdom, is a young son from a small kingdom or chiefdom north or east of the Kongo. It is told that he tired of the rule of the elders and left one day with his men. In one version of the myth, this is preceded by an act of violence. Wene is said to have killed his pregnant FZ—a blow against matrilineal succession—before leaving to establish himself in the Kongo. Upon arrival at the Kongo's capital he finds an aboriginal population whose men are routed and whose women marry Wene's men. Wene himself marries a daughter of *Nsaku ne Vunda*. But military conquest is not sufficient for Wene to establish his rule. His power must be domesticated by *Mani Vunda*, or *Mani Kabunga* as he is called in the myth. Wene becomes ill and can be cured only by *Mani Vunda*'s blessing. Wene's men go to the latter and beg for help: "We know that you are the eldest and the first occupant of this land" they exclaim. "Wene is ill and you must help him." After some hesitation, *Mani Vunda* accepts their demands and makes his way to the incapacitated conqueror, who is made to repeat that the vanquished chief is his senior and sovereign of the original inhabitants of the land. After thus recognizing *Mani Vunda*'s position, the latter blesses him by touching him with a buffalo tail. Wene promptly recovers.

This myth embodies a dualism where foreign conquerors, men and the king, are opposed to the original population, women and *Mani Vunda*. This pattern is in evidence throughout the history of the Lower Congo. The land is said to be divided in two, often by a river. There are supposedly two paramount clans, one which supplies the king, the other which is wife-giver to the former and which crowns its kings. *Mani Vunda* belonged to the Nsaku clan, while the first kings belonged to the Nzinga clan. Later we hear of the clan pairs Mpanzu-Nlaza, Mpanzu-Nsundi, Manga-Nlaza, and so on. In another origin myth, it is said that the king sent out his sons in different directions in order to occupy new territory. "Dance in pairs," he exclaims—"one with sword and the other with buffalo tail" (Cuvelier 1930:482).

In the material from Loango, the dualism is even more marked, probably because the traditional structure was maintained longer there than in the Kongo. The equivalent of *Mani Vunda* here is called *Mamboma* (end of the nineteenth century). He is the interregnum regent and lives in Lubu, which is located within the female side of the society and which is also the burial place of the kings and "princes" of the male side. A river divides the two halves of the kingdom, and men from the capital may not cross the river alive (Dennett 1906:27; Pechuel-Loesche 1907:155). The princes of the male side are referred to here as *Fumu* while those of the female side are called *Fumu si*, that is, "owners of the land" (Hagenbucher-Sacripanti 1973:34).

As we argued elsewhere (Ekholm 1977), dualism is an integral aspect of the specific structure of kingship found in the Kongo, where men move from their father's to their MB's group (where they marry MBD—see figure 9.1).



Figure 9.1. The kinship structure of the prestige-good system: local matriliny and a political patriline



Figure 9.2. Matrilateral cross-cousin marriage and the dualism of the male and the female "side"

This implies that the local group is constituted by a superior male half and an inferior female half. This relation is also expressed in terms of *tata-muana* (father-son).

Mani Vunda belongs to the inferior, female side of society, the *muana* group. He resides at or near the royal burial place. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the royal grave lay just north of the capital, on a wooded hilltop referred to as a "sorte de bois sacré," where it was absolutely forbidden to use the land (Cuvelier 1946:73). This was the sacred grove that Affonso had chopped down in his assault on the old religion.

The structural relation between *Mani Vunda* and the king can be approached via the coronation ceremony. Whose blessing, we might ask, does *Mani Vunda* transfer to the new king by striking him with the buffalo tail? In this ceremony the king is made sacred. Its climax occurs when *Mani Vunda* paints the former with chalk at the same time as he gives him the royal symbols which have been in his keeping until this moment. The chalk is taken from a basket that also contains the relics of earlier kings, more specifically, their fingernails, joints, and hair. This basket is kept by *Mani Vunda* in "the house of the ancestors," part of his function as interregnum regent. It is this house that is to be destroyed by Affonso when he asks for military help from the Portuguese, the house in which "the emblems of the divine kingship" were stored (Vansina 1963:47, 271 n. 16).

Chalk represents the blessing of the father. Its application to the new king establishes the succession from the dead to the living king whereby the dead king gives his blessing to the living. Kongo's ancestor cult, as we have said, is focused on the patriline and its power (*kitata*), not the matriline. There are descriptions from the beginning of this century of how people go to the tombs of their fathers in order to receive their blessing via direct contact with the earth of their graves (Laman 1962:46).

The king cannot reign without this blessing of the father (just as Wene in the origin myth). He needs *Mani Vunda*, who represents the "father," that is, the dead king, at the coronation and even afterward. In a text from 1701, it is told how *Kitomi* paints the king with chalk on numerous occasions: "[I]l l'oint pour le protéger contre les maléficies" when he goes out, and so on (Bontinck 1970:217). Without Kitomi the king would surely die, another document reports (Anguiano 1950:437).

There is, thus, a godly figure above both the king and *Mani Vunda*—the dead king. As long as the new king is not yet crowned, the dead king continues to rule through his representative, the *Mani Vunda.* At the coronation, the father gives his blessing to his son/king, and it is thought that the former is somehow incarnated in the latter. Randles has pointed to evidence which would imply that the king is an incarnation of *Nzambi* (the high god) in the same way that, for example, the Shilluk *reth* (king) is an incarnation of *Nyikang*. In later material from Central Africa, *Nzambi* is likened to the Christian high god, but this interpretation is very probably a result of missionary influence. In the oldest sources, *Nzami* appears instead as a name for the divine king. In 1941 the Portuguese, on their third visit to Kongo, heard songs of praise to their own king as "*zambem apongo*"—"qui chez eux signifie Seigneur du Monde" (Randles 1968:31). Similarly, Battell reports of Loango's king at the start of the seventeenth century that he is treated as a god and called "Sambe and Pango" (i.e., *zambem apongo*) (Ravenstein 1901:46).

In figure 9.3 the dead king is controlled by *B*, that is, by the subordinate *muana* group. It is precisely the fact that the *Mani Vunda* represents the dead king that has so often rendered it difficult to distinguish between the attributes and functions of the two halves of the diarchy. Both, in fact, are sacred. According to Cavazzi, "*chitome*" was thought to be "un dieu sur terre, et comme le Tout-Puissant au Ciel" (Labat 1732:i, 254). Jérôme de Montesarchio (mid-1600s) writes that *Chitomi* is worshipped "comme s'il avait été le dieu du pays" (Bouveignes and Cuvelier 1951:98). Both bring rain and fertility. Neither may die a natural death. Fingernails, joints, and hair are removed from their dead bodies as relics (Ravenstein 1901:46; Zuchelli 1715:185; Proyart 1780:81ff.). Neither the king nor *Kitomi* have ultimate power to send rain. Only the *bakulu*, ancestors, that is, the former kings, can perform this feat. It is the latter that control rain, fertility, and the productivity of the hunt, and it is only in their mediating function that the king and *Mani Vunda/Kitomi* have a role to play. The king's supposed control over nature is properly part of the Kongo's religious structure and not, as symbolic anthropologists have asserted, due to his magical power. In the latter interpretation, the king has nothing to do with the gods or ancestors, but is instead linked directly with the cycles of nature. All the antisocial characteristics listed by de Heusch—incest, cannibalism, and witchcraft—are meant to define his essence as nature as opposed to culture and society. This perspective, clearly ahistorical, would dichotomize in an all



Figure 9.3. The dualist structure of kingship/priestship

too simplistic way the complex relation between the king and *Mani Vunda*: that is., between political and religious functions as they were actually integrated in the pre- and early contact kingdoms. Further, the antisocial interpretation of kingship owes very much to the historical transformation undergone by sacred kingship in the past 450 years.

When Affonso attacks the traditional system, his primary enemy is, in fact, the dead king. In political terms, it is a struggle against the dualism that exists at every level of the kingdom and for the complete centralization of power. He is successful at first, but only temporarily. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the missionaries continue, with the king's permission, to zealously burn and destroy all the old religious structures. Axelsson (1970:115) in his history of the Lower Congo missions stated, "It is remarkable that Georges de Geel was the only one of several hundred missionaries to fall a victim to the reaction inspired by the policy of physical violence which they themselves practised." Georges de Geel was killed, or more accurately, died of wounds inflicted, by an angry populace (Hildebrand 1940), but all the others survived, miraculously (?), this era of arrogant aggression.

Dualism, as we earlier stated, continues long into the modern age, and when it finally does disappear, it is not the dead but the living king that vanishes from the arena.

THE EARLY RECORD OF KINGSHIP

There is absolutely no indication of ritual regicide in the earliest period, that is, in the Frazerian sense of formally fixed reigns of two, four, or seven years. On the contrary, kings tend to live long lives if they are not killed in war or in the frequent battles of succession.

Affonso reigned for an exceptionally long period, almost forty years, and he must have been close to eighty when he died. Following two years of anarchy, Diego I took his place and reigned from 1545 to 1561. At his death there were three new contenders, all of whom were killed, though not by ritual means. According to Lopez-Pigafetta, "The first was the king's son, who was not favored by many of the people; therefore he was killed at once." Of the two other candidates, one was supported by the Portuguese and by "certain lords." The other, however, was supported by "the greater part of the people" and was therefore elected. But while the king-elect was in the church where the election had taken place, the Portuguese murdered him, thinking that their own man would thereby have his day. Of course the opposition, with a similar strategy in mind, had simultaneously done away with the Portuguese candidate, "So that at the very same hour, but in different places, both these kings were murdered" (1970:93).

After these unfortunate happenings, Bernardo I was elected as king of the Kongo. Both he and his successor, Henrique I, died after short reigns, both in war against the Yaka and Teke, respectively (Labat 1732; Lopez-Pigafetta 1970:93ff.). The next king was Alvaro I. During his reign Kongo was invaded by Yaka and he was forced to take refuge on a small island in the Congo River. The Portuguese helped him regain his power, however, and he continued to reign for almost twenty years (1568–1587). In the latter part of his life he became quite ill, apparently from filaria, referred to as "hydropsie" (Cuvelier and Jadin 1954:125), his leg swelling to enormous size (Lopez-Pigafetta 1970:98). His condition did not, however, lead to ritual murder, and it is said that "[this] infirmity remained with him till his death" (Lopez-Pigafetta 1970:98). His successor was his son Alvaro II, who reigned for an even longer period (1587–1614). Following this, reigns became increasingly shorter until the fall of the kingdom in 1665—a phenomenon related not to ritual regicide but to the intensity of power struggles under conditions of growing instability.

In this early period, the kings are, as a rule, powerful regents. They are always conspicuous and deal directly with the Europeans. After each king's death there usually ensues a struggle for the throne in which the winner reenacts the royal origin myth of armed conquest. In later periods such struggles take on a ritual character (e.g., Laman 1957:141). They are, thus, a modern phenomenon, the transformation of a structure of real competition in a period when the crown was attractive enough to warrant such struggles.

Nor is the king subject to a plethora of tabu in this period, as is the case in the later material. There is no evidence of any direct restrictions on the king's freedom of movement. While it is said that he "seldom quits his palace" (Lopez-Pigafetta 1970:110), this does not imply that the king was imprisoned there.

He is in constant contact with Europeans, and there are several descriptions of him leaving the palace in order to visit, for example, the church (Bontinck 1964:125–27; Dapper 1670:561). The kings are also militarily active in the wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, during which some of them are actually killed in battle. These are clearly not "invisible kings."

There are, of course, certain restrictions relating to the person of the king. In seventeenth-century Loango it is forbidden to see the king eat and drink (Ravenstein 1901:45; Dapper 1670:523). In the Kongo, on the other hand, he takes his meals in public. A table and chair are placed on a podium where the king sits surrounded by his chiefs, who are dealt small bits of food from the king's hand (Lopez-Pigafetta 1970:109ff.; Cuvelier and Jadin 1954:132). The tabu against seeing the king eat in Loango is not directed against the king himself, but against others, who are penalized by death for transgression. This is obviously an expression of royal power rather than its inversion.

There is no evidence of ritual regicide in the early material. The classic model, characteristic of later periods of divine kingship, where kings are killed after a definite length of time in office or when they become sick or infirm, is not to be found. There is, in fact, one example of ritual murder from the middle of the seventeenth century, but it applies to *Kitomi* and not the king. It is said that *Kitomi* may not die a natural death, for if such were to pass, the world would come to an end, ". . . et la terre qu'il soutient tout seul par sa puissance et par son mérite, retourneroit aussi-tôt dans le néant." It is, therefore, necessary to kill him ". . . quand le *Chitomé* tombe malade, & qu'on craint que cette maladie ne le conduise au tombeau." His successor is required to enter his hut armed with a large stick or a rope with which the latter is strangled. In this way he dies "de mort accidentelle," and the world is saved (Labat 1732: 260–61).

This kind of ritual murder can be found in the later material from the Lower Congo. According to Laman, who refers to the end of the nineteenth century, a *ntinu* (king or "paramount chief") could not die a natural death—"one of his grand-children must put a noose round his neck and put the loose end of the cord through a hole in the wall, after which the *ntinu* is strangled if it is found that he is going to die" (Laman 1957:151). Van Wing recounts in similar fashion that *mfumu mpu* (crowned chiefs) of the Mpangu at the beginning of this century are not allowed to die a natural death. Two men take his spear and press it against his throat until he suffocates (1959:119). Ritual regicide of this type is also to be found in the oral traditions of Soyo. The king must not die "d'une manière ordinaire," and when it is seen that he is dying, his end is hastened by breaking his neck—"[l'entourage] s'empressait de lui tordre le cou et de lui briser la nuque" (Troesch 1962:95).

The ritual murder of *Kitomi* in the earlier period and of paramounts in the later period is not of the type usually associated with ritual regicide. They are not put to death in the ordinary sense. Their lives are not arbitrarily shortened. The fact that *Kitomi* or king may not die natural deaths refers only to the fact that *when they are already dying* they must be prevented from freely emitting their last breath. Murder would appear to render these individuals immortal. By being prevented from dying a normal death, they can be reincarnated in the next king or *Kitomi*.

It is, however, important to note that it is *Kitomi* and not the king who is killed in the earliest sources. It might be argued that in this period the king could indeed die a natural death since it was his *Kitomi* who was charged with the transfer of royal power to the next king. It is the involution of sacred kingship that accounts for the nineteenth- and twentieth-century form taken by ritual murder.

THE INVOLUTION OF SACRED KINGSHIP

The elaborate prohibitions that really limit the king's freedom belong to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the 1800s, Maloango is forbidden to leave his palace. He may not lay eyes on the sea, touch European wares, wear European clothes, nor come in contact with whites. In her excellent study of Loango, Phyllis Martin writes, "According to the nineteenth century sources, an outstanding feature of the position of Maloango was the number of *Xima* which limited freedom of action" (1972:170). She points out that such prohibitions were not in evidence in earlier centuries. The essential characteristic of the tabus is that they separate the king from Europeans and commerce. In a source from the turn of the century it is said that the conservative forces in the land, that is, the religious leaders, were responsible for the king's isolation. The former were increasingly suspicious of the Europeans and used the prohibitions to isolate the king from the slave trade, hoping to protect Vilis (Loango) from foreign influence (Peuchuel-Loesche 1907:178). Their interests, according to Martin, coincided with the new class that had made its wealth on the basis of this slave trade. These limitations were doubtless welcomed by the *nouveaux riches* who were also concerned with curtailing the actions of the Maloango and the class of nobles for their own ends (1972:171).

There is another aspect of the new prohibitions. When the king is isolated it is not merely to remove him from center stage. On the contrary, he becomes an essential instrument of society. When the king of Soyo was installed and made sacred, he became "un personnage mystérieux" (Troesch 1962:95). He had to reside deep in the forest, where his principal function was to obey a large number of rules and tabus. He had, for example, to lie on his back while he slept, for if he were to turn over, the land would suffer catastrophe. (There was a special court functionary whose only purpose was to ensure that such did not occur.)

Here the king is completely controlled by his environment. He is reduced to society's fetish, a defense against all threats, both real and imaginary. His life is one long, continual ritual whose goal is to maintain an order that had, in reality, long ago disappeared.

The decisive structural transformation is the king's disappearance from the political arena and his relocation outside or above society, a position formerly occupied by the dead king. The king thus vanishes as the representative of political power but remains as a human god or ancestor. When people of the Lower Congo crown chiefs well into the 1930s, it is fertility, welfare, and especially a functioning society that they hope to obtain. The king is their (symbolic) means to this end.

Two strategies are available. One is to get oneself a "deadking." As early as the eighteenth century there is a tendency to lengthen the interregnum periods as much as possible (cf. Martin 1972:163). One might also crown a new king and put him to death immediately in order to procure such a good or ancestor. A man named Neamlau told a missionary some time around the turn of the twentieth century that he in fact had a right to the throne of Ngoy but that he was not interested in the post—"as this chief was always killed on the night after his coronation, he did not care to do so" (Dennett 1906:120).

From Soyo there are oral traditions of ritual regicide immediately following the coronation. A king by the name of Ne Nzinga is supposed to have gone to *mbanza Kongo* to offer himself in vassalage to the king. When he returned to Soyo he invited other chiefs or kings to witness a ceremony. On the specified day he took his place on a podium with all his insignia. A man with a great sword danced around him to the sound of drums. The music increased in intensity until, when it reached a climax, the dancer suddenly lopped off the king's head. All present cheered with joy—"c'était vraiment une grande fête." A brother or son of the dead king took his place, but reigned only in his name ("toujours sous le nom du glorieux ancêtre") (Troesch 1962:96). It is claimed that the king went through with his execution of his own free will in order to attain immortality. This accords well with the representation of royal power that is incarnated in each new king and which is preserved for the future by means of ritual murder or violent death. The cries of joy are not as sinister as they might appear to the outsider. It is not, after all, every day that one gets a new god.

The second strategy is to assure oneself of a *representative of the god or ancestor* whose only function is to mediate between the higher powers and society. Here it would appear that *Kitomi* has survived, even if the king has vanished.

The "crowned chiefs" of the later period are typically young boys who are, moreover, not exactly willing to take on their new status. It is not difficult to sympathize with their ambivalence or even fear. Laman offers a description of how a certain Namenta was crowned among the Sundi (he was the last). He was taken prisoner when still very young and remained in this state for a long period. During this time he was badly treated. His guards whipped him and "treated him like a pig they had been set to tend." He was forced to look on in hunger while they ate, and they took him every day to a crossroad where they pressed his face in the dirt and made him swear not to tell of his treatment. On reaching marriageable age he was castrated "in a cruel way" (Laman 1957:141), after which he was ready for the coronation. Similar castration is also mentioned for Soyo (Troesch 1962:95).

Who, then, are these new chiefs? The society is still divided in two halves that cooperate ritually. Namenta is taken from one side and prepared and coronated by the other. His ill treatment underlines the fact that he is no more than an instrument, a living symbol. He is certainly no chief possessing power and involved in political alliances. He cannot even produce his own descendants. His power is negated in practice in the same way as in Clastres's famous South American example. He is to yield to society, to give up his own life and goals and serve as an intermediary to the higher powers, an instrument that society uses to assure a better existence for itself.

Mertens's description of "les chefs couronnés" from the 1930s is not quite as dramatic as the above example. Chiefs are elected and crowned only in times of crisis, such as epidemics and death (1942:47). The young men who are candidates for the position are still unattracted; for even if there is no castration and beating, their life is still a difficult one. One such chief complained continuously for a long period that he didn't receive enough money to be able to function as chief. When, on top of this, he got no money to pay his bride price, he exploded in anger. He took off his armbands (insignia) and threw them onto the village square, exclaiming, "If you don't want to show me the respect due to these armbands, wear them yourselves."[1]

After this outbreak, he left the village never to return. It was later learned that he had taken a job with the railroad, where he had died (Mertens 1942:320).

In the Kongo, kings or chiefs are crowned when the society undergoes crises. But kings are no cure. These societies do not "work" because they have been totally undermined by several hundred years of destructive contact with Europe. This state of affairs cannot, of course, be corrected with the help of a dead king. Their reaction is of a religious and not of a political order. Instead of struggling for their freedom, they turn to a god, not a Christian one, but their own. And because it is a human god, it is susceptible to the anger and frustration of its worshippers. It is this specific character of the god-as-ancestor that gives rise to the scapegoat complex. If the king is responsible for the course of events because of his very position as human god, he must bear the responsibility when things go wrong.

The old Kongo kingdom was organized in terms of a specific structure of power, with the king at the apex and with *Mani Vunda/Kitomi* as the balancing factor in a form of dualism that was reproduced at every territorial level. The symbolism of power was one in which the dead king represented the stable form of power that was incarnated in each king via the necessary mediation of the *Kitomi*. When the power structure disintegrates, a process not completed until the end of the slave trade, this structure is radically transformed. The king disappears from the social arena and is raised to a purely symbolic sphere, becoming merged with the dead king. It is this transformation that makes it possible to apprehend sacred kingship as an autonomous symbolic structure, hanging as it were above a relatively undifferentiated lineage-organized society and portending some future theocracy. Symbolic anthropology has, then, gotten history back to front.

NOTES

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The chapter title, "Sad Stories of the Death of Kings," is from Shakespeare, *King Richard II*, act 3, scene 2.

1. In French: "Vous ne voulez pas me montrer le *luzilu* auquel ces bracelets donnent droit. Portez les alors vous-même."

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10

Notes on Structure and History in Oceania

Jonathan Friedman

For the past century, Oceania has been subject to broad comparative, diffusionist, and evolutionary studies in a way that has not been attempted for other regions of the world. This is due to the laboratory-like conditions that Oceania affords for the study of social variation. Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia consist of a great number of island societies related quite closely by language and culture, yet having different conditions of existence that can be relatively well demarcated. Polynesia, due to its relatively recent settlement, is remarkable insofar as it affords the most recent examples of the evolution of tribal systems into state systems previous to Western expansion.

Early studies of Oceania sought to delineate the cultural continuity among the different island civilizations. With the emergence of neo-evolutionary anthropology, this region became a prime area of study. Neo-evolutionist and cultural materialist interpretations of the development from Melanesian big-man systems to ranked and stratified societies in Polynesia have become standard textbook material. The techno-ecological bias of the neo-evolutionist model (Sahlins 1958) has been criticized (Schwartz 1963, Guiart 1963, Goldman 1970), and Schwartz has made some interesting suggestions as to the relation between the politically integrative effect of regional exchange and social evolution. Goldman's alternative to neo-evolutionism is based on a model of the status lineage and status rivalry (1955, 1970) as the motor of Polynesian development. It has not, however, been accepted as a substitute for techno-ecological determinism. More recent evolutionary analyses have tended to replace technological development with population pressure as the major determinant (Kirch 1980), following, thus, the general cultural materialist trend (Harris 1977, 1979).

In this preliminary discussion[1] I shall be arguing that the fundamental premises of neo-evolutionism and cultural materialism are incompatible with the data of Oceanian prehistory and history. Following this, I shall present a sketch of the elements of an alternative approach based on regional or "total" systems of social reproduction.

EVOLUTIONISM AND HISTORY

Sahlins's classical model of Polynesian evolution (1958) and his later generalization of big man-to-chief development for the whole of Oceania (1963) contain two hypotheses: first, that the development of stratification is a general evolutionary process that depends on the degree of development of technological productivity, and second, that specific properties of social structures, that is, ramages versus local descent-line organization, are the result of adaptation to particular environments. Needless to say, Sahlins has changed significantly since his neo-evolutionary days, but his early work lives a life of its own today. *Social Stratification in Polynesia* (1958) is the clearest example of Sahlins's early attempt to combine general and specific evolution within a single framework.

Sahlins divides Polynesia into three broad classes of increasing stratification based on the number of major rank classes. He then proceeds to correlate these with local island productivity, which he measures by the demographic size and frequency of large-scale redistributions. This measure of productivity is unfortunate insofar as it is simultaneously a measure of the size of the redistributive or hierarchic network. If productivity is measured by the size of redistributive networks, which are by definition equal to the degree of stratification, then the thesis that stratification is a function of productivity is no more than a tautology. More empirically, there are numerous and critical counterexamples to the productivity argument. It has been argued, for example, that Mangareva, with a very unproductive techno-environment, was still able to support a high level of stratification (Goldman 1970:250). Tonga, which was certainly one of the most highly developed of the Polynesian societies, has a much less developed agricultural base than the elaborate irrigation works of the Society and Hawaiian islands. Finally, the single most powerful Hawaiian chiefdom that eventually unified Hawaii (with European help) is situated on the west coast of the Island of Hawaii, a zone which is exclusively dedicated to dry farming (irrigation would be impossible there).

The more general evolutionary scheme linking big-man Melanesia to chiefly Polynesia is a more serious problem. While Sahlins does not propose a necessary evolutionary process in his discussion (1963), his suggestions in that direction have become a central thesis of cultural materialism. The general evolutionary model might at first appear to be corroborated by the distribution of societies from older Melanesia to younger Polynesia. The general evolutionary model necessarily implies that Oceania must in some sense be understood as a single evolutionary continuum where big-man systems evolve into ranked systems, which then evolve into stratified systems. The problem is that social evolutionary processes as defined are localized to the single society so that Melanesian societies, being the earliest settled, ought to have the most evolved polities and Polynesia, the least evolved polities. Not even a more Darwinian selection model can account for this supposed evolutionary differentiation. There are no ecological nor technological grounds for arguing that a big-man system placed in a Polynesian environment will develop into a chiefdom. Melanesian environments are often far richer than their Polynesian counterparts, and productivity in big-man societies is certainly high enough to support Polynesian-type political structures.

The actual history of Oceanic societies is essentially the reverse of the supposed evolutionary trajectory. It would appear that big-man systems are relatively recent phenomena that may have developed out of more hierarchical systems reminiscent of Polynesia. It also is quite clear that some of the most recently settled areas of Polynesia such as Hawaii are among the most evolved.

The main alternative to materialist evolutionism is the work of Goldman on the dynamics of status rivalry (1955, 1970). Goldman's work contains a much more detailed analysis of Polynesian social structures, differentiating between East and West Polynesia and analyzing the role of different kinds of economic exchange, kinship, and religious institutions in the development of ranking and stratification. Like Sahlins, he classifies Polynesia into three broad evolutionary stages: traditional society, open society, and stratified society. Evolutionary development is a process whereby traditional small-scale societies whose sacred chiefs have fixed kinship status in a single genealogical hierarchy are transformed as the result of increasing competition from non-inheriting lines (open society) into a stratified society where rank classes stabilize around successful politicians and warriors of the open stage and where the kin categories of traditional society are redefined to cover real class distinctions. The sacred chief of traditional society is now a great paramount who wields political and military power and is himself a deity rather than a mere representative of the gods. The advantage of Goldman's categories over those of Sahlins is that they are more revealing about the actual internal states of the societies described. Traditional societies such as Tikopia have little material social differentiation. The entire population is linked in a single set of conical clan structures where rank and genealogical position are identical. Open societies are noted for their continuous warfare, for their less clearly defined status structure, and for the tendency for a part of the population to lose its kinship connection to chiefs and to land. Stratified societies, while often warlike, make a clear distinction between a more or less endogamous chiefly elite and the rest of the populace, including a class of lowly outcasts.

For Goldman, status competition is the essential driving force of Polynesian development, a competition that leads to the separation of power from traditional rank and to their institutionalized fusion in the great chiefdoms. The obvious problem here is that the notion of status rivalry is far too general to be able to generate the specifics of the various Polynesian societies which Goldman has himself done much to document and clarify. It does not help us to understand why all but one of his open societies occur in East Polynesia and all his traditional societies in West Polynesia. It cannot explain the fundamental differences between West Polynesian tendencies toward bilineal kinship and bilineal ranking, cross-cousin marriage, and a polarity between religious and political authority, and East Polynesian tendencies toward cognatic kinship, the merging of political and religious status, and a strictly "age"-based structure of rank. These are all distinctions that Goldman has himself stressed in his discussion, but which play no role in his general evolutionary argument.

Finally, it is possible to criticize the same kind of implied progressive evolution in Goldman as we found in Sahlins. From a classificatory scheme it cannot be determined in which direction societies actually develop. Goldman is clearly aware that many of his open societies, such as the Marquesas, Mangaia, and Easter Island, may be the products of a devolutionary process. The same might be said of some of the traditional societies. Such possibilities are not systematically incorporated into the general theory.

A fundamental weakness of the evolutionary approaches discussed here is that they are unable to connect the socially specific properties of the ethnographic and archaeological material with the more general evolutionary categories. This is the result of the purely classificatory nature of evolutionism. The number of ranks or the openness of a society cannot tell us anything about its kinship structure or the specific processes of circulation, accumulation, or the nature of social control. Sahlins, perhaps in reaction against his early evolutionism, has devoted himself to the thesis of cultural specificity and has most eloquently attacked the emptiness of functional and evolutionary abstractions (Sahlins 1976).

Complementary to the classificatory bias of evolutionism is the tendency to restrict the unit of analysis to the single society. As it is societies that are classified, evolutionary analysis can be quickly reduced to a mechanical activity that entirely overlooks crucial systemic features of social reproduction that generate that which is merely categorized by the evolutionist.

TOWARD A REGIONAL SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

In this preliminary discussion, I shall summon a number of disparate strands of evidence and interpretation that might enable us to construct a different kind of model for Oceania, one that builds on some of the specific properties of Oceanic societies that are ignored or trivialized in evolutionary analysis. Rather than concentrating on Polynesia alone, I shall try to outline some of the more general tendencies in Oceania as a whole at the productive risk of accusations of speculation. Our point of departure is not the single society but the regional system of which it is a part. Our understanding of the formative processes of internal structures of society will be dependent on our understanding of larger processes of intersocietal relations and their transformation over time. What follows is an outline of the argument for a regional system approach.

Recent linguistic work (Blust 1980a) has demonstrated the probable existence of generalized exchange (matrilateral cross-cousin marriage) in proto-Malayo-Polynesian populations, as well as evidence for some kind of asymmetric dualism. The argument does much to discredit the earlier thesis of an original bilateral kinship organization and is very suggestive for the understanding of the unity of Indonesia and the rest of Oceania (Blust 1980b). Oceanic societies would seem then to be derivative of a social system based on "elementary structures" combining asymmetric dualism and generalized exchange, a phenomenon widespread in Indonesia, Central Africa, and the Americas. The structure uncovered by Blust is an essential element in the reconstruction of what we shall refer to as prestige-good systems (Ekholm 1977).

The analysis of early obsidian trade in Melanesia in the Lapita period (from the second millenium BC) indicates a system of long-distance trade not unlike the systems of West Polynesia, but very unlike the highly specialized short-distance trade of later periods in Melanesia. This material (Allen 1977; Ambrose 1976, 1978) indicates a long-term intensification and differentiation of trade and specialized production.

Most of Northern Melanesia in the ethnographic present is characterized by big-man systems, intensive trading with a high degree of specialization. There are some examples of longer-distance trade in the Kula ring. The Trobriands, unlike other islands and most of mainland New Guinea, had a chiefdom organization that apparently depended on chiefly monopoly over highly valued kula objects that were passed down selectively in return for wives and a tribute of a third of the harvest (*urigubu*) each year given to any wife-taking group. Paramount chiefs took wives from many district heads and maintained a hierarchy of alliances. It has been suggested (Brunton 1975; Liep forthcoming; Persson 1983) that monopoly over external trade as the basis of political hierarchization could be maintained only under conditions of trade scarcity.

The Trobriands, on the periphery of the Kula, had few enough outlets that they could be monopolized. Dobu, on the other hand, in the center of the trade network, could not maintain such monopoly, resulting instead in intense competition in the absence of political hierarchy.

The New Guinea highlands, the classic big-man area, may have undergone the equivalent of an increase in trade density. Early reports from Mt. Hagen (Vicedom and Tischner 1943–1948) describe a relatively stable social hierarchy where an elite similar to petty chiefs entertain a monopoly over the shell trade to the coast. The "free" distribution of shells by Westerners which broke this early monopoly can be seen as the direct cause of the present, more egalitarian situation.

All this suggests that the phenomenon characteristic of Northern Melanesia and parts of Southern Melanesia (New Hebrides [Vanuatu]) can be understood as the result of a long-term increase in trade network density, leading to a breakdown in formerly more hierarchical polities. Garanger (1972) has shown for the New Hebrides, which is today characterized by complex big-man type stuctures, that there was formerly a very hierarchical political structure and social stratification as evidenced in the elaborate graves containing long-distance imports, as well as wives and chiefly retainers who were poisoned in order to be able to follow their masters.

Where trade monopolies have been maintained in the more recent past, they have been linked with the emergence of chiefdoms of various scale. The general political fragmentation of Melanesia implies a situation where the size of political units is severely limited, while the intensity of competition is often extreme. We can represent the variation as shown in table 10.1.

Table 10.1. Trade and the Distribution of Dominant Social Forms

+ External trade	*− Dense*	*+ Trade monopoly*	*Prestige-good system*	*Trobriands*
	+ Dense	− Trade monopoly	Big-man system; conversion of valuables into pigs/ food by trade	Dobu, Siassi
− External trade			Big-man system; intensification of agricultural production for feasting; valuables ranked and flow in same direction as pigs, food, etc.	Goodenough Island, Highlands N. Guinea

On the basis of the new reconstruction of Austronesian (including Malayo-Polynesian) asymmetrical marriage and dualism, it is possible, I think, to suggest that a general model of a prestige-good system can render comprehensible the historical distribution of Melanesian social types. Prestige-good systems can be characterized in their most elementary form as a combination of the following elements:

1. Generalized exchange
2. Monopoly over prestige-good imports that are necessary for marriage and other crucial payments, that is, for the social reproduction of local kin groups
3. A bilineal tendency in the kinship structure (asymmetrical)
4. A tendency to asymmetrical political dualism: religious versus political chiefs, original people versus invaders, female versus male, inside versus outside, and so on

The above elements are organically linked in a process of expansive hierarchization. The control of prestige goods implies an exchange situation in which wives move toward monopolistic centers and valuables (and men) move in the opposite direction. This model implies a tendency for the formation of localized matrilines and dispersed ranked patrilines whether or not they are cognized as such (Ekholm 1977). The general dualistic structure of such systems is the result of women moving up and/or men moving down, creating a local asymmetrical dualism: low = female/high = male. In the usual case where men move down (politically speaking), the local group represents ritual power and control of fertility, while the incoming group represents political power. If we assume that religious status, defined as descent from local ancestors, is logically primary, then the control of prestige goods may be said to emerge in opposition to the former ritual control (see figure 10.1).

Evidence of prestige-good systems is found throughout Western Polynesia, Micronesia, Southern Melanesia, and parts of Northern Melanesia. In the latter area, characterized by a high degree of political fragmentation and competition,



Figure 10.1. The local articulation to the Kula exchange


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LINEAGES B,C,D
LINEAGES E,F,G.
PRESTIGE GOODS
TRIBUTE
MATRIMONIAL ALLIANCE

Figure 10.2. The structure of the prestige-good system

the Trobriands represent a tendency, however temporary, toward the kind of structure outlined above. Here the existence of matrilineal clans is combined with dualistic tendencies, the division of society into four totemic clans, and the reciprocal alliance between the two highest-ranked subclans (patrilateral cross-cousin marriage) combined with an apparently asymmetrical form of generalized exchange between the paramount lineage and its vassals. Malinowski notes the apparent opposition between "the patriarchal and matriarchal principle" (1966, Vol. II:360), that is, between the passage of power from father

Table 10.2. Alliance, Descent, and the Matrilateral Relation

Local lineage		In-marrying lineage
MBW		MB
MBD	[=]	EGO
D		ZS

to son as opposed to mother's brother to sister's son, which is the usual form. He points out the tendency for higher-ranking men to marry into lower-ranking subclans: "Operating through the wife and allowing sons of high rank to settle in an inferior village . . . the doctrine of rank brings about the permanent shifting of authority and sovereignty to new territories" (1966, II:364).

Subclans of low rank tend to remain localized while high-ranked subclans are dispersed and are associated with immigration from a distant source. "The correlation between high rank and mobility, on the one hand, and, on the other, low rank and territorial permanence, is clear" (1966, II:365).

By combining the two quotations above, we can deduce a pattern of localized matrilines and high-ranking, in-marrying, dispersed patrilines which are the result of the movement of sons to new lower-ranking areas. This may, of course, be represented by the alliance of a local and an in-marrying matrilineage (table 10.2).

Thus, whether or not a patriline is recognized, and this is not, of course, necessary at the local level, the ranking of matrilineal local groups can be traced through the relations between F, S, and SS (A, B, and C in figure 10.3).

There is, finally, an indication of a partially defined dual power structure expressive of the same pattern. The chiefly Tabalu subclan is dispersed over a



Figure 10.3. The kinship order of the prestige-good system

large part of Kiriwina district. In-marrying high-ranking clans are ceded land by the local "original inhabitants": "In Vakuta, the Tabalu own most of the garden fields, but garden magic is still in the hands of the original sub-clan" (Malinowski 1966, II:368).

There is, thus, a tendency for power to be divided between high-ranking political and local leaders who control rituals of gardening (Uberoi 1962:40), a dualism of political versus religious functions common to prestige-good systems.

There is evidence of hierarchically organized prestige-good systems in both the Trobriands and the Admiralties in Northern Melanesia. Southern Melanesia, especially New Caledonia, is characterized by chiefdoms well into the modern period. It is known that the area was linked to the Tongan empire and the early sandalwood trade (Guiart 1963; Ralston 1978). Here, we again find evidence of diarchy, political chiefs versus earth priests ("maître de la terre" vs. "chef"). "Kavu—le maître de la terre. Celui qui détient les droits du premier occupant, sacrifie a l'ancêtre" (Leenhardt 1935:140).

> Ainsi la difference entre le maître et le chef apparaît en quelque sort une difference de forme. Le chef est là pour parler, pour agir à la vue de tous; mais il ne peut rien sans l'appui discret des vieux dignitaires qui lui donneront le signal d'aller de l'avant. Le chef... est là pour manifester l'honneur et le prestige du clan. Mais les anciens du pays ... gardent la realité d'une puissance qu'il est difficile de ne pas qualifier de politique, quoique les justifications en soient apparues de prime abord d'ordre religieux. (Guiart 1963:41)

As is usual with prestige-good systems (Ekholm 1972:151–65), this dualism is interpreted as a relation between an original population and invaders. Guiart speaks of "une complémentarité des fonctions, non pas entre le chef et le maître de la terre, qu'entre les chefferies anciennes qui ont su conserver pour elles l'autorité dû à leur présence première" (1963:37).

Southern Melanesia, contrasting as it does with the typical New Guinea big-man organization, provides an empirical basis for the argument that the simple dichotomy Melanesia/Polynesia is incorrect and that the same kinds of tendencies may crosscut the supposed cultural and/or evolutionary boundaries. This should be evident in the following discussion of West Polynesia.

Western Polynesia represents a classic example of the full-blown prestige-good system (Hjarnø 1979–1980). Even Goldman, who is not terribly concerned with such problems, notes the contrast with Eastern Polynesia on this point. Where exchange in Eastern Polynesia is characterized by competitive reciprocal feasting and taxation in kind, in Western Polynesia, valuables move in exchange against food. The Samoan chief, by giving *toga* (fine mats), can obtain "foodstuffs for feasting from the lower orders of rank" (Goldman 1970:507),

Table 10.3. Asymmetrical Alliance in Kinship Terms

Wife-taker	>	Wife-giver
Male line	>	Female line
B	<	Z
Bch	<	Zch

which he in turn uses to obtain more *toga* by feasting and exchanging with external allies. The pattern is essentially the same as that of the Trobriands.

Tongan oral history explains that at one time there was but a single high chief, the Tui Tonga, who was a sacred ruler. Then, in a period of political crisis, he delegated political power to his son while retaining religious power. While the Tongan system developed three or four titles, there is a pervasive political/religious dualism at all levels of the kingdom.[2] Interestingly enough, genealogical traditions place this development at the same period as Tongan expansion to surrounding islands and Samoa, that is, the formation of the Tongan "empire." This expansion has been described in terms of the extension of the leading chiefly lineages by the establishment of junior branches in the dominated areas. The patrilineage, *haa*, appears to have a local basis, "quoique non strictement localisé, puisque dispersé le plus souvent sur plusieurs iles" (Guiart 1963:669).

This image of a ranked patrilineage extending from a center of power in Tonga Tapu, the capital, is, again, typical of prestige-good systems.

Tongan society features an emphasis on matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. Wife-takers rank higher than wife-givers, and the male line ranks higher than the female line, all strikingly similar to the pattern of Samoa and Fiji. By listing the main features of this pattern we can discover the kinship structure that generates them (table 10.3).

This pattern is predictable from a bilineal structure of generalized exchange where women marry up and/or men marry down. There is evidence that men of the highest lineages went to rule parts of islands so that the pattern, at least among the aristocracy, might have been like that found for the Kongo kingdom (Ekholm 1977).

Besides generating the structure of Tongan kinship and political dualism, this model accounts for the Tongan myth which describes how chiefs come from outside and marry indigenous women. This analysis should also shed some light on the recent reinterpretation of Tonga as bilineal instead of patrilineal (Goldman 1970; Kaeppler 1971; Rogers 1977).

The paramounts of Tonga, Samoa, and Fiji were linked by marriage. Tonga was wife-giver to Fiji and wife-taker from Samoa. The former really amounts to husband-taking. The logic of external relations fits the internal structure. As

Table 10.4. The Order of Asymmetrical Dualism

Male	>	Female
Sea people	>	Land people
Outside	>	Inside
Chiefs	>	Commoners
Elder	>	Younger

sister ranks higher than brother, the paramount chief's sister is unmarriagable inside the society. In Samoa, such women remained sacred virgins unless external connections could be found. High-ranking Samoan women would be sent to Tonga. In Tonga, the taking of Fijian chiefly men created a new lineage, Fale Fisi, which while theoretically of higher rank than the Tui Tonga if reckoned in the matriline, was, as a foreign lineage, no threat (Kaeppler 1978).

The evidence for the prestige-good systemic nature of West Polynesia is rather clear. For example, Samoan fine mats are necessary elements in Tongan funerals and as gifts (Kaeppler 1978:250). Large numbers of Samoan mats, *kie hingoa*, are given at marriages. Imported Tongan red feathers are essential in Samoan marriages and other exchanges, and it has been argued that the control over Tongan trade contacts was essential in the short-lived political centralization of Samoa (Hjarnø 1979–1980).

Sahlins (1976), following Hocart (1952), has found in Eastern Fiji the kind of dualism that we discussed above. In his re-analysis of Moala social organization he finds the kinds of asymmetric dualism shown in table 10.4.

At the same time, Moalans practice bilateral second cross-cousin marriage, which would seem to contradict our model of generalized exchange. Sahlins shows, however, that this apparently restricted exchange contains a seed of asymmetry, since at any one time, MB < ego < FZ. He goes on to consider the Tongan structure and concludes falsely, I think, that Fijian dualism "contains the embryo of another cultural order" (1976:42), that is, the hierarchic system of Tonga. I would argue here that it is more likely that Fijian asymmetrical dualism is the product of the integration of this area into the Tongan realm, and the breakdown of that system led local Fijian societies to close in on themselves. As local exogamy became impossible, it was converted into local endogamy, but without abandoning the old social categories.

Without embarking on a new discussion, it can simply be suggested that Micronesia, especially western and central, shows clear resemblances to Western Polynesia, from large-scale regional exchange systems (the Yap "empire") to asymmetrical dualism in both kinship and politics.

Western Polynesia consists of a relatively limited number of variations on the prestige-good system. Many variants are the result of decline, such as Ontong



Figure 10.4. The transformation (devolution) of the hierarchical prestige-good order into local reciprocal dualism

Java, Tikopia, Futuna, Pukapuka, and Niue. The same kinds of transformations may have occurred here as that described for Eastern Fiji. We are not in a position to analyze all the variations here, but it can be noted that a great many of the features of the prestige-good system are preserved in transformation. The situation is completely different in the East.

In Eastern Polynesia, it is possible to argue that the prestige-good system of the West broke down very early. The earliest known settlement to date, the Marquesas, represents a minimum link to West Polynesia. It maintains the cross-cousin marriage to some extent. In the earliest archaeological period, we find pottery reminiscent of Western styles, something which is otherwise entirely absent from Eastern Polynesia. Handy (1923), in his reconstruction of the social structure of the island of Ua Pou which was politically more developed in the past, describes a situation reminiscent of Western Polynesian dualism in decline. There are male and female chiefs, and the land is divided into a chiefly and a commoner side. It also appears that the male and female chiefly lines were linked in some kind of asymmetrical dual marriage structure.

This kind of dualism is very rare in the East. There are traces of it in Mangaia and Easter Island.

While Western Polynesia is characterized by exogamy and external exchange, Eastern Polynesia is characterized by endogamy and warfare. Dualism tends to disappear, especially in the more developed societies such as the Society and Hawaiian islands. The bilineal character of kinship and ranking disappears as well, and seniority becomes the dominant principle. While the sacredness of chiefs is well established in the stratified societies of Western Polynesia, this aspect is taken to extremes in Tahiti and especially Hawaii. Chiefs combine religious and political status as opposed to the Western political versus religious polarity. There is apparently an enormous intensification of agricultural production wherever possible, and it might be argued that the loss of external monopoly leads to increasing competition within the aristocracy, which in turn puts pressure on local production, which unlike West Polynesia becomes a crucial factor in the accumulation of power and status.

The argument for the transformation of Western into Eastern Polynesian structures runs as follows. The disappearance of the prestige-good system may be generally related to the quantum increase in distance between island groups. The loss of monopolistic control of exchange must have led to increased competition, the increase in competitive feasting, and warfare. This in itself would have led to a rapid intensification of agricultural production (irrigation). In such a situation it is also likely that the alliance system would break down since it was held together by the flow of valuables. In the absence of monopolies, marriage strategies will tend toward endogamy combined with selective alliances with distant lines of at least equal rank (Valeri 1972). Genealogically based hierarchies could easily be overturned by warfare and conquest. Unification would imply a redistribution of titles and land by and for the new central lineage, but political centralization was normally short lived. This is, again, in sharp contrast to Tonga, where the exchange hierarchy tended to stabilize political relations. The emergence of cognatic kinship in Eastern Polynesia is largely the product of the randomization of the former bilineal structure. While there are still, in Hawaii, examples where priestly lineages are the wife-takers of chiefs, as in Western Polynesia, this is in no way a systematic phenomenon. Where there is no clear alliance structure, a bilineal kinship pattern is soon converted into a cognatic pattern. The same changes in the conditions of social reproduction lead to an amplification of chiefly sacredness, a multiplication of tabus, and severe punishments for wrongdoers. When the prestige-good system breaks down, the entire power structure becomes increasingly dependent upon the theocratic aspect of the system, that is, the material force of supernatural dictates.

It seems that where agricultural intensification fails in Eastern Polynesia, there ensues a long devolutionary trend caused by the social effects, usually catastrophic, of declining productivity. This is most clearly evident in the Marquesas and Easter Island, where hierarchy had declined significantly, where famine was common, and where warfare was endemic and without political issue. There is some evidence that even Hawaii may have reached a peak of intensification some time before the arrival of the Europeans and that it was suffering from declining productivity (P. Kirch personal communication). Societies that Goldman characterizes as "open" in Eastern Polynesia, Mangaia, Easter Island, and the Marquesas, were all plagued by intense warfare and unstable political hierarchy. While Goldman suggests that these properties of open societies indicate that they are generally developing toward stratification, it is, perhaps, more likely that these societies represent a devolution from former hierarchy. They are all characterized by relatively high population density and relatively poor ecological conditions, often themselves the result of overintensification.

It can, thus, be argued that the general condition of Eastern Polynesia is that of political fragmentation, competitive, in-kind exchange systems, and warfare with a cycle of conquest, political centralization, and new fragmentation. (This pattern can also be found in Northern Melanesia, although on a less-developed political level.) It is clear that none of the wide areal integration of Western Polynesia occurs here, while on the inside of any chiefdom there may be a harsher form of social control than occurs in the West. No stable centralized polities emerge in East Polynesia comparable to Tongan dominance. In fact, it is not until the advent of the European arms trade and direct intervention that real state structures emerge in Hawaii and Tahiti.

It is interesting, in this respect, to note the differences in the early articulation of expanding Europe and different parts of Polynesia. In West Polynesia, Europeans encounter a Tongan society without arms or fortified settlements as in East Polynesia. Here, the relatively peaceful Tongan hegemony immediately disintegrates into civil war as the result of European trade. This is the kind of disintegration that Ekholm has shown to be systematic in the contact between hierarchical prestige-good systems and decentralized commercial trade (Ekholm 1977). In East Polynesia, on the other hand, the differential trade in arms and the establishment of alliances with particular chiefs leads to Western-backed state formation.

CONCLUSION

We have attempted here to briefly sketch a number of transformational processes that might account for the different kinds of social forms one finds in Oceania. The diagram in figure 10.5 represents the hypothetical model of transformational processes that we discussed. The evolution of


Big-Man Systems
increasing trade density
increasing access to external exchange
breakdown of monopoly-hierarchy
development of prestige competition (smaller groups + feast)
Prestige-good systems
long-distance trade
political hierarchy
asymmetric dualism
generalized exchange
West Polynesia
West & Central Micronesia
New Caledonia
collapse of trade
loss of access to imported valuables
no clear monopoly basis for Power
competition

Figure 10.5.

stratification in this analysis is secondary to the kinds of systems in which it occurs.

Unlike models of the evolution of stratification, the present model does not abstract any major trend of hierarchization. Instead, it focuses on characteristics of social reproduction in the different areas and suggests the processes of transformation that might have led from earlier to later forms of total reproduction. As such, Eastern Polynesian hierarchization is a fundamentally different kind of phenomenon than Western Polynesian hierarchization. The lack of hierarchies in most of Melanesia is neither a cultural nor a technological problem, but the result of the combined economic evolution and political devolution of an originally West Polynesian type of system.

W. Rathje, in a very interesting article (1978), has suggested that Melanesia may have had an older, more Polynesian type of "social production." He contrasts two models of exchange, "one which limits access to strategic goods and one which circulates them" (1978:171). This distinction refers to the


Examples
intensification and differentiation of production (specialists)
– external trade (cutoff)
parallel flows of valuables and food
feasting ↔ prestige
Enga
Chimbu
Goodenough Island
+ external trade
prestige-goods flow in opposite direction to food
feasting ↔ prestige (via valuables)
Siassi
Dobu
[feasting → intensification of production]
[rank exogamy → rank endogamy] (cognatic kinship)
[warfare intensified]
[chief's religious status (sanctity) accentuated]
increasing productivity
quasi-state formation (unstable)
Tahiti
Hawaii
decreasing productivity
declining hierarchy (dualist tendency)
Marquesas
Easter
Mangaia
Theocratic "feudalism"

difference between societies of the broadly Polynesian type in which goods are accumulated and withdrawn from circulation for ceremonial purposes, often buried with great chiefs, and one in which all goods circulate in a more strictly "economic" fashion. The earlier system would correspond to a politically hierarchical society in which ceremonial wealth might be invested in large-scale constructions such as megaliths. In the later system, hierarchy would disappear and exchange would increase in volume while production specialized and became more intensive and differentiated (Rathje 1975). Rathje suggests a tendency similar to that we have noted for Melanesia: "Early broad scale systems will tend to decompose toward smaller more regionally adapted systems" (1978:167).

Our explanation for a long-term increase in trade density in Melanesia is corroborated by Rathje's discussion. It is possible to interpret the older "megalithic" cultures of Melanesia as representatives of a West Polynesian-type system of long-distance trade and political hierarchy which dissolved via increasing trade into big-man systems in which megalithic construction is no longer a politically feasible investment. This could be due to a general process of trade intensification aided by the short distances between island groups or even, perhaps, to the (as yet undocumented) integration of the area into a larger Asian trade system.

In East Polynesia there is a total disappearance of interregional trade, perhaps as a result of increasing inter-island group distances. This opposite tendency leads to a loss of the monopoly basis of political power, leading to an intensification of feasting, agricultural production, warfare, and chiefly sanctity, and to the development of systematic endogamy at high levels of rank. Where hierarchization occurs, it is this time the result of conquest. The extensive ranking of West Polynesia is transformed into a caste-like organization. Where intensification of production is successful, cyclical theocratic chiefdoms emerge. Where overintensification occurs, there results a political decline and a further intensification of warfare in highly unstable conditions.

In West Polynesia, the old prestige-good system is preserved until quite late. The spatial configuration of island groups and the distances between them may have been a stabilizing influence. There are, however, clear shifts in the centers of power in West Polynesia, especially in Samoa, where it can be argued that the Tongan empire was already in decline before the arrival of the Europeans. It is interesting to note here that there is a real conflict between political and religious lineages in prestige-good systems, and in periods of crisis there may be a tendency for one lineage to absorb the other, combining in this way political and religious attributes, an Eastern tendency.

Oceania cannot be conceived as a single evolutionary continuum. It is not the case that Tongan dualism is merely a specific cultural feature of West Polynesia as opposed to East Polynesia, a largely irrelevant variation on a general evolutionary theme. On the contrary, it can be suggested that there are three very different kinds of systems of social reproduction in Oceania: prestige-good systems, big-man systems, and theocratic "feudalism." While the systems themselves are transformationally related to one another, the functioning of the systems is quite different in each case. The forms of social control, accumulation, and hierarchization are not of the same type, and they correspond to very different social structures. There is, thus, a transformational continuum in Oceania, but it is one that is based on the properties of social reproduction and not on the degree of political stratification.

NOTES

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This article is dedicated to the memory of Professor Johannes Nicolaisen, who in the brief period in which I knew him impressed upon me his qualities of deep humanism and honesty that are all too rare in this world. His interest in the relation between history and social structure is, I hope, reflected in this essay.

1. The present work is quite preliminary, based on a research project begun last year that has a long way to go.

2. The fourth title, Tamaha, does not really consist of a line. The ZD of the Tui Tonga is highest in rank in the kingdom and unable to marry in theory, the children having the status of bastards. The actual marriage of the Tamaha to a Fijian lineage creates a real fourth line, but one whose status is clearly ambiguous in Tonga as a foreign lineage.

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11

Morphogenesis and Global Process in Polynesia

Jonathan Friedman

In the 1980s, Marshall Sahlins produced a pathbreaking corpus of historical structuralist analysis on Hawaii and the Pacific (1981b, 1983, 1985). The current analysis is in large part an attempt to supplement that corpus in a small way. This work is a substantial development with respect to the earlier *Culture and Practical Reason* (1976) that was criticized for what was perceived as the reduction of culture to code and its promotion to a position of the autonomous determinant of social reality. Here practice is reinserted into a historical scheme that still largely maintains the earlier model, producing a dialectic between the practice of structure and the structure of practice, whereby, in the abstract, at least, cultural categories are transformed by their very implementation, that is, where their practice contains properties external to and differing from the categories themselves and leading to their necessary reconfiguration. This model is applied exclusively to the confrontation between Europeans and Hawaiians in a particular historical conjuncture, so it is not altogether clear how the model might work endogenously to a particular culture. Sahlins sets out to demonstrate the existence of a "heroic" history whose dynamic consists in the translation of historical events into the recapitulation of cosmology, and even, as in both Hawaiian and Maori cases, an actual mythopraxis, or acting out of a cosmic scenario in a new historical context, hence the title, *Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities*, highlighting the cultural assimilation of historical happenings to a particular cultural scheme of both interpretation and action. Thus for heroic history it might be said that ontogeny recapitulates cosmogony. This is partly a variant of Lévi-Strauss's notion of cold societies that reproduce themselves by absorbing and thus negating history, reducing the latter to a recapitulation of myth. But for Sahlins there is more to this. Structural change occurs because the imposition of structure on practice is incomplete; there is a significant aspect of reality that remains beyond the bounds of structure. The latter corresponds in fact to that which is part of European structure, the source of other projects and strategies that cannot in themselves be neutralized within the local sphere. This perspective might best be broadened to include the "others" in their totality, in which case we have a confrontation of two systems of different orders, which is necessarily reduced here to a relation between Hawaiian cultural structure and a series of events that are treated as externalities rather than highly structured projects in their own right. Thus, the fact that Captain Cook is identified as the god Lono (if the notion of "god" makes any sense here) need not bear any relation to the subsequent military alliance between chief Kamehameha and the British navy that resulted in the unification of the islands, nor to the trade that ultimately led to the bankruptcy of the aristocracy. That part of Hawaiian history which is also European history is reduced to external event in this discussion, even though a wider perspective reveals that the structure of global process is determinant in the long run and even in the short run. Global process, as we have stressed in the introduction, is not a disembodied macro-phenomenon with its own principles of operation. It is, on the contrary, the emergent systemic process constituted in the articulation of intentionalities represented by Hawaiian elites and European expeditions but within the context of global distributions of economic and social conditions that propel the expeditions and their continuation, that make the Pacific and its inhabitants part of a series of competing imperial projects. The actors all have their day, but they do not create their own conditions of existence. Without imperial competition, which led from Spanish to Dutch to British and then American hegemony in the region, without the possibility of exchanging Pacific sandalwood and Assamese opium for Chinese silks and tea, the confrontation might have been of a different nature and taken a very different temporal path.

Sahlins presents his material as a confrontation between Hawaiian mythopraxis and European secular practices. The structure of authority/power in Hawaii is represented as a specific kind of dualism. The king or paramount chief is a "descendant" of Ku, the god of war and human sacrifice, who is opposed to Lono, the god of peace and fertility. Lono is also a kind of ancestor of the king, but in a rather special way. In the origin myth of Hawaiian kingship, the younger brother (yoB) of Lonopele (yoB represents the Ku line) leaves Kahiki, the distant land (heaven) where sky meets earth (water) (Kahiki = Tahiti) because of a quarrel involving the death of Lonopele and his brother's sons. He arrives at Hawaii, where the original chiefs are killed and the new Hawaiian regime is installed. The original chiefs were associated with peace, fertility, orderly rules of succession by inherent right, tabu status, and the lack of human sacrifice (the Lono pole). The new chiefs (usurpers) are, of course, exactly the opposite of this. The chiefs, then, represent Ku as opposed to Lono who has, in fact, no living line of chiefs to represent him. Thus, the opposition, which cannot be expressed as a social division (spatial) is instead expressed through the annual ritual cycle. Ku reigns for eight months of the year—this is the normal part of the year when warfare and human sacrifice are allowed. But four months are reserved for the Makahiki (harvest) festival, when Lono returns to Hawaii from Kahiki to claim his dominant position as the god of fertility and of the "people." During this period the king is ritually defeated and goes into seclusion. The temples of Ku, of human sacrifice, are closed, and the chiefly tabus are lifted. There is great celebration and feasting. An image of Lono tours the island, is celebrated and fed, *and* collects taxes. At the end of the period, Lono is himself ritually defeated, sacrificed, and returned to Kahiki. He is, via his sacrifice, incorporated into the *mana* of the king (chief) who thus comes to represent both, Ku and Lono within his single being. The significance of the articulation between the Hawaiian system and the European lies in the arbitrary arrival of Captain Cook during the Makahiki. The illustrious captain had, in fact, also visited the islands at an earlier date (anchoring at the island of Kauai), was received as a great chief, and struck up a handsome trade. But his second visit at Kaleakekua Bay on the island of Hawaii in the season when Lono was to come, the fact that his sails could be interpreted as a Lono image, the direction of his voyage around the island (the same as the path followed by the Lono image), his obviously high status and power, entailed, in Sahlins's argument, his acceptance as the god Lono returned. The rest of the story follows logically therefrom: Cook is taken physically to represent Lono, is involved in the appropriate rituals, and everything goes according to schedule until when leaving—on time and at the entreating of his guests—his mast breaks and he is forced to return. The challenge to the king by Lono himself can only lead to death, that is, the actualization of the ritual in reality (much like Pirandello's Henry IV, except that here reality and play are reversed).

The identification of Cook with Lono and his ultimate sacrifice and incorporation into the chiefly lineage (his bones are stripped and some of them kept as relics) is the essential argument for the articulation of Hawaiian history to Europe. The mythopraxis of the Hawaiians translated Cook's fate into a repetition of the cosmogony. But Kahiki became more closely identified with England, and British sailors became gods. The ensuing history combines a European-assisted formation of the Hawaiian state as well as a simultaneous discrediting of the tabu (*kapu*) system on which chiefly power is based. The settling of Europeans in Hawaii as new aristocrats, the flagrant breaches of the tabu system without corresponding punishment by gods or men, the conversion whereby women offering themselves as tribute to the gods, of Kahiki, (i.e., British sailors) becomes vulgar commerce, the rapid accumulation of trinkets and iron, formerly monopolized wealth, by commoners, the consequent multiplication of tabus by the chiefs in order to maintain some degree of control, the enormous increase in chiefly wealth and the Europeanization of aristocratic fashion, appearance, and lifestyles—all this led to the secularization of the sacred basis of power and to the ultimate collapse of the old order.

This process is what we have referred to as an integrative transformation, that is, it is generated by the economic and political incorporation of Hawaii into the Western world system. Moreover, these are not endogenous structural transformations of the structuralist sort, that is, not logical derivatives of the earlier structure. Rather, the new order is a product of the substitution of new relations originating in the global system for certain pivotal traditional relations. This kind of structural change is of a different order than endogenous transformation, even when the latter is exogenously caused. There is, however, one area where in the first decades of contact, a short-lived structural change of the latter type does occur. Valeri in an important article (1982) attempted to show how the European-sponsored unification of the Hawaiian islands results in a transformation of the symbolic structure of power. The original structure, as we have said, is based on the following opposition:

Ku : Lono :: war + human sacrifice : peace + fertility

The unification of the islands and the European support of the new centralized kingdom undermine the function of Ku at the same time as aristocratic power becomes increasingly dependent on the foreign trade of individual chiefs. This is expressed in the transformation of ritual practice. Now there are, to be more concrete, four types of gods and four corresponding types of temples that can be distributed in the following way between the Ku and Lono poles (figure 11.1).



Figure 11.1. The continuum of war to peace and destruction to fertility in the trajectory of the Hawaiian chief



Figure 11.2. From opposition to encompassment in the constitution of Hawaiian chiefship

The traditional dualism opposed the war and sorcery gods to the same version of Ku and Lono. With unification, the warrior king appears to have become a fisherman king and a farmer king (Valeri 1982:29).

In this new situation, the ritual series of oppositions shifts to the right. The king becomes increasingly associated with the sorcery gods—who express individual projects of self-gain—the war gods drop out, and the other side of the opposition focuses increasingly on Lono. The latter, instead of being a god who visits once a year to oppose the King, becomes increasingly a permanent and encompassing aspect of the new kingship. However interesting this transformation, the collapse of the tabu system and the advent of Christianity puts an end to it all.

The apparent problem in Sahlins's historical structural analysis is that he provides an image of an evolving unity, when, in fact, there are a number of quite disparate if connected processes involved. The fact that Captain Cook is identified with Lono and incorporated into the identity of the chiefly lineage does not have any necessary significance for the subsequent history of Hawaii. Our argument can be stated as follows.

Captain Cook was not merely treated as a "god" but as a chief of very high status. Divinity is quite simply an attribute of high status, and Cook must have appeared as a very high chief indeed with his great ships, powerful weapons, and enormous wealth. The Western concept of god, which seems implied in Sahlins's discussion, is inapplicable to a context in which human beings can be gods incarnate in a universe where there is a genealogical and functional continuity between gods and chiefs. This might all reduce to the word "god" itself, since the logic of Sahlins's argument appears similar to that stated here.

From this it follows that Hawaiians treated Cook as they might have treated any foreign visitor of high status who happened to drop in during Makahiki season (Valeri 1982:23). This is not contradicted by Sahlins, but the stress in *Historical Metaphors* is on the assumed belief in Cook as a god. Such an assumption is totally unnecessary even for Sahlins's own argument.

On the contrary, the "apotheosis" of Cook is more likely a European interpretation of the Hawaiians' treatment of the illustrious captain. This is a fundamental feature of the integration of Hawaii into European civilization. If Europeans had not returned to Hawaii, if no new boats had come, then it is most likely that Cook would have lost his significance in the following generations of Makahikis. *It is the Europeanization of Hawaii that makes the symbolism of Cook a permanent part of the new kingdom.* And the symbolism is a European and not an indigenous product. The colonization of the islands by missionaries who trained local Hawaiians in the European version of recent Hawaiian history must be crucial here. In other words, it might be argued that the apotheosis of Captain Cook as an image was transferred to Hawaiian history from Europe in a colonial situation that made it into a principal aspect of Hawaiians' own identity. But such an argument is not available to an approach that conceives of the historical process in terms of structure versus praxis and structure versus event, that is, where there is only one subject to speak, the rest being relegated to the category "external event." The argument for a global perspective is that the symbolism of Captain Cook and his death are European constructs that were implanted in the emergent Hawaiian identity.

A more important problem is the fact that the foreign engagement in Hawaii was determined by foreigners rather than by Hawaiians. The continuous flow of Europeans and Americans to Hawaii from the last decades of the eighteenth century, the trade in weapons, and the direct military involvement in chief Kamehameha's drive to become paramount of all the islands would all undoubtedly have occurred irrespective of the fate of Cook. The settlement of Europeans on the islands, the breakdown of the tabu system, the secularization of the power structure, and so on—all would have occurred even if Cook had not become a god. These processes, which are perfectly systemic, are quite autonomous with respect to Hawaiians' own "heroic history," just as is the fact that virtually the entire aristocracy of the islands gathered around Kamehameha's court in Honolulu and became totally dependent on a disastrous sandalwood trade that led to the final dissolution of the "ancient" Hawaiian polity.

This argument is borne out by the strikingly similar development in Tahiti. Here, too, unification is led by a European-backed chief, Pomare I. That Cook's bones play a role as royal relics in Hawaii is not functionally different from the fact that Pomare I's personal insignia was a Union Jack (perhaps received from Cook in 1774) decorated with red feathers and pearls (Wilson 1799: 327). The secularization of power, the politically motivated conversion to Christianity by Pomare II (in Hawaii it is Liholiho, that is, Kamehameha II), and the ensuing military victory over the old religion is also parallel to the Hawaiian sequence.

It might be suggested that the transformations of both Hawaii and Tahiti depend upon processes that are largely external to indigenous cultural categories, which is not to say that they are not internally orchestrated in terms of those categories. When social arenas including European actors and regimes instigated by colonial powers manifest themselves, then the social space within which endogenous logics prevail becomes part of a larger arena. The emergent social arena itself, for example, the formation of a port town like Honolulu, with its casinos and brothels, cannot be deduced from indigenous logics even if the latter continue to penetrate aspects of their functioning.[1]

POLYNESIAN TRANSFORMATIONS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Sahlins's and Valeri's arguments concerning the history of European contact in Hawaii are based on a structuralist analysis of the symbolism of power. They have also assumed—Sahlins quite explicitly—that the dualism of land/sea, peace/war, ritual/politics, inside/outside is a common Polynesian, if not more widely distributed, cultural structure. For Sahlins, the dualistic theme of the "stranger-king" is postulated to be a universal symbolism of power (Sahlins 1981a). Invoking Frazer and Dumézil's Indo-Europeans, he argues on the basis of Fijian and Hawaiian materials for a common philosophy of the "state"—à la Clastres—as antisocial, a foreign-imposed body. I have suggested elsewhere (1981, 1982 and in the previous chapter), following Ekholm (1977), that the dualist symbolism of power is itself an aspect of what we have referred to as a prestige-good system (Ekholm 1977:117–29; Ekholm 1984; Friedman 1982:184–89) and that other kinds of system—for example, of the Kachin type—symbolize power monistically (Friedman 1975, 1979). As regards Polynesia, it would appear that there is a significant transformation of the symbolical structure of power as we move from Western to Eastern Polynesia, and that this transformation is congruent with the specific nature of European contact in Hawaii and Tahiti as opposed to, for example, Tonga. As I have noted (1982), initial European involvement led to the rapid dismemberment of the Tongan "empire" and fifty years of incessant warfare, whereas in both Tahiti and Hawaii it led to political unification and state formation.

In the previous chapter, I suggested the way in which Eastern Polynesian chiefdoms can be understood as structural transformations of Western Polynesian chiefdoms. Rather than reiterate that presentation, I shall here attempt to develop the same model with respect to the symbolic structure of power. Most significant in this respect is the kinship structure of diarchy in Western Polynesia, one that is widespread in Indonesia, Africa, and South America as well. Here a line of chiefs representing the land, the people, and fertility, the "religious"chiefs, are wife-givers to a line of "stranger-kings," warrior and/or political chiefs, said to come from across the sea, from distant lands, from heaven. Thus the political chiefs are symbolically inferior with regard to ritual status, yet superior in rank. They are both wife-takers and sister's sons to the religious chiefs of the land. The dualism resulting from this relation is expressed in the following oppositions:

Religious chief/political chief
El/yo
Land/sea
Wife-giver/wife-taker
Female/male
Internal/external
Fertility/destruction
Peace/war

In the Eastern Fijian version of the ritual of chiefly succession, the future warrior chief is said to arrive from the sea on a shark. Upon arrival at the coast he is led inland to the center of society along a path of bark cloth (of Tongan origin), a principal inter-island prestige good, where he is given kava by the land chief in a symbolic act of poisoning. The sea chief, defeated and sacrificed (that is, "dead from kava" in Sahlins 1981a:126) returns to life as a chief encompassed (Sahlins 1981a:127) by the land. This is a fundamental expression of the unstable yet balanced relationship between political rank and ritual authority, a dualism uniting two complementary ruling lines. In terms of power relations, the dualism is asymmetrical insofar as sea chiefs rank higher than land chiefs. This is more evident outside the "capital" where high-ranking incoming males are wife-takers to local females.

The Hawaiian Makahiki is the inverted form of this Western Polynesian/Eastern Fijian symbolism. In Hawaii, the war-sea chiefs are also the land chiefs. That is, there is no dualist structure at the level of real kinship and politics. Instead, Lono, god (chief) of the land, comes once a year to claim his ultimate sovereignty. He wins a temporary victory, but is, in the end, defeated and sacrificed, thus incorporated into the *mana* and even the ancestry of the ruling war chief. It is, in fact, this act of incorporation that makes the Hawaiian chief a chief of both land and sea, peace and war, fertility and human sacrifice. This transformation of the Western Polynesian model accounts for the principal ambivalences of the Makahiki: the god of the land (Lono) comes from the sea, the sea chief is the de facto chief of the land. At the close of the festival, the sea chief "of the land" defeats the land chief "of the sea." Peace and fertility are encompassed by war and human destruction; Lono is appropriated by Ku.

Valeri (1982) shows how what he considers to be the diarchic character of Hawaiian power is incorporated within a single paramount's being. This is achieved by a continual movement from rituals of Ku to rituals of Lono, a movement characterizing the transition from war to peace (i.e., successful conquest), the ideal career of a paramount, and even to the relations between or within generations, where a chief's son may be made to take on the rituals of the temple of Lono while the father is still connected to the temples of Ku.

There is indeed a dualism here, but it is significantly transfigured in relation to the Western Polynesian version. We have argued (Friedman 1982) that the breakdown of the Western Polynesian prestige-good system leads to rank endogamy, a more permanent state of warfare, and an intensification of agricultural production as the only source for maintaining a structure of power that was previously a function of monopoly over exchange. It appears to me that the "two-into-one" ritual characteristic of Hawaii is a result of the breakdown of a real dual division of power. Hawaiian chiefly ritual is a continual battle against dualism, a negation of dualism and at the same time a recognition of the latter, a striving to reduce two opposed principles to one. The transformation from West to East Polynesia can be depicted as shown in figure 11.3.

The product of the historical transformation of Western into Eastern Polynesian structures is two very different if related symbolic organizations of power. Captain Cook could never have appeared as a representative of the god of fertility in Tonga because in the Tongan equivalent of the *Makahiki*, the *'Inasi*, the Tui Tonga, ritual paramount and sacred chief of Tonga, would be present to receive the harvest gifts. That is, there is a real line of descent from the god of fertility who rules on this earth all year round.[2]

The transformations of Polynesian society are structural in the structuralist sense. They are also global, but not in the sense of modern and historical commercial global systems. We have used the term *regional system* to refer to processes that are intersocietal and organized in this particular case on the basis of noncommercial forms of exchange dependent on a specific kinship-political order. This does not detract, of course, from their global nature, but it does imply that a different kind of global model is needed. And in order to understand the different ways in which specific geographical regions have been integrated and transformed in the process of Western expansion, it is necessary to understand the global transformational processes that precede and become articulated within the modern world system.


Western Polynesia
Eastern Polynesia
Political Structure
Dual Chiefship
Land/Sea
Religious/Political
Single chiefs
Chief/god
Religious/Political
Cosmology
Fertility/Warfare
Land/Sea
Land chief/Sea Chief
Fertility/Warfare
Land/Sea
Land-god from overseas
Sea-chief on the land= "shark on the land"
Lono
Ku
Ritual
Priestly function
Political function
Priestly function
Fertility
Lono
4months
Lono
Ku
8 months
Annual cycle
Ku
Chiefly power
Political function
Spatial dualism
Temporal dualism
Symbolism of diarchy
Foreigner chief= political chief
= younger brother
= + human presence
Foreigner god = religious chief
= elder brother
= - human presence
Dualism replicated and reinforced
Dualism negated

Foreign chief ritually killed and resuscitated on earth

Foreign god killed and sacrificed. Not brought back to life but sent away, back to *Kahiki* (land beyond the horizon)

Foreigner remains among the living as the political chief, allied (by marriage) to the religious chief.

Foreigner returns to the other land overseas and is incorporated into the ancestry of the chief who thereby contains the two sides of diarchy within his own identity

Figure 11.3. From Western to Eastern Polynesian cosmological and political structures

NOTES

1. The original article from which this is taken was published in 1985, long before the well-known debate between Sahlins and Obeyesekere on the nature of Cook's position in Hawaiian history (Obeyesekere 1992, Sahlins 1995). Note that Obeyesekere argues for a position similar to mine, that is, that the actual apotheosis of Cook was a Western phenomenon, an interpretation that became cemented into official Hawaiian history in the nineteenth century. But his reasoning is quite different insofar as he assumes that Hawaiians themselves could not have appreciated the godly qualities that Sahlins assumed to be attributed to Cook by Hawaiians. Sahlins has demonstrated clearly that this argument is absurd, based as it is on an assumption that Hawaiians could not have entertained such absurd ideas, being rational human beings. In his argument that it was Cook who was irrational in his treatment of the "natives," he strangely reverses the old rational/irrational = western/native, turning Cook into a savage and Hawaiians into European rationalists. The question is quite misplaced in my view, since the question of how a reality is constituted is not in itself an issue of rationality but of the axiomatic basis of rationality. While Sahlins's treatment of the cultural logics involved in the historical process is compatible with our argument here, the larger global conditions within which it is situated are not properly taken into account. The result is that crucial historical transformations in the conditions of functioning of the Hawaiian political system are largely ignored in his early writings, which in turn leads to the formulation of a curiously cultural determinist rendition of the actual processes involved. The very notion of mythopraxis sums up precisely this kind of approach, but in his subsequent work on Hawaii (Kirch and Sahlins 1992) the approach is increasingly modified in a direction that I find compatible with what I have suggested here. In any case my own analysis, as can be seen here, is very much based on his analysis.

2. As indicated above, this piece was originally written in 1985, so there is no reference to subsequent discussions. It should be noted, however, that Valeri, in a later article on diarchy in Tonga and Hawaii (1990), corroborates many of the suggestions made here without, of course, placing his comparison in a regional systemic context. Valeri demonstrates in his analysis the way in which diarchy is preserved in Tongan mythology such as the origin myth of the Tui Tonga in which the first king-to-be goes to heaven in search of his father, only to be eaten by his jealous brothers. He is brought back to life and integrity at the behest of his father, who makes him paramount. The young man is thus sacrificed and then resuscitated and transformed into a ruler while his father and elder brothers are maintained in their sacred positions as well. In Hawaii the equivalent myth of Umi ends with the sacrifice of the elder brother, his younger sibling, that is, his conversion into an ancestral element of the latter's power.

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